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Foreword and Acknowledgments 
The rapid expansion of international trade during the past 
fifteen years has confronted the American business counselor with 
a great variety of new problems. Solutions to these problems were 
not expounded to him in his pre-war legal education, nor are they 
to be found in the rich proliferation of advance sheets, digests, and 
loose-leaf services with which the modern American lawyer is 
blessed. When he turns to foreign counsel, he finds that a lack of 
common legal background makes meaningful professional com-
munication difficult. 
This book has been prepared with the primary purpose of help-
ing those American lawyers who, because of their clients' expand-
ing activities, confront for the first time the problems of trading 
with and trading in the European Common Market. It is designed 
to give them an over-all picture of the new legal framework of the 
Market itself and of the laws of business organization, labor rela-
tions, industrial property, competition, and taxation which prevail 
there. With this background American lawyers should be better 
able to select and use the services of the European experts on 
whom they must, of course, depend for definitive counsel. 
Better books on the European Common Market will no doubt 
appear very soon in this country, including particularly analytical 
monographs, and we hope they will be better in part because of 
the exploratory work done in this one. Eventually, a commercial 
publisher, emboldened by this and future studies developing and cor-
recting many of the things said in these pages, may furnish the 
American lawyer with a current service on European trade. 
We hope, too, that this book-conceived within the framework 
of the international and comparative legal studies at the University 
of Michigan Law School-may have interesting progeny in the 
academic world. We would like to think that it may encourage more 
teachers of comparative law to venture from the traditional paths 
of civil law into the more rapidly evolving areas of commercial 
law; that it may help students of American commercial law to com-
pare American institutions with their European correlatives; and 
v 
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that it will direct the attention of constitutional and international 
lawyers to a new kind of emergent federalism and "supranational" 
organization which "breaches the integrity of national legal sys-
tems." 
The purposes of the book explain its content. Since the Ameri-
can lawyer's job will be to conceive and plan, rather than to ex-
ecute details, we have sought to explain the legal and administrative 
structure of the European Community and the broad outline of 
the national legal systems, rather than to tell in detail "how 
to .... " Since our principal audience is composed of American 
business counsellors, we have omitted many aspects of the Com-
munity of the greatest interest to Europeans-such as agricultural 
and transportation policy-in favor of topics like business or-
ganization. The hard choice of priorities has also forced us to omit 
or deal only incidentally with many topics of great interest both 
to Americans and Europeans-the role of state-owned enterprises, 
government purchasing regulations, and price controls, for example. 
Even after these and other topics had been eliminated, the 
breadth of the subject matter obviously called for a cooperative 
effort by scholars and practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic. 
It is inherent in a cooperative undertaking of this type that the 
completion of the contributions cannot be exactly synchronized in 
point of time. While most of the chapters were completed in the 
fall of 1959, some carry the story into the early months of 1960. 
I wish to record here our profound gratitude for the assistance 
and advice we have received from a multitude of sources. 
The concept of the book emerged from discussions with my 
friend and colleague Alfred F. Conard, whose ideas had a de-
termining influence on the selection of the topics and organization 
of the book. 
Financial support came from the Ford Foundation and from 
the Cook Research Funds of the University of Michigan Law 
School. Dean E. Blythe Stason, Professor Allan F. Smith, Director 
of Graduate Studies, and Professor William J. Pierce, Editor of 
Michigan Legal Publications, deserve our particular thanks for 
their consistent support and wise advice. 
The late Tullio Ascarelli, Professor of Comparative Law at the 
University of Rome, a brilliant scholar and successful practitioner, 
helped us greatly in developing the plan for the book. His sudden 
death just prior to his planned teaching assignment in Ann Arbor 
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cast a tragic shadow upon our effort. The suggestions of Professor 
Jean Limpens, Director of the Centre lnteruniversitaire de Droit 
Compare in Brussels, were also most useful in the planning stages. 
Our expression of profound appreciation goes to Professor Paul 
Reuter of the Paris Law Faculty who did not spare time and effort 
in instructing us in the intricacies of the Community and offering 
extensive comments on parts of the manuscript. 
It is more than the usual cliche to say that this book could not 
have been written without the help and encouragement of Mr. 
Michel Gaudet, Director of the Legal Services of the European 
Communities. Mr. Gaudet made detailed suggestions on parts of 
the manuscript, answered innumerable queries, and even visited 
with us in Ann Arbor. We also obtained valuable counsel from 
Mr. Theodor Vogelaar, Director of the Legal Services of the 
Euratom Commission, and-in the planning stages-from Dr. 
Robert Krawielicki, Director of the Legal Services of the High 
Authority of the Coal and Steel Community. Our thanks go also 
to Professor Bruyas, Dr. Minunni, and Baron de Vos van Steenwijk, 
who commented on parts of the manuscript, and to the numerous 
other officials of the European Communities who assisted us. Two 
distinguished members of the Commission of the European Eco-
nomic Community, Dr. Hans von der Groeben and Mr. Jean Rey, 
visited the Law School, and our undertaking was discussed with 
them at some length during their visits. 
Professor Kahn-Freund desires to express his thanks to the 
Division for Labor Problems of the European Coal and Steel 
Community; to Mr. Van Werwecke and Mr. Ewen of the Ministry 
of Labor in Luxembourg; and to Professor Gino Giugni of Rome 
for his assistance with regard to Italian Law. 
Mr. Ladas received valuable comments on his manuscript from 
Dr. G. H. C. Bodenhausen of the Hague, Professor at the Univer-
sity of Utrecht; Mr. Jean Favart of Brussels, Advocate before the 
Court of Appeals of Brussels; Mr. Jean Lavoixof Paris, Member 
of the Executive Committee of the French Association for the 
Protection of Industrial Property; Dr. Attilio Luzzatto of Milan, 
Advocate and Editor of the "Rivista della Proprieta lntellettuale e 
lndustriale"; Dr. Eugen Ulmer, Rector of the Ludwig-Maximilian 
University of Munich and Director of the Institute for Foreign 
Industrial Property Law at Munich. 
Professor Conard received the helpful collaboration of experts 
in the six countries of the Community. These included Mr. Arendt 
VIII FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
of Luxembourg, Professor Ascarelli and Dr. Bruna of Rome, 
Professor Bernini of Ferrara, Mr. Deelen and Mrs. van VIis of 
Amsterdam, Professor Heenen of Brussels, Professor Houin of 
Paris, and Professor Serick of Heidelberg. The respective con-
tributions of these experts are identified in more detail at the outset 
of Mr. Conard's chapter. 
Dr. van Hoorn, co-author with Professor Wright of the chapter 
on taxation, wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the staff mem-
bers of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Messrs. 
W. H. J. Charbon, J. P. C. Huiskamp, and D. A. van Waarden-
burg. Dr. van Hoorn's findings concerning tax laws in the Com-
mon Market countries other than the Nether lands were verified 
by the following national experts who are referred to in more 
detail in the chapter on taxation and to whom he extends his ap-
preciation: Dr. Giancarlo Croxatto of Genoa; Dr. Albert J. Radler, 
Dip I. Kfm., of Munich; Mr. Jean H. Rothstein, H. E. C., of Paris; 
and Mr. Paul Sibille of Brussels. 
Professor Wright received able research assistance from Mrs. 
Elizabeth Brown, research associate at the University of Michigan 
Law School and Mr. Robert Wartell, a senior at the same school. 
Mr. Nicholson owes special thanks to Mr. Herman Walker, 
Jr., of the Department of State. 
Others who offered valuable suggestions on portions of the 
manuscript include Miss Miriam Camps of London; Dr. Hans-
Wolfram Daig, attache of the Court of Justice of the Communities 
in Luxembourg; Dr. Isaiah Frank of the U.S. Department of 
State; Professors William W. Bishop, Jr., Frank Cooper, Paul 
Kauper, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, and Hessel Y ntema, all of 
the University of Michigan Law School. 
We wish to mention the invaluable aid of Dr. Vera Bolgar, 
Executive Secretary of the American Journal of Comparative 
Law, and Mrs. Lilly Roberts, Bibliographer of the Michigan Law 
Library, in translating parts of the manuscript and on biblio-
graphical work. 
In completing the research and editorial work we had the 
efficient assistance of Mrs. Hortense Berman of Ann Arbor, and 
Mrs. Trudy Fisher of Washington, D.C.; of Mr. Dudley Chap-
man, Instructor at the Michigan Law School; of the graduate 
students of the Law School, Messrs. Jacques Bourgeois of Brussels 
(Belgium), Geerd Muntinga of Tubingen (Germany), Dr. Her-
mann Roos of Bonn (Germany), Dr. Peter Ulmer of Heidelberg 
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(Germany), Mr. Laurence Ziman of Cambridge (England); of 
Mr. Peter Eld of the University of Michigan Law School. 
In the early stages of the project Professor Conard and I had 
extensive interviews with officials of the American diplomatic mis-
sions in Brussels, Luxembourg, Paris, London, and elsewhere in 
Europe, with foreign diplomats and other governmental officials, 
with parliamentarians, and with officials of the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe, with 
European attorneys, businessmen, labor leaders, and scholars in 
European universities, and with American attorneys and executives 
stationed in Europe. In this country we interviewed government 
officials, members of the Bar, and businessmen, too numerous to 
mention individually. We wish to thank all of them for their 
generous help and attention. 
Mr. Thomas L. Nicholson joined us in Ann Arbor in the sum-
mer of 1959 after a year in Europe, and did most of the editorial 
work on the manuscript in addition to contributing his own chapter. 
It goes without saying, of course, that the positions taken and 
views expressed in this volume are those solely of the respective 
authors. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
May, 1960 
E.S. 
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I. A PERSPECTIVE 
A. A "PROPHECY" 
The next few years will reveal whether the European Economic 
Community with its Common Market will in fact become "one of 
the most important undertakings of the Twentieth Century" as 
prophesied by a group of prominent American businessmen in I 9 5 9. 1 
This is a hazardous prediction in a century which has already been 
rich in momentous events, and which, viewed from the mid-century 
vantage point, promises such important future developments. 
If the Community becomes a reality in the image of the Treaty 
of I 9 57, a single market will be created within the territories of 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Neth-
erlands and Luxembourg, comprising some I 70 million people; this 
single market will result in rising living standards, rapidly growing 
productivity, and a more important role for the six countries in 
world trade. If the economies of the six Member States coalesce, a 
new and powerful economic entity of obvious economic and politi-
cal importance will emerge. Should economic integration lead to 
political integration, the face of continental Europe would undergo 
a profound change-a change which would have world-wide reper-
cusswns. 
*J.D., University of Michigan Law School; J.U.D., Charles University, Faculty 
of Law, Prague. Professor of International Law and Organization, University of 
Michigan Law School. Member of the Illinois and District of Columbia Bars. For-
merly of the United States Department of State. Author of a number of articles on 
European integration problems. 
1 THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND ITS MEANING TO THE UNITED STATES, A 
STATEMENT ON NATIONAL PoLICY BY THE RESEARCH AND PoLICY COMMITTEE FOR Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (1959). 
2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
In the two years which have elapsed since the Treaty came into 
effect most of the steps envisaged by the Treaty have been taken in 
accordance with its timetable. Important questions have also arisen 
concerning the relationship of the Community to other Western 
European as well as non-European states. 
B. A GLANCE AT HISTORY 
The European Economic Community is an outgrowth of the Eu-
ropean movement, a complex composite of political and economic 
forces which have come to the fore in strength since World War II. 
Europe, devastated and weakened by war and the loss of colonies, 
faced the two emergent giants, the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Its division by trade barriers underlined its weakness. De-
termined to build on pre-war ideas of a United Europe, on the feel-
ing of the people that there must be no more internecine European 
wars and on a variety of special national interests favoring such a 
movement, a small group of individuals pressed for unification of 
Europe. NATO provided the defense shield. The Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation ( O.E.E.C.) had paved the. way in 
the economic field. This body, which before its reorganization had 
as members 18 countries of "Greater Europe," 2 was originally set 
up to help distribute the all-important Marshall Plan aid. When 
this task was completed, O.E.E.C. worked with substantial, but 
nonetheless partial, success to free intra-European trade from 
quantitative import restrictions. Through its European Payments 
Union it provided a European clearing house for multilateral settle-
ment of accounts. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (to-
gether referred to as "Benelux") agreed on a closer association in 
a customs union. The Council of Europe originally conceived of as 
a framework for a federated Europe provided a "European" forum 
for an organized debate by national parliamentarians of fifteen Eu-
ropean states. Finally, in 1952 the Six of "Little Europe" (Bene-
lux, France, Germany, and Italy) established the European Coal 
and Steel Community which represents the first serious effort to ad-
vance toward a federal structure on the Continent of Europe. In-
stitutionally, the Coal-Steel Community represented a compromise 
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom. In addition the United States and Canada were associate countries, 
Yugoslavia was invited to be represented by an observer at meetings of the Council 
and of the subordinate bodies, and both Yugoslavia and Finland participated in cer-
tain activities of the Organization. 
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between the federalists who would subordinate national states to a 
European federal state possessing its own territorial sovereignty, 
and those who would not accept any limitations on the sovereignty 
of the Member States beyond revocable Treaty obligations directed 
at international cooperation within organizations such as the 
O.E.E.C.3 
The next move was the r 9 52 plan for a "supranational" Euro-
pean Defense Community among the Six of "Little Europe" which 
envisaged a European Army. When it foundered in the French 
Parliament two years later, the cognate project for a European 
Political Community was also abandoned. Political integration, it 
was said, should be deferred until economic integration lays the 
necessary ground work; economic integration must proceed by "sec-
tors" within the national economies of the Six. 
The movement was given new momentum by a variety of factors: 
the intensified efforts of the militant "Europeans" such as Jean 
Monnet and his Action Committee, the need for pooling national re-
sources to develop atomic energy in Europe, and somewhat later, 
the Suez crisis which emphasized Europe's lack of economic, as well 
as of political, independence. The 1955 conference of the six For-
eign Ministers in Messina established a group of governmental 
delegates and experts which produced the "Spaak Report," named 
after its distinguished Belgian chairman. On the basis of this report, 
approved by the Ministers in Venice in May 1956, an intergovern-
mental conference prepared the texts of two new treaties, one estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, the other the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community. The two treaties were signed in 
Rome on March 25, 1957. After rapid approval in the national par-
liaments, they went into effect on January r, 1958.4 
3 Robert Schuman, Preface, in Reuter, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON 
ET DE L'ACIER 7 (1953). 
• The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (the E.C.S.C. 
Treaty) has been published in English translation by the High Authority of that Com-
munity. The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the E.E.C. 
Treaty) and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the 
EURATOM Treaty) have been published in English translation by the Secretariat of 
the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom in Brussels. The English 
text may be obtained from the Information Service of the European Communities, 
220 Southern Bldg., Washington s, D.C. 
The national laws approving the E.E.C. Treaty are: 
Belgium: Law of Dec. z, 1957, [1957] Pasinomie 889. 
France: Law No. 57-88o of Aug. 2, 1957, [1957] Sirey, Lois annotees 243· 
Germany: Law of July 27, 1957, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt II, 753· 
Italy: Law No. 1203 of Oct. 14, 1957, [1957] Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei 
decreti 3973· (continued on next page) 
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C. RELEVANCE OF THE COMMUNITY FOR 
AMERICAN LA WYERS 
These two volumes of essays are destined primarily for American 
lawyers. The European Economic Community and some of the 
concomitant developments are of considerable interest to an Ameri-
can lawyer for at least three reasons: 
First of all, the American businessman has been increasingly in-
terested in Western Europe. Rapid economic growth accompanied 
by rising purchasing power in that area has indicated attractive mar-
ket possibilities. This prospect has been the primary reason for the 
dynamic upswing in American direct investment in Western Europe 
from about $r.7 billion in 1950 to an estimated $4.8 billion in 1959. 
The U.S. investment in the six countries of the European Economic 
Community amounts to about two-thirds of that in the rest of 
Western Europe (mostly the United Kingdom). However, the 
share of the Six has been increasing faster than the share held by 
the rest of Western Europe or, for that matter, by all foreign areas 
combined.5 The signing of the E.E.C. Treaty increased the attrac-
tion for American enterprises by creating a vision of a mass market 
within the territory of the Six similar to that of the United States. 
In fact, although new American investments decreased during the 
1958 recession everywhere else in the world, they increased sub-
stantially in the Community countries. 
The interest and involvement of the American businessman in 
Western Europe is growing then-whether he only sells his prod-
ucts, licenses his patents and trademarks, enters into joint ventures 
with local manufactures, or sets up his own plants in the area. His 
planning and his decision-making will have to adjust to the novel 
economic and legal framework of the Community. This in turn 
means that the American lawyer as his legal counselor must make 
the necessary adjustments in his own thinking. 
The second reason why these developments are of concern to an 
American lawyer is because they have an impact upon the policies of 
the United States government. This is of importance not only to 
lawyers in government agencies and international organizations, 
Luxembourg: Law of Nov. 30, 1957, [1957) Pasinomie Luxembourgeoise, Supp. du 
vol. XXX, 1. 
Netherlands: Law of Dec. 5, 1957, [1957) Staatsblad No. 493, 1029. 
5 Buchdahl, U.S. Investment in Common Market Shows Growing Trend, FoREIGN 
COMMERCE WEEKLY 19 (Dec. 21, 1959). 
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who deal with these matters professionally, but to all American law-
yers, who, because of the influential role they play on the domestic 
scene, must keep abreast of foreign policy developments. 
Since the end of the Second World War the United States govern-
ment has advocated free trade on a world-wide nondiscriminatory 
basis. Despite the fact that the six Member States form a block 
whose members will grant each other tariff and quota preferences 
which they need not extend to it or to other non-member states, the 
United States has nonetheless supported the formation of the Euro-
pean Economic Community. It has been prepared to accept this dis-
crimination not only in anticipation of an increased market for 
American goods but principally for political reasons. It has viewed 
the Community not as just a preferential trade arrangement, not as 
just a customs union authorized under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), but as an important step toward 
political unification of Europe. The United States has considered 
this unification necessary in order to provide a new framework for 
Franco-German relations and to preserve economic and political 
stability in Europe. 
But other Western European countries-and most importantly 
the United Kingdom-fear that the successful creation of an inte-
grated community will prejudice their own traditional trade inter-
ests in the community area and cause new American investments 
to concentrate there; they have therefore urged the formation of 
a larger free trade area which would include not only the six Com-
munity countries but all of the other members of the O.E.E.C. as 
well. The negotiations for the larger free trade area collapsed in 
1958. 
It is difficult to identify the principal reason for this collapse, but 
these reasons have been suggested: the reluctance as a matter of 
principle on the part of some Community members (particularly 
France) to open their national markets to goods from additional 
countries; the concern that the Community would be destroyed if 
it were "diluted" in a broader arrangement before its institutions 
are firmly established; the unwillingness of the United Kingdom to 
accept any limitation on its freedom to control its national tariff vis-
a-vis the states outside the free trade area (presumably because of 
the Commonwealth preference arrangements) ; the United King-
dom's need to protect its agriculture; technical difficulties created by 
the untried free trade area concept; and finally, the suspicion on the 
part of some that the United Kingdom's primary purpose, in line 
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with its historic continental policy, was to prevent the emergence 
of a single powerful entity on the Continent. 
After the negotiations had ended in a deadlock, the United King-
dom, along with Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, 
and Portugal (the so-called "Outer Seven") initialed a Convention in 
November 1959 establishing a European Free Trade Area Associa-
tion (E. F. T.A.). 6 This Convention which was ratified in 1960 is to 
create a free trade area within the territories of the Seven, but it is 
devoid of any institutional, or other, elements of integration. 
As a result of these developments the United States finds itself 
faced with two groups, the Six and the Outer Seven, which are not 
very friendly to each other and which as preferential trade group-
ings are inherently discriminatory against American-made goods. 
This unforeseen situation has occurred at a time when the U.S. bal-
ance-of-payments deficit has created a need to increase exports of 
American goods to Europe, when previously-existing grounds for 
discrimination against dollar goods based on shortages of hard cur-
rency have disappeared, when a coordinated Western effort on a far 
larger scale in aid of less-developed areas has become imperative, 
and when political unity within the Atlantic Community is as urgent 
as ever. 
In the face of this situation, the United States took the initiative 
in January 1960 which led to the creation of a new forum for fur-
ther study and negotiation concerning these complex questions. 
A third reason justifying an American lawyer's preoccupation 
with the European Economic Community is this: the Community 
represents a new kind of organization. It is sometimes described as 
"supranational" because of the significant powers which the Mem-
ber States have given to the Community institutions. The Commu-
nity has the power to make Community law with direct and immedi-
ate impact upon the national laws of the six Member States and on 
enterprises in those States. It has a Community Court with the 
power to interpret this Community law and its interpretations bind 
national courts. And, finally, the Community envisages harmoniza-
tion of the six national legal systems in those fields which affect the 
functioning of the Common Market. In the long run modifications 
of national law will therefore occur which will affect commerce and 
industry. 
• For the text of the E.F.T.A. Convention see EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA AssociA-
TION, Text of Convention and other Documents approved in Stockholm on zoth Novem-
ber, 1959, Cmnd. 906, London. 
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II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
This brief review will focus on the Community, but will make 
some reference to the European Free Trade Association 
(E.F.T.A.), since the Association is of obvious relevance to much 
that will be said. 
A. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY AND 
THE E.F.T.A. 
When the Six established the Community, their aim was to ex-
pand their economies by increasing the effectiveness of their uses of 
national resources and to raise living standards; their ultimate aim 
was a coalescence of the six economies. The objective of the Seven 
in agreeing on the E.F.T.A. was firstly to enlarge trade among them-
selves and thus to compensate for any trade losses they may suffer in 
Community markets by remaining outside the Community; secondly, 
they hoped to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis the 
Community. 
The Six sought to achieve their objectives within a new extensive 
institutional framework in two ways: by establishing the so-called 
Common Market and by laying the foundation for the development 
of a common Community economic policy. The Seven of the 
E.F.T.A., on the other hand, sought to achieve their objectives by 
means of a free trade arrangement with little institutional machinery 
and a minimum of limitation on national policy-making. 
B. THE COMMON MARKET vs. THE FREE TRADE AREA 
ARRANGEMENT 
The Common Market of the Community has three main features: 
1) In the first place it involves a customs union like that which 
has existed since 1950 among Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg. Customs duties, import quotas and equivalent governmental 
restrictions upon the flow of goods will be gradually removed 
within the territories of the Six and a common external tariff on non-
member goods will be progressively established. A common external 
tariff distinguishes a customs union from a free trade area such as 
the E.F.T.A. Thus within the E.F.T.A. customs duties and equiva-
lent charges and quotas will be removed progressively on a time 
schedule substantially synchronized with that of the Community; 
but in the E.F.T.A. each of the seven members will retain its own 
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national tariff levels on non-member goods. In principle, agricultural 
products are subject to the tariff and quota provisions of the E.E.C. 
Treaty but are not within the reach of the comparable provisions of 
the E.F.T.A. Convention. 
2) The second feature of the Common Market which distin-
guishes it from a simple customs union resulted from the conviction 
that free circulation of goods alone is not enough to ensure the most 
economical employment of labor and capital. The Common Market 
requires the removal of discriminatory governmental restrictions 
upon the movement of workers (so that they can move into areas of 
labor demand), and the removal of similar restrictions on the flow 
of capital and free access of individuals and companies to self-
employed economic activities (so that individuals and companies 
may enjoy freedom of establishment and may freely supply com-
mercial, industrial, and professional services across national fron-
tiers). The E.F.T.A. Convention says nothing about the free move-
ment of workers, apparently because the present national laws and 
international obligations of the Seven were considered adequate; 
although it views the prevailing international obligations with re-
spect to the freedom of "invisible transactions and transfers" as 
"sufficient at present," the Convention contemplates possible future 
decisions of the E.F.T.A. Council in this field; and it contains a very 
flexible and qualified "national treatment" provision with respect to 
the right of establishment. 
3) The third feature of the Common Market reflects the idea 
that effective employment of resources requires competition. Thus 
the Common Market includes the so-called "Common Rules" which 
are designed to maintain conditions of qualified free competition. 
Some of these rules will be enforceable by penalties against enter-
prises and others by proceedings against Member States. The rules 
prohibit specified restrictive agreements and practices by individ-
uals or enterprises, some, but not all, governmental subsidies, dump-
ing practices, protective taxes on imports and excessive drawbacks 
on exports within the Community. Public enterprises and state mo-
nopolies are to be governed by Treaty rules with certain qualifica-
tions. Indirect taxes are to be "harmonized." National laws which 
distort competition are to be modified so that the distortion is re-
moved, and generally laws which have "direct incidence" on the es-
tablishment or functioning of the Common Market are to be "ap-
proximated." 
There is, of course, little competition and extensive government 
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regulation in the field of agriculture and transportation. The E.E.C. 
Treaty recognizes this situation, but it provides that national regu-
lation in these two vital areas is to be superseded by Community 
regulation and Community policy to be developed by the institu-
tions of the Community. 
The E.F.T.A. does not deal with transportation. Primary agri-
cultural products (but not manufactured foodstuffs) are excluded 
from the provisions requiring the removal of customs duties and 
quotas and are to be the subject of "agricultural agreements" be-
tween members. Until the Community succeeds in the difficult task 
of formulating a common agricultural policy, the power of the Six 
to protect their agriculture, although it is subject to supervision by 
the Community institutions, does not, in effect, differ substantially 
from the power of the Seven. 
No "approximation" or "harmonization" of national legislation 
is envisaged in the E.F.T.A. Instead of the fairly detailed "Com-
mon Rules" of the Community, the E.F.T.A. Convention contains 
broad and more or less general principles on restrictive practices, 
government export subsidies, public enterprises, dumping and the 
like. The violation of these principles may lead to a complaint by a 
member government before the Council of governmental repre-
sentatives. The Council is to examine before the end of I964 
whether additional measures are necessary to deal with the effects 
of restrictive practices or dominant enterprises on trade between the 
members. 
C. THE BASES FOR "COMMON POLICIES" 
OF THE COMMUNITY 
The Common Market involves one single common external tariff 
against non-member goods. The Six transferred the control over this 
tariff to Community institutions and authorized the institutions to 
pursue a common commercial policy in relation to non-member 
states and to negotiate tariff agreements on behalf of the Commu-
nity. This common commercial policy is to include uniform princi-
ples particularly in regard to tariff amendments and conclusion of 
tariff and trade agreements, alignment of measures of liberalization 
of import restrictions, export policy and protective measures such as 
those to be taken in cases of dumping and subsidies. Although the 
Community institutions will determine the tariff levels on imports 
from non-member countries, national authorities of the Member 
States will continue to collect the customs duties on these goods, and 
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the revenue from customs will continue to flow into national treas-
uries. The Treaty does, however, envisage the possibility of making 
customs revenues available to the Community to defray its expenses 
in lieu of direct financial contributions by the Member States. This 
substitution may be achieved by unanimous agreement in the Com-
munity Council of Ministers coupled with whatever implementing 
national action may be required under the constitutions of the Mem-
ber States. 
In sharp contrast to the Community arrangement, the E.F.T.A. 
members have retained control over their national external tariffs 
and commercial policies as well as their individual freedom to nego-
tiate tariff agreements with third countries-subject, however, to 
consultation and complaints procedure in the event of trade deflec-
tions caused by differences in national tariff levels. 
The Member States of the Community declared that their eco-
nomic policies relating to cyclical boom and slump trends are a "mat-
ter of common interest" and agreed to consult on specific remedial 
measures. Moreover, the Community Commission may propose ap-
propriate measures to the Council of Ministers; but it is only after 
the Council has unanimously agreed on a basic measure that it may 
issue implementing directives by a qualified majority. In March 
1960 the Council of Ministers established a special committee on 
policy concerning economic trends and provided that the govern-
ments of Member States will keep the Commission informed of their 
projects which might affect economic trends. The E.E.C. Treaty pro-
visions are substantially less specific than the corresponding provi-
sions of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, and they give no indication 
of the character and extent of "governmental" intervention by Com-
munity institutions which the Member governments may be pre-
pared to accept in the event of economic strain. 
The Six have retained separate budgets, currencies, central banks, 
reserves, and balance-of-payments. But they undertook in the Treaty 
to pursue an economic policy which would maintain sound currency 
while ensuring a high level of employment and price stability. They 
have accepted an obligation to coordinate their policies in order to 
achieve these "magic triangle" objectives. The coordination is to 
take place through the collaboration of governmental departments 
and central banks but the Community Commission may recommend 
to the Community Council of Ministers ways of bringing about 
such collaboration. A Monetary Committee helps to coordinate 
national policies in monetary matters but it has purely advisory 
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functions. The Six undertook further to treat their exchange rate 
policies as a matter of common interest and to accept national coun-
ter-measures, taken under the Community Commission's control, 
against unilateral alterations in exchange rates. Escape clauses and 
mutual assistance measures under the control of the Community in-
stitutions are also available to Member States which find themselves 
in balance-of-payments difficulties. In the present state of sound cur-
rencies and generally favorable balance-of-payments situation of 
the Member States, the objectives of coordination appear to be 
achieved; the test will only come if adverse changes occur in one or 
more of the Member States. But the fact that the Members have re-
linquished the right to re-impose restrictions and tariffs unilaterally 
should prove a powerful incentive to coordinate policies. 
Apart from specific Treaty limitations (such as those concerning 
the free flow of capital) national policies regarding investment of 
public funds or the channeling of private investments will be cir-
cumscribed only to the extent that a common Community economic 
policy emerges by agreement among the members. The European 
Investment Bank, with a subscribed capital of $1 billion and estab-
lished by the E.E.C. Treaty as a Community body, was conceived 
of as a supplementary source of capital patterned after the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Its establish-
ment reflects the concern expressed during the negotiations that new 
investment capital will tend to move to those areas of the Com-
munity which are already industrialized, with the result that the 
less developed regions like southern Italy will fall still further be-
hind. 
In the field of social policy the Community members stated their 
intention to improve the working conditions of labor by means of 
gradual equalization in an upward direction. This result is to be 
achieved not only through the changes brought about by the advent 
of a Common Market economy but also through Treaty procedures 
and "approximation" of national laws. 
In viewing the E.E.C. Treaty provisions in the area of economic, 
financial and social policy, it is apparent that the specific legal com-
mitments of the Member States are quite limited. Yet the Com-
munity machinery offers ample potential for the development of 
common Community policies through Community institutions if the 
Member States should wish to utilize the institutions for this pur-
pose. Should the Community institutions be allowed to make im-
portant economic policy decisions, a move towards political integra. 
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tion would appear unavoidable since economic policy cannot be for-
mulated without making important political choices. However, there 
is no indication at this time that the governments are willing to take 
such a step. A unified policy is more likely to emerge as a result of 
national action taken in response to the economic realities of the 
Common Market than as a result of the decisions of Community in-
stitutions. 
The E.F.T.A. Convention contains no reference to social policies 
nor to a common investment agency. It limits itself to providing for 
periodic consultations on economic and financial policies and for 
consideration of balance-of-payments difficulties in the Council. In 
general, the Council may hear complaints of member governments, 
recommend remedies and authorize suspension of benefits against 
any member government which refuses to comply with a recommen-
dation. The basic philosophy of the E.F.T.A. is one of economic 
cooperation among independent states coupled with a minimum of 
institutional machinery and only such institutions as are fairly com-
mon in public international organizations. 
D. THE TIMETABLE 
Some of the Member States of the Community like France and 
Italy, which have a long-standing protectionist tradition, were con-
cerned during the negotiations for the E.E.C. Treaty that their in-
dustries would suffer from the new competitive conditions. To cush-
ion the anticipated impact of the changes envisaged by the Treaty 
it was agreed that the various steps toward the realization of the 
Community should only be gradually taken-this step-by-step pro-
gression to be effected in three stages over a longish transitional 
period of twelve to fifteen years. This meant that the Common 
Market could have been in full operation by the end of 1969, and, 
in any case, by the end of 1972. 
One of the most interesting and unexpected later developments 
has been the demand by industrial groups in the Community that the 
transitional period be shortened. These groups have accepted the 
Common Market, have made their investment plans on the basis · 
of a large market and now wish that large market to come into be-
ing as quickly as possible. Some of the industries which opposed the 
Common Market in the earlier stages now favor acceleration. One 
reason may be that they have concluded that their earlier fears of 
competition were groundless. Another reason which may be sug-
gested, if one chooses to be cynical, is that industrialists have now 
made restrictive arrangements with their potential competitors in 
AMERICAN LAWYER VIEWS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 13 
the other Member States of the Community which will prevent com-
petition, although this may be contrary to the Common Rules of the 
Community. It is certainly true that there has been a wave of in-
dustrial mergers and agreements for cooperation and specialization 
across national frontiers in the Community in anticipation of the 
larger market. The overriding factor favoring accelerated reduc-
tion of internal tariffs and quota barriers and the erection of a com-
mon external tariff has, however, been the prosperous state of na-
tional economies. 
In May I960 the Council of Ministers, acting as an intergov-
ernmental conference of the Member States, approved a modified ac-
celeration proposal of the Commission. According to this decision, 
the tariff reduction within the Community on industrial goods was 
to be increased by the end of I 96 I from 30% to 40% and, subject 
to a further Council decision in the light of the economic situa-
tion, to so%. The first step toward the establishment of the com-
mon external tariff was to be advanced from the end of I 96 I to 
the end of I 960. Because the external tariff is calculated on the 
basis of the arithmetic average of the national tariffs of the Mem-
ber States, however, the low-tariff Member States, such as Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, would have to increase their current 
customs duties on some non-member goods to approach the new 
external tariff level. An acceleration would require a speed-up in 
such increases, which in turn would create problems not only for 
the Member States concerned but for non-member states (such as 
the United States) whose exports will be affected by such increases. 
To meet this problem the Council decided that for the purpose of 
calculating the adjustments in national tariffs involved in the first 
step toward the establishment of the common external tariff, that 
tariff be reduced provisionally by zo% for the benefit of goods from 
non-member states on the assumption that non-members will grant 
reciprocal concessions in the G.A.T.T. negotiations in I961. This 
step was to stress the liberal trade policy of the Community towards 
the outside world. The Council decided further that all quantitative 
import restrictions on industrial products of Member States must 
be removed by the end of I 96 I, while such restrictions on non-
member products were to be removed "as soon as possible" in ac-
cordance with the obligations derived from G.A.T.T. and in the 
light of recommendations by the International Monetary Fund. Spe-
cial provision was made with respect to agricultural products. 
In a simultaneous "declaration of intention" the Council affirmed 
its desire to hasten the application of the Treaty with respect to 
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social measures particularly concerning occupational training of 
workers, their freedom of movement, equal pay for men and women 
workers, and the adjustment in social security systems. The Council 
also indicated its intention to move forward correspondingly in the 
fields of competition, transportation, and right of establishment and 
to ensure progress in the economic development of the associated 
overseas areas. The Commission was directed to submit the neces-
sary proposals. The Council stressed the liberal trade policy of the 
Community toward third countries and called for negotiations par-
ticularly with the E.F.T.A. countries with a view to reciprocal re-
duction of trade barriers on the basis of G.A.T.T. principles. 
Despite the complexities and difficulties arising especially with 
respect to agricultural products it is quite likely that the Community 
schedule will be substantially accelerated. 
E. THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE COMMUNITY 
The E.E.C. Treaty applies to the European territories of the 
Member States and to a substantial extent to Algeria and to French 
overseas departements. The other overseas dependencies of the 
Member States located mostly in Africa are tied to the Commu-
nity in a special "association." The link between Europe and Africa 
involving territories almost ten times larger than the metropolitan 
areas of the Six and 55 million people is of obvious political signifi-
cance. The tariff provisions governing the "association" are con-
tained in the Treaty itself while the rules on import restrictions, 
right of establishment and financial assistance are included in a sepa-
rate Implementing Convention annexed to the Treaty which is to be 
renegotiated in five years. 
By virtue of this "association" the dependent territories will ac-
quire free access for their products to metropolitan markets but 
may retain protection against the products of the Member States 
to the extent necessary for the development of their economies. 
Moreover, the Treaty established a Development Fund under the 
administration of the Community Commission to provide some $5 So 
million for economic development of the overseas territories during 
the first five years. The rapidly evolving changes in the political ties 
between the Member States and their dependent territories have, 
however, already brought about modifications in the membership of 
the "association." 
If an overseas dependency associated with the Community be-
comes independent, its "association" with the Community termi-
nates, as did that of the former French Guinea when it achieved 
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statehood. However, if such a newly independent state chooses to 
maintain a special relationship with a Member State, there appears 
to be no obstacle to a continuation of its "association" with the 
Community. There is a possibility that the new Malagasy Republic 
and Mali Federation, both former French dependencies, may choose 
this course. 
The Community may negotiate an agreement of "association" 
with any third country, a union of states or an international organi-
zation. Such agreement is to embody reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions, provide for joint action and may or may not require a Treaty 
amendment. 
Those independent overseas countries with which a Member State 
has maintained special relations have been invited to associate them-
selves with the Community. The negotiations for an "association" 
with one such country, Tunisia, appear to have been interrupted. 
Turkey, Greece, and Dutch East Indies (through the Netherlands 
government) have asked to be "associated" with the Community, 
and separate negotiations are in progress concerning association of 
each of the three. 
As distinguished from "association," full membership in the Com-
munity is open only to European states; admission to full member-
ship can be effected only after the necessary Treaty amendment has 
been ratified by all Member States. 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
A. THE TREATY: A QuADRILINGUAL LABYRINTH? 
The legal basis for the Community is a multilateral Treaty, a 
formidable instrument of 248 Articles with four Annexes, thirteen 
Protocols, and one Convention; another Convention relating to cer-
tain institutions common to the European Communities; and the 
Final Act concerning both the E.E.C. and Euratom Treaties with 
nine annexed Declarations. All these documents were drafted in the 
four official Community languages (Dutch, French, German, and Ital-
ian) and all four versions are equally authoritative. 
Two members of the Paris Law Faculty disagree in their estimate 
of the E.E.C. Treaty. Professor Daniel Villey says: 
[The Treaty] is interminable, complex, impossible to dis-
entangle. This is not the form of the great texts which 
heralded and brought about the great transformations in 
history. . . . This then is how Europe-still in the proc-
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cess of gestation-falls head first into byzantinism .... 
What is this mixed salad of eloquent declarations of 
principle, minute and at times ridiculously detailed regu-
lations, platonic protestations of good intentions, tech-
nical rules of economic disarmament, pious wishes, prin-
ciples and exceptions to principles and exceptions to excep-
tions? There is not an article affirming a proposition that 
another article hidden in another corner of the Treaty 
would not render almost meaningless. The judges of the 
Court of Justice better have their spectacles handy! The 
text which it will be their chore to interpret is a maquis, 
a labyrinth, a brain-twister, a puzzle.7 
On the other hand Professor Paul Reuter of the same faculty, a 
leading authority in the field of European integration, points out 
that despite the vastness of the subject matter the Treaty is not any 
longer than the Coal-Steel Community Treaty. He describes its text 
as 
terse and clear ... without being sketchy .... [D]e-
spite the resort to four languages . . . a comparison 
with the Havana Charter or with the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade would redound to the advantage of 
the Treaty; only a few questions were resolved in too 
great a haste, ... and thus are expressed in extremely 
defective formulae. . . . While not achieving the preci-
sion and clarity of the Treaty establishing Euratom, the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
reflects a certain conciseness. . . . s 
The exceptions, the escape clauses and safeguards written into 
the Treaty, particularly at the insistence of France, give an impres-
sion of undue complexity. But if one considers the novel character of 
the Treaty, its scope and the need to accommodate vital national in-
terests, as well as the continental approach to constitutional docu-
ments, it would be naive to expect a simple instrument. The Treaty 
extends to all economic activities of a complex industrial society-
with the exception of those activities which relate to coal, steel, and 
atomic energy, to the extent that such activities are regulated either 
by the Coal-Steel Community Treaty or by the Euratom Treaty. 
Article 232 of the E.E.C. Treaty seeks to avoid conflicts in the ap-
plication of the three Treaties by providing that the E.E.C. Treaty 
does not "modify" the Coal-Steel Community Treaty or "detract 
7 Les Communautes Europeennes et leur incidence sur Ia profession d'avocat, Rapport 
de M. Claude Lussan, 1958 LE DROIT EUROPEEN 49, at 52 (No.2, Aug.-Sept. 1958) (this 
author's translation). 
8 Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, 1958 REVUE DU 
MARCHE CoMMUN 6, at 8 (No. 1, Mar. 1958) (this author's translation). 
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from" the Euratom Treaty. Consequently, the latter two have 
priority as leges speciales. On the other hand the broader E.E.C. 
Treaty as lex generalis would apply to coal and steel products and 
nuclear materials where it does not conflict with the other two 
Treaties. This formula, however, does not provide simple solu-
tions to a number of problems concerning the relationships of the 
three Communities. For instance, while the E.E.C. institutions will 
have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to commercial policy toward 
non-member states, under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty the 
Members retain in principle their freedom to determine national 
commercial policies with respect to coal and steel. The Coal-Steel 
Community Treaty, however, confers on the Community institu-
tions powers under specified circumstances to restrict imports and 
exports to and from non-member countries, to determine maximum 
export prices and minimum or maximum tariffs on non-member 
goods, and to review trade agreements concluded by the members 
with non-member countries. Thus coal and steel appear excluded 
from the jurisdiction of E.E.C. institutions over general commercial 
policy; yet as a practical matter such exclusion seems hardly feasi-
ble. The answer lies perhaps in coordinated action by the institu-
tions of the two Communities. Special problems arise from the fact 
that the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, unlike the other two 
Treaties, does not apply to the overseas areas. Again, the E.E.C. 
Treaty prohibits certain restrictive agreements unless they are spe-
cifically authorized; the Euratom Treaty contains no corresponding 
provision. Thus such agreements concluded among enterprises en-
gaged in the production of nuclear materials would be illegal un-
less authorized in accordance with the E.E.C. Treaty procedure.8" 
Obviously, problems of this kind will have to be considered on a 
case-by-case basis and, if necessary, resolved by the Commurtity 
Court. In the long run the logical solution would be to replace the 
three Communities by a single Community. 
B. THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN 
EcoNOMic CoMMUNITY 
As suggested in the chapter entitled "The New Legal Remedies 
of Enterprises-a Survey," the Treaty provisions range from policy 
declarations and obligation~ imposed upon Member States to "self-
executing" provisions applicable to individuals and enterprises. 
8° CATALANO, LA COMMUNITA EUROPEA E L'EURATOM, 227, 101-102; cf. Carstens, 
Die Errichtung des gemeinsamen Marktes, 18 ZEITSCHR. FtiR AUSL. OFF. RECHT U. 
VoLKERRECHT 459 at 461-462, 522-525 (1958). 
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The Treaty confers upon the Community an international legal 
personality (including the power to enter into international agree-
ments, diplomatic immunity for missions of third states accredited at 
the Community, and the like) as well as "domestic" legal personality 
(including such rights as the right to sue and hold property) under 
the laws of the Member States. Interestingly, the Treaty does not 
guarantee the Community immunity from judicial process: it may be 
sued in national courts of the Member States or, in specified cir-
cumstances, before the Community Court. 
In its legal foundation the Community resembles other public 
international organizations such as the United Nations, which was 
also established by a multilateral treaty. Unlike the Coal-Steel Com-
munity Treaty which was concluded for a period of fifty years, and 
like the United Nations Charter, the E.E.C. Treaty was concluded 
for an indefinite period of time, and no provision is made for with-
drawal. Presumably, however, the E.E.C. Treaty could be termi-
nated by mutual agreement of the Member States. A Treaty re-
vision requires ratification of the amendment by all Member States 
in accordance with their constitutions, but, by unanimous agreement 
in the Community Council of Ministers, the institutions may take 
action necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty even if the 
Treaty does not expressly grant the requisite power. The Member 
States retain, of course, their own international legal personality; 
moreover, their role in the selection of the principal personnel and 
in the functioning of the institutions is a crucial one. The Com-
munity is financed by contributions of its Member States and has no 
independent source of revenue at the present time. If a Member 
State violates a Treaty obligation, the matter can be brought be-
fore the Community Court for binding adjudication; but there is no 
general enforcement procedure available against a Member State. 
In many respects the Community therefore resembles a public inter-
national organization rather than a federal state based on a con-
stitution. 
It has been said that the Community is a "supranational," rather 
than an international, organization because it can have direct im-
pact on individuals and enterprises, because important powers have 
been "transferred" to it irrevocably rather than merely "dele-
gated," because important binding decisions can be taken by major-
ity vote in the Community institutions, and because the institutions 
have the task of fostering the development of a common policy and 
of enforcing its impartial execution. 
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The Community has also been called a "union of states," "a par-
tial federal state," "a partial economic state," "a functional federa-
tion," and it has been likened to the German Zollverein as it existed 
after 1 8 67. The analysis of the institutional framework in the next 
chapter concerning the new institutions and the description of the 
sources of the Community law in the chapter on the new legal reme-
dies of enterprises will suggest the conclusion that the Community 
is a body which is sui generis, defying classification in any existing 
categories. 
C. THE TREATY As A "CoNSTITUTION" AND "STATUTE" 
Whatever the label which is most appropriate for the Commu-
nity, the techniques and procedures of the Community resemble in 
many respects those of the public law of a state-predominantly of 
administrative law, but also those of constitutional law-rather 
than those of international organizations and international law. 
It may help to understand the character of the Community Treaty 
if it is compared with the United States Constitution, providing of 
course, that fundamental differences, not only in the legal foundation 
but particularly in the functions and objectives of the Community 
and of the United States, are kept in mind. Obviously no comparison 
is possible between the scope of the powers granted to the federal 
institutions in the United States-power to tax, power over defense 
and foreign affairs, over interstate and foreign commerce, over cur-
rency and post offices, immigration, citizenship-and of the powers 
granted to the Community. But the Constitution and the Treaty 
both establish institutions, define the mutual relationship of the in-
stitutions and their jurisdiction with respect to the Member States, 
and provide legal protection for states as well as individuals. In 
addition, however, the Treaty incorporates, in more or less gen-
eral terms, substantive policies which in the United States would be 
contained not in the Constitution but in federal statutes. 
For example, the Constitution grants to Congress the right to 
regulate interstate and foreign commerce and deprives the indi-
vidual states of the power to impose import or export duties. Apart 
from certain principles concerning commercial policy derived by the 
courts from the commerce clause, American commercial policy is 
not defined in the Constitution but in federal statutes, such as the 
Tariff Act and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and is im-
plemented by reciprocal trade agreements concluded with other 
nations. 
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The Treaty also prohibits internal customs duties and grants ex-
clusive power over the external tariff to Community institutions; but, 
in addition, it establishes a detailed time schedule of steps that must 
be taken by the Member States in order to remove intra-Commu-
nity tariffs and to set up a common external tariff. These obligations 
are relatively well defined, and their fulfilment is subject to the super-
vision of the Community institutions. 
Similarly, the antitrust policy of the United States is defined in 
federal statutes rather than in the Constitution; the statutes are 
based on the very general grant of power by the Constitution to the 
Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. On the other 
hand, the Treaty, in addition to granting certain powers to the 
Community institutions in the antitrust field, defines Community 
policy in some detail in the Common Rules and accords to the Com-
munity institutions the power to issue implementing provisions with 
penalties enforceable directly against enterprises. 
The six governments obviously sought to include in the Treaty as 
tnuch substantive content as they were able to agree upon. Some 
portions, such as those dealing with internal tariffs, are elaborated 
in great detail while others contain little more than vague directives 
requiring the institutions to evolve general programs or calling for 
action by Member States. In such fields as agriculture or transporta-
tion, these directives in effect call for continuation of the negotia-
tions which were not completed in the Treaty. Some of the gaps were 
unavoidable since the Treaty in some respects deals with national 
policies dependent on factors that are neither predictable nor neces-
sarily subject to institutional controls. Because of its general char-
acter the Treaty is often referred to as a traite cadre or traite in-
stitutionel as distinguished from the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, 
a traite normatif. Since the latter Treaty was limited in scope-cov-
ering only the fairly concentrated coal and steel industries-it lent 
itself to a more detailed and elaborate statement of policies and law. 
One consequence of the general character of the Treaty is the 
difficulty of predicting the ultimate character of the Community. 
The second and related consequence is the importance of the role 
assigned to the Member governments and to Community institutions 
in filling in the gaps in the Treaty. 
IV. LEGAL PROBLEMS FOR AMERICAN LAWYERS 
The brief sketch of the Community's objectives, scope and legal 
basis drawn above leaves unanswered the question of the impact of 
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the Community on the concrete problems of an American lawyer 
advising a client who exports to, or does business, in Europe. The 
principal purpose of our book is to explore this question as far as 
it is possible at this very early date of the Community's existence. 
Only a few thoughts will be offered in this introduction in the hope 
that they will orient the reader before he embarks upon the detailed 
study of the various aspects considered in the individual chapters. 
A. ExPORTING TO THE CoMMUNITY 
If, for example, an American client has been exporting American-
made goods to France, his lawyer will still have the problem, as the 
Community develops, of making sure that the client does as little 
as possible that would subject him to French tax laws or to the juris-
diction of the French courts. The French authorities will still col-
lect customs duties and French import restrictions and other regula-
tions and laws will still have to be observed. But there will be new 
problems. 
As the tariff and quota barriers are progressively lowered within 
the Community the American exporter will be in an increasingly diffi-
cult position vis-a-vis his German competitor who exports a similar 
product from Germany to France unless, of course, steps are taken 
to reduce the customs duties against non-member goods also. By the 
end of 1969, and possibly earlier, German goods will move into 
France freely while American goods will face the common Com-
munity tariff and whatever quota restrictions may be left. 
Neither this introduction nor the book itself purports to inquire 
into the economic impact of the Community upon American exports 
to the Community area. Estimates of this impact vary and in any 
event only a detailed product-by-product analysis would be of prac-
tical value. One view holds that only a slight fraction of American 
exports will be injured severely. 9 If the forecasts of a steep increase 
in the growth rate within the Community prove correct (one esti-
mate suggests that by I 97 5 the Six will increase their gross product 
by I 20% and perhaps I 50;-,~) / 0 the increased demand for imported 
raw materials such as foodstuffs, fuel, and special machinery is ex-
pected to cause an increase in absolute terms of imports from non-
"Kreinin, European Integration and American Trade, 49 AM. EcoN. REv. 615, at 
620 (1959); cf. Piquet, First Effects of the Common Market in AMERICAN MANAGEMENT 
ASSOCIATION REPORT, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET, NEW FRONTIER FOR AMERICAN 
BUSINESS, 124-159 (1958); Les Etats-Unis et le Marche Commun, 1959 REVUE DU 
MARCHE COMMUN, no-II8 (No. 12, Mar. 1959). 
10 The European Economic Community, Problems It Confronts, .A Statement by 
C.E.P.E.S., op. cit. supra note x, at 84. 
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member countries. But rhe share of non-members countries, includ-
ing that of the United States, in the Community market in certain 
groups of products may well diminish, 11 and there is concern that 
the evolving agricultural policy of the Community will restrict im-
ports of American agricultural products. 
Mr. Marc Ouin analyzes in his chapter the Treaty formula for 
the computation of the common Community tariff against non-mem-
ber goods and the progressive steps to be taken toward the erection 
of this tariff. Since the completion of Mr. Ouin's study, the basic ex-
ternal tariff has been formulated except for a few gaps still to be 
determined. 
A lawyer will also have to keep in mind that new procedural re-
quirements exist-for instance, if American goods initially exported 
to France are to be re-exported to Germany during the transitional 
period while internal tariffs are being reduced but are still in exist-
ence. Moreover, the common Community tariff differs from the na-
tional tariffs not only with respect to the level of customs duties but 
also in its structure and headings. Finally, modifications will occur in 
the national customs laws and regulations of the six Member States 
since they are, in the words of the Treaty, to be "approximated," 
by the end of 1961. 
The first IO percent reduction in the internal tariffs within the 
Community has been made as prescribed by the Treaty. With some 
important exceptions, benefits of the first reduction have been ex-
tended voluntarily to all members of G.A.T.T. including the U.S. 
Mr. Ouin also offers a detailed analysis of the Treaty provisions 
concerning the gradual removal of the quantitative import restric-
tions within the Community. The first two steps prescribed by the 
Treaty were taken on the specified dates and the Member States 
offered to extend certain benefits of the first step on the basis of 
reciprocity and-with certain reservations-to grant advantages 
"similar" to those involved in the second step, to all members of the 
O.E.E.C. The current trend towards an elimination of industrial 
(not agricultural) import restrictions in Europe-which certainly 
was not anticipated during the Treaty negotiations-may render 
moot the question whether the Members of the Community would 
infringe their G.A.T.T. undertaking by continuing to maintain 
quota restrictions against non-member goods despite their favor-
able balance-of-payments situation. 
As far as the E.F. T.A. is concerned, the American client, export-
u Ibid. at 85. 
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ing for instance to the United Kingdom, will continue as before to 
face the national United Kingdom tariff, but here also his competi-
tive position will become weaker, in relation for instance to Swedish 
exporters who will in due course introduce their goods into British 
markets unhampered by tariff or quota barriers. Because the differ-
ent national tariffs will continue to exist, the E.F.T.A. Convention 
contains provisions intended to prevent the trade deflection which 
might occur if outside raw materials or semi-finished products could 
enter in large quantities the E.F.T.A. country with the lowest tariff 
and, after processing, move to the other Member States. 
B. DOING BusiNEss IN THE CoMMUNITY 
The American client who thus far has exported his products from 
the United States into France may conclude that he should obtain 
a foothold within the Common Market for at least two reasons: 
first, because of the anticipated tariff disadvantages just mentioned 
and second-and probably more important-because he may have 
discovered that he can manufacture the same product at a substan-
tially lower cost, for instance, in the Netherlands where labor costs 
are considerably lower than in the United States. In fact, he might 
calculate that the same product manufactured in the Netherlands 
will be competitive not only in the other Common Market countries 
to which it will move freely but also in the United States and per-
haps in other markets thus far supplied from the United States-
for instance those of Latin America. 
Another client may have been doing business on the Continent for 
some time. He has a manufacturing plant in Germany and assembly 
plants in Belgium and in the Netherlands. In anticipation of the 
Common Market he sees little purpose in maintaining the assembly 
plants. He wants to liquidate the assembly operations and to expand 
his German manufacturing facility. This client may estimate that 
the E.F.T.A. will function at least for some time as a tariff grouping 
against both American and Common Market manufactured goods, 
and so he decides to establish a manufacturing plant also in Britain 
or to expand an existing British facility with a view to supplying the 
E.F.T.A. markets. British-manufactured goods, incidentally, will 
also benefit from the Commonwealth trade preferences if exported 
to Commonwealth countries. 
Finally, still another client has manufacturing facilities in several 
European countries. He decides to simplify his line of products and 
to manufacture a standardized product in a single country for dis-
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tribution in the entire Common Market area. This may require cen-
tralization of management and development of a "European" policy 
for investments, patent licensing, marketing and advertising. 
Obviously some, if not most, of these situations will not become 
realities in the immediate future. But very little imagination is neces-
sary to identify the legal problems involved in implementing the 
policy decisions of the client, if and when they are made. · 
The law at the basis of any legal advice on these problems will 
as before be predominantly the national law of the countries con-
cerned: company law, tax law and tax treaties, patent and trade-
mark law, the law of unfair competition, foreign exchange and credit 
regulations, labor legislation, and a host of other national laws and 
regulations. But as the client to an increasing degree comes to view 
the area of the Six as an economic unit, his lawyer (with the as-
sistance of foreign counsel) must increasingly frame his advice in 
terms of the six (instead of one or a few) national legal systems-
and, keeping in mind the E.F.T.A., perhaps in terms of the laws 
of other European countries as well. 
In addition, new legal problems and new possibilities will arise for 
the client as individual provisions of the Treaty are applied. It would 
be unwise to expect far-reaching changes in the immediate future, but 
examples in seven areas dealt with in this book are suggested to illus-
trate the possible developments. 
I) As Professor Conard and Mr. Nicholson point out in their 
contributions, the Council is to adopt by 1962 a general program 
which will ensure that nationals and companies of a Member State 
will not suffer discrimination by reason of nationality in regard to 
the freedom of establishment and to the supply of services in the 
other Member States. When this program is put into effect, an 
American subsidiary organized under German law and carrying on a 
bona fide operation in Germany should be able to establish itself in 
Belgium or sell its services there on the same basis as a Belgian com-
pany. This would still leave untouched the multitude of license and 
permit requirements and restrictions which condition access to in-
dustrial, business and professional activities for nationals and for-
eigners alike. But here also the Treaty calls for "coordination" with 
a view to making access to such activities easier. The obligations of 
the Member States in this latter respect are less precise and the ex-
ceptions and escape possibilities are many. The progress will, no 
doubt, be slow but a proposal for progressive action has already been 
developed by the Commission in cooperation with experts in the 
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national governments. For a long time to come an enterprise will be 
concerned primarily with the national laws of business organization 
explored by Professor Conard with the aid of advice from his ex-
pert consultants. 
2) Will an American parent-given exchange controls-be able 
to transfer profits of its wholly-owned subsidiary in France to Bel-
gium in order to invest them in a Belgian company? The Council of 
Ministers, by the end of 1960, is to adopt directives to remove re-
strictions on capital movement of this kind, and the Council has al-
ready adopted the first directive. Maitre J eantet suggests, in his 
chapter dealing with French exchange controls, that the implementa-
tion of the Treaty will sooner or later result in virtually complete 
freedom of transfer of funds within the Community except in case 
of emergency-and the Community institutions will decide, subject 
to review by the Community Court, whether an emergency exists. 
3) When the program for the free movement of workers is put 
into effect-and it is to be in effect by the end of the transitional per-
iod-a German manager or engineer employed by an American 
subsidiary will be freely transferable to a sister subsidiary in Italy. 
Again, an American subsidiary which faces a labor shortage in Ger-
many will be able to recruit in the surplus labor pool in Italy, since 
German regulations must be adjusted to allow entry and employ-
ment of Italian workers in Germany without discrimination. The 
reverse of the coin is that the enterprise will not be allowed to fire 
these Italians because of their nationality when German labor later 
becomes available. Perhaps the most important regulation adopted 
by the Council thus far was designed to help labor mobility by mak-
ing transferable social security rights acquired by a worker in one 
country when he moves to another country. As Professor Kahn-
Freund points out in his chapter, whether these provisions and other 
measures including the special Social Fund for temporary unemploy-
ment assistance will in fact bring about large scale mobility compar-
able to that in the United States is an open question in view of dif-
fering European mores. 
The Treaty anticipates that the substantial differences in social 
benefits and working conditions generally within the Community 
will be equalized upward by virtue of the normal operation of the 
expanded single market (for example, under collective bargaining 
pressures) ; but intervention of the institutions and harmonization 
of national laws is also contemplated as a secondary means of ad-
vancing this process. The scope of this intervention and the extent 
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of the modification of national laws cannot now be foreseen. Point-
ing to the great diversity obtaining in national laws and practices in 
the Six, Professor Kahn-Freund concludes that the immediate effect 
on the national laws in not likely to be striking. The tendency to-
wards harmonization of the various legal systems, he feels, is un-
mistakable, but it is anyone's guess how far harmonization will go. 
In any event, for a long time to come the lawyer will have to continue 
to consult the national legal sources which Professor Kahn-Freund 
surveys in his contribution. 
4) A similar conclusion is reached in the chapter by Dr. Van 
Hoorn and Professor Wright concerning tax problems facing 
American enterprises in the Community. The national tax systems 
manifest important differences predicated on historic forces which 
cannot be easily deflected. Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers 
has been given the power under the Treaty, on the Commission's 
proposal, to take measures to harmonize national indirect tax laws 
"in the interest of the Common Market"; and in response to 
pressures from industry, studies have already been instituted to 
determine ways of harmonizing turnover taxes. 
5) Mr. Stephen Ladas, viewing the industrial property laws of 
the Six against the background of the emergent Common Market, 
foresees limited modification of the patent laws, but a substantial 
harmonization of trademark laws with the possibility, for instance, 
of a "European Community Trademark." 
6) In conducting its foreign operations in the Community an 
American enterprise must comply with national legislation pertain-
ing to restrictive practices and mergers in the Community countries. 
Some such legislation exists in three of the Six and the remaining 
three may be expected to adopt measures in this field in due course. 
Professor Riesenfeld discusses this national legislation and the new 
problems which the Treaty rules governing competition create. 
7) Enforcement of Treaty rules is to be provided for by Council 
regulation establishing penalties for violations by enterprises. Prob-
lems of the legal protection of enterprises are considered in the 
chapter entitled "The New Legal Remedies-a Survey." 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding observations viewed from an American lawyer's 
standpoint suggest three conclusions: 
I) A client's policy decisions will obviously not be determined 
solely or even preponderantly by legal or tax considerations; for in-
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stance, a decision to locate in France rather than in the Nether lands 
might be dictated by an opportunity to buy into a going concern in 
France which is not available in the Netherlands. But it is obvious 
that as the area of the Six tends to become a single economic unit a 
comparative investigation of the national laws of the Six will be 
increasingly necessary as a basis for competent legal advice. 
2) In due course the Treaty provisions and acts of the Commu-
nity institutions will have some impact on national laws and on en-
terprises. 
3) In the long run differences in national laws and regulations 
will tend to lessen, particularly where these differences distort com-
petition or otherwise interfere with the proper functioning of the 
Common Market. One commentator would include here legislation 
in the field of commercial law, negotiable instruments, law of busi-
ness associations, unfair competition, indirect and even direct tax 
laws and civil procedureP Although the Treaty confers substantial 
powers on the Community institutions in this field, there is no indi-
cation that the institutions will embark on a systematic effort to 
bring about a large scale assimilation of national laws. Instead, the 
Community Commission has proceeded, in cooperation with na-
tional officials, on the basis of a priority list which includes subjects 
where a disparity among the laws has already created or is expected 
to create practical problems and where pressures for action are 
exerted by trade organizations, by the European Parliamentary As-
sembly or by national governments. Studies and negotiations are in 
progress directed at assimilation of laws governing industrial prop-
erty, indirect taxes, public bidding, sale of goods, health regulations, 
such as those governing contents and packaging of food products, 
safety regulations, and laws on recognition of foreign judgments 
and arbitral awards and some phases of company law. Such assimi-
lation may be achieved by Council directives (particularly under 
Article 100) and by new international agreements. 
V. A LONGER RANGE VIEW 
A. THE COMMUNITY AND THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
Although some of the Six, such as Belgium, have made more in-
tensive efforts to attract American capital than have others, the 
climate for American investment has been generally favorable in 
12 Thiesing in HANDBUCH FUR EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFI', KOMMENTAR 1/Teil B. 
IA52, 2-3 (1958). 
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all the Community countries and the rate of return high. With the 
increased demand for capital necessary for the development of the 
Common Market there is little reason to anticipate any change. Dr. 
Hallstein, President of the Community Commission, addressed an 
American audience in the .. following terms: 
It seems to me that our Community has received no more 
gratifying vote of confidence than American industry's 
rapidly mounting investment in the Common Market. I 
can assure you-and I wish to make this point emphati-
cally clear-that we welcome this import of capital and 
know-how from America, and we hope in the future to see 
a reciprocal movement of European investment to your 
country. Not only is this good economics for all of us, but 
it is a great force for unity. The more our businessmen be-
come partners-the more our economic eggs are scram-
bled-the greater will be the strength and solidarity of 
the Western W orldY 
The experts differ in their estimates of the role which American 
capital will play in the industrial growth of the Community. Point-
ing to the current drive of the Community industries to marshal their 
resources and streamline their facilities and methods, some believe 
that the American role, while substantial in absolute terms, will be 
no more than marginal in the context of the over-all development in 
the Community. 
In any event, one problem deserves consideration from the longer 
range viewpoint of American enterprise. It is reflected in the very 
first "parliamentary" question addressed in the spring of 19 58 to 
the newly organized Community Commission. The question was 
asked in the just-born European Parliamentary Assembly by M. 
Michel Debre, then a parliamentary representative and later the 
first Prime Minister of the French Fifth Republic. M. Debre pointed 
to the investment plans of foreign and particularly American com-
panies seeking to take advantage of the Common Market, which 
in his opinion, if unsupervised, might cause economic as well as 
political and social unbalance. He inquired of the Commission 
whether "strict regulation" should not be considered on an urgent 
basis to ensure that all the Member States of the Common Market 
would share the benefits and burdens of foreign investment on an 
equal basis. The Commission replied: · 
13 Remarks by Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European 
Economic Community, at the National Press Club Luncheon in Washington, D.C., on 
June II, 1959. 
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The Commission favors maximum development within 
the Community of private investment originating in third 
countries and believes it necessary to avoid discouraging 
it; it is, however, conscious of the problems which may 
result from an excessive concentration of such investment 
in any one country or in any given industry .... 
The Commission went on to recall Article 72 of the Treaty which 
requires Member States "to keep the Commission informed of any 
movements of capital to and from third countries as are known to 
them" and authorizes the Commission to address to Member States 
appropriate "opinions." It indicated its intention to call promptly 
for the necessary information. "To the extent that investment proj-
ects known to it will call for concerted action," the Commission will 
issue opinions to governments and "seek, in accord with them, the 
bases for an effective collaboration." 14 Since then the Commission 
has stated that it has completed the classification of capital move-
ments and a study of methods of obtaining information concerning 
them and has invited the governments to supply it with specified 
information "known to them." The arrangement for the supply of 
information to the Commission is reported to be functioning regu-
larly. 
The implication of this exchange for long range investment plans 
of American enterprises is self-evident. Difficulties must be expected 
if an entire industry or an important part thereof in one or more 
Member States should come under American control. Similarly, 
problems would arise if American investment should tend to concen-
trate in one Member State at the expense of others with equal or 
more urgent capital requirements. It might be of interest to mention 
a few figures showing the relative level of saturation of the Com-
munity Members with American direct investment. In 1957, meas-
ured in terms of the relation of these American investments to the 
respective national incomes, the degree of saturation amounted in 
Italy to 1.1%, in France and in the Federal Republic of Germany to 
1.2 %, in Belgium to 1.9%, and in the Netherlands to 2.9%. These 
figures may be compared with 3·9% for the United Kingdom and 
35·3% for Canada where the predominance of American capital has 
been the subject of considerable discussion.15 
14 [1958] ]OURNAL 0FFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES 25-26. 
15 Les Etats-Unis et le Marchi Commun, 1959 REVUE ov MARCHE CoMMUN no, at 
II4 (No. 12, Mar. ·1959), 
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B. THE UNITED STATEs AND EuROPE 
The re-emergence of Western Europe as an economic power of 
the first order has modified profoundly the relationship between 
the United States and Western Europe. The change from economic 
dependence to economic partnership requires adjustments in the 
forms of cooperation. The need for such adjustment was recognized 
at the Western Summit meeting at Paris in December 1959. The 
subsequent conference of Ministers of thirteen O.E.E.C. countries 
and the European Economic Community Commission led to the 
appointment of "Four Wise Men" who produced a report in April 
1960 recommending a scheme for a reorganization of the O.E.E.C. 
The United States and Canada, which heretofore held the status of 
"associates" in the O.E.E.C. are to become full members of the re-
modeled "Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment." 
The Report suggests as the first, and perhaps foremost, task of 
the organization continuous economic policy consultations to ensure 
coordination of national policies toward sustained economic growth 
under conditions of stability. The growing interdependence of na-
tional economies clearly requires coordination. The annual country 
review procedure developed by the O.E.E.C. under which each mem-
ber submits its economic situation and policies to the examination of 
all its partners would continue to be the basis for the consultations. 
It is logical that the new Western Europe must carry its share in 
what is perhaps the most vital undertaking of this century, the aid 
to developing countries. The Report recognizes the common interest 
in this "challenge of our time" and foresees that the Organization's 
role will be to coordinate technical and financial assistance. The 
"Development Assistance Group" consisting of capital-exporting 
O.E.E.C. countries and Japan, which was formed in January 1960, 
would become affiliated with the Organization. It would seem to this 
writer that wise policy will seek to utilize existing instrumentalities 
such as the World Bank and the United Nations in which all the 
states concerned, including the developing countries and other non-
European capital exporting states, are full participants. 
In the trade field the Report notes that the O.E.E.C. has largely 
achieved its regional European objectives: "balance of payments 
difficulties have, in general, disappeared; external convertibility of 
the principal currencies has been restored; and the liberalization of 
trade in industrial products is almost complete." Recognizing that 
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the context within which the O.E.E.C. operated has now changed, 
the Report recommends that the O.E.E.C. Code of Liberalization 
and the other O.E.E.C. decisions on commercial policy be termi-
nated. However, the Report also suggests that commercial policy, 
as an element of general economic policy, will be within the responsi-
bility of the Organization. The availability of G.A.T.T. as a perma-
nent forum for trade matters is noted. Because it may prove diffi-
cult to transplant some of the O.E.E.C. methods to G.A.T.T. (such 
as the almost continuous confrontation of views of all interested 
members), the Report suggests that such methods might be adopted 
by the new Organization in considering "trade problems of a general 
and recurrent nature as well as for concrete problems causing special 
difficulties." 
A draft Convention attached to the Report would retain in sub-
stance the institutional framework of the O.E.E.C., consisting of a 
Council composed of representatives of all member governments, a 
small Executive Committee, the Secretary-General with a Secretar-
iat and certain subordinate bodies and agencies. In principle, deci-
sions would require unanimous consent in the Council. The Conven-
tion is to enter into force not later than September I, I 96 I, if by 
that time at least I 5 signatories have completed the ratification or 
acceptance process required by their national constitutions. 
* * * * * 
There is little question that the present division of Western Eu-
rope into two groups, the Community and the E.F.T.A., harbors 
seeds of discord and threatens the unity of the free world. Germany 
for economic reasons and France for reasons of political policy are 
likely to oppose further integration of the Six in the immediate fu-
ture. Nevertheless, the continuing co-existence of the Community as 
an economic grouping of increasing economic impact and of 
E.F.T.A. must be anticipated. Since Greece and Turkey are in the 
process of associating themselves with the Community and Finland 
is gravitating toward the E.F.T.A., only Iceland, Ireland and Spain 
of the I 8 members of the old O.E.E.C. remain outside the two 
groupings. An important problem will be, on the one hand, to pre-
vent conflict between the two groups which could have grave politi-
cal consequences and, on the other hand, of course, to avoid trade 
arrangements between them which would prejudice non-member na-
tions. Some observers discern a trend in the United Kingdom toward 
accepting membership in the Community providing that the Com-
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munity functions will be limited to those of a customs union. The fact 
that both the Community and the E.F.T.A. depend greatly on 
trade with each other as well as with the outside world holds promise 
of a satisfactory solution-a general reduction of trade barriers. 
Efforts to achieve such a reduction would be most effective in the 
Geneva forum of G.A.T.T., since that forum assures broad partici-
pation of free world countries. The negotiations for tariff conces-
sions scheduled for 1961 offer an opportunity to lower tariff bar-
riers against American exports to Europe before the effects of the 
regional groupings on trade patterns are felt strongly. The emer-
gence of other regional trade groupings, one in Central America 
and the other in South America, underlines the necessity for 
strengthening G.A.T.T. as an instrument for increasing world-wide 
non-discriminatory trade. 
The countries of the \Varsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union have 
been engaged in a massive regional integration undertaking of their 
own designed to create "a socialist market" as a corollary of their 
drive toward large-scale industrialization. The free world must be 
prepared to continue to face unrelenting and increasing pressures 
from the East. For this, if for no other reason, the strength and 
unity of the free world remain the overriding policy goals to which 
regional interests must be subordinated.16 
10 Portions of this chapter were included in an address delivered before the Institute 
on Legal Aspects of the European Community held by the Federal Bar Association in 
Washington, D.C., on February II-I3, 1960. 
Chapter II 
The New Institutions 
Eric Stein 
Even a cursory review of the Treaty indicates that the tasks as-
signed to the Community institutions range across the entire spec-
trum of economic activities in the Community, but this general 
statement is subject to three reservations. 
In the first place, the areas in which exclusive jurisdiction has been 
granted to the institutions are limited. In other areas the institutions 
have concurrent jurisdiction ":ith national authorities and their 
primary role is to supplement and supervise national action. In many 
of these areas their powers of decision are granted for the purpose 
of "prohibiting certain practices rather than substituting themselves 
for national authority." 1 In others the institutions are limited, as 
a matter of Treaty law, to the issuance of recommendations or 
opinions addressed to the national governments. 
Secondly, because of the very general character of major portions 
of the Treaty the eventual scope of the power of the institutions 
cannot yet be assessed. Only the Investment Bank, the Overseas 
Development Fund and in a lesser degree the Social Fund now have 
direct operational responsibility, although proposals have been made 
for the establishment of new agencies, such as a European Fund for 
Structural Improvement in Agriculture 2 or a European Center for 
Fuel and Power Policy to coordinate action in the energy field. 3 
Thirdly, in any organization the legal powers and structure created 
[The author is greatly indebted to Professor Paul Reuter of the Paris Law Faculty 
and to Mr. Michel Gaudet, Director of the Legal Services of the European Com-
munities, for their detailed and most helpful comments on this chapter.] 
l Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, 1958 REvUE nu 
MARCHE COMMUN 160 at 166 (No. 3). 
"Proposals by the E.E.C. Commission summarized in POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PLAN-
NING (P.E.P. LONDON), PROPOSALS FOR A COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN E.E.C. 
( 1960). 
"443 PRESS BULLETIN EUROPE, EURATOM AND COMMON MARKET (supplement) (June 24, 
1959) [hereinafter cited as EUROPE]. 
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by its constitutive document are only a part of the story. An in-
stitution, once created, tends to develop in ways which often differ 
substantially from the intentions of the drafters of its basic docu-
ment. The United Nations offers a startling example of this develop-
mental process. 
In the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, provisions regarding the 
institutions figure prominently at the beginning of the Treaty. In 
the E.E.C. and Euratom Treaties these provisions are placed at 
the end. The former Treaty employs the term "supranational," 
the latter two do not. The chapter on institutions of the Coal-Steel 
Community Treaty begins with the "executive" while the chapters 
of the latter two deal first with the Assembly. There is reason to 
believe that these differences reflect an evolution in the attitudes of 
the national governments toward the role of the institutions in the 
Communities. 
I. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: THE 
INSTRUMENT OF THE GOVERNMENTS 
A. THE COUNCIL AS THE PARAMOUNT INSTITUTION 
In the Coal-Steel Community Treaty the "supranational" High 
Authority, composed of independent Community officials, is con-
ceived of as the central organ. The primary task of the Council of 
Ministers is to approve the most important decisions of the High 
Authority and to harmonize its work with the general economic 
policies of the national governments.4 In the E.E.C. Treaty, on the 
other hand, the principal decision-making power is given to the 
Council of Ministers, whose members are subject to national gov-
ernment control, rather than to the independent Commission. This 
change from the Coal-Steel Community pattern was due as much to 
the substantially broader scope of the E.E.C. Treaty as to the politi-
cal necessity of soft-pedaling "supranationality." 5 The Coal-Steel 
Community Treaty extends to the production and some phases of 
distribution of coal and steel only; it does not deal with the general 
·• See Stein, The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of Emerging "Po-
litical Control," 13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 233, 239 (1959). 
5 A spokesman for the French steel industry complained of the "premature" supra-
nationality of the E.C.S.C. and proposed that the E.C.S.C. be gradually merged in the 
Common Market. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1959. The French Government spokesman indi-
cated that the French Government may propose a revision of the E.C.S.C. treaty to 
align it to some extent with the E.E.C. Treaty. See 1959 Bulletin of the European 
Community 10 (No. 38, Oct.-Nov., 1959) quoting Agence France to the effect that 
such revision is unlikely. 
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economic policies and does not encompass the commercial or agri-
cultural policies of Member States. This relatively narrow scope 
made an independent High Authority with strong regulatory 
powers palatable to national governments. The E.E.C. Treaty on 
the other hand extends to all economic activities and affects national 
policies in vital areas such as agriculture and commerce with non-
member countries. Given the domestic political repercussions which 
important Community measures therefore might have, the national 
governments insisted that the political Council rather than the inde-
pendent Commission be given preponderant power. 
The difference between the Coal-Steel and the Economic Com-
munity patterns may not be as striking as it first appears. In some 
important instances the High Authority has acted independently, 
but as a rule it has hesitated to make important decisions without a 
prior assurance of support from the Council. The center of decision-
making in the Coal-Steel Community has therefore in fact shifted at 
least in some measure from the High Authority to the Council. 5a 
The relationship between the Council and the Commission is de-
fined in the E.E.C. Treaty with considerable care. This relationship 
and the Council voting formula are among the most original fea-
tures of the Treaty. Both represent a compromise between opposing 
views as to the relative weight to be given to Community as opposed 
to national interests. In most instances the Council can act only 
upon a formal proposal by the Commission, which ensures that 
Community interests to which the Commission has given recogni-
tion will be considered by the Council before it makes a decision.6 
In some instances-generally those involving matters of intense 
political concern to Member States-even though no formal pro-
posal is required, the Council must obtain at least a report, opinion 
or recommendation from the Commission. 7 The Council acts with-
out any reference to the Commission only in determining its own 
•• Marjolin, Cooperation intergouvernementa/e et autorite supranationales, 1958 RE-
VUE EcoNOMIQUE 266 at 272 (No.2, Mar. 1958). On the Coal-Steel Community generally 
see DIEBOLD, THE SCHUMAN PLAN (1959) and LISTER, EUROPE's COAL AND STEEL CoM-
MUNITY (1960). On European organizations generally see POLITICAL AND EcoNOMIC 
PLANNING (P.E.P. LONDON), EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS ( 1959). 
6 For a list of those instances see La Communaute Economique Europeenne: Aspects 
fnstitutionne/s, ANNUAIRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 491, annex 2, at 506 
( 1957); France, ASSEMBLEE NATION ALE, TROISIEME LEGISLATURE, SESSION 0RDINAIRE 
1956-1957, No. 5266, Rapport fait au nom de Ia Commission des affaires etrangeres 
sur le projet de loi (No. 4676) autorisant le President de Ia Republique a ratifier: / 0 
Le Traite instituant La Communaute economique europtienne ... par MM. Savary 
et July, deputes, annexe B, 2366-67. 
7 France, ASSEMBLEE NATION ALE, supra note 6. 
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internal affairs or in matters concerning control over the Com• 
miSSIOn. 
B. THE VoTING FoRMULA 
The Council acts either by a unanimous vote or by "simple" or 
"qualified" majority. 
A vote by a "simple" majority of four out of the six Ministers (in 
effect a two thirds majority) applies only in a·handful of relatively 
less important instances where the Treaty fails to specify another 
formula.8 
Council measures which are most important to the creation and 
maintenance of the Common Market require a unanimous vote ei-
ther during a part of, or during the entire, transitional period.9 In 
specified matters of essential political interest (including most in~ 
stances of harmonization of legislation) and in those instances 
where gaps in the Treaty are to be filled or its provisions are to be 
modified, unanimity is required during and after the transitional 
period.10 The right of veto accorded to any one of the six Member 
States by these provisions may not be as potentially paralyzing as 
would appear at first glance.n In the first (and most numerous) 
group of instances mentioned above the veto power is, after all, 
temporary only and vanishes upon the expiration of the transitional 
period. In other instances, moreover, unanimity is required to re-
lieve the Members of their Treaty obligationsP Finally, in some 
instances the Treaty itself provides a means for circumventing a 
veto 13 or at least makes available to Member States measures of 
safeguard and retorsion in case ot paralysis.14 
A "qualified" majority vote based on weighted voting is required 
in some instances during the transitional period and will apply to a 
large majority of all measures after the termination of the transi-
tional periodY The weighted voting formula accords four votes to 
each of the Big Three (Germany, France, Italy), two votes each to 
8 These matters, it has been said, include either problems in which smaller members 
have an interest equal to that of the larger, or questions of internal procedure. 
ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, at 493 and annex 5, at 510. 
9 Cf. ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, annex 4, at 508-10. 
10 E.g. Arts. 99, para. 2, 100 para. I, 235· 
11 Cartou, Le Marchi Commun et Ia technique du Droit Public, 74 REVUE DU DROIT 
PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER IS6 at 216-17 ( 1958 ). 
"E.g., art. 93 (2) para. 3· . . 
13 E.g., arts. 54(2), 63 (2) when no general program has been adopted. 
"Arts. 70(2), 107(2). 
15 ANNUAIRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, annex 6, at 510, 5II. 
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Belgium and the Netherlands and one to Luxembourg. Of the, total 
of I 7 votes, I 2 are required for a measure to be adopted on pro-
posal of the Commission 16 but the Council may modify such 
proposal by a unanimous vote onlyP Each Member State, in effect, 
may therefore exercise a veto in defense of the Commission's pro-
posal. Where no proposal by the Commission is required for Coun-
cil action, the I 2-vote majority must include the votes of at least 
four members. 
This ingenious formula obviously has a number of purposes. In 
the first place it excludes a veto by any one Member State acting 
alone or by Benelux acting as a unit in cases where the Council acts 
on a proposal of the Commission and thus presumably in the Com-
munity interest. If the Big Three agree, they can override the three 
smaller Member States, but only if the Community interest reflected 
in the Commission's proposal is the basis for the Council's action. 
The Big Three must enlist the support of at least one of the others 
-Luxembourg is enough-in instances where no Commission pro-
posal is required. The Big Three are thus encouraged to agree 
among themselves, and the Community interest as well as the in-
terests of the smaller members are given a measure of protection. 
If the Big Three do not agree, no two of them can, without the sup-
port of both Belgium and the Netherlands, force their position on 
the third. The purpose of this limitation appears to be to discourage 
alliances among two of the Big Three to the prejudice of the other 
members, and is particularly interesting in the light of the much 
plJblicized Franco-German "alliance" (or better DeGaulle-Ade-
nauer entente) of recent vintage, which apparently has created 
some concern in the Benelux countries.18 
A Minister can vote by proxy for not more than one other Min-
ister-a corporation law concept transplanted into public law.19 
Abstention does not prevent a decision even where unanimity is 
16 Art. I48. 
17 Art. I49· 
18 In three instances the Treaty provides for special qualified majorities. Thus the 
establishment of minimum agricultural prices is to be decided by a majority of nine of 
the seventeen votes. Art. 44 ( 6). The budget of the Social Fund is to be adopted by 
a majority of 67 of the IOO votes, of which Germany and France command 32 votes 
each, Italy 20, Belgium 8, Netherlands 7 and Luxembourg I. Art. 203 (s). Finally, in 
administering the Development Fund for the overseas territories, the Council acts 
by a majority of 67 of the IOO votes, of which France and Germany command 33 
votes each, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands II votes each and Luxembourg I. 
Art. 7 Implementing Convention relating to the Association with the Community of 
the Overseas Countries and Territories. 
10 Art. I 50. 
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required if the abstaining Minister is present or represented by 
proxy. Unlike the practice of the Security Council of the United 
Nations, absence of a Minister would seem to prevent action where 
unanimity is required.20 
Although the Treaty is silent on the point, the Council has kept its 
deliberations and its voting secret-which has been a matter of 
some chagrin to the Assembly. 
C. THE CoMPOSITION OF THE CouNCIL 
Since it is composed of Cabinet Ministers, the Council is a politi-
cal body par excellence. Ministers change as governments change 
so that the Council reflects the prevailing political constellation in 
the Member States. Even though the Treaty conceives of the Coun-
cil as a Community organ, it will act primarily as a center for com-
position of national governmental differences, particularly in the 
earlier stages. 
As Ministers in the national Cabinets the Council members are 
responsible (to a larger or smaller degree depending on national 
constitutions) to their national parliaments. Although the Euro-
pean Parliamentary Assembly claims that the Council is politically 
responsible to it as well, the Assembly has no means of enforcing 
this responsibility. Acts of the Council, which are legally binding, 
are subject to attack on specified grounds before the Community 
Court by states, other institutions and individuals. 
A government is free to designate any one of its Cabinet Min-
isters to represent it on the Council. It appears likely, however, that 
Foreign Ministers will continue to appear at the meetings of the 
E.E.C. and Euratom Councils at least whenever basic matters are 
to be discussed.21 The Foreign Offices seem concerned that they will 
lose control over "European" affairs if Ministers other than those 
of Foreign Affairs should sit on the Councils. By the same token 
no Foreign Office of the Six would, presumably, favor the creation 
of a new cabinet post of "Minister for European Affairs." The 
creation of such a post obviously would raise a variety of adminis-
trative problems, but it has been suggested as one method of estab-
lishing in fact a single Council of Ministers common to all three 
Communities, even if in law under the treaties the three Councils 
20 Although there is no specific provision in the Treaty to this effect, this conclusion 
may be reached from art. 148(3). 
21 Ministers of Foreign Affairs often recess a Council meeting in order to meet as 
members of the governments of the Member States to discuss such matters as the 
selection of the seat of the institutions (art. 216). 
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remain separate organs. The E.E.C. and Euratom Councils some-
times meet jointly to deal with matters pertaining to both Com-
munities. 22 
In practice Cabinet Members other than Foreign Ministers (for 
example, Ministers of Finance, Transport, Agriculture) meet on 
Economic Community matters, but not as the Council, and sug-
gestions have been made that these important meetings should be 
brought within the official Community framework. 
The Councils have built up a Secretariat at Brussels composed of 
some 270 employees, and the large size of the Secretariat has been 
strongly criticized in the Assembly.23 Taking advantage of the au-
thorization of the Treaty/4 the E.E.C. Council established a Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives of Member States to which 
national governments have appointed high ranking diplomats with 
supporting staffs totalling some 150 persons. The Council has met 
as a rule not more than once a month 25 and has relied heavily on 
this Committee for preparatory work and to take follow-up action.26 
II. THE COMMISSION: THE COMMUNITY 
"ADMINISTRATION'' 
A. THE ROLE OF INITIATIVE AND SUPERVISION 
In the Community jargon the Commission is referred to as "the 
executive," 27 but the neutral term "Commission" is a substitute for 
the more impressive "High Authority" of the Coal-Steel Com-
munity Treaty and the adjective "supranational" it contained was, 
as already indicated, omitted in the corresponding article of the 
22 In the E.E.C. Council the members are generally repre~ented by their Foreign 
Ministers except for the Federal Republic of Germany which is represented by the 
Minister for Economic Affairs. In the Euratom CouncB the members are represented 
generally by Foreign Ministers or Ministers for Atomic Affairs. The Council of the 
Coal and Steel Community, perhaps because of its more specialized and less crucial 
role, is attended usually by Ministers of Economic Affairs or Ministers of Industry 
and Commerce and at times by other Ministers principally concerned with the subject 
under discussion. ANNUAIRE MANUEL DE L'ASsEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE 
1958-1959, 127-28. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 159 (1959). 
23 Resolution of December 17, 1958, [1959] JouRNAL 0FFICIEL DES CoMMUNAUTES 
EUROPEENNES (hereinafter cited as J'L OFF.) 15-17; La Communaute a l'Cpreuvc 
des faits, 1-La Commission et les Gouvernements, 1959 REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 
425 at 426 (No. 20). 
24 Art. 151. 
26 396 EUROPE item 2274 (April 25, 1959). 
26 E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 
27 (1958). 
27 Thus, the High Authority, the E. E. C. Commission, and the Euratom Commission 
are referred to as the "three European executives." 
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E.E.C. Treaty.28 These differences in terminology emphasize the 
fact that the Commission's power of independent decision has been 
curtailed as compared with that of the High Authority. The Com-
mission's principal power is that of initiative in preparing and pro-
posing action by the Council (and the Assembly). In addition, it 
ensures and supervises the application of the Treaty provisions and 
of Council measures. It has a limited power of independent decision 
("under the conditions laid down in the Treaty") but it may issue 
recommendations and opinions "where the Commission considers 
it necessary" as well as where "the Treaty expressly so provides." 29 
Again, the Council may charge the Commission with implementa-
tion of its measures. The Commission represents the Community in 
national courts,30 in contacts with international organizations,31 and 
in negotiations for international agreements (under the direction 
of the Council) .32 According to a reported internal arrangement 
between the Council and the Commission, any request from a for-
eign government for accreditation of a foreign mission is made to 
the Commission and forwarded by it to the Council which approves 
the request and the head of the mission. The official accreditation is 
then performed by the President of the Commission.33 
The Commission submits an annual report and special reports to 
the Assembly which are the basis of the Assembly's work. It is politi-
cally responsible to the Assembly which can force its resignation in 
a body (but not that of individual members) on a motion of censure 
by a vote of a two-thirds majority.34 
B. THE COMMISSIONERS AND THEIR STAFF 
The Commission is composed of nine members, nationals of the 
Member States, ':chosen for their general competence and of in-
disputable independence" 35 and appointed by the Member States, 
28 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 9, E.E.C. Treaty art. I 57, Euratom Treaty art. I26. Both the 
E.E.C. and Euratom Commissions call themselves officially "European Commission." 
E.E.C. CoMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 26, at I5. 
29 Art. I 55· 
30 Art. 2II. 
31 Art. 229. 
32 Arts. 228, I I r ( 2) of the Treaty and art. 6 of the Protocol on Privileges and Im-
munities ; cf. art. 23 8 in connection with art. 228. 
33 Cf. ~the announcement that President Hallstein received the Chief of the Japanese 
Mission who presented to him his letters of accreditation, [I959] J'L OFF. 1127. As of 
March I96o, ten governments have accredited diplomatic missions to the Community. 
(United States, Greece, Israel, Denmark, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, Norway, Ireland), [r96o] ]'L OFF. 526-27 . 
.. Arts. I 56, I44· 
35 Art. I 57· 
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"acting in common agreement," for a four year term which is re-
newable.36 Thus each Member State has a veto over any candidate. 
The Treaty directs that the Commissioners act in the Community 
interest; it specifically prohibits them from accepting instructions 
from their national governments and obligates the latter to refrain 
from seeking to influence them. The members are not allowed, while 
in office, to engage in any other occupation,37 paid or unpaid, and 
their obligation of "honesty and discretion" with respect to their 
official duties extends beyond their term of office under the penalty 
of loss of pension. They are subject to provisional suspension by 
the Council and removal by the Community Court for serious mis-
conduct.38 
At present each of the Big Three has two nationals and the Bene-
lux countries have one each on the Commission. Professor Hallstein, 
former State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, is the Presi-
dent and there are French, Dutch and Italian Vice-Presidents.39 
While nationality was obviously a factor in their selection (the 
Treaty provides that not more than two nationals of any one Mem-
ber State may be appointed), the present group appears competent 
and well qualified.40 It includes three former ministers in national 
governments and represents a variety of educational and profes-
sional backgrounds ranging from law, diplomacy, and economics 
to finance, agriculture, journalism, colonial administration, and so-
cial work; it reflects experience in business, government, and uni-
versity teaching.H As a new body it has attracted top-notch person-
alities; past experience with other bodies points up the difficulties 
of retaining men of high caliber in similar positions. 
The staff of the Commission (the 1960 budget authorizes 1,686 
persons) 42 is grouped into eight functional departments (General 
Directorates), corresponding broadly to the principal areas of the 
•• The High Authority is also composed of 9 members while the Euratom Commission 
has only 5· For considerations underlying these numbers see REUTER, CouRS DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 54 (Paris 1958-1959). 
37 Art. 157(2). The German text speaks of "Berufstiitigkeit." 
33 Art. 160. The German text of the Treaty refers to a "Verfehlung." 
30 Art. 161 provides that the President and the Vice-Presidents are appointed from 
among the Commissioners by the governments acting in common agreement. (Although 
the Treaty provides for two Vice-Presidents, three Vice-Presidents have been ap-
pointed.) 
40 See CAMPS, THE FIRST YEAR OF THE E.E.C. 4-5 (1958), on the distribution of the 
presidencies in the three Communities. 
41 See 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 23-24 (No. 1), for names and biographic 
sketches of the. original members. 
'"Budget de Ia Commission economique europeenne pour l'exercice 1960, [1960] 
]'L OFF. 466. 
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Treaty, and an administrative department.43 Each department con-
tains three or four divisions (Directorates) .44 The members of the 
Commission have organized themselves in eight standing working 
groups of three or four. Each group supervises the work of one 
department. A group composed of the President and the three Vice-
Presidents has responsibility for the department of administration. 
The President may place any matter before the Commission for its 
consideration at any time.45 
The Commission makes its decisions by a simple majority of five 
in meetings held, as a rule, weekly in Brussels. 
C. POLICY MAKERS OR ADMINISTRATORS? 
If one conceives of the Council of Ministers as analogous to the 
Head of the State in a parliamentary democracy, the members of 
the Commission could be deemed to have the status of Cabinet Min-
isters, and the heads of departments of the Commission the status 
of the ranking civil servants. The Commission seeks to stress its 
non-bureaucratic and "executive" character. In the words of its 
President, it sees itself primarily as a policy-making and coordinat-
ing authority with direct administrative functions limited to the 
operational responsibilities for the various Funds mentioned earlier. 
It is to act as a general staff relying on selected experts and special-
ists.46 
There may be some doubt whether the organizational pattern as 
well as the size and the character of the staff recruited at a brisk 
pace reflect the "general staff" concept. 47 Unquestionably the staff 
includes a number of exceptionally able and well-trained experts. 
Yet, a keen American observer felt that preoccupation with balanced 
distribution of nationalities throughout all staff levels, coupled with 
a somewhat elaborate staff hierarchy, created an impression of over-
organization and possibly of temporary over-staffing. The latter 
may be due partly to the fact that the Commission has hardly begun 
to develop its policy in a number of fields and partly to the fact that, 
13 The eight general directorates are: External Relations, Economic and Financial 
Questions, Internal Market, Competition, Social Affairs, Agriculture, Transport, Over-
seas Countries and Territories. E.E.C. CoMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 26, annex A at 
129-30 (1958). 
" I d., annex B at r 3 r-32. 
'"I d. at 21. 
•• Speech by E.E.C. President Hallstein of October 21, 1958, Community Publication 
2089/2/58/5, at 36-37. 
47 At least one Member government was reported as believing that the Commission 
(and for that matter even the Council of Ministers) have become bogged down in 
detail. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1959. 
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because the Council must approve the budget, the Commission fears 
an early "freeze" of personnel at a too low level.48 
The Council did, in fact, reduce the Commission's first draft 
budget substantially.49 When the Assembly debated the budget, 
the Christian Democratic group limited its criticism to what it con-
sidered the excessive size of the Secretariat of the Councils, and the 
Assembly resolution appears to reflect this position.50 The resolu-
tion was interpreted, however, (particularly by the Liberals) as 
censuring also the size of the staff of the Commission, one Liberal 
speaking of a "pathological inflation" of administration, threaten-
ing administrative paralysis and usurpation of the policy-making 
functions of the Commission by its high-ranking staff. 51 The Com-
mission members, on the other hand, complained that the reduction 
ordered by the Council will gravely impair the preparation of the 
necessary studies, statistics, analyses of legislation for purposes of 
harmonization in the tax field and the like. 52 The spectacle was, in 
short, reminiscent of budgetary debates in American legislatures 
and for that matter in any parliament. More recently the As-
sembly manifested its concern that the Commission would not be 
given adequate personnel to perform its tasks, and particularly 
those in the social field. 53 
The fact that three "executives" operate independently under 
three different treaties is an absurdity explainable on political 
grounds but hardly compatible with effective administration. Efforts 
have been made to coordinate their work through joint committees 
and by other means. "Common services" have been established in 
the legal, statistical and information fields to serve all three "execu-
tives," but apparently only the statistical "common service" in fact 
operates as a unit. 54 
•• CAMPS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 5; the nationality key allows each of the Big 
Three 25% of all positions and the Benelux countries share the remaining 25%. 
•• Stein, suPra note 4, at 248-49. 
60 Resolution of December 17, 1958, [1959] }'L OFF. 15-17; Resolution of April II, 
1959, para. 6, [1959] J'L OFF. 548, 550. 
61 For a "liberal" view see also Margulies, Die Kosten der Klein-europiiischen 
Gemeinschaften, 2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 292-94 (No. IZ) (1959). 
60 E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 
16 (1959). 
G3 [1959] J'L OFF. 1052. 
64 The problem of a "European Civil Service" has engaged the attention of the 
Council of Europe. Its consultative Assembly called-without noticeable success-for 
standardization of conditions of service, common recruitment methods and coordinated 
training of personnel in the numerous European organizations. 1959 CouNCIL OF 
EUROPE NEWS 9-10 (No.4). 
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III. THE EVOLVING PATTERN OF COUNCIL-
COMMISSION RELATIONS 
A. THE TREATY PROCEDURE 
The Treaty contemplates a close and continuing relationship be-
tween the Council and the Commission. The Commission proposal, 
as suggested, is a prerequisite of Council action in most instances. 
On the other hand, if the Commission fails to submit a proposal, 
the Council may request it to do so; and if the Commission fails to 
act as it is required to under the Treaty, the Council may bring the 
matter before the Community Court for adjudication.55 The Com-
mission, for its part, has the right to request that a meeting of the 
Council be held and likewise may bring the Council before the Court 
in specified circumstances.56 The Treaty calls for consultations be-
tween the two bodies and the details of their collaboration are to 
be settled by "mutual agreement." 57 The essence of the Treaty 
pattern may thus be described as follows: the Commission develops 
proposals concerning Community policy, and, if they command the 
required support, the Council adopts them, after consulting with 
other bodies as prescribed. 
B. THE EVOLVING PRACTICE 
In practice the pattern of Council-Commission relations has de-
veloped somewhat differently. The Commission has been in close 
and continuing contact with the Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives representing the governments of the Member States at 
the Brussels seat of the Communities. Through the Permanent Rep-
resentatives the Commission obtains the views of national gov-
ernments before making proposals to the Council. Through them 
it also arranges for conferences with experts supplied by national 
governmental departments. A number of mixed working groups 
composed of officials drawn from national administrations and the 
Commission staff meet regularly on problems under consideration 
by the Commission. For example, some nine groups of this type have 
been working on the general program for the removal of the re-
strictions on the right of establishment and supply of services which 
the Commission is to propose to the Council-each group examining 
""Arts. 152, 175. 
58 Art. 147. 
57 Art. 162. 
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the national legislative and administrative provisions governing 
a given category of activities (insurance, banking, trade, crafts, 
agriculture, etc.) Similarly, negotiation in a number of working 
groups under a central group has produced agreement on most items 
of the common external tariff which the Treaty left to be determined 
by negotiation among the members. Groups of national experts have 
been considering with the Commission staff outlines of proposals 
for a common agricultural policy, and others concerning anti-dump-
ing measures, state subsidies and the like. A conference of national 
experts under the chairmanship of a Commission member estab-
lished three working groups on taxation problems.58 
Conferences and groups of this type have served to coordinate 
national action and to provide information to the Commission.59 
Experts from national administrations also bring to these confer-
ences complaints against actions of other Member States which they 
view as violations of Treaty commitments. Even in the field of 
restrictive practices, where the Community was given powers of 
direct intervention, the Commission has proceeded with caution: the 
head of the Commission department concerned with competition 
chairs conferences of national experts designated by the govern-
ments. In these conferences agreement is sought on interpretation 
of the rather loosely-drawn provisions of the Treaty, and cases of 
restrictive practices suggested by national experts are examined to 
determine whether they fall into the categories proscribed by the 
Treaty. 60 While, of course, there are direct contacts between the 
Council and the Commission, the emerging pattern discloses con-
tinuing negotiations between the Commission and the national gov-
ernments on various levels and particularly through the Permanent 
Representatives. As a result, where the Treaty requires the sub-
mission of a Commission-prepared proposal to the Council, the gov-
ernments in fact pass upon it before it is submitted to the Council. 
In exercising its power of supervision and enforcement the Com-
mission has also communicated with the member governments con-
cerned before concluding that the Treaty has been violated or taking 
other steps. In several instances where new customs duties, allegedly 
in violation of the Treaty's "standstill" provision, were introduced, 
08 See the communique of the Commission reported in 443 EUROPE, item 2694 (June 
24, 1959)· 
•• E.E.C. COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 52, at 8-9. 
00 /d. at 86-89. Mixed Council-Commission committees have been established in a 
few instances, for example, to examine the problems raised by a possible European 
Economic Association. 
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the Commission, after discussion with the government concerned, 
took the preliminary steps of the enforcement procedure envisaged 
by the Treaty, but there has been no official public notice from the 
Commission on the outcome of this action. In one instance, the 
Commission is reported to have issued a "reasoned opinion" under 
Article r69 advising the French government that the imposition of 
a customs duty on paper pulp was in violation of the Treaty and 
inviting that government to remove the duty within a given period.61 
On another occasion the Commission, acting under Article 93 ( 2), 
rendered a "decision" directing the same government to remove a 
subsidy in the form of tax benefits accorded to French industries 
only. The "opinion" and the "decision" respectively are prerequisite 
preliminary steps to bringing the matter before the Community 
Court for adjudication. But in both cases compliance by the govern-
ment concerned made further steps unnecessary. Again, the Com-
mission disclosed in its reply to a parliamentary question that it had 
instituted an investigation of an agreement concluded between pro-
ducers and merchants of earthenware to determine whether the 
agreement infringes upon the antitrust provisions of the Treaty.62 
The pattern of negotiations, in which the Permanent Representa-
tives play such a major role, may well be the only realistic modus 
operandi in view of the present powers of the Commission, the lack 
of information in its files, the time it will take to build up truly ex-
pert knowledge, the still limited awareness on the part of the public 
of Community issues and the unwillingness of some governments 
to support a stronger role for the Commission. The failure of the 
governments in the spring of I959 to support the High Authority's 
proposals for the handling of the coal crisis has undoubtedly made 
the Commission even more inclined to seek to persuade national 
governments before making formal proposals to the Council. 63 
IV. ADVISORY COMMITTEES: THE VOICE OF 
"OUTSIDE" EXPERTS AND SPECIAL 
INTEREST GROUPS 
The Treaty creates a number of advisory bodies of which the 
three most important merit consideration here. The Economic and 
01 Cf. Les Echanges dans le Marchi Commun, pt. II, 1959 REVUE ou MARCHE CoMMUN 
239 (No. 15) • 
.. [1959] ]'L OFF. II22-23· 
63 E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
COMMUNITY 63--76 (1959); also E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, RAPPORT SPEciAL DE 'LA 
HAUTE AUTORITE A L'ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE CONCERNANT LA QUESTION 
CHARBONNIERE (1959). . 
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Social Committee is endowed with the broadest advisory functions. 64 
It serves both the E.E.C. and Euratom. The Treaty provides that 
in specified instances the E.E.C. Council or the Commission must 
seek the Committee's opinion, which, however, is not binding on 
them. In addition, the Council or the Commission may seek the 
advice of the Committee whenever either deems it appropriate. 65 
The Committee membership is rather large, consisting of 101 
members serving in their personal capacities and therefore not sub-
ject to instructions from their governments. The Big Three are each 
allotted 24 seats, Belgium and the Netherlands 12 each and Luxem-
bourg five. 66 Each member government submits to the Council a list 
of candidates containing twice as many names as there are positions 
and the Council makes the appointments from these lists after con-
sulting the Commissions.67 Under the Treaty the Committee is to 
include representatives of "the various categories of economic and 
social life, in particular, representatives of producers, agricultural-
ists, transport operators, workers, merchants, artisans, the liberal 
professions and of the general interest." 68 
The Treaty reflects an intention of the governments to maintain 
fairly strict control over this Committee of uninstructed individuals: 
any Member State may veto in the Council the appointment of any 
representative; the Council must approve by unanimous vote the 
Rules of Procedure of the Committee and the Committee is to be 
convened "at the request of the Council or of the Commission." 69 
In working out the Rules of Procedure a difference arose between 
•• Katzenstein, Der Arbeitnehmer in der europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 12 
DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 1081 at 1083 (1957) is of the opinion that the Committee 
has a more far-reaching right to be heard by the executive institutions than the Euro-
pean Parliamentary Assembly. 
65 Art. 198. 
66 Art. 194· 
01 Art. 195· 
68 Art. 193, para. 2. 
The Committee comprises a great variety of interests with emphasis on producers 
and labor both in industry and agriculture. The precise balance varies from one 
national contingent to the other. Among the members are officials of labor and white 
collar employees' unions and unionists from overseas areas; officials and executives 
of trade associations (composed of agricultural and industrial producers, merchants, 
and craftsmen) and of chambers of commerce and agriculture; bankers, shipping and 
river navigation company executives, import-export wholesale executives; experts in 
transportation, tourism, radiology, nuclear energy, and nuclear economics; university 
professors of chemistry and economics; representatives of cooperatives; a few govern-
ment officials concerned with economic planning and agriculture; a single Italian 
lawyer representing liberal professions; a housewife-consumer expert, etc. For the 
original membership, see 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 131-137 (No. 3); for a 
more recent Jist, see ANNUAIRE-MANUEL DE L'AsSEMBLEE PARI.EMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE 
1958-1959, at 185-94. 
69 Art. 196. 
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the Councils on one hand and the Committee on the other, as to the 
scope of the latter's right of initiative; a "compromise" was reached 
after considerable delay under which the Committee may meet on 
its own initiative and in the absence of a formal request for an 
opinion but only if one of the Councils or Commissions has given 
its prior approval and only on those questions on which it "must 
or may be consulted" under the Treaty.70 
Control of publicity by the Committee may have been considered 
a possible instrument of pressure upon the institutions: thus the 
Rules provide that the opinions of the Committee can be published 
only "under conditions and by means determined" by the institution 
concerned.71 No provision is made to preclude publicity originated 
by an individual Committee member concerning his attitudes or 
those of other members, however, and the right to seek assistance 
from outside expert consultants 72 may also provide a method of 
circumventing the limitation on publicity. 
The Assembly recommended that labor and employers be assured 
parity on the Committee and expressed formally its regret when the 
recommendation was not heeded. 73 The composition of the Com-
ittee was termed "thoroughly unbalanced" in certain labor quar-
ters.74 An early conflict between labor and employers over the allo-
cation of the offices of the Committee President and Vice-President 
was solved by a compromise based on an overall increase in the 
number of Vice-Presidents: 75 it took time and considerable doing 
to complete the organization of the Committee.76 
The Committee is required by the Treaty to establish "specialized 
sections" in the fields of agriculture and transportation, in which 
the Community institutions are to develop common Community 
policies. It established similar sections in five other fields obviously 
in an attempt to overcome the handicaps of unwieldiness stemming 
70 Reglement interieur, art. IS, para. 3 [I959] }'L OFF. 496. 
n /d., art. 45, para. 3· 
72 /d., art. I4. 
73 Resolution of March 2I, I958, [I958] ]'L OFF. II; Resolution of January IS, I959, 
pt. VI, [1959] }'L. OFF. 167 at I69. 
74 Rosenberg, Zusammenarbeit und Organisation der Gewerkschaften West-Europas, 
2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT I65 at I66 (No.7) (I959). 
7
" The labor group claimed that a Vice-President elected to represent the "general 
interest" group in fact represented the employers. By way of a compromise the total 
number of Vice-Presidents as well as the number of Vice-Presidents representing labor 
interests was increased. 278 EuROPE, item 1350 (November 28, I958). 
76 The Euratom Commission made it clear that the present composition of the Com-
mittee reflects only partially its suggestions concerning the number of nuclear special-
ists. EURATOM COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CoM-
MUNITY 34 (I958), 
THE NEW INSTITUTIONS 49 
from its size.77 The work is done principally by the sections and by 
working groups within the sections and any proposed opinions-
of which it had already rendered several by the beginning of 1960 
-are ratified in plenary meetings of the Committee. The institu-
tions may not approach the sections directly.78 
The Committee's relations with the Commissions appear satis-
factory. Several E.E.C. Commissioners have already addressed a 
plenary meeting of the Committee in order to describe the Commis-
sion's working plans in the social and other fields in which requests 
for opinion may be forthcoming, and, although not required to do 
so by the Treaty, the E.E.C. Commission asked the Committee for 
an opinion on a proposed directive concerning the application of 
the right of establishment to the overseas areas.79 
It is much too early to say to what extent this Committee will be 
more significant than a similar committee of the Coal-Steel Com-
munity.80 It is important in that it offers a forum for private indi-
viduals and interest groups in the Community, and despite its cir-
cumscribed powers, it may play a useful role. 
When the E.E.C. Commission asked the Committee for an opin-
ion on the very topical question of harmonization of certain aspects 
of national commercial policies, for example, the Committee pro-
duced a provisional urgent recommendation addressed to the gov-
ernments of the Member States urging them to adopt certain posi-
tions with respect to imports from third countries with exceptionally 
low wages, multiple exchange rates, and state trading systems. The 
Rules of Procedure provide for no such provisional recommenda-
tion, but this fact was brushed aside by the Committee. 
Another advisory body, the Monetary Committee, may become 
of considerable importance particularly because the Committee 
may offer opinions to the Council or to the Commission on its own 
initiative as well as at their request. 81 Its function is to assist in the 
coordination of national policies in monetary matters in accordance 
with a charter ( Statut) 82 established by the Council. Each Mem-
ber State has appointed one executive of its central bank and one 
high official of its Ministry of Finance and the Commission has 
designated two officials from its own staff to serve on the Com-
77 [1959] J'L Orr. 503-507. 
78 Art. 197, para. 3· 
70 E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 
23 (1959)· 
80 ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 169 ( 1959). 
81 Art. 105. 
""[1958] J'L Orr. 390. 
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mittee. The work of the Committee may be facilitated by the fact 
that the governors of the central banks have been discussing com-
mon problems regularly over many years in the sessions of the Board 
of Governors of the Bank of International Settlements in Basel 
and have established close personal relationships. The Committee, 
with the assistance of the Commission staff, has been engaged in a 
quarterly examination of the monetary and financial situations of 
the Six, in studies of convertibility and in working out a program 
for lifting restrictions on flow of capital.83 
A third advisory body, the Transportation Committee "com-
posed of experts appointed by the Governments" 84 has been estab-
lished to advise the Commission on matters relating to transporta-
tion. 85 In accordance with this committee's charter ( Statut), formu-
lated by the Council,86 each government ultimately appointed two 
high level officials and three transportation experts (with alter-
nates) to membership. The members serve in their personal capacity 
and must not receive instructions from their governments.87 The 
Committee elects its Chairman and Vice-Chairman from among 
the members who are government officials.88 It may meet and render 
opinions at the request of the Commission.89 
Controversy arose at the outset in connection with the composi-
tion of the Committee with the result that it was not formed until 
more than a year after the Treaty had come into effect. Moreover, 
the Commission has since been closely questioned in the Assembly 
because the role of experts as compared with that of government 
officials in the Transportation Committee was thought to be dispro-
portionately small, the Parliamentary Assembly Committee on 
Transportation having expressed the view that the Committee 
should be composed of independent experts rather than govern-
mental officials or spokesmen for special interest groups.90 The 
labor unions have also demanded that at least one representative 
83 E.E.C. CoMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 79, at 24. 
•• Art. 83. 
85 This committee must be distinguished from the specialized section for transporta-
tion of the Economic and Social Committee mentioned above. 
•• Statut du Comite des Transports, [1958] ]'L OFF. 509. 
87 I d., art. 3· 
88 ld., art. 5, para. 1," 
•• I d., arts. 6 and 7· 
00 Parliamentary question and answers of the E.E.C. Commission and the E.C.S.C. 
High Authority in [1959] ]'L OFF. 685-86. Speeches by Rapporteur Kapteyn and 
Commissioner Schaus in the European Parliamentary Assembly, AssEMBLEE PARLE-
MENTAIRE EUROPEENNE, DEBATS, COMPTE RENDU IN EXTENSO DES SEANCES, EDITION PRO-
VISOIRE [hereinafter cited as Pari. Debates] (No. sA, Jan. 13, 1959) 147 at 149-50 and 
165 at r68-7o. 
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be appointed to this Committee from their ranks by each govern-
ment.91 
The Committee has already been called upon by the Commission 
to give its opinion on a proposed regulation for the abolition of 
certain forms of discrimination in transportation.92 
The Treaty provides for other advisory bodies. Because of its 
"triangular" composition, mention may be made particularly of the 
mixed Committee which is to assist the Commission in the adminis-
tration of the European Social Fund. It is chaired by a Commission 
member and composed of representatives of governments, labor 
unions and employers' associations.93 
V. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY: 
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE? 
94 
A. COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE AssEMBLY 
The Assembly and the Court of Justice are the two institutions 
common to all three Communities.95 The Assembly's functions un-
der the three treaties differ somewhat. It succeeded the Common 
Assembly of the Coal-Steel Community which was in existence from 
1952 until 1958. Although technically a new institution, the Euro-
pean Assembly has adopted in substance the practices and proce-
dures of the Common Assembly and has been seeking to perfect 
them. It has been able to profit from the expertise and experience 
accumulated in the more than five years of its predecessor's work. 
When the Rome Treaties were in the process of negotiation, the 
French delegation insisted that an entirely new assembly be created 
91 317 EUROPE, item 1622 (January 19, 1959). Only the Benelux countries included 
labor union representatives among the three experts; France appointed a unionist as 
an alternate expert. Ibid. 
92 Art. 79(3). E.E.C. CoMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 79, at 25-26 (1959). 246 EUROPE, 
item 1858 (February 24, 1959); 373 id., item 2083 (March 27, 1959); 407 id., item 
2381 (May 12, 1959); 415 id., item 2455 (May 22, 1959). 
03 Art. 124. Cf. also Committee of Control which is charged with auditing the budget. 
Art. 206. Its Statut (charter) is contained in [1959] J'L OFF. 861. For a description of 
the E.E.C. Administrative Commission for Social Security of Migrant Workers see the 
chapter of this book by Otto Kahn-Freund. The Statut of this Commission is con-
tained in [1959] }'L OFF. 1213 . 
.. This section is based in part upon this writer's article: Stein, The European Parlia-
mentary Assembly: Techniques of Emerging "Political Control," published in XIII 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 233-54 (1959); on the European Parliamentary Assem-
bly generally see HEIDELBERGER, DAS EUROPAISCHE PARLAMENT (1959). 
05 Arts. 1 and 3, Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the Euro-
pean Communities. Both the E.E.C. and Euratom treaties speak of "the Assembly," but 
the Assembly ass1.nned the name "European Parliamentary Assembly" in its first 
session. 
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for the E.E.C. and Euratom. This would have meant a fourth As-
sembly in Western Europe, to be added to the Common Assembly 
of the Coal-Steel Community, the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe and the Assembly of the Western European 
Union. The strong and coordinated opposition on the part of the 
three Assemblies then in existence was an important factor in creat-
ing the single European Assembly.96 
The Assembly has been called the most "supranational" of the 
Community institutions.97 Composed of "representatives of the 
peoples" 98 independent of national governments and independent 
of the other institutions, the Assembly has exclusive control over 
matters of its own organization 99 and votes in most instances by 
simple majority.100 Yet it is in no sense a legislature and its powers 
are limited. 
The 142 representatives are members of the national parliaments 
of the six Member States and are selected by them.101 The assembly 
hall in Strasbourg, borrowed from the Council of Europe Assembly, 
has the semi-circular design typical of national parliaments and for 
the first time in the history of international assemblies, the repre-
sentatives are seated not according to nationality but according to 
political affiliation.102 
Three political "groups" currently exist in the Assembly. These 
are, from left to right, the Socialists, the Christian Democrats and 
the Liberals with affiliates. Just as the United States Constitution 
contains no reference to political parties, so the three tr~aties set-
ting up the Communities make no mention of political groups. 
Nevertheless, political groups are as much the mainspring of politi-
cal action in the Assembly as are political parties in the U.S. Con-
gress. Political groups are regulated by the Rules of Procedure of 
96 ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 167 (1959); France, CONSEIL DE LA REPUBLIQUE, 
SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 1956-1957, ANNEXE AU PROcES-VERBAL DE LA 1'6 SEANCE DU IZ 
JUILLET 1957. No. 873, Rapport fait au nom de Ia Commission des Affaires etrangeres 
sur le projet de loi .•. autorisant le President de Ia Republique a ratifier: z• le 
Traite instituant Ia Communaute economique europeenne ... par MM. Cartassonne 
et Biatarana, senateurs, at 7239. On European Assemblies see LINDSAY, EuROPEAN As-
SEMBLIEs-THE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD 1949-1959 (1960); LINDSAY, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT (1958). 
97 Heraud, Observations sur Ia nature juridique de Ia Communaute economique 
europeenne, 62 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 26 at 45 ( 1958). 
98 Art. 137. 
'"Arts. 140, 142. 
100 Arts. 141. 
101 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 21, E.E.C. Treaty art. 138(1), Euratom Treaty art. 108(1). 
102 E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 
19 ( 1958 ). 
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the Assembly,103 which require a minimum membership of I 7 for 
the formation of a group, 104 since both political and financial con-
siderations make it desirable to avoid proliferation. There was also 
some concern that groups under the guise of political affinity might 
serve as cover for national rather than Community-wide blocs.105 
The treaties _do not expressly prohibit the representatives from 
receiving instructions from their parliaments, but such instructions 
would obviously impair the Assembly's role as a representative of 
Community interests. The practice of the Coal-Steel Common As-
sembly had already established the independence of representatives 
from their parliaments, 106 and in order to encourage it, the Common 
Assembly made arrangements for funds to provide the political 
groups with independent secretariats.107 When the Assembly con-
venes in Strasbourg, one therefore finds the secretariats of the three 
political groups, 108 as well as offices of the national contingents. 
While the political groups meet frequently under their respective 
presidents, the national contingents meet only rarely, and it has been 
said that in the past the French contingent, for instance, met only 
to note that it was divided. The differences within the national con-
tingents have moreover led to spirited exchanges on the floor. 109 
The key to the composition of the Assembly is nationality: the 
Big Three (France, Germany, and Italy) hold 36 seats each, Bel-
gium and the Netherlands 14 each, and Luxembourg six. 110 This 
103 Rules of Procedure, art. 34(5), [1958] J'L OFF. 217. 
104 There are seventeen members in the smaller of the thirteen standing committees. 
Resolution of March 20, 1958, r 1958] J'L OFF. 4· 
105 Doc. No. 17 AssEMBLER PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE (JUNE, 1958), Rapport fait 
au nom de Ia Commission du Reglement, des questions juridiques, des petitions et des 
immunith sur le Reglement de L'Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne par A. van 
Kauvenbergh, Rapporteur, para. II at 12; cf. also Pari. Debates (No. 7, June 1958) 
( mimeo.) s-6. 
106 C.E.C.A., L'ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE DANS L'EUROPE DES SIX (P. Wigny, rap-
porteur) 24 ( 1958) [hereinafter cited as Wigny Report]. 
107 Decision of June 16, 1953, id. at 25. 
108 HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 411 (1958). 
1011 See, for instance, the debate of two German parliamentarians, Mr. Deist (Chris-
tian Democrat) and Mr. Burgbacher (Socialist), on the German coal-oil cartel. Pari. 
Debates (No. 2, Jan. 9, 1959) 38 at 44 and 48. 
110 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 21, as modified by art. 2(2) of the Convention Relating to 
Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities; E.E.C. Treaty art. 138(2); 
Euratom Treaty art. 108(2). 
The representation of the Big Three in the new Assembly was doubled from what 
it was in the Common Assembly while the representation of the Benelux countries was 
increased by 40 to so per cent. The· object was to equal the number of representatives 
plus substitutes of each of the member countries in the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe in order to permit the appointment of one "set" of European parlia-
mentarians. Belgium, CHAMBRE DES REPRESENTANTS, Rapport fait au nom de /a Com-
mission Speciale, 727 (1956-1957), No.2, at 23-25; CATALANO, LA CoMUNITA ECONO-
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distribution of seats resulted in a larger representation of the Bene-
lux countries than is justified by their population, but the Big Three 
agreed to it in order to permit the smaller countries to send politi-
cally diversified delegations. However, it was pointed out in the 
German ratification debates that the distribution of seats may have 
to be reexamined when the Assembly is elected directly by universal 
suffrage as eventually contemplated in the three treaties.m 
In the June 1959 session there were 69 Christian Democrats, 32 
Socialists, and 40 Liberals and affiliates. 112 The Liberals have since 
increased substantially in number, principally as a result of the shift 
in the composition of the French National Assembly resulting from 
the De Gaulle landslide in the I 9 58 elections. 
The national contingents are composed of members of both 
chambers of the national parliaments, with the exception of that 
from Luxembourg, which has a unicameral system, and that of Ger-
many. The German upper chamber (Bundesrat), with the support 
of the government, claimed the right to participate in the German 
contingent, but the lower chamber (Bundestag) proceeded to fill 
the entire German contingent from its own membership on the 
ground that the Bundesrat is an appointed and not an elected body.113 
The procedure for designating the national contingents varies 
from parliament to parliament. As a rule, the political parties within 
the parliament divide the total number of seats among themselves 
and select their own candidates; this selection is then formally rati-
fied by the parliament. The national parliaments have excluded the 
Communists (and the Poujadists) from their Strasbourg contin-
gents.114 
In contrast to the national parliaments, the Assembly has no true 
MICA EUROPEA E L'EURATOM 20 (1957); von Stempel, Die ]nstitutionen der Euro-
piiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschajt, I EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 167 at 
168 (1958) No. 9· 
111 Germany, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, 2 WAHLPERIODE 1953, DRUCKSACHE 3440 ANLAGE 
C, Erliiuterungen zu den Vertriigen zur Griindung der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsge-
meinschaft und der Europiiischen Atomgemeinschaft, 142 ( 1957). It is reported that 
the French delegation took the same position during the negotiations for the Rome 
Treaties. 
112 [1959] }'L OFF. 791-93. 
113 Germany, BuNDESRAT, Niederschrift iiber die Sitzung des Sonderausschusses 
"Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom" vom 2¢ April, 1957, 65-68; BUNDESRAT, DRUCK-
SACHE NR. 146/57, Anlage zu dem Schreiben des Priisidenten des Bundesrates an den 
Bundeskanzler vom 3 Mai, 1957; BUNDESRAT, No. 181 SITZUNGSBERICHT 744 (July 19, 
1957); Gesetz zu den Vertriigen vom 25 Miirz 1957 zur Grundung der Europiiischen 
Wirtschaftgemeinschaft und der Europiiischen Atomgemeinschaft, [1957] Bundesgesetz-
blatt II, 753· 
1U Reuter, Les Institutions de Ia Communaute a l'epreuve, 17 DROIT SociAL 518, 522 
( 1954). 
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"administration" and "opposition" parties. The Assembly is not 
"organized" by ony one of the three groups, but the principal offices 
(President and eight Vice-Presidents) and the composition of the 
thirteen standing committees reflect an effort to assure fair national 
as well as political representation. In this respect the Assembly has 
characteristics both of an international assembly and of a national 
parliament. 
In the Common Assembly the Christian Democrats were said to 
have been forced into the position of the "administration" party, 
particularly because of their opposition to Socialist attacks against 
the High Authority of the Coal-Steel Community. The Liberal 
group was composed of a variety of political parties with varying 
objectives, but they joined with the Christian Democrats whenever 
the latter took a position favoring free enterprise. When the Chris-
tian Democrats were divided on High Authority policy, as was fre-
quently the case, the Liberals tended to use their influence to block 
action. 115 While it may be too early to draw any definite conclusions 
concerning the European Assembly, a similar pattern apparently is 
emerging in it. The Socialists, certainly the most cohesive group, 
would seem to be playing an even more "activist" role than they did 
in the Common Assembly, pressing for Community planning, action 
and direct intervention in a variety of fields. 
B. INTERNATIONAL AssEMBLY OR PARLIAMENT? 
What are "the powers of deliberation and of control" 116 which 
are entrusted to the Assembly by the E.E.C. Treaty? 
The Commission is obligated to submit to the Assembly an annual 
general report. 117 The Assembly and the individual representatives 
may address questions to the Commission, which is required to 
answer orally or in writing.118 The Assembly may force the resigna-
tion of the Commission at any time by a motion of censure based on 
any of the Commission's activities and adopted by two-thirds of the 
votes cast representing a majority of all representatives. 119 In in-
stances specified by the Treaty, the Assembly must be consulted by 
the Council: these include important matters of Community policy, 
110 HAAS, op. cit. supra note 108, at 436. 
116 Art. 137. The German text speaks of "Beratungs-und Kontroll-befugnisse," the 
French of "pouvoirs de deliberation et de controle." 
117 Arts. 143, 156. Cf. E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIVITIES 
OF THE COMMUNITY (1958); and E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE CoMMUNITY (1959). 
118 Art. 140. 
119 Art. 144. Cf. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 24. 
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some of the measures affecting national legislation, 120 "extension" 
of the powers of the institutions, 121 the calling of conferences to 
amend the Treaty 122 (but not the amendments themselves) and the 
conclusion of agreements of association with other entities (but not 
the decision to admit a new member to the Community) .123 The 
Assembly must also be consulted on the budget and has the right to 
propose modifications.124 The Assembly "consultations" are not 
binding on the Council. 
In terms of its power the Assembly resembles in some respects 
an international organization assembly, and in other respects a na-
tional parliament. 125 Like the United Nations General Assembly, 
it discusses, obtains facts, and recommends. Its powers over the 
budget are inferior to those of the United Nations Assembly which 
determines the budget of the Organization. Like a national parlia-
ment the European Assembly exercises a measure of control over 
the "executive" organ and may force its resignation. Unlike a parlia-
ment, it has no power to legislate and thus to impose its policy, nor 
does it possess "the power of the purse" in the parliamentary sense. 
Both the Common Assembly and its successor, the European As-
sembly, have consistently stressed their parliamentary character-
istics. One report states, "if legitimate doubt arises with respect to 
a question concerning the status of this Assembly one must seek the 
solution in the traditional parliamentary law and not in the un-
founded comparisons with commissions, assemblies or organizations 
of an international character." 126 
Since the Council and not the Commission is the principal de-
cision-making body, it could be argued that the Assembly's power of 
""'E.g., arts. 43 {2), 75(1), 87{1), 100. 
121 Art. 235. 
,., Art. 236. 
123 Art. 238; but see art. 237. Although the decision to admit a new Member State is 
not subject to consultation with the Assembly it cannot be implemented without Treaty 
amendment and the Assembly plays a role in the amending procedure. 
124 Art. 203 (3). 
For other instances in which the Assembly must be consulted see Soule, Comparaison 
entre les dispositions institutionelles du Traite C.E.C./1. et du Traite C.E.E., 1958 
REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 95, 102 (No. 2); La Communaute Economique Euro-
peenne: Aspects /nstitutione[s, ANNUAJRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, annex 10, 
at 513 (1957). The obligatory consultation is an innovation not known in the E.C.S.C. 
Treaty. 
,.. Doc. No. 2. ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE {November 1955), Rapport sur !'organisation a 
donner a l'Assembtee Commune pour rendre plus efficace son action dans le cadre des 
dispositions actuelles du Traite, presente par M. Poher, Rapporteur, para. 13 at 14-15. 
,.. Avis sur Ia participation des observateurs du Conseil de !'Europe a l'Assemb!Ce 
Commune et sur Ia conclusion d'un accord a cet effet, as cited in the Poher Report, id. 
at 14, n. 3, this author's translation. 
THE NEW INSTITUTIONS 57 
control under the E.E.C. Treaty is narrower than under the Coal-
Steel Community Treaty, according to which the High Authority, 
the central body, is subject to Assembly motions of censure. Yet, as 
suggested, the practical difference between the schemes of the two 
Treaties may be less significant than would appear from the texts. 
Moreover, even though the Council makes final decisions, the Com-
mission plays an important part as a result of its power of initiative. 
Thus the Assembly's control over the Commission and its right to 
be consulted by the Council have given it a measure of authority, 
and this it has sought to develop with vigor and ingenuity. In do-
ing so it has drawn upon "general principles" governing national 
parliamentary procedures and has assumed what it considered im-
plied powers. 
C. THE WoRKING OF THE AssEMBLY 
The Assembly has sought to assure the continuity and effective-
ness of its activities by greatly increasing the frequency of its meet-
ings. In 1959 seven meetings of two to seven days duration were 
scheduled.12i The schedule reflects the thorny problem of coordi-
nating the meetings of the Assembly not only with those of the 
national parliaments, but also with the Consultative Assembly of 
the Council of Europe and of the Western European Union, in 
view of the joint mandates held by a number of representatives in 
all of these bodies.128 A Belgian Senator predicted that a parliamen-
tarian will have to spend about 100 days annually on his "European 
mandates" and at the risk of neglecting his national parliamentary 
activities.129 The many vacant seats commonly seen in the Assembly 
are due, at least in part, to conflicting sessions of national parlia-
ments. 
The Assembly has established a substantial number of standing 
committees. Most of the Assembly's work and most of the compro-
mising is carried out by these committees, which meet throughout 
the year, ordinarily in private sessions, to examine sections of the 
general reports of the "executive." On the basis of this examination 
the committees prepare their own reports and draft resolutions 
127 284 EUROPE, item 1381 (December 5, 1958). 
128 See Speech by Representative Santero, No. 8 ASSEMBLER PARLEMENTAIRE EURO-
PEENNE, COMPTE RENDU STENOGRAPHIQUE PROVISOIRE 18 (June 1958). 
129 Speech by Senator Motz, Belgium, SEN AT, ANN ALES PARLEMENTAIRES, SEANCE DU 
MERCREDI, 27 NOVEMBRE, 1957, at 137. The problem of co-ordinating the work in the 
European Assemblies and the national parliaments was also mentioned by LINDSAY, 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 31, 32, 81 (1958), with respect to the Council of 
Europe. 
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which then form the basis for floor debate. A large majority of com-
mittee reports has received unanimous approval by both the com-
mittee and the Assembly.130 This contributes to the impression that 
no real "opposition" exists in the Assembly. The number of amend-
ments to resolutions offered from the floor during plenary debates 
is, however, increasing. In debate the rapporteur of the committee 
introduces and defends the report, and Assembly representatives 
frequently speak for an entire political group. 
In their private meetings the committees hear members of the 
Commission and of the other two "executives", as well as their ex-
pert staffs, and consider whatever documentation is submitted by 
them. Independent experts and missions of study and inquiry are 
also employed.131 One such mission of representatives was dis-
patched to overseas areas of the Community.132 In addition, the 
social, transportation, and agriculture committees have heard pri-
vate interest groups representing labor, management and the like. 
In contrast to committees of the United States Congress, however, 
the Assembly committees (and for that matter the Assembly itself) 
do not have the power to subpoena witnesses. Moreover, because 
most committee meetings are private, they have not performed the 
public-opinion-forming function which is such a striking character-
istic of American congressional committee hearings. In some areas 
of Community activity, such as the application of antitrust pro-
visions or in dealing with social affairs, public hearings of formal 
testimony by the committees might well be advantageous, even 
though foreign to European parliamentary practice. 
Voting on the various draft resolutions often takes place in the 
final plenary meetings after a number of representatives have de-
parted from Strasbourg. As a rule the representatives vote by a 
show of hands.132a 
D. THE AssEMBLY's "PoLITICAL 
CoNTRoL" ovER THE COMMISSION 
The members of the Commission (but not staff members) 133 
have the right under the Treaty to attend "all meetings" of the 
Assembly and "to be heard," 134 although the Assembly has made 
130 HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 41o-12 (1958). 
'"'Rules of Procedure, arts. 37(4), 38(2}, [1958] ]'L OFF. 229. 
132 Resolution of April 15, 1959, [1959] J'L OFF. 554-55; also [1959] ]'L OFF. 674, 797· 
=• Rules of Procedure, art. 33 (r), [1958] ]'L OFF. 227. 
133 /d., art. 29 (4), at 226. 
134 E.E.C. Treaty art. 140. 
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attendance by Commission members at committee meetings subject 
to invitation.135 Correspondingly, the Commission members have 
the obligation under the Treaty to reply orally or in writing toques~ 
tions put to them either by the Assembly or by individual repre-
sentatives.136 Commission members most directly concerned with 
agenda items have invariably been in attendance at Strasbourg. 
As national parliaments do, the Assembly has sought to act as a 
"watchdog" over the "executive," particularly in connection with 
the Commission's budgetary functions. The Assembly has done this 
by means of parliamentary questions, some of them obviously moti-
vated by party politics. The questioning has related to such sub-
jects as the size of the severance payments and pensions of former 
members of the "executive" 137 and the involvement of one of the 
Commission members in a national court proceeding 138 and the 
activities of one of the judges of the Community Court. 139 
More important, however, have been the efforts on the part of 
the Assembly to influence, and help develop, the policies of the "exe-
cutive." The technical nature of the problems in the coal and steel 
industry initially proved to be an obstacle to a similar effort by the 
Common Assembly. That Assembly urged the High Authority to 
formulate broad and long-range policies as distinguished from its 
day-to-day operations and to state them distinctly in its reports in 
a long-range context lest the trees obscure the forest. When the 
policy issues were presented, the political groups in the Assembly 
were forced to develop policy positions, no easy matter in the ab-
sence of experience and specialized knowledge.l4° By now a number 
of representatives have developed considerable expertise and, as a 
result, some Assembly committees are capable of producing policy 
reports whose impact promises to exceed that which the formal 
powers of the Assembly would give them. This is particularly ob-
vious at present in the fields of agriculture and transportation. 
The debates and resolutions reflect the Assembly's desire to en-
courage the Commission in-and sometimes to prod it into-inde-
pendent and vigorous exercise of its functions. The Commission has 
been urged to reject restrictive and formalistic interpretations of 
the Treaty in dealing with national measures designed to circumvent 
135 Rules of Procedure, op. cit. supra note 131, art. 38 (2). 
136 E.E.C. Treaty art. 140. 
137 [I959] }'L OFF. 682, 687. 
138 [1959] }'L OFF. 686-88. 
139 [I959] }'L OFF. 849-59· 
140 See Speech by High Authority President Monnet, DEBATS DE L'ASSEMBLEE CoM-
MUNE (No. I, September u, I952) IS; Wigny Report, supra note Io6, at I2-13. 
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reductions in customs duties 141 and to propose the required directive 
for the removal of charges equivalent to customs duties.142 The 
Socialists have pressed strongly for action in the antitrust field; one 
Socialist has blamed the "executive" inaction for the emergence of 
the new (and short-lived) German oil-coal cartel.143 The Assembly 
as a whole has gone on record in support of the Commission's posi-
tion that the antitrust articles are applicable even before promulga-
tion of the Council regulations required by the Treaty. It called for 
prompt and practical solutions which would allow present applica-
tion of these articles.144 The Commission has also been pressed by 
Assembly resolutions to take an active role in social affairs, in the 
coordination of economic policies, 145 in the development of a co-
ordinated policy embracing the different sources of energy (coal, 
nuclear energy, oil), 146 and in organizing investments. 147 In the in-
vestment field differences in the Assembly are apparent in the points 
of view of those who see the European Investment Bank as a main 
investment source and "liberals" who view it as a source of capital 
supplementary to private investment. 148 Some representatives have 
even cautioned the Commission not to rely excessively on national 
governments,149 also warning that the conferences with national 
experts through which the Commission has become accustomed to 
seek prior agreement of national governments to its proposals have 
no standing under the Treaty.150 The Commission has been prom-
ised support even if it should take action in areas not clearly within 
its jurisdiction.151 Suggestions have been made in Assembly reports 
141 Representative Illerhaus, presenting the report of the Internal Market Committee, 
Pari. Debates (No. I, Jan. 8, I959) 7; Resolution of January IS, I959, [I959] }'L OFF., 
para. 3, at I6 5· 
142 Representative Kreyssig, speaking on behalf of the Socialist group, Pari. Debates 
(No. I, Jan. 8, I959) IO. 
143 Speech by Representative Conrad, id. (No.2, Jan. 9, I959) 38 at 39-4Ij Speech 
by Representative Deist, id. (No. z, Jan. 9, I959) 48 at 56-58. 
144 Resolution of January IS, I959, [I959] ]'L OFF., para. 5; cf. Speech by Representa-
tive Deringer, Pari. Debates (No. I, Jan. 8, I959) I3-I4• 
145 Resolution of April IS, I959, [I959] J'L OFF. 557; Resolution of January IS, I959, 
[I959] id., para. 15, at 167; id., part IV, para I2, at 168; id., part I, para. 3, at I67. 
""Resolution of January 15, 1959, [1959] }'L OFF., para. 3, at 169-70. 
147 See Speech by E.E.C. Vice-President Malvestiti, Pari. Debates (No. I, Jan. 8, 
1959) 16-19; speech by Representative Deist, supra note 143, at 57; Resolution of 
January 15, 1959, [1959] }'L OFF., paras. 5-7, at I66. 
148 See speeches by Representative Battaglia, Pari. Debates (No. sA, Jan. I3, I959) 
I85 at 189; by Representative Lindenberg, id. (No. sB, Jan. I3, 1959) 201-<13; and by 
Representative Nederhorst, id., 193-201. 
149 Representative Kapteyn as quoted by E.E.C. Commissioner Schaus, Pari. Debates 
(No. sA, Jan. 13, 1959) 165 at I68. 
100 Speech by Representative Deringer, supra note I44, at I3· 
161 Speech by Representative Kreyssig, supra note 142, at 12. 
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and statements that Community regulation of transportation, now 
limited to road, railroad and inland waterway transportation, 
should be extended to include pipe lines and civil aviation, that the 
Monetary Committee and the Council be given additional powers 
similar to those of the United States Federal Reserve System.152 
Moreover, the Commission has been urged to consult with private 
interested parties 153 as well as with governments. Only relatively 
rarely (for example, in the debates on the budget and on the Free 
Trade Area negotiations) have complaints been heard on the floor 
thatthe Commission has not provided sufficient information to the 
Assembly.154 
· -In statements before the Assembly, Commission members have 
expressed appreCiation for the Assembly's support and have sought 
to explain and defend the steps taken by the Commission, giving 
assurances of further study of any Assembly suggestions. It is espe-
cially interesting that members of the Commission have lectured the 
Assembly on the Commission's lack of legal power under the Treaty 
to take action suggested in the Assembly/55 asserting that increases 
in powers of the Commission in a given field 156 may not be necessary 
or desirable, that, since the power of decision currently lies with na-
tional governments in some fields such as transportation, negotiation 
rather than independent Commission initiative is essential 157 and 
that the establishment of "joint services" for all three Communities 
would be illegal in the transportation field 158 and unwise in the 
energy field. 159 
E. THE AssEMBLY AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: 
AN UNEVEN PowER CoNTEST 
The legal basis for the development of relations between the As-
sembly and the Council is limited. 160 The first problem for the 
102 Speech by Representative Troisi, Pari. Debates (No. sA, Jan. 13, 1959) I89 at I9I. 
163 Reference to statements by Representative Deringer in speech by E. E. C. Com-
missioner von der Groeben, Pari. Debates (No. r, Jan. 8, 1959) 19 at zr. 
154 Speech by Representative Leverkuehn with reference to the negotiations for a 
European Economic Association, Pari. Debates (No. 6, Jan. 14, 1959) 238; para. 6 of 
the Resolution of April II, 1959, [1959] J'L OFF. 548, 550, with reference to the budget. 
'"' E.E.C. Commissioner Schaus with respect to control of pipelines, supra note 149, 
at r 87; E.E.C. Vice-President Malvestiti with respect to investments, supra note 147; 
E.E.C. Vice-President Marjolin with respect to fuel policy, Pari. Debates (No. z, Jan. 
9, 1959) 67 at 69, 70. 
156 E.E.C. Vice-President Marjolin, supra note I 55-
107 E.E.C. Commissioner Schaus, supra note 155. 
lGS /d, at 170, 
109 E.E.C. Vice-President Marjolin, supra note 155, at 68. 
100 Poher Report, supra note IZ5, par. 13 at 14-15. 
62 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
Assembly was one of communication with the Council. The Treaty 
provides that the Council "shall be heard" by the Assembly "under 
the conditions which the Council shall lay down in its rules of proce-
dure." 161 Obviously, it was important to have the Ministers attend. 
Nevertheless, the Assembly took the position that the Ministers, 
like Commission members, may attend the meetings of its com-
mittees upon invitation only. The Ministers objected, but acquiesced 
when the Assembly stood firm. 162 Nevertheless, the Ministers have 
made it clear that for practical reasons they will not attend meetings 
of Assembly committees except in unusual circumstances. At least 
one Minister now attends part of each plenary session of the As-
sembly but the absence of all Ministers during important phases of 
the debate continues to be the subject of strong criticism from the 
floor. 163 
In its rules of procedure, the Assembly asserted its right to ad-
dress resolutions to the Councils and passed some such resolutions, 
which have received varying responses from the Ministers. 164 The 
three treaties contain no provision relative to addressing questions 
to the Councils. The Committee on Procedure of the Common As-
sembly ruled in 195 5 that a written question submitted by a repre-
sentative could not be transmitted to the CounciJ.l65 However, the 
argument was advanced in the committee drafting the Rules of 
Procedure for the new Assembly that, since the decision-making 
process under the new treaties had shifted to the Councils, the 
Assembly must have the formal power, first, to address questions to 
the Councils, and second, by way of "a sanction," to adopt a motion 
of disapproval of the Councils' policies-an idea taken from the 
Charter of the Western European Union.166 The argument in favor 
101 E.E.C. Treaty, art. 140. 
Does a member of the Council have the right to be heard "at any time?" The Ger-
man version of art. 29 (4) of the Rules of Procedure includes the word "jederzeit" 
while the French version only states "sur leur demande." Cf. Pari. Debates (No. 7, 
June 1958) (mimeo.) 42-45. The additional German word being superfluous, members 
of the Council may speak "upon demand," which is tantamount to "at any time." van 
Kauvenbergh, id. at 42. 
1 
.. COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, REGLEMENT DE L'ASSEMBLEE 
CoMMUNE (edition of March 1956), art. 38(2); Rules of Procedure, art. 38(2), [1958] 
J'L OFF. 229; LYON, L'ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE DE LA C.E.C.A. 51 ( 1957). 
163 Speech by Representative Duvieusart, Pari. Debates (No. 2, Jan. 9, 1959) 58-59; 
Resolution of April n, 1959, [1959) J'L OFF. 548. 
1 
.. Rules of Procedure, art. 25, [1958) J'L OFF. 225. There was a similar provision 
in art. 26 of the Rules of Procedure of the Common Assembly, op. cit. supra note r62. 
Cf. LYoN, op. cit. supra note r62, at 52. 
1 
.. Decision of May 12, 1955, Kauvenbergh Report, supra note 105, para. 23, at 
28-29. In the Common Assembly, resolutions addressed to the Council in a sense 
provided a substitute procedure. 
166 Kauvenbergh Report, supra note ros, para. 22, at 27-28; Speech by Representative 
van Kauvenbergh, supra note r6r, at 12. 
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of the power to question the Council prevailed, but the committee 
decided not to pursue the suggestion concerning the motion of dis-
approval "at the moment." 167 Accordingly, the Rules were adjusted 
to create the power of addressing oral or written questions to all 
three Councils 168 not only for the Assembly itself, but also for the 
individual representatives. The Assembly agreed, however, that the 
Councils have no legal obligation to respond.169 Nevertheless, an 
interesting provision was included in the Rules to the effect that, if 
the Council should fail to respond within two months to a question 
addressed to it, the question will be published in the Official Journal 
of the Communities.l7° In fact, the Councils have answered in writ-
ing questions directed to them by representatives although some 
answers were quite perfunctory and not at all enlightening. The 
questions and the answers have been published in the J ournal.171 
More recently, the Ministers have taken the position-although not 
quite consistently-that they shall reply only to questions within 
the jurisdiction of the Council but not to questions which, although 
pertaining to the Community, under the Treaty fall within the juris-
diction of the national governments. They have also indicated un-
willingness to reply where the Council has not yet made a decision 
on the matter raised in the question. These attitudes have been criti-
cized by the Assembly.171a 
The Treaty requirement that the Assembly be consulted before 
certain measures are taken is the most important legal link between 
the Council and the Assembly. While the Treaty is not explicit, the 
consultation formula seems to indicate that the Council, having 
received a proposal from the Commission, will transmit it to the 
Assembly.172 The Commission will be able to explain and defend the 
proposal in the Assembly and, possibly, to modify it on the basis of 
the Assembly debate before the Council makes a final decision.173 
The Assembly committee which prepared the Rules of Procedure 
noted that parliamentary concepts would be applied more effectively 
167 Ibid. 
168 Rules of Procedure, arts. 25, 41, [1958] ]'L OFF. 225, 23o-31. 
169 "We are convinced," said Mr. Deringer, speaking for the Christian Democratic 
group, "that independently of the letter of the treaties, the Council will answer these 
questions." Pari. Debates (No. 7, June 1958) (mimeo.) 20, (this author's translation). 
170 Rules of Procedure, art. 41 (4), [1958] ]'L OFF. 231. 
m Cf. [1958] }'L OFF. 629; [1959] ]'L OFF. 18o-82, 258-59, 509-10, 849-53. 
171
• Doc. No. 71 ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE (Nov., 1959), Rapport fait au 
nom de Ia commission des affaires politiques et des questions institutionnelles sur les 
relations entre I' A ssembtee parlementaire europtfenne et les Conseils de ministres des 
Communautes EuropCennes par M. Charles Janssens, rapporteur. 
170 E.g., art. 87 ( 1) : " ••• the Council ... on a proposal by the Commission and 
after the Assembly has been consulted ... " 
178 Cf. art. 149, para. 2. 
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if the Commissions themselves consulted the Assembly before they 
made their proposals to the Councils. This would enable the Assem-
bly to express its view at the outset of the decision-making process, 
although it could obviously not deprive the Councils of their inde-
pendent right to consult the Assembly. A joint Assembly-Commis-
sion position on any question, agreed to before the Council came 
into the picture, would have "unquestionable weight" in the eyes of 
the Council.174 The intent of the Treaty formula may have been, 
however, to preclude precisely this kind of prior understanding be-
tween the Commission and the Assembly, which could create politi-
cal pressures on the Council, in the hope of encouraging instead co-
operation between the Council and the Commission.m The final 
text of the Rules of Procedure does not preclude direct Assembly-
Commission consultations.176 In fact the Assembly committee on 
agriculture, in examining the Commission's annual report and pre-
paring its own recommendations, has formulated common policy 
suggestions in advance of the Commission's proposal to the Coun· 
cil. 177 Although the Commission apparently has cooperated in this 
effort and participated in the Assembly debate thereon, it has made 
it clear that it feels free to frame its own proposal to the Council 
independently of any prior position taken by the Assembly.l78 An 
Assembly committee suggested recently that the procedure followed 
in connection with the Euratom health rules and the rules for the 
European Social Fund has now established a pattern of consultation 
along the following lines : the Commission informs the Assembly 
committee concerned of any proposals it intends to make to the 
Ministers; the committee, "in the normal exercise of parliamentary 
control," discusses the proposals and offers suggestions; when the 
Commission submits the proposals to the Councils the latter consult 
the Assembly.178a 
The Assembly has not been happy about its relationship with the 
Councils. As a demonstration of this dissatisfaction it proposed that 
a substantial amount be included in the first budget for the purpose 
of developing this relationship.179 The Assembly's resolution on 
"'Kauvenbergh Report, supra note 105, para. 22 at 24. 
175 La Communaute Economique Europeenne: Aspects Institutionnels, ANNUAIRE 
FRANc;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 491, 499 (1957). 
178 Rules of Procedure, art. 23, [1958] ]'L OFF. 224. 
177 413 EUROPE, item 2499 (May 20, 1959). 
178 See statements made by Vice-President Mansholt as reported 444 EuROPE, item 
2697 (June 25, 1959). 
1788 Rapport Janssens, note 171a supra. 
179 Resolution of April II, 1959, para. 5, [1959] }'L OFF. 548, 549· The Council did not 
accept this proposed modification. See Budget of the European Economic Community, 
sec. II, ch. II, para. 243, art. 24. [1959] }'L OFF. 885, 907. 
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the budget of December I958 contained 27 paragraphs bristling 
with criticisms of the Councils and was adopted despite the efforts 
on the floor by the President of the Council of Ministers to offer ex-
planations and to sooth ruffled feathers. The basic complaint was 
the failure of the Councils to supply timely information on which 
the Assembly could form intelligent opinions concerning various 
budgetary questions. 
Other paragraphs of the resolution reflect concern that the Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives, mentioned earlier, may usurp 
the powers of the Councils of Ministers, and also gradually assume 
the preparatory functions of the Commission, thus destroying a 
crucial institutional feature of the Treaty.180 Primarily because of 
this desire to preserve the constitutional balance, the Assembly 
called for reduction of the size of the Secretariat of the Councils 
and protested the employment by the Councils of another special 
committee of national experts (not envisaged in the Treaty) for 
the review of the budget. 181 For the same reason the Assembly 
formally warned against an undue increase in the staffs of the Per-
manent Representatives.182 Still other criticisms were directed at 
delays in the transmission of the proposed budgets to the Assem-
bly.183 Indications are that at least some of the difficulties which 
arose in connection with the first budget will be avoided in the 
future. 183a 
During the recent economic crisis caused by the surplus of coal 
in the Community, the High Authority appealed to the Assembly 
after the Council rejected its proposed solutions. The Assembly 
adopted a resolution, by a vote of 44 to I 2, supporting the Author-
ity's proposals and placing principal responsibility for the failure in 
evolving a Community solution on the Council.l84 German liberals 
and French Gaullists formed the nucleus of the opposition. Less 
than one-half of the representatives participated in the vote on a 
decision which placed the Assembly in open conflict with the Coun-
cil on an important problem. 
The Assembly's power under the two Rome Treaties to file a 
complaint in the Community Court against the Councils (or against 
the Commissions) whenever their failure to act constitutes a viola-
tion of the Treaty 185 is, perhaps, of theoretical interest only. In any 
180 Stein, supra note 94, at 250. 
181 /d. at 249; also [1959] ]'L OFF. 550. 
182 Resolution of December 17, 1958, para. 17, [1959] J'L OFF. 16. 
183 Resolution of December 17, 1958, [1959] ]'L OFF. 15. 
183
" But see Assembly Resolution in [1959] }'L OFF. 1257. 
1 
.. Resolution of April 16, 1959, [1959] }'L OFF. 560. 
185 E.E.C. Treaty art. 175; Euratom Treaty art. 148. 
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case it is impossible at this juncture to estimate its practical value. 
In cases brought before it under the Coal-Steel Treaty the Court 
has demonstrated no tendency to assert vigorous policy control over 
the Community of the kind encountered in judgments of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. 
F. THE AssEMBLY AND THE MEMBER GovERNMENTs 
The United States Congress has the power in the areas defined by 
the Constitution to determine policies binding upon the States of 
the Union. The decision-making institutions of the Communities 
may also determine policies, within the areas defined by the treaties, 
that have binding effect upon the Member States, but the Assem-
bly's role in the decision-making process is extremely limited, and 
its powers over Member Governments are practically non-existent. 
Despite the absence of any grant of authority by the treaties 
the representatives have not hesitated to discuss individual national 
policies which in their view could impair the functioning of the Com-
munities. The Common Assembly had already asserted the right 
"to draw the attention of Member States by appropriate resolu-
tions and after debate" to such harmful policies.186 The Common 
Assembly had also claimed the right for itself, its committees, and 
its Secretariat to receive pertinent information from national ad-
ministrations. 
The six governments reserved to themselves under the treaties the 
important prerogative of appointing the "executive," leaving no 
role to the Assembly comparable to that played by the U.S. Senate 
in confirming executive appointments as required by the U.S. Con-
stitution. The Assembly has, however, sought to influence the ap-
pointments by means of resolutions and informal contacts of its 
President, but concrete recognition of any Assembly role in this 
important area has not been forthcoming. 187 
The principal complaint of the Assembly against the governments 
has related to their failure to select a seat for the Community's 
institutions as required in the Treaties.188 The institutions are pres-
ently dispersed in Luxembourg, Brussels and Strasbourg.189 The 
18
' Doc. No. 5, AssEMBLEE CoMMUNE, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des 
A!faires politiques et des relations extirieures de la Communaute sur les pouvoirs de 
controle de l'Assemb!Ce Commune et leur exercice, 17 para. 19 (Rapport Teitgen) (No-
vember 1954). This author's translation. 
187 Stein, supra note 94, at 25o-51. 
188 E.E.C. Treaty art. 216, Euratom Treaty art. 189, E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 77· 
1 
.. The High Authority had been located in Luxembourg, the E.E.C. and Euratom 
Commissions in Brussels. The Assembly's own work is dispersed between seven 
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dispersal of the institutions, requiring, as it does, excessive travel 
and hindering communication, causes time and energy to be wasted 
and creates morale problems among the staff. The annual expense 
resulting was estimated by the Assembly at $2 million. Perhaps an 
even more important consideration is the fact that concentration of 
the institutions in "a European district" would provide further 
impetus for integration. Indeed, this may be one reason why some 
of the governments seek to delay a final decision on the location of 
the "single seat." 
In response to a request for an opinion, the Assembly suggested 
in June, 1958 that the seat should be located-in order of prefer-
ence-in Brussels, Strasbourg, or Milan, 190 and it endorsed the idea 
of a "European district" similar to the District of Columbia, the 
seat of the U.S. Government.191 This suggestion and numerous sub-
sequent appeals by the Assembly have achieved no action by the gov-
ernments. Because of this lack of progress, which is partly due to 
the French government's insistence on delay, the Assembly has 
threatened to select its own seat and to construct its permanent 
quarters, if the governments do not respond to the entreaties of a 
special Assembly delegation led by President Schuman.192 
Because the treaties rely to such considerable measure on the 
cooperation of the Member States, Assembly resolutions frequently 
contain more or less urgent appeals to the governments of the l\1em-
ber States to take specified action either singly or jointly with Com-
munity institutions.193 
The Assembly may also attempt to influence national govern-
ments through the national parliaments to which they are respon-
sible. This avenue would seem particularly promising in view of the 
fact that the Assembly is composed of national parliamentarians 
who could very easily raise Community problems in their respective 
national parliaments by introducing bills or resolutions or by utiliz-
ing the government questioning procedure with a view to obtaining 
desired action. To date, however, the extent of the influence of the 
buildings in the three cities and the fact that it must share the Maison d'Europe in 
Strasbourg for its plenary sessions with the Council of Europe causes further incon-
venience. The Committees of the Assembly have been meeting in Brussels, Luxembourg, 
Strasbourg and even in Paris, and its staff must travel from Luxembourg to Strasbourg 
at meeting time. Similarly, the Commissions and the High Authority and their staffs 
must travel to Strasbourg from Brussels or Luxembourg. 
100 (1958] )'L OFF. 234· 
1
m Resolution of May 14, 1959, para. 4, [1959] }'L OFF. 678. 
102 Ibid. 
193 E.g., Resolution of January 15, 1959, para. E, [1959] }'L OFF. 163; Resolution of 
May 14, 1959, para. 2, [1959] }'L OFF. 674-75. 
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Strasbourg representatives does not appear to have been significant. 
Debates in Strasbourg and in the national parliaments are not co-
ordinated,194 and some of the Strasbourg delegations do not even. 
report regularly to their national parliaments.195 In recent Assembly' 
debates and resolutions, exhortations to use the available means 
have been voiced, 196 since it is clear that the Assembly and the in-
dividual parliamentarians have not even come close to exhausting 
the possibilities of exerting influence over the governments through 
this channel. 
VI. THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
A Court of Justice is established to "ensure observance of law 
and justice in the interpretation of" the Treaty. 197 It is a common 
institution for all three Communities.198 It has succeeded the Court 
of the Coal and Steel Community which existed from I 9 52 to I 9 58 
and developed a sizeable body of jurisprudence. For most practical 
purposes, the new Court is a continuation of the Coal-Steel Com-
munity Court to which new jurisdictional powers have been given by 
the E.E.C. and Euratom Treaties.199 
A. CoMPOSITION OF THE CouRT: THE 
jUDGES AND ADVOCATES GENERAL 
The Court is composed of seven judges who must be qualified to 
be judges of the highest courts of their rellpective states or "jurists 
of recognized competence." 200 They are appointed "by the govern-
ments of Member States acting in common agreement" for a six-year 
term and are eligible for reappointment. This arrangement has been 
criticized by a distinguished writer because it results in practice in the 
unilateral appointment by each nation of as many judges as, by agree-
, •• Apparently only the Netherlands Parliament has debated the Coal and Steel 
Community problems annually. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 407 (1958). 
""'LYON, L'AssEMBLEE COMMUNE DE LA C.E.C.A. 55 (1957). 
'""For instance, the Assembly urged its members to press for a solution of the problem 
of the seat for the Community institutions in their national parliaments. Resolution of 
May 14, 1959, op. cit. supra note 191, para. 5; see speech by Representative Kreyssig, 
Pari. Debates (No. r, Jan. 8, 1959) ro at u. . 
197 Art. 164. 
198 Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Communi-
ties, arts. 3-4. 
199 The new Court was formally established on October 7, 1958. [1958] ]'L OFF. 453· 
Its Rules of Procedure were published in [1959] J'L OFF. 350. Four of the seven judges 
sat on the E.C.S.C. Court. For a discussion of the question as to the extent to which 
the new Court is likely to draw on the jurisprudence of the E.C.S.C. Court, see Chap-
ter VII infra. 
,.,. Art. 167. 
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ment, are to be its nationals. This method of appointment and the 
relatively short term of office compare unfavorably with those of 
the International Court of Justice and perhaps attest to a desire on 
the part of the governments to preserve a degree of influence which 
may not be compatible with the independent status of the Court.201 
The treaties do not specify the nationality of the judges, but the 
present bench is composed of a national from each of the Six, the 
seventh judge being the second Italian national on the Court. The 
judges were drawn from national law faculties, benches and bars. 
The Chief Justice, a Dutch national, is just over 40 years of age. 
The Court is assisted by two Court Advocates General, an in-
stitution originating in the French Conseil d'Etat. As institutional-
ized "amici curiae" they present to the Court independent opinions 
on the cases before it. They must have the same qualifications and 
are appointed in the same manner as the judges. Advocate General 
Roemer of German nationality has primarily private law back-
ground in the corporate field. The French Advocate General La-
grange held a high post in the Conseil d'Etat and served as a member 
of the French delegation in the negotiations concerning the Coal-
Steel Community Treaty. The differing experience of these two men, 
who also served the Coal-Steel Community Court, is reflected in their 
differing approaches to the problems before the Court. 
The discussions of law and the conclusions based on them of the 
Advocates General-for example, M. Lagrange's classic compara-
tive analysis of the meaning of "detournement de pouvoir" (mis-
application of power) as a ground for review of administrative 
acts 202-are of great assistance to the Court. They acquire added 
significance in view of the fact that the Court works as a "collegiate 
body": it renders judgments without any indication of authorship 
and publishes neither votes nor dissenting opinions. On the other 
hand the conclusions of the Advocates General are published and, 
like dissenting opinions, frequently offer alternative solutions which 
may be of relevance for the development of law. The Court rarely 
indicates the sources of law on which it relies except to mention the 
relevant Treaty articles and its own earlier judgments. In this re-
spect also the Advocates' discussions, drawing on a variety of the 
available sources of law, fill the gap somewhat and facilitate the 
understanding of the judgment as well as the development of law. 
001 Reuter, Aspects de la Communaute Economique Europeenne, 1958 REVUE ou 
MARCHE CoMMUN 3II (No. 6). 
209 Case 3-54, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes, Vol. I, at 157-871 
(1954-J.955), 
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Unlike a common law court, the Community Court is not bound by 
precedent. Yet this Court, not unlike the common law courts, and 
particularly those of early periods, will have to play a vital role in 
the development of law of the Community. 
B. THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court's jurisdiction is varied and in some respects unique, 
defying categorization. For the purposes of illustration and at the 
admitted risk of drawing loose analogies, one might say that the 
Court's jurisdiction is analogous to the federal jurisdiction of the 
United States Supreme Court, to the "administrative" jurisdiction 
of the French Conseil d'Etat or the German Bundesverwaltungs-
gericht, and is at the same time a "civil" jurisdiction, and in a sense 
the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.2°3 
The Court's jurisdiction is similar to that of a federal court in 
regard to controversies between Member States concerning the ap-
plication of the Treaty-controversies similar to those between 
States of the Union which the U.S. Supreme Court is asked to re-
solve under the Federal Constitution or statutes.204 The Court's 
jurisdiction may also be viewed as "federal" in disputes between 
Member States and Community institutions, between the institutions 
themselves, and in cases where the Court decides whether proposed 
international agreements to be concluded by the Community are 
compatible with the Treaty.205 Finally, one might mention in this 
category the jurisdiction of the Court to rule on questions arising 
in national judicial proceedings which concern interpretation of the 
Treaty and the validity and interpretation of the acts of the institu-
tions. National courts of last resort are bound to refer these "fed-
eral" questions to the Court for binding determination. This obliga-
tion on the part of the national courts has been substantially 
strengthened in the Rome Treaties as compared with the Coal-
Steel Treaty.206 
The Court's jurisdiction is "administrative" ("public municipal") 
203 Cf. INSTITUT DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES (!.R.I.), LA C.E.C.A. 222 ( 1953). 
Bebr, The DeveloPment of a Community Law by the Court of the E.C.S.C., 42 MINN. 
L. REV. 845, 850 (1958) . 
..,. It has been argued that the Community Court's jurisdiction in such a case is one 
of international Jaw. See jERUSALEM, DAS RECHT DER MONTANUNION 44-47 ( 1954) ; 
MATHIJSEN, LE DROIT DE LA C.E.C.A. 74 (1958); Hay, Book Review, 8 AM. J. CaMP. L. 
243-244 (1959). 
205 Art. 228 ( r), para. 2. 
2fJfl Cf. Vedel in preface to CARTOU, LE MARCHE COMMUN ET LE DROIT PUBLIC III 
(1959). It would seem that the "municipal public law men" in the negotiating delega-
tions for the new treaties prevailed over the "public international law men" who 
did not wish to press legal integration so far. 
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where it affords legal redress to individuals and enterprises praying 
that administrative acts of the Community institutions be annulled.207 
The right of access of private parties to the Court-their govern-
ments need not intervene-is a necessary corollary to the power of 
the institutions to act with direct effect upon these parties. This right 
marks a radical departure from the conventional international tri-
bunal, enables the Court to exercise its powers of control over the 
institutions and adds to the "public municipal" characteristics of 
the Communities. 
The ucivil" jurisdiction (in the common law sense) of the Court 
extends to cases in tort against the Community and on contracts to 
which the Community is a party. In contract cases the jurisdiction 
of the Court must have been stipulated.208 
Finally, the jurisdiction of the Court may be said to resemble 
that of an international tribunal where the Court determines con-
troversies between the Community and a non-member state arising 
out of an international agreement or possibly out of a contract in 
which the parties stipulated such jurisdiction.209 
National authorities in the Member States are bound to execute 
money judgments of the Court against individuals and enterprises. 
C. THE RoLE oF THE CouRT 
The Coal-Steel Community Court and the new Court have al-
ready decided well over fifty cases-all arising under the Coal-Steel 
Community Treaty, and most of which on appeals brought by en-
terprises praying for annulment of acts of the High Authority. Any 
new move by the High Authority to exercise its power in a manner 
affecting enterprises has almost invariably caused a flurry of such 
appeals. Some of these (particularly during the first years) were 
filed with a primary view to strengthening the hand of the enter-
prises involved in their negotiations with the Authority and were 
subsequently withdrawn. In January, 1960, sixty-four actions were 
pending before the Court, 6o under the Coal-Steel Community 
Treaty and four under the F.E.C. Treaty, which compares favor-
ably with the work load of the International Court of Justice and 
of the U.S. Supreme Court in the first years of its existence. 
201 Cf. I.R.I., op. cit. supra note 203, n. 7· 
208 Arts. 178, 181, and 215. In at least some Member States certain cases in this 
group would be viewed as falling within the administrative type of jurisdiction. 
Complaints brought by Community employees against its institutions (Art. 179) 
would certainly be considered "administrative." Pinay, La Cour de Justice des 
Communautes Europeennes, 1959 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 145 (No. 12). 
209 Art. 181. See also art. 182 for jurisdiction over disputes between Members "in 
connection with the object of this Treaty" submitted to the Court by a "compromise." 
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The exclusive power of review of Community acts and the con-
trolling power of interpretation of the Community law enables the 
Court to assume an important role in the development of the Com-
munity law. 
In its first judgment the Coal-Steel Community Court-feeling 
its way in its novel task-preferred to adhere to the letter of the 
Treaty. The case involved a decision of the High Authority seeking 
to support competition in the steel market. The High Authority had 
interpreted the Treaty obligation of the steel producers to publish 
their prices and adhere to the published price schedules as one allow-
ing minor deviations from the prices published. Interpreting the 
Treaty literally, the Court struck down the High Authority's de-
cision.210 During the brief 1958 recession in the steel market, the 
ghost of this judgment returned to haunt the Authority. However, 
the tenor of subsequent judgments suggests that, if the same prob-
lem would come before the Court for the first time now, the out-
come might be different. 
In forty of the forty-eight cases brought against the High Au-
thority the Court upheld the Authority, frequently justifying the 
Authority's policies by virtue of the spirit of the Treaty.211 In doing 
so, however, the Court has not been insensitive to the need of pro-
tecting enterprises. It has interpreted the right of appeal for annul-
ment broadly 212 and it has sought to assure "procedural due proc-
ess" by forcing the High Authority to give sufficient reasons for its 
decisions.213 In a case concerning scrap iron the Court protected an 
enterprise against what it considered excessive and unlawful dele-
gation of power by the Authority to a subsidiary organ. Holding 
that such delegation would disturb the "balance of power" under 
the Treaty, the Court developed a constitutional concept of some 
importance.214 On appeal from an enterprise in another case the 
Court struck down, on procedural grounds, certain High Authority 
decisions concerning the Ruhr coal which apparently had been taken 
under strong pressure from national authorities and in circum-
stances impairing the independent position of the Authority.215 
21° Cases 1-54, 2-54, 3-54 and 4-54, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes 
(hereinafter cited as Sammlung), Vol. 1, at 7, 79, 131, and 189, respectively. Cf. Stein, 
The European Coal and Steel Community: The Beginning of Its Judicial Process, 55 
CoL. L. REV. 985 (1955). 
211 E.g., Case 2-56, Sammlung, Vol. III, at 9· Stein, The Court of Justice of the 
European Coal and Steel Community: 195¢-1957, 51 AM. J. INT'L. L. 821 (1957). 
212 E.g., case 9-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 331 at 365. 
213 Cases 9-56 and 10-56, Sammlung, Vol. IV, at 9 and 51. 
""See Case 9-56, supra note 213. 
2lli Case 18-57 of March 20, 1959, advance mimeographed text. For a more detailed 
discussion of the Court see Chapter VII infra. 
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VII. ENTERPRISES AND THE COMMUNITY 
INSTITUTIONS 
A. EMERGENT PROBLEMS OF THE SCOPE OF THE 
"LAw-MAKING" PowER 
73 
Article I 89 of the Treaty enumerates the various kinds of action 
which the Council and the Commission may take to accomplish their 
functions and defines the different legal effects of each. "Regula-
tions," "directives" and "decisions" are legally binding according 
to Article I 89 while "recommendations" and "opinions" have no 
binding effect on the Member State, individual or enterprise to 
whom they are addressed. 
Two practical problems have already arisen, if in blurred out-
line only, concerning the scope of the authority of the Council and 
of the Commission, which are of direct interest to enterprises in 
the Community. 
I. HOW MUCH IMPLIED AUTHORITY? 
The first of these questions is whether the Commission may issue 
regulations, directives and decisions only where expressly authorized 
to do so by a specific provision of the Treaty or whether it may claim 
an implied authority to do so whenever necessary to the proper per-
formance of a function entrusted to it by the Treaty.216 For instance, 
although the Commission with some exceptions is specifically re-
quired in the Treaty only to study, issue opinions and consult with 
Member States on social affairs, may it also issue a regulation or a 
decision if it deems it necessary for the achievement of its tasks in 
this field? Again, where the Council has issued a regulation in ac-
cordance with a specific Treaty provision, may the Commission issue 
a more detailed implementing regulation without specific delegation 
by the Council and in the absence of any specific Treaty authoriza-
tion? 
This problem actually arose under the Euratom Treaty. The 
Euratom Commission is to publish production programs indicat-
ing targets for nuclear energy activities and types of investment 
required for their attainment. The purpose is to "stimulate the 
initiative of persons and enterprises and to facilitate coordinated 
development of investment." The industry is required under the 
216 The Commission clearly may issue non-binding recommendations and opinions 
without specific treaty authorization whenever it "considers it necessary." Art. 155 and 
corresponding Euratom Treaty art. 124. 
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Treaty to communicate investment projects in this field to the 
Commission before they are undertaken. The Commission is to 
discuss with "the persons or enterprises all aspects of any invest-
ment projects relating to the aims of this Treaty" and "communi-
cate its views thereon to the Member State concerned." The Council, 
on a proposal of the Commission, is to establish "criteria" as to the 
"type and scope" of the projects which are to be communicated to 
the Commission. 217 
After the Council had issued a regulation in accordance with these 
provisions, the Commission proceeded to enact a regulation of its 
own establishing an extensive and detailed questionnaire to be an-
swered by the enterprises.218 The legality of the Commission's regu-
lation was questioned in some quarters on the ground that it was not 
authorized by any specific Treaty provision or by the Council's regu-
lation,219 and on the further ground that even if the Commission 
had an implied power to issue a regulation without specific authori-
zation, the Commission had exceeded its power by extending the 
scope of the information required beyond the criteria of the Coun-
cil. If allowed to stand, the argument went, the Commission's regu-
lation would serve as a precedent permitting the Commission to 
broaden its powers considerably and thereby to upset the balance 
of powers carefully worked out in the Treaty.220 It was argued in 
support of the regulation that the Commission must have the power 
to specify with a binding effect the information required from the 
industry if it is to perform its task properly. A working group of 
the Euratom Council and Commission was appointed to explore 
possible solutions to this disagreement. Subsequently the Commis-
sion issued an interpretative statement under the heading "Applica-
tion of Regulation No. I of the Commission," 221 which provides 
217 Euratom Treaty, arts. 4o-44. 
218 Euratom Commission Regulation No. r, [1958] ]'L OFF. 5II; later renumbered 
to No 5, [1959] ]'L OFF. 6so; Euratom Council Regulation No.4 [1958] ]'L OFF. 417. 
219 Everling, Die erst en Rechtsetzungsakte der Organe der Europai"schen Gemeinschaf-
ten, 14 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 52 (1959); Meibom, Die Rechtsetzung durch die Organe 
der Europalschen Gemeinschaften, id. at 127. It was argued that the Treaty excludes 
the implied powers concept because under art. 203 Euratom Treaty (art. 235 E.E.C. 
Treaty), if any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve one of the 
aims of the Community, and the Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers, 
the Council may enact the appropriate pro.visions. The Euratom Commission relied 
upon arts. 41, 124 and x6r of the Eur.atom Treaty. Cf. Glaesner "Obertragung recht-
setzender Gewalt auf internationalc Organizationtfiz in der volkerrechtlichen Praxis," 
(1959] DIE .OFFENTLICHE. VERWALTUNG 6S3-s8 .. 
""'Cf. Haedrich, Die ersten Euratom-I' erordnungen: Investitionen und Sicherheitskon-
trolle, 1959 (No.6) ATOMWIRTSCHAFT 232, 233· 
221 [1959] }'L OFF. 571, 
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that the confidential nature of any communication will be safe-
guarded and states that if "in certain cases a detailed answer ... 
cannot be given because of special circumstances in which a person 
or enterprise finds itself," the Commission will be able to accept 
supplementary information in a discussion between the Commission 
staff and the person or enterprise concerned. Since the Commission 
is to determine which aspects must be discussed, this statement does 
not seem to settle the question of how much information the Com-
mission may require. Unquestionably a great deal will depend upon 
how the Commission applies this interpretation in practice. Al-
though any Member State which considered the Commission regu-
lation illegal or any enterprise which the Commission directed to 
reply to the questionnaire could have raised questions in the Com-
munity Court, none did, and the period for appeal against the regu-
lation itself has lapsed. It was, indeed, probably wise not to bring 
the matter before the Community Court at this early state of the 
Community development. 
In a subsequent regulation the Euratom Commission again pre-
scribed the information which must be made available to it for pur-
poses of control against diversion of nuclear materials. The Com-
mission did so without any specific Treaty authorization, or m 
other words, clearly on the theory of implied powers.222 
2. REGULATION OR DIRECTIVE? 
The second problem concerning the authority of the Council and 
the Commission arises from the fact that in a number of instances 
Treaty provisions authorize the institutions to act by "regulations 
or directives," or are entirely silent with respect to the legal form 
which an authorized act may take.223 A "regulation," it will be re-
called, modifies national law directly, while a "directive" imposes an 
obligation on a Member State to conform its national law to the 
rules contained in the directive by whatever means it desires to adopt 
in accordance with its own constitution. One view is that, because of 
the basic nature of the Community, its institutions should, in prin-
ciple, rely on Member States to incorporate Community rules into 
national laws, and should therefore resort to regulation only where 
the act, in order to be effective, must directly accord rights to, or 
impose obligations on, individuals or enterprises. If this standard 
is the proper one, it could be said that several regulations is-
••~ [1959] J'L OFF. 298. The Commission relied on Euratom articles 77, 78, IZ<h r6r, 
•~ E.g., art!~. 43 (2), 49, 75, 127. 
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sued thus far should have taken the form of directives or deci-
sions.224 
Some German writers have discerned an inclination on the part 
of the institutions to favor regulations over other forms. One writer 
points out that, although the German Constitution sanctions the 
delegation of law-making powers to international organizations, 
such as the Community, it requires some measure of democratic 
control over the law-making process,225 and regulations-which 
have a direct effect on national law-are adopted by the Council or 
Commission without the participation of national parliaments. 
Moreover, the European Assembly, because of its limited powers 
(if not because of its composition) cannot today provide the type 
of parliamentary control required. Thus, the argument goes, exces-
sive recourse to regulations might raise the question in Germany 
of the Treaty's constitutionality.226 
On the other hand, the employment of "directives" obviously 
may raise practical difficulties where uniform rules are required 
promptly. Thus, when the Euratom Council adopted health and 
safety standards for nuclear installations by a directive, it was neces-
sary for the European Assembly to urge the Members to adjust 
their national laws to conform to the directive-an indication of a 
224 Thus, the identical Regulations No. 2 of the E.E.C. and Euratom Councils con-
cerning identity cards for members of the European Parliamentary Assembly ( [1958] 
}'L OFF. 387, 403, respectively) did not create substantive rights of immunity for the 
parliamentarians since those had already been given by a Protocol to the Treaty 
(Protocol on Privileges and Immunities art. 6) ; the form of the identity card could 
therefore have been established by a simple decision. Everling, supra note 219, at 
53· Likewise, it is argued that Regulation No. 5 of the E.E.C. Council ( [1958] ]'L OFF. 
68r) concerning the manner of payment of the financial contributions of the Member 
States to the Development Fund does not create rights or obligations with regard to 
individuals and should therefore have been issued in the form of a directive. Everling, 
supra note 219, at 53; Meibom, supra note 219, at 130. In contrast to these two exam-
ples, the E.E.C. and Euratom Council Regulations No. r concerning the official lan-
guages of the Community ( [1958] }'L OFF. 385, 401 respectively) and the E.E.C. Coun-
cil Regulation No. 6 ([1958] }'L OFF. 686) were properly issued as regulations. In 
the former definite rights were given to individuals to be answered in their own 
language by the Community institutions, while the latter regulation establishes rules 
for the liability of the auditor and accountants of the Development Fund. Ibid. In 
between these two sets of regulations are the E.E.C. Regulations Nos. 3 and 4 con-
cerning the social security benefits of migrant workers ( [1958] J'L OFF. 561 and 597, 
respectively). Because of the far-reaching impact of these regulations on the national 
insurance systems, one writer (Everling, supra note 219, at 53) suggests that a direc-
tive to Member States would have been the wiser political course to follow, while an-
other writer (Meibom, supra note 219, at 130) points out that this question of political 
expediency does not change the propriety of these acts as regulations since legal 
rights were conferred upon individuals. 
"""Cf. art. 20 of the German Constitution; Everling, supra note 219, at 55· 
226 Art. 24 of the German Constitution. The argument is that art. 24 of the German 
Constitution requires parliamentary control of some form. Everling, supra note 219, 
at 55· 
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problem of compliance which does not arise in this form when a 
regulation is issued. 227 
Finally, an analogous problem arises because the Council is 
"Janus-headed" : it is both the Community organ authorized to 
adopt regulations and a conference of ministers who possess au-
thority to enter into international understandings and agreements 
on behalf of the Member States, subject possibly to approval in 
national parliaments. In some instances the Treaty does not state 
clearly which of the two methods is to be employed. The Coal-
Steel Community practice has already caused some obfuscation. 
E.E.C. Council Regulation No. 3 concerning social security of 
migrant workers was first embodied in a convention signed-but 
not ratified-by the six governments. When the Treaty came into 
effect, the six governments, instead of obtaining ratification by 
their parliaments, chose to have the Council of Ministers adopt 
Regulation No. 3 pursuant to Article 51 of the Treaty.2!!8 
B. LEGAL POSITION OF ENTERPRISES IN 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE INSTITUTIONS 
Basic to the conception of the Treaty are the relationships among 
governments and those between the institutions and governments. 
The E.E.C. Treaty contains substantially fewer rules directly ap-
plicable to enterprises, and fewer provisions envisaging direct action 
by the institutions with respect to enterprises than the Coal-Steel 
Community Treaty. Instances of both may, of course, increase to 
the extent that the Council with the Commission draw upon the 
broad potential powers conferred upon them by the Treaty and 
enact appropriate regulations. The question thus arises concerning 
the procedural rights which an enterprise may invoke for its pro-
tection in a "quasi-judicial" proceeding in which the Commission by 
a decision applies a general rule to an enterprise, as well as in cases 
where the Council or the Commission formulate general rules in 
the form of regulations or directives. 
I. QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
The Treaty requires that all decisions be "supported by rea-
son." 229 A "reasoned" decision is specifically prescribed where the 
227 See Resolution of January 15, 1959, para. (E), [1959] J'L OFF. 163. 
"'"REUTER, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 128-·132 (1958-1959)• See also 
Meibom, Zur rechtlichen Systematik der Beschlussfiihigkeit der Organe der Euro-
paischen Gemeinschaften, 14 DER BETRIEBS- BERATER 584 ( 19 59). 
229 Art. 190. 
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Commission acts to "confirm the existence" of an infringement of 
the antitrust principles of the Treaty.230 No decision addressed 
to an enterprise takes effect until the enterprise is notified of it.231 
The enterprise may appeal to the Community Court for annulment 
of any decisions addressed to it on grounds specified in the Treaty, 
an important legal remedy discussed in some detail in the chapter 
on The New Legal Remedies of Enterprises. The appeal, however, 
has no staying effect unless the Court orders suspension. 
Beyond this, however, the Treaty contains no code of procedural 
safeguards applicable in proceedings before the Commission, anal-
ogous for instance to the Administrative Procedure Act governing 
federal agencies in the U.S.232 The Treaty contains, moreover, no 
provision requiring the Commission to give an enterprise an oral 
hearing, an opportunity to make written submissions, access to evi-
dence, a right of rebuttal or the like. The Coal-Steel Community 
Treaty specifically authorizes the High Authority in a number of 
instances to impose penalties upon enterprises. Correspondingly, 
Article 36 of that treaty requires the Authority to give the inter-
ested enterprise "an opportunity to present its views" prior to im-
posing a penalty upon it. The E.E.C. Treaty contains no general 
provision analogous to Article 36, probably because penalties under 
the E.E.C. Treaty may be imposed only if prescribed by Council 
regulations. Where the Council prescribes penalties, it may also 
confer jurisdiction upon the Community Court to impose them.233 
In a proceeding before the Court the defendant enterprise would 
receive the basic protection of procedural safeguards including, of 
course, full hearing. However, the Treaty may be interpreted as 
empowering the Council to charge the Commission as well with the 
imposition of penalties.234 In that case there is no specific Treaty 
provision for a hearing before the Commission, but the hearing 
could be prescribed in the Council regulation. In any event the en-
terprise would, of course, be free to request the Community Court 
to review and annul the Commission decision imposing the penalty. 
It is interesting that the Treaty does require the Commission to 
grant to a Member State charged with a violation of its Treaty 
obligation an opportunity for "comments" in written or oral form. 
The Treaty also prescribes consultations with, or notice to, Mem-
Jl00Art.89(2). 
mArt. 191, para. 2. 
232 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 ( 1952) . 
... Art. 172. Cf. art. 87 (2) (a) • 
... See Chapter VII infra. 
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her States before certain decisions are taken including some de-
cisions which may affect enterprises.235 
In the absence of Treaty provisions assuring an enterprise the 
opportunity to present its case to the Commission, the burden of 
developing minimum procedural safeguards lies, in the first place, 
upon the Council and the Commission and, secondly, upon the Com-
munity Court. As is suggested in the chapter on The New Legal 
Remedies of Enterprises, there is a basis in the Treaty for the 
Community Court to establish such safeguards in its jurisprudence 
by striking down any decision brought before it for review if the 
decision was adopted in disregard of these safeguards. The French 
Conseil d'Etat, despite the absence of a statutory requirement, has 
progressively imposed procedural safeguards on lower adminis-
trative authorities. Moreover, there is substantial support for such 
a course in the legislation and jurisprudence governing administra-
tive procedures in the other Member States of the Community, even 
though national systems differ somewhat in the emphasis placed, 
for instance, on the requirement of an oral hearing.236 As indicated 
earlier in this chapter, the Community Court has already begun the 
development of some minimal safeguards. For this purpose the 
Court has drawn principally upon the rules recognized by the legis-
lation, principles of law, and judicial decisions in Member States. 237 
2. <~LAW-MAKING" PROCEEDINGS 
The Treaty provides that regulations of the Council and of the 
Commission must be published in the Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities and that they become effective 20 days thereafter 
unless the regulations themselves otherwise provide. The Journal, 
an official publication of all three Communities, is published in the 
four "official" languages. 238 From the viewpoint of the national 
legal systems, publication in the Journal has the same effect as pub-
lication in national official journals as required by national law.239 
"""Arts. 169, 170, 79(4), 8o(z), 93(2). 
2.'l8 An international group of experts which recently considered this problem from 
the viewpoint of procedures for the enforcement of the antitrust provisions in the 
Treaty prepared a brief survey of national procedures and suggested specific prin-
ciples for the Commission's guidance. See Nebolsine et al., The "Right of Defense" in 
the Control of Restrictive Practices under the European Community Treaties, 8 AM. 
J. COMP. LAW 433 (1959). 
287 Cf. Joint Cases 7-56 and 3-57 to 7-57, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Ge-
richtshofes, Vol. III (1957), 3 at II8 and 127. 
288 Dutch, French, German, Italian. E.E.C. Regulation No. 1, [1958] J'L OFF. 385. 
289 See Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, 1958 REVUE ou 
MARCHE COMMUN 161, 168 (No. 3). 
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Nevertheless, in Germany, for example, regulations are also pub-
lished in the German official journal ( Bundesgesetzblatt, Part II) 
but such publication has only a declaratory effect. Addressee Mem-
ber States must be notified of directives, and they take effect upon 
such notification.240 Directives (and for that matter decisions also) 
are published in the Official Journal of the Communities for in-
formation purposes if the issuing institution so decides, which as a 
rule has been the case.241 Again, regulations and directives must be 
supported by reasons stated therein.242 
Depending on their substantive content, regulations may be com-
pared to federal statutes or administrative regulations in the United 
States. In the United States, legislative hearings before congres-
sional committees offer enterprises an opportunity to present their 
views on contemplated legislation. The purpose of the hearings is 
to ensure that the legislator has all the relevant facts necessary to 
the formulation of legislation. Federal rule-making procedures in 
administrative agencies also provide ample opportunities for in-
terested enterprises to submit their views, even where private rights 
may not be directly affected. Such a procedure is apparently not part 
of legislative or administrative "law-making" on the Continent, 
and the Treaty provides no analogous procedures. Nor does it con-
tain a provision like that in Article 7 r of the United Nations 
Charter authorizing the Economic and Social Council (composed 
of instructed government representatives) to consult directly with 
important non-governmental groups, national and international, 
which are given for this purpose a special status in relation to the 
Council.243 Instead, the Treaty allows and even requires the Coun-
cil and the Commission to consult with a variety of advisory bodies 
some of which are so composed as to reflect the various economic 
interests within the Community.244 Where the Treaty requires con-
sultation with an advisory body as a prerequisite to the adoption of 
""As to the question of what constitutes notification, the E.C.S.C. Court has held 
that a party is deemed to have notice of a letter when it has come "within the in-
ternal sphere of the addressee." Case 8-56, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Ge-
richtshofes, Vol. III, 189 at 200. 
211 In Germany, decisions are published either in the Bundcsgesezblatt, Part II, or in 
the Bundesanzeiger, but according to Meibom, the need for publishing "directives" 
has not been determined as yet. Meibom, Die Rechtsetzung durch die Organe der Eu-
ropaischen Gemeinschaften, 14 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 127, 128-29 ( 1959). 
242 Art. 190. 
213 These groups have the right to propose matters for inclusion in the Council's 
agenda and to present their views formally. EcoSoc Rules of Procedure, arts. 9, 
77-79, U.N. EcoSoc OFF. REc. 8th Sess. Annex, 142 at 147, 168-170 (E/1130) (1952). 
"''See PART IV supra. 
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a regulation, directive or decision, any such act must expressly refer 
to the opinion obtained in such consultation under the penalty of 
annulment by the Court for a defect in form. The opinion of the 
advisory body is not, of course, binding on the institution which 
requested it. 
Consultations with advisory bodies such as the Economic and 
Social Committee (and, in a sense, consultations with the Assembly) 
provide an organizational structure within which interchanges of 
views between the institutions and private interests can take place, 
and of course, the national governments will take private interests 
into account in instructing their Ministers in the Council to the ex-
tent that considerations of policy or national laws so dictate. 
C. ORGANIZING FOR CoMMUNITY AcTION 
I. COMMUNITY LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS OF INDUSTRY 
AND COMMERCE 
The organizational foundation for cooperation of European in-
dustries with the emerging international organizations was laid 
by the creation of the Council of Industrial Federations of Europe 
( C.I.F.E.) in I 949· The Council, established at the initiative of the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.), em-
braces national industrial federations of the 17 member countries 
of the organization.245 The Council's "Steering Committee for In-
formation and Cooperation with the O.E.E.C." has worked with the 
O.E.E.C. "Group for Liaison with Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions." A permanent Secretariat has functioned in Paris and the 
Assembly of members has met periodically. A number of expert 
working groups have studied special problems, such as economic co-
existence with the Communist world, the coordination of European 
transportation systems, sources of energy, the influencing public 
opinion through mass media and, more recently, the problems of a 
free trade area in Western Europe. 
When the Coal-Steel Community became reality, a special Union 
of Industries of the Six Nations was organized as a special group 
within the Council. In February I958, after the Rome Treaties 
became effective, 10 national federations of industries in the six 
Member States formed an independent "Union of Industries of the 
European Community" (U.N.I.C.E.). All but two of these federa-
tions are also members of the Council of Industrial Federations of 
245 Spain joined O.E.E.C. as the eighteenth member in 1959. 
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Europe ( C.I.F.E.) .246 According to its charter the purposes of the. 
Union are "to stimulate the elaboration of industrial policy in the 
European spirit" and to act as the authorized spokesman of the in-
dustries before the Community institutions "on all problems of gen-
eral interest or affecting questions of principle relating to the com-
mon policy" of the member federations. For these purposes the 
Union is to assure "permanent liaison" with the institutions, to under-
take studies, to coordinate positions and action (demarches) of 
the member federations, and to foster "common attitudes" of indus-
trial representatives in international organizations. Of particular in-
terest is the undertaking by the member federations to keep the Sec-
retary General of the Union informed and to consult with each other 
prior to taking a position before Community institutions. The or-
gans of the Union are: the President, the Council of Presidents of 
the member federations (which is the policy-making body) , a Secre-
tary General, a Committee of Permanent Delegates and various 
special committees and committees of experts. The Council of Presi-
dents has been meeting in Brussels under the Presidency of Mr. L.A. 
Bekaert of the Federation of Belgian Industries, to examine Com-
mon Market problems, particularly those under consideration by 
the institutions. This examination of problems is reported to have 
covered policies concerning prices and government controls of 
prices, commercial policy problems, discrimination in transporta-
tion, industrial property, harmonization of indirect taxes and the 
like.247 The primary purpose is to establish common positions on 
matters with which the Community institutions are concerned. Only 
rarely are such common positions made public.248 
Special commissions and expert working groups have been or-
ganized to deal with problems of cartels, taxation, social questions, 
harmonization of national legislations, financial and monetary ques-
tions, freeing of capital, economic trends, investments and tariffs 
and quotas. 
The Chambers of Commerce in the six Member States created 
no new organization comparable to U.N.I.C.E. Instead, they or-
ganized a "Permanent Conference of the Chambers of Commerce 
of the European Economic Community." Each chamber designates 
up to six delegates (supported by a certain number of experts) who 
meet every three months in one of the six Member Countries. Re-
246 On U.N.I.C.E., see Nagels, Die Zusammenarheit der industriellen Spitzenver-
hiinde in Europa, I EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 444 (No. 22) (1958) . 
.. 
7 418 EUROPE, item 2477 (May 26, 1959); 422 EUROPE, item 2685 (June 23, 1959) . 
... E.g., a memorandum, Le Probleme des Transports dans le cadre de Ia Com-
munaute Economique Europeenne (July 19, 1958). 
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ports, prepared on the basis of replies to questionnaires by the in-
dividual chambers, and draft resolutions are studied by experts 
before they are submitted to a General Assembly. The Conference, 
in meetings held in Strasbourg, Brussels, Berlin, Milan, and Paris, 
has dealt with such matters as the troublesome distinction between 
fiscal and "economic" duties, certain items of the future common 
external tariff, right of establishment, transport organization, and 
labor costs. 249 
In addition to these Community-level organizations comprising 
all national industries, an impressive number of industrial and trade 
groups have formed new Community-level associations in their own 
specialized fields. Other groups have established autonomous sec-
tions of their international or all-European federations, or created 
permanent committees, "congresses," liaison offices, or study and 
working parties to deal with Common Market problems, or at least 
held special meetings to consider these problems. A number of these 
new associations and committees plan to employ liaison secretariats 
at the seat of the institutions; some have already established offices 
in Brussels.250 Where new specialized associations are formed on the 
level of the six Member States, liaison is established with corres-
ponding associations of broader European or international mem-
bership and with U.N.I.C.E.251 Some of the new industrial associa-
tions, although formed because the E.E.C. Treaty has gone into 
effect, include industrial groups in other European states, such as 
the United Kingdom, Austria, and Switzerland, in addition to those 
in the six Member States. 
The new Community-level organizations of the various branches 
"'
9 See La Con/irence Permanente des Chambres de Commerce de la C.E.E., 1959 
REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 238-239 (No. 15). 
"""A partial list of the new E.E.C. level organizations is contained in 1959 REVUE 
DU MARCHE CoMMUN 309-3II (No. 17). This list includes some 28 organizations in 
the field of industry (wood-working, paper, rubber, shoes, clothing, construction, 
agriculture and food processing, flax, dairy products, fodder, vinegar, beer brewing, 
malt, fruit juices, sugar, mustard, flour milling, pasta, margarine, edible oil, powdered 
milk, meat packing, chocolate, vegetable canning), and some 38 organizations in the 
field of commerce. The Bulletin EUROPE lists the new organizations as they come into 
being (e.g., Feb. 16, Mar. 3, 10, Apr. 6, 22, 23, May 25, June 26, 1959). See also the 
list of permanent representatives of producers, users and transporters of coal and 
steel at the E.C.S.C. in Luxembourg in ANNUAIRE-MANUEL DE L'AsSEMBLEE PARLE-
MENTAIRE EUROPEENNE ( 1958-1959) 241-43. Dr. F. Nagels of the Federation of German 
Industries lists Community-level organizations among the following industries: chem-
ical, metal workings, non-ferrous metals, clothing, iron producing, food, coal mining, 
sugar 'manufacturing, wood working, shoe, beer brewing and construction. Nagels, 
supra note 246. 
m Thus, COLI ME, representing the Metal, Mechanical and Electrical Industries 
on the level of the Six, maintains close liason with ORGALIME-the federation of 
these industries on the level of the 17 (later 18) O.E.E.C. countries-and with U.N.I.C.E. 
290 EUROPE, item 1435 (Dec. 12, 1958). 
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of industry and other European industrial organizations will no 
doubt wish to represent the interests of their specific industries be-
fore the institutions in Brussels. The liaison committee of 
U.N.I.C.E.-it has been suggested-will have to make certain that 
where the interests of several branches of industry or of Com-
munity industry generally are involved, a uniform position is pre-
sented to the Community institutions which would have the support 
of the national general federations. If conflicting positions were 
taken, it was said, the institutions would "have the choice of pick-
ing from the bouquet of positions presented the most agreeable 
one." 252 
In a sense, this organizational surge transcending national fron-
tiers is a corollary to the intensive drive toward concentration and 
specialization effected by means of agreements among Community 
enterprises-which is perhaps the most noticeable economic effect 
of the E.E.C. thus far. The view was expressed in some labor circles 
that the primary purpose of the new organizational arrangements 
was to facilitate agreements among Community enterprises, some 
of which may not be compatible with the Treaty rules governmg 
competition. 
2. COMMUNITY-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS OF LABOR 
It is not surprising that labor has not lagged behind in the drive 
toward Community-level organization, particularly in view of the 
fact that, with perhaps one exception, all major non-Communist 
labor unions in the six Member States have been among the most 
consistent supporters of European integration. All three leading 
international labor organizations responded promptly to the Rome 
Treaties. 
The mammoth International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (I.C.F.T.U.) with headquarters in Brussels, which com-
prises some 55 million non-Communist workers on both sides of the 
Atlantic (including the American AFL-CIO) has maintained a Re-
gional European Organization (O.R.E.) since 1950. In 1958, the 
I.C.F.T.U. established a new Community-level organization under 
an executive committee composed of representatives of the national 
confederations in the Community States which are associated with 
I.C.F.T.U. The Secretary General of O.R.E. also sits on the execu-
tive committee. Two standing committees, one for the Coal-Steel 
252 Nagels, supra note 246, at 446. 
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Community and the other for the E.E.C. and Euratom, and anum-
ber of other committees have been established. The General As-
sembly of the new organization meets bi-annually and its Secretariat 
is located in Brussels. An I.C.F.T.U. office to effect liaison with the 
Coal-Steel Community operates in Luxembourg. Several commit-
tees of craft unions affiliated with the I.C.F.T.U. coordinate their 
activities within the six Member States in such fields as agriculture, 
transport and the construction trades.253 
The International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions 
(I.C.C.T.U.) of some 5 million workers draws its European mem-
bership principally from the six Member States. In 195 5 it organ-
ized a Federation of Christian Trade Unions of the Coal-Steel Com-
munity countries. In I 9 58 it established a European organization 
under an executive committee composed of representatives of na-
tional I.C.C.T.U. confederations in Europe and in the African areas 
associated with the Community. On Community matters only the 
representatives from the Six and from the associated African areas 
have the right to vote. This committee coordinates I.C.C.T.U. 
activities in all European organizations including the Council of 
Europe, O.E.E.C., United Nations Economic Commission for Eu-
rope, as well as in the Communities. A number of subcommittees have 
been appointed. The Secretary General has his office in Brussels. An 
advisory European conference of representatives of national con-
federations and craft federations meets annually. 
In these organizational arrangements one may discern an effort-
stemming perhaps from the relative weakness of labor unions in 
some of the Community countries-to avoid weakening unduly the 
ties with the powerful trade unions elsewhere in Europe, particu-
larly in the United Kingdom.254 
The Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions 
(W.F.T.U.) which claims a membership of 93 million (with three-
fourths in the Soviet Union) established in I 9 58 a "coordination 
and action committee" which includes representatives of its national 
federations in Italy, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg and in 
Africa. Reflecting the position of the Communist parties (and of 
the Soviet Union) this group is opposed to the Communities; it sees 
in the Common Market an effort of "monopolistic capital" to 
2
r.a ANNUAIRE-MANUEL DE L'ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE 1958-1959, at 
244-47· 
254 Cf. Rapport du Secretariat a Ia Deuxieme Assemblee generale des Syndicats Libres 
des Etats Membres des Communautes Europeennes, Oct. 12, 1959. 
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strengthen its "grip over the working people" and calls for a united 
action by the people.255 
D. EFFECTIVE CoNTACT PoiNTs BETWEEN 
INSTITUTIONS AND PRIVATE GROUPS 
One logical function of the secretariats of the private groups at 
the seat of the institutions is to serve as listening posts for their or-
ganizations, and to receive, digest, and disseminate to their mem-
bers the documentation published by the institutions. Some of the 
reports 256 are of considerable value both to industry and labor as 
a source of economic, social, technical, and other information.257 
Another function is the representation of the views of their organi-
zations before the appropriate bodies and officials in the institu-
tions. 
I. CONTACTS WITH THE COMMISSION 
While the Euratom Treaty provides for contacts and consulta-
tions between the Commission and the enterprises particularly for 
the purpose of coordinating investment and research, the E.E.C. 
Treaty contains no comparable provisions.258 The E.E.C. Com-
mission has the right "[FJ or the performance of the tasks en-
trusted to it, to collect any information and verify any matters" but 
only "within the limits and under the conditions laid down by the 
Council in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." 259 
The Commission has not developed any regular, formalized pro-
cedure for dealing with non-governmental groups, and occasionally 
complaints are heard from both labor and industry that their views 
have not been obtained on matters of interest to them.260 The Com-
255 Tessier, L'Organisation du Syndicalisme Ouvrier dans le Cadre Europien, 1959 
REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 242 (No. 15). Rosenberg, Zusammenarbeit und Organisa-
tion der Gewerkschaften West-Europas, 2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 165 (No. 7) 
(1959). 
256 E.g., E.C.S.C.: Les Regimes de Securite Sociale, 2 vols. (1957-1958); the bi-
monthly Bulletin Statistique; the periodic trade analyses Commerce exterieur de Ia 
Communaute. 
E.E.C.: L'evolution recente de Ia situation economique ( 1958) ; Document de travail 
sur Ia situation de !'agriculture dans Ia Communaute (1958). 
Euratom: Report on the Position of Nuclear Industries in the Community (1958). 
257 The public information services of the three Communities have been consolidated 
into a "common service," but each "executive" has its own official spokesman. See 
E.E.C. CoMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 
28-30 (1958); SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 17 
(1959). 
258 E.g., Euratom, arts. 5, 40, 41. 
256 Art. 213 . 
... 359 EuROPE, items 1976-77 (March II, 1959). 
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mission's avowed attitude, however, was announced m the First 
General Report on the Activities of the Community: 
9· While the common institutions and the Governments 
of Member States have a special responsibility for the 
attainment of the objectives of the Community, it will not 
be possible to attain them without the cooperation and 
help of the men who exercise leading functions in all fields, 
an? _in the last resort, of the active support of public 
opm10n. 
It is for these reasons that the Commission has decided 
to let its actions be fully known to the public, keeping in the 
picture the representatives of those economic and social 
groups concerned, consulting them, advisin_q them, even as-
sociating them with the work where possible. In this con-
nection the Commission attaches great value to the advice 
it will have to ask from the Economic and Social Commit-
tee. In its endeavours to take account of all legitimate in-
terests, the Commission will listen to the opinions and 
comments submitted to it by the representatives of these 
interests, whether organizations or individuals. 
This Commission also notes with pleasure the many 
endeavors that have already been made to arrange for the 
exchange of ideas among those responsible for the various 
fields of activity in the six countries or for a better un-
derstanding of the objectives of the Community; in the 
firm belief that such action will further the realization 
of the objectives of the Treaty and will develop a sense 
of community, the Commission gives them its unstinted 
support.261 
In a recent statement before an industrial group, President Hall-
stein reportedly confirmed that the Commission has been in constant 
contact with representatives of industry; he welcomed the fact that 
politicians who make decisions affecting the European idea are sub-
jected to increasing pressures from interested groups.262 Similarly, 
in Assembly debates Commission members have declared that they 
will consult interested groups, for instance, in investment matters.263 
As could be expected, the Assembly has encouraged the Commission 
to establish direct contact with both labor and industry particularly 
in the social field. 264 
201 E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 
14-15 ( 1958). Italics added. 
"""456 EuROPE, item 2805 (July 9, 1959); Resolutions of the Assemblee generale des 
Syndicats C.I.S.L., Nov. 5 and 6, 1959, Brussels. 
263 Speech by E.E.C. Vice-President Marjolin, Pari. Debates (No. 2, Jan. 9, 1959) 
67 at 70, referring to a statement by Representative Van Campen, id., No. 5B, 210 at 
213. 
26•Resolution of January 15,1959, para. 16, [1959] J'L OFF. 167. 
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The Commission is reported to have consulted representatives of 
agricultural producers and labor in developing its proposals for a 
common agricultural policy.265 It also has announced that it will 
seek the advice of industry and labor groups in drafting the Rules 
for the Social Fund.266 In fact, consultations are reported to have 
taken place on the basis of a Commission draft with the two non-
Communist labor groups (I.C.F.T.U. and I.C.C.T.U.) as well as 
with U.N.I.C.E., simultaneously with the Commission's discussions 
with government officials from national labor and finance minis-
tries.267 These consultations were in addition to those with the 
Economic and Social Committee which are required by the Treaty. 
In response to a request by the unions, a Vice-President of the 
Commission and members of its staff are reported to have met in an 
"economic round table" with leaders of the two labor groups for a 
general discussion of major Community problems, and suggestions 
were made in labor quarters to make "round table" sessions of this 
type a regular feature. 268 The belief prevails in union circles that 
labor has not been given as much voice and representation in the 
institutions of the new Communities as it has in the Coal-Steel 
Community. Union efforts for closer contact are directed not only 
at the Commission, but also at the governmental expert groups 
working with the Commission. Specific suggestions have been urged 
by the unions upon the Commission, such as the appointment of an 
African as the head of the Department of Overseas Territories.269 
2. CONTACTS WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEES 
OF THE COMMUNITY 
Where the Community advisory committees comprise individuals 
selected from industry, labor and other such sectors of society, pri-
vate interest groups will naturally seek contacts with their respective 
spokesmen. This tendency has already been particularly evident as 
far as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on 
"'"'The Committee of Agricultural Associations of the Community (C.O.P.A.) is 
reported to have been asked for comments on specific memoranda prepared by the 
Commission staff. 411 EuROPE, item 2412 {May 16, 1959); 448 id., item 2733 (June 
30, 1959); 455 id., item 2792 (July 8, 1959). 
200 E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIVITIES OF THE CoM-
MUNITY 114 ( 1959) • 
267 377 EUROPE, item 2IIO (April 3, 1959); 451 id., item 2757 (July 3, 1959). 
268 455 EUROPE, item 2793 {July 8, 1959). 
269 337 EUROPE, item 1794 (Feb. 13, 1959). 
The Euratom Commission will of course be in increasingly close contacts with pri-
vate enterprises and groups, particularly with the public utilities participating in the 
construction of nuclear power plants under the EURATOM-U.S. program. 
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the Social Fund are concerned. Some feel, however, that although 
the Economic and Social Committee may be suitable for general 
debates on policy matters and on important aspects of policy imple-
mentation, it is not effective for purposes of continuing consultation. 
The general criticism of some that government officials play an ex-
cessive role in certain of these committees-the Transportation 
Committee, for example-has already been mentioned.270 Similarly, 
some members of the Economic and Social Committee have re-
portedly complained that the Administrative Committee on Social 
Security for Migrant Workers should not have been composed 
only of government officials,271 and both the transportation industry 
and labor spokesmen have criticized the composition of the Trans-
portation Committee.272 
3· CONTACTS WITH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES, 
THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
The Permanent Representatives of the national governments in 
Brussels offer another avenue of contact. Their position is somewhat 
analogous to that of permanent missions to the United Nations in 
New York-the United States Mission, for example, which holds 
regular briefings for American non-governmental organizations par-
ticularly during General Assembly sessions. The role of the Perma-
nent Representatives is of importance not only because they prepare 
documents for the Council of Ministers, but also because of their 
influence on the Commission as spokesmen for national govern-
ments. An important labor group has reported, however, that it has 
been difficult to establish relations with the Council because not only 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs but other ministers as well are involved 
in the Council's work. Moreover, ministers have tended to consult 
national employer and labor organizations in their respective coun-
tries and to rely on the Permanent Representatives of the six gov-
ernments in Brussels to work out the problems. "We are categori-
cally opposed to this tendency," this labor group reported, "because 
we do not want to lose on the European level what we had gained on 
the national level in terms of consultation and co-determination." 2n 
The Council appointed a special Committee to assist the Commis-
sion in future tariff negotiations with third countries. This Com-
07° Cf. parliamentary question by Representative Muller-Hermann, [1959] }'L OFF. 
818-19. 
271 376 EUROPE, item 2015 (April2, 1959). 
272 317 EUROPE, item 1615 (Jan. 19, 1959). 
073 Rapport, supra note 254. 
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mittee is composed of governmental representatives, and there are 
no indications that it or the Commission will seek the views of inter-
ested private groups by means of public hearings like those con-
ducted by the United States Committee on Reciprocity Information 
in connection with tariff negotiations or by any other organized 
means. However, the Commission, through its Department of Ex-
ternal Relations, is reported to have been consulting informally on 
tariff problems with the representatives of U.N.I.C.E.274 
A number of European Assembly members have cooperated 
closely with labor union representatives in Brussels. 
If the role of the Assembly in the Community increases, pressures 
might develop to increase the number and scope of informal hear-
ings of private interest representatives before the standing com-
mittees of the Assembly.275 Individuals and enterprises have at pres-
ent the right to address petitions to the Assembly on matters falling 
within the scope of activities of the Communities, but no such peti-
tions appear to have been received thus far. 276 
4· CONTACTS VIA NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
Because of the important role they play in making the policy de-
cisions of the Community, the executive branches of the national 
governments remain, of course, the most important avenue of con-
tact for private interests. The Minister of Foreign Affairs who sits 
on the Council, his ministry, and other ministries concerned, the 
national experts assigned by the ministries to work with the Com-
mission, and finally the Permanent Representatives and their staffs 
may all be helpful. A Community enterprise also has access to its par-
liamentary representatives who may raise questions in the national 
parliament directed at the Minister concerned. If a given representa-
tive is also a member of the European Assembly, he may take similar 
action in that body and in addition encourage the adoption of posi-
tions in the standing committees of the Assembly favored by his 
constituents. Membership in the Assembly does not thus far seem 
to have significantly increased the election appeal of parliamen-
tarians running in national elections. However, their service in the 
Assembly has marked them as experts in the various areas of Com-
J!7• 454 EUROPE, item 2780 {July 7, 1959). 
276 Some recent instances were the consultations in the Agriculture Committee, men-
tioned by Representative Torsi in Pari. Debates, (No. 7, June 1958) (mimeo.) 276 at 
278, and in the Social Committee, mentioned by Representative Sabatini, Pari. De-
bates (No.4, Jan. 12, 1959) 128. 
l!7"Rules of Procedure, art. 42 (1958) ]'L OFF. 231; HEIDELBERGER, DAS EUROPAISCHE 
PARLIAMENT 37 (1959). 
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munity work (such as agriculture, social affairs, transportation), 
and this fact has measurably strengthened their positions in their 
own political parties. Political parties have a major, if not deter-
mining, influence on individual political careers-a substantially 
greater influence, for example, than political parties in the United 
States. With growing electorate interest in Community matters, an 
Assembly membership may become increasingly desirable for na-
tional politicians who, in turn, may become more sensitive to the 
views of their constituents on Community matters. 
5. A CASE OF INTER-ACTION 
An interesting instance of inter-action between private enterprise 
'groups, national governments, and Community institutions arose in 
connection with a recent acute scarcity of untreated hides which was 
due in part to extensive purchases by Eastern European countries 
and which caused a spectacular rise in prices. The affected leather-
processing industries demanded export controls, and, in fact, export 
limitations in varying degrees were imposed by national govern-
ments. They were directed not only at exports to third countries but 
also at exports to other Member States. The industry is reported to 
have approached formally both the Commission and the Council, 
but the Permanent Representatives decided to defer submission of 
the matter to the Council pending consideration by the Commission. 
In obvious response to a request by the industry, a French liberal 
member of the European Assembly addressed a parliamentary ques-
tion to the Commission implicitly presenting the industry position. 
In its answer the Commission pointed to the undesirable differences 
among the national export controls and called for an examination 
of the over-all situation.277 Shortly thereafter the Commission con-
vened a meeting of national governmental experts and Commission 
staff in which the suggestions of the industry were considered. It is 
reported that an agreement was reached on a harmonization of 
national measures which would decrease the undesirable features 
affecting industries in other Member States. Subsequently, a Dutch 
socialist representative addressed another parliamentary question 
to the Commission. He inquired what measures the Commission 
proposed to take to prevent what he considered violations of the 
Treaty resulting from Belgian and French prohibitions of the ex-
port of hides.278 The Commission replied that the French measures 
277 Parliamentary question by Representative Rochereau and answer of the E.E.C. 
Commission, [1959] J'L OFF. 709-10. 
278 [1959] }'L OFF. 1097· 
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did not constitute a Treaty violation and that the Belgian govern-
ment had lifted its export prohibitions in response to recommenda-
tions of the Commission. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
In the institutional framework of the Community the Council pos-
sesses the power of final decision concerning questions of Com-
munity legislation and policy. As the transitional period progresses 
the number of instances in which the Council cannot act without 
unanimous agreement of all national governments will be reduced; 
to that extent at least the control of the individual governments will 
be loosened somewhat. Surrounded by an extensive Secretariat and 
served also by the Permanent Representatives of the governments, 
with their large national staffs in Brussels, the Council has as a rule 
considered questions only after agreement had already been reached 
among national administrations or a deadlock had developed in the 
negotiations which could be resolved by political decision only. A 
number of important matters relating to Community policy-for 
instance, in the field of transport and agriculture-are explored out-
side the Council in informal sessions of national ministers whose 
departments are directly concerned with the questions under con-
sideration. This development, which is not contemplated by the 
Treaty, may well advance the policy formation in the Community 
but obviously detracts from the central role of the Council.279 
Experience in the O.E.E.C. and in other organizations has shown 
that where important national interests are involved governments 
represented by their Ministers find it difficult to agree. The Com-
mission has been established on the theory that, as an independent 
"executive," supported by an independent expert staff of civil serv-
ants and acting by simple majority vote, it will be able to agree on 
policy proposals for the Council, thus facilitating the Council's 
policy decisions. The Commission has also been given supervisory 
and implementing functions. In the exercise of its tasks the Commis-
sion has relied heavily on negotiations with national governments 
on all levels. This has been required where the Treaty calls for 
negotiations on matters not resolved by the Treaty itself. More-
over, in these and in other matters national administrations have 
been the obvious and principal source of factual data required by the 
279 La Communaute a l'epreuve des faits, I-La Commission et les gouvernements, 1959 
REVUE DE MARCHE COMMON, 425 at 426 (No. 20). 
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Commission. National governments have responded with varying 
degrees of readiness to the Commission's requests for information 
and to its suggestions, frequently insisting on a clear indication of 
the specific Treaty provision under which the request was made. 
Some concern was expressed that if the Commission should seek 
agreement of national governments in all cases before making its 
proposals to the Council it would dilute its independent position 
and its right of initiative. Considering the fact that a Commission's 
proposal cannot become law without the Council's decision, it is not 
surprising, however, that the Commission wants to avoid rejections 
of its proposals by seeking to obtain the support of national govern-
ments before submitting them to the Council. 
In several instances where national governments disagreed the 
Commission has stepped into the breach and have offered compro· 
mises reflecting its own views which have eventually been accepted 
by the Council. This was essentially the case in the important nego-
tiations for a wider free trade area, in which the French govern-
ment, finding itself in a minority position in the Council, tended to 
rely on the Commission despite the opposition in principle on the 
part of the French government to a strong Commission. Whatever 
success the Commission has achieved in these instances has been due 
in a significant measure to the personal ability of its present mem-
bers, a factor not to be underestimated in the institutional picture. 
It may well be that in the future the Commission's approach in con-
troversial matters will be first to persuade at least the required 
majority of the Council members to accept a proposal and then to 
rely on the European Assembly and on public opinion generally to 
generate pressures on the national governments forcing favorable 
action in the Council. Such a plan of action assumes, of course, the 
existence of an informed and active public opinion and that the As-
sembly has real political influence, two indispensable factors if the 
Commission is to play its part successfully as the driving force of 
the Community. 
The fact that both the Council and the Commission have had to 
devote so much time and energy to the problem of Community re-
lationships with non-member countries explains in part the relative 
slowness of progress in other areas of Community activities, par-
ticularly in the development of common policies. On the other hand 
the pressures exerted on the Community by the contracting parties 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, by the United 
Kingdom and by other O.E.E.C. countries particularly during the 
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unsuccessful negotiations for a free trade area association, have 
proved a strong unifying factor. 
The Court of Justice and the Assembly-the two institutions 
common to all three Communities-have shown considerable sensi-
tivity to the need for a balanced development of the institutions. 
The desire to assure to enterprises the broadest possible access to 
the Court and the incipient tendency to interpret the treaties as con-
stitutions are of particular interest in the judgments of the Court. 
The deputies from the six national parliaments to the Assembly 
have been seated by political affiliation rather than nationality-a 
historical innovation in international assemblies. The Assembly has, 
moreover, been remarkably successful in establishing practices and 
procedures which not only facilitate cooperation with the High 
Authority and the E.E.C. and Euratom Commissions, but also pro-
vide a basis for a measure of control over these executive bodies. 
It is impossible, however, to state at this juncture that the Assembly 
has in fact succeeded in influencing or controlling the activities of 
the "executives" in any significant fashion. 
The Assembly has developed fairly successful techniques to bring 
its views before the Councils. However, evidence of any significant 
influence, not to speak of control, over the Ministers, remains non-
existent. Decisive power in the Communities remains in the hands 
of the Councils and, to a substantially lesser degree, in the hands of 
the "executives." For those who consider parliamentary or popular 
control an essential component of democratic government, this is 
a matter of great concern, since the treaties will very likely lead to 
a substantial concentration of executive-administrative power both 
on national and Community levels. 
On the national level officials of national administrations form 
the staff of the Permanent Representatives in Brussels, and national 
official experts are called in to work with the staff of the "execu-
tives." These same officials advise their respective Ministers on the 
Councils as well as their own governments generally. The staffs of 
the Commission and of the other "executives" as well as the staff 
of the Councils' Secretariat have been recruited to a large measure 
from national administrations. Some former Ministers have become 
members of one of the "executives," and former representatives in 
the Assembly have become Ministers or members of an "executive." 
This interplay of national and Community administrations, the 
growing expertise and the development of vested interests of Com-
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munity officials will inevitably increase the influence of a compact 
bureaucracy. 
Under the scheme of the treaties, executive branches of the gov-
ernments in the Member States, acting through their Ministers in 
the Councils, will be able to assume important obligations in matters 
heretofore within the scope of parliamentary control without parti-
cipation by their national parliaments. The Councils may, it will be 
recalled, adopt regulations directly modifying national laws and 
enter into international agreements with .third parties of the type 
normally subject to parliamentary approval. Each Minister is, of 
course, responsible to his national parliament as a member of his 
government for what he does in the Council and must follow na-
tional law. There is some question, however, as to the effectiveness 
of this responsibility considering particularly the fact that a Minister 
can be outvoted in the Council. These implications may seriously 
impair support for the Communities in the Member States. During 
the recent coal crisis the French Minister explained in the Council 
his opposition to the exercise by the High Authority of direct con-
trol over French coal production on the ground that the French 
government and not the High Authority would be responsible for 
the social and political consequences of such controls. Again, the 
concern of the German Parliament is reflected in the German statute 
approving the Rome Treaties. This statute requires the German 
government to advise the parliament before action is taken in the 
Councils affecting German law.280 This requirement apparently has 
been interpreted so broadly as to require parliamentary approval 
even to conduct factual surveys proposed by the Commission.281 A 
general trend in this direction would seem to contain seeds of serious 
difficulty for the Communities. 
In these circumstances the case for a strengthening of the Euro-
pean Assembly as a chosen instrument of democratic control over 
the Community institutions is quite impressive. This control in re-
gard to the "executives" may be in the process of development, but, 
the influence of the Assembly would increase substantially if it were 
given a meaningful role in the selection of the members of the 
"executives." The Assembly has carried its efforts to assert some 
influence over the Councils abol.lt as far as is possible within the 
!l8<l Gesetz zu den Vertriigen vom 25. Marz 1957 zur Griindung der Europaischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europaischen Atomgemeinschaft, art. z, [1957] 
Bundesgesetzblatt II, 7S3· · ·· · 
281 See Commission's answer to written question No. 28, [1959] ]'L. OFF. 851. 
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present legal framework. If it is to go further it must have a true 
"power of the purse," at least over the administrative expenses of 
the Communities, if not over the operational programs of the vari-
ous Funds. A logical concomitant would be to give the Assembly a 
decisive voice in determining the size of the tax presently levied by 
the High Authority upon coal and steel producers. This raises the 
question of assuring a similar independent source of revenue to 
the other two Communities, subject to the control of the Assem-
bly 282-a system of financing which would replace that of annual 
contributions by the Member States. 
Again, under present provisions the Councils are required to 
consult the Assembly on specified matters but no such consultation 
is required on a number of important decisions such as those re-
lating to overseas territories. Moreover, even where consultation 
is required the Councils are free to disregard the Assembly's ad-
vice. It could be provided that decisions on all important policy 
matters would require approval not only in the Council but also in 
the Assembly.283 This change, which would require an amendment 
of the Treaty, would in a sense elevate the Assembly to a position 
comparable to the lower chamber of a bicameral legislature in which 
the Council would play the role of the upper chamber. 
There is some question whether the Member States are willing 
at this time to countenance a significant increase in the role of the 
Assembly. The De Gaulle government, it will be recalled, has 
opposed any effort on the part of the French National Assembly 
to increase its powers in relation to the national executive beyond 
the strict letter of the new Constitution.284 One reason for the 
opposition to such an increase of the European Assembly's power 
may be the fact that the Assembly has discussed rather freely 
steps toward further integration.285 Nevertheless, the Assembly it-
282 The Rome Treaties envisage that the expenses of the two Communities will 
eventually be financed from their own resources, e.g., for the E.E.C. from the revenue 
from the customs duties collected on the basis of the common external tariffs (E.E.C. 
Treaty, art. 201) and for the Euratom from the revenue from Community levies in 
the Member States (Euratom treaty, art. 173). The Assembly asked the Commissions 
to accelerate their studies on this subject. Resolution IV of Nov. 24, 1959, [1959] 
]'L OFF. 126 I. 
= M. Marjolin, Vice-President of the Commission supported a similar proposition 
in his interview with Le Monde of Sept. 22, 1959. 
28
' Cf. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1959; cf. also the decision by the Constitutional Council, 
as reported in N.Y. Times, July 2, 1959. 
285 E.g., the proposal that the three Communities enter into an agreement for closer 
formal integration among themselves under E.E.C. Treaty art. 238, and Euratom 
Treaty art. 206. Doc. No. 14 ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE (June 1958), 
Rapport fait au nom de Ia Commission des affaires po/itiques et des questions institu-
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self appears determined to press at least in one direction. All three 
treaties envisage direct elections of Assembly representatives by 
universal suffrage of the people of the Member States.286 The As-
sembly working party has reported progress on a plan which might 
make such elections possible in 1962 or 1963.287 In order to con-
duct such elections the political parties would have to organize 
themselves on a Community level. An Assembly so elected would 
not have the direct access to national parliaments which the present 
Assembly enjoys. 288 On the other hand, if the understanding and 
support of the public opinion develops sufficiently to permit a mean-
ingful election (and some doubts have been expressed on that 
score), the new Assembly may constitute an important further step 
toward integration. Moreover, the increase of its powers might well 
prove more acceptable if linked with direct elections. 
As seen by General de Gaulle, "the realities of Europe" require 
the cooperation of sovereign states through organized consulta-
tions of governments rather than "extranational" institutions with 
policy-making powers.289 If this concept prevails, the Community 
institutions will remain technical agencies for the execution of 
policies determined by national governments. 
tionelles sur Ia coordination des trois Communautes Europeennes, para. r8 at 22. See 
also speech by Representative Van der Goes van Naters, Pari. Debates (No. 8, June, 
1958) (mimeo.) II-12. 
"""E. C. S.C. treaty, art 21, para. 3, as amended by the Convention Relating to Cer-
tain Institutions Common to the European Communitiers, art. 2(2); E.E.C. Treaty art. 
138(3), Euratom Treaty art. ro8(3). The original version of the E.C.S.C. treaty art. 
21 did not contain the requirement of a "uniform procedure in all Member States" 
which was added by the Rome Treaties and the Convention. The added requirement 
may make the speedy adoption of a scheme for direct elections more difficult. Spitaels, 
Les Elections Directes Europeennes, 8 LES CAHIERS DE BRUGES 23, 26-27 (1958) No. I. 
The Assembly appointed a working party within its Committee on Political Affairs 
and Institutional Questions to study the problem. Its composition is given in [1959] 
}'L OFF. 794· 
2
"' See statement by Representative Dehousse, Chairman of the Working Party, 416 
EUROPE, item 2465 (May 23, 1959). 
288 It has been suggested that during a transitional period only a portion of the 
representatives should be elected directly. Doc. 22 AsSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EURO-
PEENNE, DOCUMENTS DE SEANCE 196o-r96I, APRIL 30, 1960. Rapport ... sur /'election 
de l'Assembllfe parlementaire Europeenne au Suffrage universe/ direct par MM. Bat-
tista, Dehousse, Faure, Schuijt, Metzger. 
289 Ambassade de France, Service de presse et d'information, Speeches and Press 
Conferences No. 152, Full text of President De Gaulle's third press conference in 
Paris on September 5, 1960, at 8. 
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Regulations 
APPENDIX 
List of Selected /1 cts of the 
E.E.C. Council and Commission Issued 
During the First I8 Months of the Community's Existence 
Regulation No. I (Council) 
The official languages are French, German, Italian and Dutch. A Member State 
and an individual or an enterprise have the right to choose any official language when 
corresponding with the institutions. The institutions must employ the language of the 
addressee. [1958] ]'L. OFF. 385. 
Regulation No. 2 (Council) 
An identity card (laissez-passer) is made available for members of the European 
Parliamentary Assembly under Art. 6 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities. 
[1958] ]'L. OFF. 387. 
Regulation No. 3 (Council) 
This regulation concerning the social security of migrant workers was issued under 
Arts. 51 and 227, par. 2 E.E.C. Treaty. The regulation covers sickness, maternity, in-
validi•m, old age, accident, death, unemployment, and other benefits. The purpose of 
the regulation is to assure that migrant workers do not suffer prejudice with respect 
to their social security benefits as a result of their employment in different Member 
~tates. For this purpose the regulation lists in the annex relevant national laws under 
which migrant workers will acquire the benefits and lays down which of these laws 
are applicable for the purpose of determining benefits in a given case. The burden 
of payment is apportioned according to various formulae between the state of origin 
and the state of residence. 
An Administrative Commission promotes cooperation among Member States and 
acts as a liaison agency and as administrative tribunal in resolving differences arising 
from the application of the regulation and interpreting its provisions. 
The regulation does not provide any direct recourse by individuals to the Community 
institutions. If a Member State fails to extend its social security benefits to a migrant 
worker, the latter will have to avail himself of the legal remedies provided by the 
national law. The case will, however, reach the Community Court on a reference 
from the national court if a "prejudicial question" is involved (Art. 177 of the 
Treaty). [1958] }'L. OFF. 561. 
Regulation No. 4 (Council) 
This regulation supplements and contains implementing proviSions for Regulation 
No. 3 (e.g. it determines which national authorities are competent, how to "add" 
the periods of insurance, etc.). [1958] ]'L. OFF. 597· 
Regulation No. 5 (Council) 
This regulation contains provisions with respect to calling for and transferring 
financial contributions, budgeting, and administration of resources of the Development 
Fund for the overseas countries. (See Art. 6 Implementing Convention). [1958] }'L. 
OFF. 681. 
Provisional Regulation No. 6 (Council) 
Supplementing Regulation No. 5, this regulation defines the responsibilities of the 
auditor and accountants of the Development Fund. [1958] }'L. OFF. 686. 
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Regulation No. 7 (Commission) 
In accordance with the Council's instruction under Regulation No. 5, the Commis-




Some Published Decisions 
I) Council Decision establishing the Journal Officiel. [I958] J'L. OFF. 390. 
2) Commission Decision concerning the use of a certificate for goods coming from 
non-member countries under arts. 9 and IO. E.E.C. Treaty {libre pratique). 
[I958] ]'L. OFF. 688. 
3) Commission Decision containing provisions applicable, as regards trade between 
Member States, to goods originating in another Member State in whose manu-
facture products were used on which customs duties were not levied or which 
benefited from drawbacks on such duties. (Cf. Art. IO par. 2 E.E.C. Treaty) 
[I958] ]'L. OFF. 694· 
+) Decision of the Administrative Commission prescribing the first series of forms 
to be used in the application of Regulations Nos. 3 and 4 on the social security 
of migrant workers. [I959] ]'L. OFF. 37· 
5) See No. 4, supra: Decision prescribing the second series of forms. [I959] ]'L. 
OFF. 5s. 
6) Council Decision directing the E.E.C. Commission to function as the secretariat 
of the Administrative Commission established by Regulation No. 3 supra. [1959] 
J'L. OFF. 703. 
7) Council Decision apportioning funds of the Development Fund to social and 
economic projects. [I959] J'L. OFF. 864. 
8) Council Decision approving special aid to Madagascar from the Development 
Fund. [I959] }'L. OFF. 865. 
9) Council Decision allowing certain exceptions from Regulation No. 5· [I959] J'I.. 
OFF. 866. 
Miscellaneous (examples) 
I) "Statut'' (charter) of the Monetary Committee. [I958] J'L. OFF. 390. 
2) "Statut'' (charter) of the Transport Committee. [I958] J'L. OFF. 509. 
3) "Reglement Interieur" (Rules of Procedure) of the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. (1959] ]'L. OFF. 493• 
4) "Statut'' (charter) of the control committee of auditors established by Art. 206 
E.E.C. Treaty and Art. 180 Euratom Treaty. [I959] J'L. OFF. 861. 
Agreements 
1) Agreement of Cooperation with the International Labor Organization. [1959] 
J'L. OFF. 521. 
Chapter III 
The Establishment of the Customs Union 
Marc Ouin * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Economic Community is, above all else, a customs 
union. The provisions of the Treaty establishing it which directly 
relate to the customs union make up, it is true, only forty-odd of its 
two hundred and forty eight articles. Nevertheless, the point of 
departure of the Treaty doubtless was and remains the establish-
ment of a customs union. 
A customs union groups countries each having a national geo-
graphic and economic area generally protected at the outset by cus-
toms barriers and, with regard to certain products, by import quotas 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world. These countries agree to eliminate 
among themselves customs duties and quotas, and thereby to form a 
single territory within which goods may circulate wholly without 
obstacles, regulation or limitation. Commercial unification of such 
a group of countries also involves agreement to enforce, within the 
newly-unified territory, a single tariff schedule which, vis-a-vis the 
rest of the world, replaces national tariffs. This common external 
tariff must at the same time be combined with a common commercial 
policy vis-a-vis non-member countries. 
The elimination of the obstacles to trade among the countries 
which thus form a customs union, and the establishment of an ex-
ternal tariff common to its members necessitate a series of progres-
sive steps. The importance of a step-by-step progression is increased 
whenever differences among the points of departure of member 
countries are pronounced. 
* Licencie en Droit, Paris. Deputy Director of the Directorate of Trade and Pay-
ments, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Paris. Formerly Admin-
istrateur Civil in the French Ministry of Finance. Author of publications on European 
trade problems. 
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In the case of the European Economic Community, the problem is 
to establish a customs union among the following: 
1) The three Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg), who have already established a customs union among 
themselves, which has been in existence since I950. In that year 
these three countries abolished customs duties among themselves at 
a single stroke and adopted a common external tariff. On the other 
hand, the elimination of quotas on their mutual trade (even today 
there still exist a few) and the creation of a single list of liberated 
goods in regard to imports from member countries of the Organiza-
tion for European Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) and from the rest of 
the world required several years. A list of liberated goods was 
established in I 9 56 valid for imports from O.E.E. C. countries, but 
no similar list is yet in force in regard to imports from certain non-
O.E.E.C. countries. The general level of tariff protection in the 
Benelux countries is quite low, although their duties on certain manu-
factured products are relatively high. These countries are poor in 
raw materials and to a large extent have traditionally depended 
for economic survival upon foreign commerce. Their imports per 
capita average $450.00 annually and their exports $400.00. 
2) Germany, a country whose tariffs in the past have been fairly 
high. In keeping, however, with Professor Erhard's policy of free-
ing its economy from controls, Germany has, since I 9 55, reduced 
its tariffs of its own accord, and is therefore considered today as 
having relatively low tariffs. Germany is characterized by its highly 
dynamic policy of commercial expansion. Per capita imports attain 
a yearly average of $200.00, and exports of $250.00. Germany's 
quota policy is also a very liberal one. Because her balance of pay-
ments is flourishing and her exchange reserves are considerable, she 
has progressively eliminated almost all quotas on imports from 
countries of the non-communist world. 
3) Italy, whose foreign commerce represents a smaller share of 
national income-per capita imports averaging $8o.oo yearly and 
exports $8o. Italy has, however, systematically developed her for-
eign trade, especially since the war, to a point where she is emerging 
as a great commercial country. She very early adopted a remarkably 
liberal policy in regard to quotas on imports from European coun-
tries. In fact, she has since 1950 removed almost all quotas on im-
ports of goods produced in the member states of the O.E.E.C. Her 
restrictions on goods from other countries are stricter, but these 
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are now being progressively removed. Italy is considered to be a 
high-tariff country, even though she has unilaterally suspended 
duties in a very substantial degree. 
4) France, which, because of traditionally protectionist attitudes 
and balance-of-payments difficulties, maintains both a very rigid 
system of import quotas and high tariffs. Foreign commerce gen-
erates a relatively small portion of France's national income, im-
ports averaging $1 8o.oo per capita annually and exports $170.00. 
Since the end of 1958, however, France has pursued a policy of 
progressive elimination of quotas on imports from O.E.E.C. coun-
tries, a policy which will in the future be applied to imports from 
other countries. 
Among countries whose situations are so disparate at the outset, 
unusual efforts are required to achieve the elimination of obstacles 
to the exchange of goods and the establishment of a common ex-
ternal tariff as well as of a common commercial policy vis-a-vis third 
countries. The economies of these countries can be subjected only 
progressively to foreign competition. More abrupt changes in com-
petitive conditions would create the risk that economic activity 
(which in one of the Six had always been protected either by high 
tariffs or quotas or both against foreign competition, including the 
competition of its new partners within the Community) would be 
endangered by the competition of similar activity of the other mem-
bers of the Six. The goals of the Common Market, it is true, are to 
stimulate a better division of labor among the Six, to increase pro-
ductivity and the like, but the sudden disappearance of any signifi-
cant economic activity within a Member Country would create eco-
nomic, financial, and social problems which the Community would 
not survive. 
This emphasizes the necessity of proceeding slowly in order to 
extend the impact of the consequences of coordination of the in-
dustries of the Six over a period of time. Clearly this necessity is 
more imperative for those countries of the Six which at the begin-
ing enjoyed the protection of the highest tariffs and quotas. To the 
Benelux countries, which enforced few quotas and low tariffs and 
were therefore accustomed to world competition (with th~ excep-
tion of a few Benelux industries which. enjoy greater than average 
protection), the delil:>eration with . which the Community. will. be 
created is less important than to France. 
A "transitional period" of twelve to fifteen years beginning on 
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January I, 1958, was therefore agreed to in the course of which the 
customs union is to be progressively created. During this transitional 
period, the Six are to undertake to : 
I) abolish altogether tariffs among themselves, 
2) abolish all import and export quotas on trade among them-
selves, 
3) establish a common external tariff, 
4) establish a single list of quota-free imports from non-member 
countries and, as to products which are not free from quotas, adopt 
a common quota policy. 
In addition and concurrently, other more technical measures must 
be taken. For instance, methods of applying customs duties are to be 
unified: a common tariff is not adequate if methods of evaluation in 
Hamburg, Rotterdam, Marseilles, and Genoa differ. It is therefore 
appropriate not only to fix common tariffs but also to establish com-
mon rules for the application of such tariffs. In short, customs rules 
and regulations in their entirety must be unified. 
But the solution of tariff and quota problems requires contem-
poraneous settlement of a great number of other questions as well. 
The problem of coordinating basic economic policies aside, steps 
closely connected with the elimination of tariffs among members 
of the Six include the establishment and enforcement of equitable 
rules of competition, and the harmonization of fiscal legislation af-
fecting imported products. These problems, all of foremost impor-
tance, are in part treated elsewhere in this book. These remarks are 
merely intended to emphasize the fact that, even though the rules 
directly relating to the customs union constitute only forty or so of 
the two hundred and forty-eight articles of the Treaty, the majority 
of the other provisions contribute to its creation. 
A direct connection has, moreover, been established between the 
progressive formation of the customs union and the other steps 
which are related to it. This connection is a characteristic of each 
of the stages of the transitional period. 
The Treaty provides that the Common Market shall be estab-
lished in the course of a transitional period of twelve years divided 
into three stages of four years each.1 It further provides that, "to 
each stage there shall be allotted a group of actions which shall be 
undertaken and pursued concurrently." This provision ensures the 
necessary contemporaneity between the creation of the customs 
1 European Economic Community Treaty art. 8. The E.E.C. Treaty is generally re-
ferred to herein as "the Treaty." 
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union in the strict sense of that term and other measures, like har-
monization of fiscal legislation, to which reference has already been 
made. In addition the Treaty provides that a condition of the pro-
gression from the first to the second stage of four years shall be con-
firmation that the purposes envisaged for the first stage have in 
their essentials been achieved and that the obligations incurred by 
the Member States in accordance with the terms of the Treaty have 
been fulfilled.2 These objectives and obligations are, of course, those 
related to the initial creation of the customs union, but they also in-
clude those not specifically related to tariffs and quotas. 
At the end of the first stage a statement shall, subject to the 
unanimous agreement of the six Member States, be issued that the 
objectives have been reached and the obligations fulfilled. If una-
nimity cannot be achieved, the first stage shall automatically be ex-
tended for a period of one year. At the end of this year (the fifth 
after the coming into force of the Treaty) the Six shall again seek 
a unanimous vote that the obligations fixed by the Treaty have been 
effectively fulfilled. If unanimity still cannot be achieved, the first 
stage shall be extended for a further period of one year (the sixth). 
At the end of this further year the vote of a majority of the Member 
States shall decide. If no majority can be obtained, the Member 
States shall designate an arbitration board to determine whether the 
required statement should issue. Its decision shall bind the Member 
States. 
What would result if the arbitration board decided that the ob-
ligations had not been fulfilled? The Treaty is silent on this question. 
Clearly, however, in such a case the extremely serious political situa-
tion resulting would bring about either a complete failure of the 
Treaty, or the Member States, on the highest governmental level, 
would be forced to take political measures to save the situation. 
If, as a result of a unanimous vote at the end of the fourth or the 
fifth year, or of a majority vote at the beginning of the sixth year, 
or of a decision by the arbitration board, the statement is issued that 
the objectives of the first stage have been attained, the Member 
States must proceed with the execution of the second stage. The 
Treaty is silent on the transition from the second to the third stage; 
therefore it is to be assumed that this transition is automatic. The 
Treaty also provides that the second or the third stages may not be 
extended or curtailed, except pursuant to a unanimous decision of 
the Council. 
2 Ibid. 
I 06 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
The Treaty further declares that the provisions which may per-
mit the extension of the first stage in the manner described, or those 
which permit modification of the duration of the second and third 
stages, shall not have the effect of extending the transitional period 
beyond fifteen years. Consequently, the customs union among the 
Six should become a reality in all particulars in the period between 
December 3 r, 1969, and December 31, 1972. 
Obligations arising from the Treaty do not excuse the Six from 
meeting outstanding national obligations which individual Member 
States may owe to other countries.3 The substance of these -obliga-
tions is contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(G.A.T.T.) of which each of the Six is a signatory. This Agree-
. ment, to which about forty countries on six continents are parties, 
establishes a number of rules which bind the signatories in fixing 
commercial policy. The basic philosophy of the Agreement is that 
reflected by most-favored-nation clauses. If certain countries de-
cide to abolish tariffs among themselves, without extending such 
benefits to the other signatory countries, the most-favored-nation 
principle is obviously not respected with regard to those countries. 
The G.A.T.T., however, authorizes the formation of customs 
unions, but it stipulates specific conditions with a view to giving cer-
tain guarantees to those contracting parties of the General Agree-
ment who are not to be union participants. The Six must respect 
those conditions in establishing the Common Market, and these 
same conditions will govern, to a large extent, the commercial policy 
of the new Community towards the rest of the world. 
The two categories of actions to be taken by the Six-those de-
signed to abolish the obstacles to trade among themselves, and those 
designed to establish a common external tariff and a common com-
mercial policy-conveniently define an outline of a study of their 
customs union. Part II of this chapter will therefore be devoted to 
relations of the Six with one another and Part III to the relations of 
the Six with third countries. Agricultural and food products will 
not be considered. Although it is true that basic principles are the 
same whether these or industrial products are at issue, the means 
of giving effect to such principles where agricultural and food prod-
ucts are concerned differ somewhat. The measures envisaged are, 
moreover, not so clearly defined as those in the area of industrial 
products since the Treaty generally leaves them to be spelled out and 
implemented by decisions of the Community institutions. 
3 Treaty art. 234-
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II. RELATIONS AMONG THE SIX 
A. ABOLITION OF TARIFFS 
The Treaty provides that tariffs shall be frozen as of the date of 
the entry into force of the Treaty.4 Consequently, since January, 
I958, the Six have no longer had the right to raise their tariffs vis-
a-vis each other. 
I. THE BASIC CUSTOMS DUTIES TO WHICH THE TREATY 
RULES APPLY 
The tariffs to which the rules governing the abolition of tariffs are 
to be applied are precisely dcfined.5 The Treaty calls these tariffs 
"basic duties," and provides that the basic duties which are subject 
to successive reductions are those applied on January I, I 9 57. This 
means that the "freeze" applies to duties actually in force on J anu-
ary I, 1957. More precisely, if a country had increased its customs 
duties between January I, I957, and the date of the first tariff re-
duction (January I, I959), it was obliged at that date to revert to 
the level in force on January I, I 9 57, and to use this level as the basis 
for the reductions provided for by the Treaty. 
This rule is all the more strict since the basic duty is the one that 
was in fact applied on January I, I957· If, at that date, a country 
had temporarily suspended, either in whole or in part, a customs 
duty previously obtaining, the basic duty would be the tariff actually 
collected on merchandise on January I, I 9 57, taking into account the 
suspension, and not the tariff which would have been applicable had 
there been no suspension. This interpretation of the provisions of 
the Treaty has been confirmed in particular by the ruling of the 
Commission directed at France, which in I958 had re-established a 
customs duty on paper pulp which she had suspended in I957· The 
Commission ruled that France must abolish the re-established duty. 
2. THE TIMING OF THE PROGRESSIVE ABOLITION 
OF CUSTOMS DUTIES 
The timing of the progressive abolition of customs duties among 
the countries of the Community is determined as follows : 6 
I) In the course of the first stage of four years, the first reduction 
• Treaty art. 12. 
6 Treaty art. 14. 
• Ibid. 
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was to be made one year after the date of the entry into force of the 
Treaty (that is, on January r, 1959); the second reduction is to 
be made eighteen months later (on July I, I 960) ; the third reduc-
tion is to be made at the end of the fourth year (on January I, 
I962). 
2) In the course of the second stage (which may begin either 
immediately after the first stage, or one or two years later, or even 
a little later) 7 a reduction is to be made eighteen months after the 
beginning of the second stage, a second reduction eighteen months 
later, and a third reduction one year later. If it is assumed that the 
second stage will begin immediately after the end of the first stage, 
the reductions of the second stage will occur on July I, I963, Janu-
ary I, I965, and January I, I966, respectively. 
3) The reductions which still remain to be made at the end of the 
second stage are to be carried out in the course of the third stage, 
according to a time-table to be determined by a majority of the 
Council of Ministers of the Community. 
The amount of the tariff reductions is determined in the follow-
ing manner : 8 
I) At the time of the first reduction (which was effected on J anu-
ary I, I 9 59) all tariffs (i.e., the basic duties) between Member 
States of the Community were to be reduced by IO%. 
2) At the time of each subsequent reduction, each Member State 
is to reduce the total of its customs duties towards its partners in 
the Community in such a way that its "total customs receipts" will 
be reduced Io%, it being understood that the reduction of duty on 
each item shall be equal to at least 5% of the basic duty. 
The "total customs receipts" are to be calculated by multiplying 
the value of the imports of each Member State from other Member 
States during the year I 9 s6 by the basic duties.9 The "total cus-
toms receipts" provide a basic point of reference which remains 
unchanged throughout the period during which the Treaty is in 
effect. Each country within the Community has therefore estab-
lished this figure by applying to a table of its imports for the 
year I956 the relevant customs duty in effect on January I, I957 
(basic duty). The sum of the products of the multiplication of these 
two elements is the "total customs receipts." With each reduction 
pursuant to the Treaty, each country must reduce customs duties in 
this table to the extent necessary to ensure that the application of the 
new duties will result in a Io% reduction of the "total customs re-
7 See text at note 2 supra and discussion thereafter. 
8 Treaty art. 14 • 
• !hid. 
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ceipts." The new duties thus arrived at are to be applied to imports 
of 1960, I96I, and so forth. 
3· FLEXIBILITY OF THE RULES ABOLISHING 
INTERNAL TARIFFS 
The first reduction-that which took place on January I, I959-
is therefore the only one which involves a diminution of 10% of 
each customs duty. A reduction of 5% of each customs duty is there-
after obligatory each time reductions are to be made, but each coun-
try remains free to choose those duties which will be reduced more 
drastically in order to achieve a reduction of total customs receipts 
of 10%. It would seem, however, that the Six plan an equal all-
round reduction on July I, I96o. The freedom thus given to Mem-
ber States exemplifies the flexibility of the Treaty system of tariff 
reductions. In effect it permits each country to maintain for as long 
a period as possible customs protection of products with regard to 
which it most fears the competition of other Member States. In the 
course of the first two stages six reductions are thus contemplated 
which are to reduce the total customs receipts by 6o% as compared 
with the duties in force on January I, I 9 57. A country can, by a p-
plying the minimum reductions to a given product, that is 10% at 
the first reduction, and 5% at each of the five subsequent reductions, 
keep reduction of tariff protection of that product to a minimum 
3 5% as of the end of the second stage. This means of course, on 
the one hand, that it shall have applied a reduction as to other 
products which exceeds 6o% in order that the over-all reduction of 
total customs receipts shall equal 6o%, and on the other hand, that 
the efforts to be made in the course of the third stage with regard 
to products enjoying the greatest amount of protection during the 
first two stages will be greater. 
Consequently, at the end of the second stage, and solely on the 
basis of the rules described above, the level of over-all tariff protec-
tion of each Member State will have been reduced to one which is 
40% of the initial level. With regard to certain products, however, 
the level may still be as high as 6 5% of the initial level, the level 
with regard to other products being, correspondingly, less than 40% 
of the initial level. 
4· SAFEGUARDS AGAINST EXCESSIVE FLEXIBILITY 
To avoid, however, the situation which might result at the end 
of the second stage-namely, that the Member States will have 
maintained a degree of tariff protection which cannot be abolished 
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in the third stage without creating serious difficulties-the rules 
elaborated above are supplemented by three provisions: 
I) On the one hand, it is provided that duties exceeding 30% at 
the time of any reduction must be reduced at least ro%. Therefore 
any duty remaining above 30% is deprived of the benefits of the 
rules creating flexibility. If, as a result of any reduction, the duty 
falls below 30%, the rules creating flexibility are then applicable to 
it and the minimum reduction is thereafter s%.10 
2) On the other hand, goals are established for Community 
countries. They must endeavor to arrive at a reduction of the duties 
on each product amounting to at least 25% of the basic duty at the 
end of the first stage, and at least so% at the end of the second 
stage. The Commission may make recommendations to Member 
States to encourage them to achieve these goals.11 
3) FinalJy, the Member States, having declared their willingness 
to reduce tariffs among themselves more rapidly than provided for 
in the rules-if general economic conditions and the situation of 
the industrial sector concerned so permit-the Commission may, 
with this end in view, make recommendations to the Member 
Sta tesP 
As suggested/3 the timing of reductions remaining to be achieved 
at the end of the second stage is not fixed by the Treaty. The Coun-
cil must determine such timing at the appropriate moment. In prin-
ciple, only the timing itself should thus be defined, the system of 
reduction continuing to be as flexible as it is in the first two stages 
(the first reduction of the first stage apart). But it must be em-
phasized that the Member States have incurred an unconditional 
obligation to abolish completely customs duties among themselves 
by the end of the third stage.14 Even though there is a right, there-
fore, to invoke the rules creating flexibility as a matter of law, this 
right will become more and more illusory in fact. For instance, if a 
country has, with regard to a given product, made full use of the 
flexibility of the system in the course of the first two stages, and 
maintains on that product at the beginning of the third stage a duty 
which is 65% of the basic duty which obtained on January r, 1957, 
it will necessarily be obligated to eliminate this 6 5% within the four 
years of the third stage. 
10 Ibid. 
n Ibid. 
12 Treaty art. 15. 
13 See note 7 supra • 
.. Treaty art. 13. 
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5· METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION ON JANUARY I, 1959, 
OF THE RULES ABOLISHING INTERNAL TARIFFS 
The uniform Io% reduction on January r, I959, of customs 
duties among Member States pursuant to the Treaty caused no dif-
ficulties. In fact, implementation proved to be remarkably simple. 
Implementation of the Treaty rules in subsequent stages will be 
complicated to the extent that Member Countries, seeking to post-
pone the day when certain sectors of their economies must forego 
tariff protection, invoke the rules creating flexibility. Obviously 
special interest groups in each country may try to convince their 
governments that their economic activities, more than any others, 
need the maximum protection permissible and for as long a period 
as possible. On the other hand, many industries-having strenu-
ously prepared to meet new competition in the Common Market, 
and having invested heavily to this end-are now interested in 
speeding up the removal of economic frontiers so that they may 
more rapidly obtain access to a larger market and a return on 
their investments. 
On January I, 1959, each Member State effected, then, a Io% 
reduction of its tariffs vis-a-vis other Community countries. Be-
cause of Germany's unusually favorable balance of payments and 
in keeping with the liberal policies pursued by Dr. Erhard, during 
r 9 57 she unilaterally reduced tariffs on a substantial number of im-
ports from the rest of the world. Given the fact that the basic duty 
of the Treaty is the duty in force on January r, 1957, Germany was 
under no obligation to reduce tariffs on imports from other Member 
Countries on January I, I9591 where it had already reduced them 
more than ro% of the basic duty during 1957. As a result, Germany 
was obliged to reduce customs duties on January I, 1959, only on a 
few products, notably those on textiles and leather.15 
6. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE RULES ABOLISHING INTERNAL TARIFFS 
The Treaty also provides 16 that taxes having an effect equivalent 
to that of customs duties shall be progressively abolished during the 
transitional period. No definition of such taxes is given, however. 
The Commission is to define them, and to determine the means and 
'"The difficulties encountered by France arising from the fact that it had not cor-
rectly determined its basic duty on paper pulp have already been mentioned. 
16 Treaty art. 13. 
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timing of their abolition; in doing so it is to be guided by the Treaty 
rules governing the abolition of customs duties. The Commission 
has not yet collected the necessary information from industry with 
regard to taxes which have an effect equivalent to that of customs 
duties and which may be in effect in Community countries. No spe-
cific measures have been taken, therefore, with respect to taxes. 
In connection with the relations of the Six to one another, one 
problem arises which has so far been only rarely discussed: that of 
customs evaluation. When products are to be imported, the customs 
authorities examine the documents which the importer (or his 
agent) produces to establish the price of the products. When the 
authorities decide, on the basis of these documents, that the de-
clared price is reasonable, was freely negotiated by the buyer and 
the seller, and has been correctly declared, they accept it and cal-
culate the duty with that price as a base. In all Community coun-
tries customs authorities enjoy, however, a very large measure of 
discretionary power. They may decide-virtually without being 
required to give any justification therefor-that the declared price 
is too low, and they may themselves fix another price as the basis 
upon which the duty to be paid is determined. By systematically in-
creasing prices declared by importers, customs authorities could, 
therefore, partially annul the effects of customs reductions to be 
achieved in keeping with the Treaty. Given the customs laws pres-
ently in force in the Six, importers would have few ways of combat-
ting such arbitrary action, even though international conventions, 
and in particular those elaborated by the Council of Customs Co-
operation, have established certain rules concerning the calculation 
of values for customs purposes. Customs authorities do not, how-
ever, appear to have misused their powers up until now, and no com-
plaint seems to have been voiced by any of the Community countries. 
It should also be noted that as the customs reductions increase with 
the passing of the years, increases in customs evaluation would be 
less and less effective as a means of defeating the intended effects of 
the Treaty. 
Such is the rather complex system created by the Treaty for the 
abolition of tariffs among the Six. It has the advantage of being 
flexible enough to permit each country to maintain protection of its 
most vulnerable industries for longer periods of time. The obvious 
disadvantage of this flexibility is that, if the Member States take 
full advantage of it, final tariff reductions will be particularly diffi-
cult for industries which continue to enjoy protection unless the 
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respective countries also take advantage of the first years of the 
transition period to reorganize or convert them effectively. 
B. THE ABOLITION OF QUOTAS 
I. THE RULES OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
Since its creation in I948 the Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) has endeavored to abolish import 
quotas among the seventeen member countries of Western Europe. 
The obligations of these countries, which O.E.E.C. imposed with 
a view to abolishing quotas, have taken the form of "percentages 
of liberalization." A "year of reference," the year I948, was chosen, 
and each country agreed to abolish, on specified dates, quotas on a 
given list of products. This list was to be determined according to the 
following formula: the volume of I948 imports of the products in-
cluded in the list from other Member States (and their territories) 
must at least have equalled a determined percentage of the total 
volume of all products imported by the country in question in I948 
from the other Member States (and their overseas territories). 
Having fixed this minimum percentage at so% in I949, 6o% in 
I950, 75% in I9SI, the O.E.E.C. raised it to 90% in I955· 
The Six are all members of the O.E.E.C. and as such they have 
been-and remain-subject to these rules. With the exception of 
France, each of the Six has of its own accord adopted, and even gone 
far beyond, the minimum percentages of liberalization established 
by the O.E.E.C. Germany had thereby achieved liberation of 91.8% 
of her intra-European trade, the Benelux countries 95.6%, and 
Italy 98.4%. France, on the other hand, was forced to invoke, in 
June, I957, the safeguard clauses to which O.E.E.C. obligations 
are subject; until December I 9 58, she therefore applied a global 
quota on imports from O.E.E.C. countries, including those from 
Community countries. In December 1958, in conjunction with the 
return to partial convertibility of European currencies, and as a 
result of the program to achieve sound economy and finance initiated 
by the government of General de Gaulle, France also liberalized 
90% (based on I948) of its imports originating from other 
O.E.E.C. countries. 
On January 1, I959, therefore, only a relatively small percentage 
of imports from one of the Six were subject to quotas in another of 
the Six. This percentage varied, however, from country to country, 
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and the kinds of goods involved varied greatly. Generally the im-
ports still subject to quotas were those which, in the view of the 
governments concerned, would have endangered domestic produc-
tion of similar products if no quotas had existed. 
Germany, the Benelux countries, and Italy maintained quotas only 
on a limited number of imports of industrial products. On the other 
hand, France, even though she had liberalized more than 90% of 
her imports compared with I948, applied quotas to a large list of 
products. If quotas on these goods had been removed, imports 
would doubtless have increased greatly and would have represented 
much more than 10% of French imports. These facts explain the 
rules of the Treaty concerning the abolition of import quotas. As 
will become clear in the following discussion, developments have 
proved that the authors of the Treaty were, in this regard, overly 
pessimistic. 
2. THE RULES OF THE TREATY 
As is true in the case of tariffs, the Treaty provides, first of all, 
that quotas be frozen as of the effective date of the Treaty. 17 This 
measure takes two forms: 
I) on the one hand, the reinstatement of quotas which had been 
abolished as of January I, I 9 58, is prohibited, and 
2) on the other hand, a quota may not be made more restrictive 
-in other words, the level of imports envisaged by the quota may at 
no time be reduced.tB 
These rules apply, of course, only among Member States. Each 
country is perfectly free to reinstate quotas vis-a-vis third countries, 
or to make them more restrictive. 
The Treaty provides, moreover, that quotas are to be totally 
abolished by the end of the transitional period.19 To this end, the 
Treaty provides that: 
I) each Member State shall, one year after the Treaty takes 
effect, convert bilateral quotas into global quotas open, without dis-
crimination, to all other Member States.20 European countries which 
maintain quotas on given products generally do not, in fact, fix them 
unilaterally. Quotas are negotiated with each European supplier 
country, and each negotiating party attempts to gain as great an 
advantage as possible for its exports to the markets of the other 
'
1 I.e., January I, I958. Treaty art. 3 I. 
'" Treaty art. 32. 
18 Ibid • 
.., Ibid. 
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while increasing as little as possible quotas on the sales of the 
other's goods in its own markets. Accordingly, if the quid pro quo 
which country A receives from country B is larger than that _ 
from country C, country A will open a larger quota to country B's 
goods than to those of country C. Discrimination exists as between 
countries B and C in the market of country A, therefore. The globali-
zation of quotas or, in other words, the transformation of bilateral 
quotas on the same product, each of which is open to one country, 
into a single quota open to all will put an end to such bargaining, 
abolish bilateral negotiations, and assure, in principle, non-discrimi-
nation. 
2) The global quota must at least equal the sum of the bilateral 
quotas previously applicable to that product. Moreover, when each 
state has globalized its bilateral quotas, it must increase the total 
of its global quotas to such an extent that their total value as com-
pared with the preceding year is increased not less than 20%, it 
being further understood that the global quota for each product 
must be increased by not less than 10%. 
3) The global quotas must be increased each year in accordance 
with the same rules and in the same proportions ( 20% of the total 
value of the preceding year's global quotas and a minimum of w% 
per quota). 
4) The fourth increase of the quotas shall take place at the end 
of the fourth year after the Treaty becomes effective, and, taking 
account of the problem of the transition from the first to the second 
stage of the transitional period, the Treaty further provides that 
the fifth increase shall take place one year after the beginning of the 
second stage. Therefore, if the first stage is extended, as is per-
mitted, 21 there will be no increase of quotas during the period of 
the extension. 
3· FLEXIBILITY OF THE TREATY RULES AND THE 
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST EXCESSIVE FLEXIBILITY 
As is true of the rules concerning tariffs, the rules in regard to 
the elimination of quotas are flexible. This results from the fact that 
each country, although obligated to increase by 20% each year the 
total volume of its quotas, may limit the increase to Io% in con-
nection with goods of its own industries which have reason to fear 
a too-rapid growth of foreign competition. If a Member State does 
so, however, it must increase to a greater extent its remaining quotas 
"' See note 7 supra. 
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in order to attain the required over-all increase of 20% of its quotas. 
It became evident, however, that these rules might not prove 
adequate to bring about a total liberalization by the end of the 
transitional period. It was, in fact, difficult to measure the degree of 
restrictiveness of any particular quota and to say whether its annual 
increase by 20% over the preceding year for a period of twelve 
years would certainly result in the total liberation of the product 
from quotas by the end of the transition period. For this reason 
these rules have been supplemented by a number of other provisions. 
In the first place, special rules have been established for low or 
nonexistent quotas.22 The Treaty provides that if, for a product 
which cannot be freely imported, the global quota does not amount 
to 3% of the national production of the nation concerned, a quota 
equal to not less than 3% of such production shall be established 
one year after the date of the entry into force of the Treaty (that is, 
on January I, I 9 59) . This quota is to be raised to 4% at the end of 
the second year (i.e., on January I, I96o), and to 5% at the end of 
the third year (i.e., on January I, I96r). Thereafter, the State 
concerned must increase the quota by not less than I 5% annually. 
The Treaty also indicates that in the case where there is no national 
production, the Commission must fix an appropriate quota. 
By these special procedures, the drafters of the Treaty intended 
to establish quotas at relatively high levels at the outset in the hope 
that at the end of the transitional period there would be every chance 
that the affected products could be freed of quotas or that such 
liberation would create no problems. The establishment of such 
points of departure was obviously necessary in the case of certain 
countries which today, in effect, prohibit the importation of certain 
products. For such products the annual global increase of 20% and 
the Io% increase per quota would not have sufficed to assure 
liberalization after the twelve quota increases. 
In the second place, the Treaty provides that, at the end of the 
tenth year of the transitional period, each quota shall be equal to 
not less than 20% of the national output of the product in question.23 
This rule strengthens even further the rules concerning low or non-
existent quotas,24 since, the application of the other rules relating 
to them would not normally raise quotas higher than I3·3% of the 
national production at the end of the tenth year of the transitional 
period. 
23 Treaty art. 33· 
23 I bid. 
~• See note zz supra. 
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In the third place, the Treaty contemplates that, if in the light 
of experience, the Commission finds that the rules concerning the 
progressive abolition of quotas, and in particular the rules relating 
to percentages, do not assure the complete abolition of import 
quotas at the end of the transitional period, the Council may, pur-
suant to a proposal of the Commission, modify these rules and, 
specifically, may raise the percentages. Decisions of the Council 
must be made by a unanimous vote during the first stage, and there-
after by a majority vote. 
Finally, as is true of the abolition of tariffs, the Member States 
have declared their willingness to abolish import quotas, in rela-
tion to other Member States, more rapidly than is provided for by 
Treaty rules if general economic conditions and those relevant to 
the economic sector concerned so permit.25 
Another quite interesting rule concerning the abolition of quotas 
should be mentioned.26 It provides that, in case the Commission finds 
that in the course of two successive years the imports of any prod-
uct have been below the level of the quota fixed for it, this quota may 
not be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the 
total value of global quotas. In such a case, the interested country 
must liberate the product in question. If no such rule existed, a coun-
try could, in order to achieve the 20% over-all annual increase of 
quotas for which the Treaty provides, effect a considerable increase 
in the quota on a product for which it knows that the domestic de-
mand is small with the certainty that no imports of consequence 
would result. This would avoid the necessity of increasing quotas 
on products for which a strong domestic demand exists-increases 
which would result in a larger volume of imports. It is a rule which, 
m a sense, is designed to prevent fraudulent calculations of quota 
increases. 
4- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES ELIMINATING 
QUOTAS ON JANUARY I, I959 
The application of these rules on January I, I 9 59, created a great 
number of difficulties and a great number of problems had to be re-
solved in order to give them effect. At first they did not seem to 
have been observed in all countries to everyone's satisfaction, and 
complaints were fairly frequent. The net result, however, of the 
initial application of these rules has been definite progress. More-
""Treaty art. 35· 
26 Treaty art. 33· 
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over, the return of European currencies to convertibility, as will 
become clear, set off a much faster movement towards the elimina-
tion of quotas, which has made the problem far less acute, not only 
among the Six, but also between them and the rest of the world. 
Each country had, at the outset, to establish a "quota framework" 
-a list of products still subject to quotas in the country concerned. 
Opposite each of the products on this list the country indicated the 
bilateral quotas it had granted to other Community countries in the 
course of I958, as well as, for each product, the global quota that 
was to be established in the course of 1959, pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Treaty. 
For the purpose of calculating the quota for I 9 59, the rules of the 
Treaty were applied in the following manner: 
I) In the first place each country increased by ro% on each prod-
uct the total of the quotas granted to other Community countries 
in the course of 1958. 
2) With regard to those products on which no quota had been 
opened in the course of I958, or on which the quotas opened in 
I 9 58 were, in sum, inferior to 3% of the national production of 
the product in question, the country fixed a quota equal to 3% of 
its national output. Generally, this resulted in quotas far higher than 
10% of the total of comparable quotas opened in I958. 
3) The country in question then compared, with reference to 
the total volume of products under quota, the total of the quotas 
opened in I958 with the total of the quotas opened in I9591 taking 
into consideration the rules cited in paragraphs I) and 2) above. If 
the sum total of the quotas of 1959 was higher by at least 20% than 
the sum total of the quotas of I958, the country was considered as 
having accomplished its obligations within the terms of the Treaty. 
If the sum total of the quotas of 1959 was not higher by 20% than 
the sum total of the quotas for I958, the country, in order to fulfil 
its Treaty obligation to effect a 20% over-all increase, had to in-
crease some quotas. Each country was free to choose those products 
whose quotas were to be increased. 
The application of these rules, and especially of the 3% rule, has, 
in fact, led two countries of the Community to increase by much 
more than 20% its aggregate quotas of I958. France, whose I958 
quotas reached the sum total of one hundred billion francs, increased 
its quotas in I 9 59 to two hundred-fifteen billion francs, or by I I 5%. 
Italy increased them to twenty-eight billion lire in I959, compared 
with the eight billion lire in I958, an increase of 250%. 
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The application of the 3% rule had noteworthy results with re-
gard to certain products, for instance, passenger cars. The national 
production of cars in Italy and France is substantial, and until 1958 
both pursued a very restrictive import policy. As a consequence of 
the 3% rule, France increased the quotas open to other Community 
countries from four-and-a-half billion francs in 19 58 to seven billion 
in 1959, and Italy her quotas from three-and-a-half billion lire in 
1958 to five billion in 1959. In the Benelux countries and Germany 
which, in general, followed liberal policies in regard to industrial 
imports even before the Treaty came into force, the rule of 3% 
has been only rarely applied, and the increases of 19 59 quotas over 
those of 1958 were not much higher than the 20% fixed by the 
Treaty, at least they were not in connection with industrial products. 
No decisions have been reached in regard to products of which 
there is no national production and in connection with which the 
Commission therefore must fix quotas. 
5· TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE RULES ELIMINATING QUOTAS 
The application of the quota rules caused great difficulties, and 
protests of producers, importers, and exporters of the Community 
against the manner in which given countries implemented the rules, 
either in whole or in part, were frequent early in 1959. Criticisms 
were directed particularly at the conditions under which the 3% 
rule was applied and against the way in which global quotas were 
handled. 
With respect to the rule of 3%, the difficulty obviously lies in 
determining national production. Certain countries demonstrated 
a strong tendency to make use of every available means of reducing 
the valuation of their national production with a view to reducing 
the amount of the 3% quotas. Long discussions have been conducted 
within the Community in an effort to determine the following: 
I) Should the production be calculated by quantity or by value, 
calculation by value generally permitting more arbitrary figures 
than calculation by quantity? 
2) Is that part of the production of a given product not utilized 
as such, but incorporated as a component part of another product, 
deductible? For instance, should the quota to be opened be 3% of 
the entire national output of car tires or should it be 3% of car tire 
production marketed as such, deducting that part of tire production 
which is mounted on new cars, since the latter have obviously been 
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figured in the calculation of car production and its corresponding 
quota? 
3) May a country deduct from the value of its national produc-
tion the amount of customs duties which would have been paid 
with respect to such products had they been imported instead of be-
ing produced within the country? The reason for this question is 
the fact that the comparison between national production and im-
ports should take into account the disparity in costs of goods pro-
duced domestically and of those produced abroad which results 
from the duties payable by the latter. The Commission decided to 
authorize a fixed reduction of a maximum of 20% of the value of 
national production in order to take this factor into account. 
4) In calculating the value of production, should deductions be 
made for all indirect taxes? 
The result of the various methods used in certain countries to 
achieve a systematic reduction of national production values was 
that the quotas opened in I 9 59 on certain products were less than 
half what they would have been had the calculation been based on 
quantities. 
A particular problem resulting from the devaluation of the 
French franc in December I958 must be noted. France calculated 
her quotas in French francs, and this, in view of the devaluation, 
had the result of reducing by I 5% the value of authorized imports 
calculated in foreign currencies. 
The administration of global quotas also created difficulties-
for example the issuance of licenses was delayed or limitations were 
placed on the periods of time within which they may be used. Some 
importers feared that licenses which had not been used as of De-
cember 3 I, I959, would be annulled, even though their issuance 
was so delayed that it would have been materially impossible to 
effect the relevant imports within the period of time for which 
the licenses were valid. Moreover, even though distribution of 
licenses should be non-discriminatory, complaints have occasionally 
been heard that, within given quota categories, a large proportion 
of the total value of the licenses issued was for products having 
only a few potential buyers (for example, luxury passenger cars), 
while the total value of licenses in the same quota categories for 
products which are much in demand (for example, popularly-priced 
passenger cars) was very low. 
These difficulties are fairly serious. Nevertheless, in general the 
application of the Treaty clearly has initiated an irreversible move-
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ment towards the abolition of quotas among the countries of the 
Community. Community authorities have made every effort to carry 
out the provisions of the Treaty as faithfully as possible, but at the 
same time they have been relatively tolerant in those instances where 
certain provisions of the Treaty, especially the 3% rule, in fact im-
posed an extremely heavy burden on the importing country because 
of the risk of serious difficulties for its industries. The country con-
cerned could in such cases invoke the safeguard clauses,27 but, for 
fairly evident psychological and political reasons, partisans of the 
Treaty wished from the outset to avoid crises which might justify 
resort to these clauses. The initial implementation of the Treaty was 
greeted with some enthusiasm in Europe, and it would be extremely 
regrettable if this enthusiasm were dampened by social or other 
crises. Prudence is therefore advisable during the early stages. 
Moreover, it should be noted that, as mentioned above, the pro-
visions of the Treaty concerning the abolition of quotas will gradu-
ally lose their raison d' hre as trade is progressively liberalized on 
a world-wide scale, notably under the stimulus of the International 
Monetary Fund and the G.A.T.T. This aspect of the problem will 
be dealt with in the second part of this chapter. 
c. THE MEANING OF "LIBRE PRATIQUE" 
UNDER THE TREATY 
In regard to relations among Member States the important ques-
tion of which products are to benefit from the tariff and quota ad-
vantages mutually available in accordance with the Treaty required 
resolution. This question has been resolved by a Treaty provision 
according to which the benefiting products shall be: 28 
I) those originating in Member States, 
2) those coming from third countries which are deemed to be in 
fibre pratique in the Member States. 
The Treaty declares 29 that products in fibre pratique are those 
products coming from third countries in regard to which, in any 
Member State, import formalities have been complied with, cus-
toms duties collected, and no total or partial drawbacks (rebates) 
granted. 
The interpretation and the implementation of these provisions 
have created practical problems which the Commission must solve. 
To this end, the Commission introduced a certificate of libre 
"'See infra Part II, Subsection D. 
28 Treaty art. 9• 
•• Treaty art. 10. 
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pratique which must accompany all goods circulating among Mem-
ber States and which are to benefit from the advantages of the Com-
mon Market. The certificate serves to indicate that: 
I) the goods originated in one of the Member States; or 
2) the goods have been imported from a third country, and 
that the Member State which first imported them has actually col-
lected the usual customs duties in accordance with its tariff schedules; 
or 
3) the goods in question were imported from a third country, 
but have been transformed or finished in a Member State, and that 
the appropriate custom duties on the constituent parts imported 
from third countries into the transforming Member State were col-
lected either upon entry into the territory of the Member State, or, 
in certain cases, upon their leaving the transforming Member State 
destined for another Member State. 
The principle is, therefore, that to be deemed free to circulate 
within the Community, a product must be free to circulate within 
one of the Member States. The customs duties on the product must 
have been collected in that Member State, and the product must 
not have benefited from customs drawbacks, as products so often 
do in Europe upon being exported. The product also must not have 
been admitted temporarily. 
This apparently simple system nevertheless may cause difficulties 
until the common external tariff of the Community has been estab-
lished. At the end of the transitional period all merchandise com-
ing from abroad will pay the same duties, irrespective of its point 
of entry, whether this be one of the Benelux countries, Germany, 
Italy, or France. Meanwhile, however, as long as the common ex-
ternal tariff is not in force, merchandise coming from abroad will 
pay different duties depending on the country of entry into the Com-
munity. Therefore, exporters in third countries could bring their 
goods into the Community through that member of the Six which 
at a given moment applies the lowest tariffs vis-a-vis third countries, 
or the least restrictive quotas, thereby creating risks of trade diver-
sion and diversi·on of other commercial activity within the Com-
munity. 
In fact, however, these risks are limited by Community rules: 
I) In the first place, the fact that drawbacks of customs duties 
are prohibited on a product which is imported by a Member State 
from a third country and re-exported, either in its original form or 
transformed, to another Member State, results in two duties being 
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paid on it-that of the first importing state, and that of the second 
importing state. This second customs duty is, it is true, lower than 
the duty which would have been levied on the product had it been di-
rectly imported from a third country to the second Member State. 
The difference is, however, minimal during the first years of the 
transitional period and it is, in the majority of cases, made up by 
the duty of the first importing country. It is even certain that, at 
the beginning of the transitional period, it will be worthwhile in 
many cases of products manufactured in one of the Member States, 
incorporating materials imported from a third country, not to ask 
for a certificate of libre pratique, but rather to request a drawback.80 
""This is all the more true since, on January x, 1959, the Member States made, as 
to a great number of products, the first tariff reduction of xo% applicable to imports 
from non-member countries, and there are as yet no substantial tariff preferences ex· 
tended by the Member States to each other. In order to make clear how this works 
take the following example: an importer of Member Country A buys $xoo worth of 
raw material in a non-member country on which there is a 2o% duty on entry into 
Member Country A; he therefore pays $20 import duty to Member Country A. With 
this raw material he manufactures a product of which the ultimate total cost is $300. 
He exports this product to Member Country B. On entry into B this finished product 
would have been subject to a duty of 30% before the Treaty went into effect. During 
the transitional period the manufacturer-exporter of country A has the choice, when 
he exports the finished product to country B, between two solutions: 
(a) either not to request that the product be considered in "libre pratique," to bene-
fit in this case from the drawback of the duty collected on the raw material and to pay 
the full tariff ( 30%) on the finished product when it enters countJY B; or 
(b) to demand a certificate of "libre pratique," not to request a drawback of the 
duty paid on the raw material and to pay the preferential tariff of the Community on 
the finished product when it enters country B. Obviously this choice will be dictated 
by the desire to sell his product at the lowest possible price in Member Country B. 
If the manufacturer-exporter chooses solution (a), he receives a drawback of the 
duty paid on the raw material of $20. His product therefore costs only $280, and this is 
the basis for the calculation of the duty owed upon entry of the finished product into 
Country B. The cost of the product upon being imported into Country B is therefore 
28o + zSo X 30 = $364. 
100 
If he chooses solution (b), he does not ask for a drawback, and the cost of the final 
product after it has been imported into Country B is· 300 + 3oo X 30 = $390. 
100 
After the first tariff reduction of ro% pursuant to the Treaty the tariff in Member 
Country B on the finished product will be 27% instead of 30%. The product can there-
·fore be brought into Country B at 300 + 300 X 27 = $381. 
100 
Since this is a higher cost than that of solution (a) the manufacturer-exporter will 
still have no reason to ask for the benefit of a certificate of "libre pratique." 
After the second reduction of xo% the tariff of Country B will be 24%. The product 
can then be delivered in Country B for 300 + 300 X 24 = $372-still higher than the 
100 
cost of solution (a). 
After the third reduction of xo%, however, the tariff of Country B will be 21% and 
the product can be delivered in Country B for: 300 + 300 X 21 = $363• 
100 
Thus after the third tariff reduction, but only then, solution (b) will be more ad-
vantageous than solution (a). 
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Of course as the Member States reduce tariffs among themselves 
without making such reductions available to third countries, the 
difference between the tariff that one Member State will apply to-
wards third countries and the tariff that it will apply to other Com-
munity countries will be increased to the point where it will be eco-
nomically beneficial, despite the prohibition against drawbacks, to 
effect the diversions of traffic described. 
2) In the second place, another factor which will compensate 
for these risks is the mechanism of the first stages of the establish-
ment of the common external tariff. This mechanism 31 will reduce 
the differences in the external tariffs of the Member States, increas-
ing the tariffs on imports from third countries of Member States 
with the lowest duties, and decreasing the corresponding tariffs in 
Community countries where they are highest. Combined with the 
drawback prohibition, this reduction of the differences among tariff 
rates towards third countries will abolish the possible profits which 
merchants could otherwise obtain by trade-flow diversions. The 
differences between intra-Community tariffs and Community coun-
try tariffs vis-a-vis third countries will, of course, increase as the Six 
grant each other progressively increasing tariff preferences during 
the transitional period. 
3) Thirdly, in cases where, despite these factors, trade diversions 
occur which prejudice the interests of certain Member States, the 
Commission must take all necessary steps to eliminate them. 32 The 
nature of permissible Commission action is not defined by the 
Treaty, but the Treaty provides that such action should cause the 
least possible disturbance in the functioning of the Common Market 
and should take into account the necessity of advancing, whenever 
possible, the establishment of the common tariff. If these diversions 
of traffic occur as a result of the disparities between intra-Com-
munity tariffs and tariffs of Member States on goods from third 
countries, the best curative measure would logically be a more rapid 
establishment of the common external tariff. 
Other measures are also conceivable, however. For instance, a 
Member State might refuse to consider a product in libre pratique 
which had been imported from a third country by another Member 
State. Such national measures would prove extremely serious be-
cause they would impose obstacles to the free circulation of goods 
within the Community. Some Member States, although they do not 
81 See Part III of this chapter. 
32 Treaty art. us. 
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go so far, do, in fact, require for imported products, which may have 
originated in and been imported from a third country, a certificate of 
origin as well as a certificate of libre pratique. If this certificate of 
origin shows that the product in question does, in fact, come from 
a third country, the Member State reserves the right to refuse to 
grant to this product the quota and tariff advantages of the Treaty 
and the right to treat the product as if it had been imported directly 
from a non-Community country. Until now measures designed to 
achieve this kind of protection have generally not been directed 
against diversions of commercial traffic due to the differences in 
tariffs, but against diversions due to differences among quota policies 
vis-a-vis third countries. These measures are directed notably at 
commerce in goods finished in the Community but originating in non-
Community low wage countries, countries with multiple exchange 
rates, or countries of which foreign commerce is a state monopoly 
(Japan, Uruguay, and the countries of the East). The particular 
industrial products affected are natural and fabricated textiles, pho-
tographic and movie equipment, and the like. In fact, taking into 
account the low prices at which such products are sold by the pro-
ducing country, some Member Countries can protect their own in-
dustries only by recourse to a quota system or to an absolute pro-
hibition of imports. If such products could enter under cover of a 
certificate of libre pratique issued by another Member State whose 
import policy is less restrictive with regard to third countries, the 
more restrictive policies of the first country would be frustrated. 
Finally, and again with a view to avoiding diversions of traffic, the 
Commission envisages the imposition of advance charges in lieu of 
customs duties on products originating in third countries when they 
pass from one Member State into another Member State, but there 
is as yet little information available in this regard; 
The free circulation of goods within the Community will remain 
a serious problem so long as the common external tariff of the Com-
munity is not in force and the countries. of the Community have not 
adopted a common quota policy towards third countries. In order 
to avoid the rather complex formalities, which could obstruct intra-
Community trade, the drafters of the Treaty refused to provide a 
means for checking on the origins of goods. Protectionist reflexes 
are quasi-automatic, however, and ultimately the certificate of origin 
will reappear in acute cases. Community countries will no doubt be 
forced to make considerable efforts to rid themselves effectively of 
red-tape and of the useless nuisances which, either by force of habit 
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or under the pressure of protectionists, national governments tend to 
multiply. 
D. CLAUSES PROVIDING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST 
DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM THE 
ELIMINATION OF QUOTAS 
The Treaty provides safeguard clauses permitting a Member 
State, when difficulties arise, to take protective measures with a view 
to limiting the volume of its imports. These are: 
1) a clause which may be invoked in case of balance-of-payments 
difficulties; and 
2) a clause which may be invoked in case of special difficulties in 
a given sector of its economy. 
I. THE CLAUSE PROVIDING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST 
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES 
The clause concerning balance of payments is similar to the usual 
clauses included in all international trade agreements. To prevent 
Member States from invoking it too often, however, the Treaty 
imposes very strict conditions on its applicability. 
In the first place, the Treaty envisages a procedure which is, in a 
sense, preventive. The economic, financial, and monetary policies 
of each Member State are kept under constant review in order to 
avoid disequilibriums in the balance of payments.33 Each Member 
State must therefore pursue economic policies which will ensure 
equilibrium of its over-all balance of payments, maintain confidence 
in its currency, and at the same time ensure a high level of employ-
ment and stable price levels. In order to facilitate the attainment of 
these objectives, the Member States are to coordinate their economic 
and monetary policies. The institutions of the Community, and 
notably the Commission, a special consultative committee, and the 
Monetary Committee are to formulate opinions for the Member 
States concerning the polici~s which they should follow to assure 
normal functioning of their economies as well as of the economy of 
the Community as a whole. Obviously constant supervision of the 
evolution of the economy and of financial, economic, and monetary 
policies constitutes the best means of avoiding disequilibriums. 
Secondly, if despite supervision and coordination of current poli-
cies of the Member States, disequilibrium in balances of payments oc-
cur, the consultations for which the Treaty provides must take place. 
The Treaty describes disequilibrium as difficulties or serious threats 
33 Treaty arts. I<J3-IOS. 
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of difficulties as regards a Member State's balance of payments 
resulting either from an "over-all disequilibrium of the balance of 
payments or of the kinds of currency at its disposal and where such 
difficulties are likely, in particular, to prejudice the functioning of 
the Common Market or the progressive establishment of the com-
mon commercial policy .... " 34 The Treaty takes into account, 
then, such disequilibriums as might constitute a threat for the in-
ternal functioning of the Common Market-that is, which might 
impel a country to re-establish protective measures with regard to 
imports originating in other Member States-or a threat to the 
common commercial policy-that is, which might bring a Member 
State to follow, in regard to third countries, a different policy than 
that of other Community countries. An accentuation of policy dif-
ferences in regard to third countries would in fact create the risk 
of larger trade diversions and, as a consequence, of reinforcement 
of controls on the circulation of goods among Member States. 
The procedures contemplated in these cases do not permit the 
country in question to re-establish protective measures in regard to 
imports. The Treaty provides that the Commission shall, without 
delay, proceed to an examination of the situation of the country in 
question, as well as of the measures that country has taken or may 
take in order to bring its economy into balance. The Commission 
shall make recommendations with these ends in mind. Even though 
the Treaty does not say so explicitly, it is clear that at this stage the 
recommendations of the Commission are to be directed at reform 
of the internal economic and financial policies of the country in-
volved (reduction of public expenses, reduction of credit to private 
enterprises, increase of taxes, higher discount rates or, even, mone-
tary revaluation) but not at the direct or quantitative control of its 
imports. 
The procedure contemplates that, if these measures prove inade-
quate, the Commission thereafter shall recommend to the Council 
that it institute the mutual assistance measures for which the Treaty 
provides, subject to a majority vote of the Council. The essence of 
the notion of mutual assistance is its Community character. Mutual 
assistance signifies that the associated countries of a country in diffi-
culties are obliged to aid it in overcoming them, thereby emphasizing 
the interdependence of the Six. 
The Treaty contemplates that mutual assistance may take the 
following forms: 
1) Concerted action within such international organizations as 
"'Treaty art. 108. 
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may be asked for help by the countries of the Community-that is, 
within those organizations which can grant credits in foreign cur-
rencies to the country in difficulty. 
2) Action to avoid trade diversions when the country in diffi-
culties maintains or re-establishes quotas on goods imported from 
third countries. The country in difficulties will not always be author-
ized at this stage to re-establish restrictions vis-a-vis other Com-
munity countries, although it can vis-a-vis third countries. The aim 
of such restrictions may well be defeated, however, if other Mem-
ber States continue unrestricted importation from third countries 
of the products subjected to quotas by the country in difficulties, 
since the entry of such products, accompanied by a certificate of 
libre pratique from another Member State cannot be restricted. 
Because this is true, the other Member States must, in such cases, 
take the necessary steps to prevent the products in question from 
being re-exported to the Member State which finds itself in diffi-
culties. 
3) The grant of credits by other Member States, if they agree 
this is indicated. 
4) Finally, and during the transitional period, a recommenda-
tion by the Commission to the other Member States to reduce tariffs 
more rapidly or effect larger quota increases in order to facilitate 
the increase of exports from the country in difficulties to them, 
thereby permitting it to increase its foreign exchange receipts. 
If mutual assistance recommended by the Commission is not 
granted by the Council, or if mutual assistance is granted but the 
measures taken are insufficient to mitigate the difficulties of the coun-
try concerned, the Commission is to authorize the country in diffi-
culties to take protective action with regard to exports of the other 
Community countries. The Commission must define the conditions 
applicable to such measures, their timing and the like, but the Treaty 
does not indicate the form which they are to take. It is likely, how-
ever, that, during the transitional period, they may, for example, 
delay the elimination of obstacles to trade (i.e., of tariffs and quotas) 
or even reverse the process, and that they might, before anything 
else, introduce quantitative restrictions on imports during the de-
cisive period. 
The process thus described is obviously quite long and complex. 
The Treaty expressly provides that the country in difficulties may 
initiate no protective measures without prior authorization of the 
Commission. The time required for the Commission to intervene 
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may be unduly long if a sudden crisis in the balance of payments 
occurs, however.35 In this case the Member State concerned may 
take the necessary steps without preliminary authorization-but 
purely to prevent the situation from deteriorating. The Treaty 
provides that these steps shall cause the least possible disturbance 
in the functioning of the Common Market and shall not be more 
extensive than is absolutely indispensable in order to remedy the 
sudden difficulties which have arisen. Even after these steps have 
been taken, the Commission may recommend that the Council grant 
mutual assistance, which in turn may lead the country in difficulties 
to suspend its own protective measures. In this regard the Treaty 
provides that by majority approval of an opinion of the Commission 
the Council may require the country in difficulties to modify, sus-
pend, or abolish its safeguard measures. 
The safeguard against continuing balance-of-payments difficulties 
may be invoked during or after the transitional period. Because of 
the interpenetration of the economies of the Member States-which 
will be increasingly significant as the transitional period expires-
and because of ever-closer economic, financial, and monetary co-
operation, the likelihood that balance-of-payments crises will be 
Community-wide rather than national in scope will approach in-
evitability. 
2. THE CLAUSE PROVIDING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST 
DIFFICULTIES IN PARTICULAR SECTORS OF 
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES 
The safeguards against difficulties in particular areas of economic 
activity are only applicable during the transitional period.36 The 
reason for this is that during this period the progressive abolition 
of obstacles to trade and the resultant competition among economic 
activities of the various Member States may create "serious diffi-
culties which are likely to persist in . . . [a] sector of economic 
activity or difficulties which may seriously impair the economic situa-
tion . . . [of a] region." Such difficulties might manifest them-
selves by a decrease in the activity of enterprises in a given sector 
of the economy, by unemployment, or by substantial economic stag-
nation or retrogression of a given region. 
Obvious problems result, but it is also obvious that recourse to 
safeguards must be viewed with a certain reserve. No government 
35 Treaty art. 109. 
•• Treaty art. zz6. 
IJO AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
may remain unmoved in the face of a deteriorating situation in a 
sector of its economy or of a depression in a region of the country, 
especially where either seems to be caused by foreign competition. 
If it took no action, the public reaction would be violent. But, on the 
other hand, if the goal of the Common Market is better distribution 
of labor among the Six, and the elimination of uneconomic activity 
in one country in favor of more efficient activity in another (and 
thereby, the attainment of a higher level of productivity for the Com-
mon Market as a whole), then it is inevitable that certain enterprises 
will disappear in some countries because they are subject to eco-
nomic, financial, technical, geographical, or natural conditions which 
prevent them from meeting the competition of enterprises capable 
of increasing productivity. A balance is, then, to be sought, which 
will permit progressive elimination throughout the Common Mar-
ket of inefficient enterprises, and will, at the same time, avoid violent 
economic disruptions which could provoke serious social or even 
political crises. 
The entire structure of the Treaty was, moreover, determined by 
the need to maintain this balance as is indicated by: 
I) the duration of the transitional period, 
2) the flexibility of the program of progressive abolition of tar-
iffs and quotas among Member States, 
3) the provisions relative to the harmonization of legislation, 
4) the creation of the European Investment Bank, and 
5) the creation of the European Social Fund. 
It is evident, however, that implementation of the Treaty is con-
ditioned, not only on these provisions, but also, and above all, on 
economic stability and a continually developing prosperity both in 
Europe and throughout the world. Only under these conditions can 
the Community countries accept the disappearance of some of their 
enterprises for it is only under such conditions that their highly-
developed economic structures will be flexible enough to permit the 
people affected to re-establish themselves in other pursuits without 
too much difficulty. 
Nevertheless, a safeguard clause remains necessary where, in 
spite of the flexibility of the provisions of the Treaty and the steps 
which each country is obligated to take to adapt itself in order to 
allow enterprises in their turn to adjust themselves to foreign com-
petition, a grave crisis develops. For the reasons already indicated, 
recourse to this clause is, however, strictly regulated. 
The government concerned may not invoke this safeguard clause 
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unilaterally, but must request authorization from the Commission, 
and its purpose must be to "restore the situation and adapt the sector 
concerned to the Common Market economy." Moreover, the Com-
mission itself must determine the measures of safeguard which it 
deems necessary, stating precisely the conditions, the means, and the 
duration of their application. These measures, and their duration, 
may be only such as are absolutely necessary to permit restoration of 
the situation. Finally, the Treaty provides that priority should be 
given in the choice of measures to those which will least disturb the 
functioning of the Common Market. 
The Treaty does not specify the measures which the Commission 
may decide to authorize, but leaves the Commission absolutely free 
to determine them. Nevertheless, it seems entirely likely that, in the 
case of activities which-once reorganized-give every indication 
that they will be able to survive, the Commission will elect measures 
which will both assure that the reorganization will take place as 
rapidly as possible and will afford the activity more and longer-last-
ing protection. Thus protected, the reorganization will take place 
-perhaps with the aid of subsidies or of the continuation of quotas 
or tariffs on the importation of the products concerned or other 
such aids. If, however, the activities concerned ought to disappear 
because, for one reason or another, it is impossible to improve 
their productivity sufficiently to make them reasonably profitable, 
the Commission will probably elect measures permitting as gradual 
a disappearance as possible. At the same time, of course, steps must 
be taken to find employment for workers losing jobs and to develop 
in the region in question economic activity better adapted to the con-
ditions obtaining. 
III. THE RELATIONS OF THE SIX WITH 
THIRD COUNTRIES 
The problem of the relations of the Community with the rest of 
the world are of extreme importance to both. The Community is, 
after all, the world's second largest commercial power (in I957• 
the U.S. share of world trade was J7.6%, that of the Community 
I 7 ·4%, and that of the United Kingdom I 1. 2% ) ; and yet this vi tal 
problem is far from solved. The Treaty creates some rules directed 
at the Community relationship with third countries, but it leaves a 
great number of questions to be resolved during the transitional 
period by an interplay of the various political and economic forces 
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which will confront each other both within the Community and with-
out it. 
The most debated question today is whether the Community will 
be turned in upon itself or outwardly oriented-that is, whether the 
Community will develop a protectionist or liberal commercial char-
acter. No attempt to answer that question will be made in this chap-
ter. At this juncture one can only describe the context within which 
this question arises-that is, describe the Treaty rules regarding 
the tariff and foreign commercial policies of the Community, the 
way they have been applied to date, and the place of the Community 
in the European and world setting, taking into account the factors 
which, for the last two years, have influenced its relations with the 
rest of the world (the free trade area and the Dillon proposals). 
A. THE EsTABLISHMENT OF THE CoMMON 
ExTERNAL TARIFF 
I. METHODS OF DETERMINING THE TARIFF 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of which the Six 
are members, excepts customs unions in applying the most-favored-
nation principle to tariffs.37 In order to qualify for this exception, a 
customs union must conform to a certain number of conditions fixed 
by the G.A.T.T., however. One condition is that the incidence of 
the external tariff of the union should not, taken as a whole, be 
greater than that of the national tariffs replaced. 
By virtue of this condition, the Treaty, as a general rule, envis-
aged a tariff corresponding roughly to the arithmetical average of 
the tariffs of the four constituent customs territories.38 ( Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium, having for the last ten years 
been part of a customs union, are considered as a single customs ter-
ritory.) 
The question of whether or not the arithmetical average of the 
tariffs of the four territories conforms to the rules of G.A.T.T. has 
long been debated. Within as well as outside the Community, it has 
been argued that a weighted average which would take into account 
not only the present level of tariffs of each of the four territories, 
but also the value of goods imported by these territories would more 
nearly conform to the spirit of G.A.T.T. Those in favor of this 
thesis calculate that on the basis of a weighted average the external 
87 See Introduction at note 3 supra. 
88 Treaty art. 19. 
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tariff of the Community would be, on the whole, lower than that 
resulting from the arithmetical average, given the fact that the two 
largest importers of the Community, Germany and the Benelux 
countries, are also the territories with the lowest tariffs. This would, 
of course, be true only of the external tariff viewed as a whole, since 
as to certain products a tariff based on a weighted average would be 
higher than one based on the arithmetical average. Discussions in 
G.A.T.T. of the choice between the two methods of averaging have 
not yet resulted in a decision. 
As in the case of the abolition of tariffs among countries of the 
Community, January 1, 1957, was chosen as the date for determina-
tion of the tariff levels to which the Treaty rules would apply.39 
Italy, however, has for the last ten years or so, in fact, applied 
a tariff which is generally ro% lower than the tariff for which her 
laws provide. The Treaty provides that in calculating the arithmeti-
cal average, the legal tariff (consequently the higher of the two) is 
to be used. 
Although they adopted the arithmetical average in principle, the 
drafters of the Treaty also wished to establish certain ceilings on 
the results which the calculation of such an average could produce. 
The Treaty therefore provides that the common external tariff shall 
not exceed: 
I) 3% on some products of which the most important among 
industrial products are: iron pyrites, raw graphite, calcium phos-
phate, flax, arsenic sulphur, natural gas, tar, bitumen, sodium ni-
trate, raw rubber, raw furs, wools, wool linters, combed cotton, 
cotton linters, etc. (List B). 
2) 10% on other products of which the most important among 
the industrial products are: glycerine, resin, petroleum bitumen, 
tannins, coloring matters of vegetable origin, essential oils, liquid 
resin, colophene; sheets and leaves of natural or synthetic rubber; 
leather and hides of cattle, sheep, and goats; newsprint in rolls, 
wool yarn (not yet finished for retail sale), linen, ramie, hemp, 
cotton, jute; iron and steel, iron bars and sheets, sheet iron, iron 
wire; bars, sections, and wire of brass, nickel, aluminum, lead, and 
zinc (List C). 
3) 15% on other products of which the most important among 
industrial products are: alkaline metals, mercury, ammonia, zinc 
oxide (List D). 
4) 2 5% on another list of products of which the industrials are; 
811 Ibid. 
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organic chemical products, synthetic organic coloring matter, artifi-
cial plastics, with the exception of products manufactured from 
plastic (List E). It should be added, however, that where, on Janu-
ary I, I 9 57, the Benelux countries applied to the respective products 
a duty lower than 3%, this duty is, according to the Treaty, to be 
raised to I 2% in calculating the arithmetical average. The result is 
plainly an attempt -at the-same time that a ceiling of 25% on the 
external tariff of the Community is fixed-to avoid establishing too 
low a tariff on these products by increasing the amounts upon which 
the calculation of the average is based. 
On the other hand, for specified products the Treaty fixes a list 
of duties which France must take into consideration in calculating 
the arithmetical average. These duties are higher than those in fact 
applied by France on January r, 1957 (List A). 
With regard to other products, the common tariff is fixed by the 
Treaty itself (List F), and is, in some instances lower, and in others 
higher, than the duty which would have been obtained had the arith-
metical average been calculated. List F products are predominantly 
agricultural, but some are industrial, such as phosphorus, iron-
oxides, sheets of veneer, and veneered panels, on all of which the 
tariff will be high, and some basic textiles (cotton, hemp, jute) and 
minerals (brass, zinc) on which Community tariff will be non-
existent. 
Finally, the Community tariff on a last category of products will 
not be determined according to the arithmetical average, but by 
negotiation among the Member States. These products are found 
in the much-discussed list G.40 
2. MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS 
CONCERNING THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF 
Once the Community tariff is determined, Member States must 
progressively put it into effect. Since in toto it corresponds to 
the arithmetical average of the tariffs in force on January I, 1957, 
in the four customs territories of the Community, some countries 
will have to increase, and others to decrease, duties in order to arrive 
at the common tariff. These changes are to be made during the tran-
sitional period so that at its end the common tariff will be in force. 
They are not to be initiated, however, until December 3 I, I 96I, a 
•• See text of this Part III, Section A at Subsection 4· 
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date which, absent extension of the first stage, will also mark the end 
of that stage. At that time 41 Member States must, in cases where 
the duties applied on January I, I957, differed no more than IS% 
in either direction from the common tariff, put the common tariff 
into effect. Each Member State will have fulfilled its entire Treaty 
obligation as far as products thereby affected are concerned. In 
respect to products on which the difference in either direction is 
greater than I 5%, the state in question must, on December 3 I, 
I96I, reduce this difference by 30%. A second reduction of 30% 
of the difference is to be made at the end of the second stage. 
The Treaty does not indicate when and how the difference still 
existing after the second reduction is to be eliminated. It specifies, 
however, that the common tariff is to be in force in its entirety at the 
end of the transitional period, which means that each country must, 
one way or another, eliminate during the third stage the remaining 
differences. 
An example with figures makes it easier to understand how the 
system works. Given a product to which the Benelux countries ap-
plied (on January I, I 9 57) an import duty of I I%, Germany a duty 
of q%, France a duty of 23%, and Italy a duty of 29%, the arith-
metical average would be: I I + I7 + 23 + 2 9 = 20%. Since the 
4 
German and French duties of I7 and 23% respectively differ by IS% 
from the common tariff of 20%, Germany and France will put the 
common tariff into effect on December 3 I, I 96 I. The Benelux coun-
tries, on the other hand, will reduce by 30% the difference between 
the I I% duty in effect on January I, I 9 57, and the 20% common 
tariff. The Benelux duty will therefore become I4 %. By virtue 
of the same rule, Italy will reduce her duty to 26%. At the end of the 
second stage Benelux will raise its duty to q%, and Italy will re-
duce hers to 23%. In the course of the third stage, both Benelux and 
Italy will attain the 20% rate. 
The Treaty also provides 42 for the case where some duties of 
the common tariff-those which have to be negotiated by the Mem-
ber States (List G)-are still unknown at the end of the first stage 
of the transitional period. In this case the rules described above 
are to be applied six months after the date these duties are estab-
lished. 
u Treaty art. 23. In the spring of 1960 the feasibility of advancing the Dec. 31, 
1961, date was, however, being discussed. See also Chapter I supra. 
42 Treaty art. 20. 
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The Treaty also provides that the Member States shall be free, 
in order to align their duties with the common customs tariff, to 
modify these duties more rapidly than indicated above.43 
3· TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
RULES ESTABLISHING THE EXTERNAL TARIFF 
If the Member States are to adopt duties which conform with the 
external common tariff, they must, of course, know the amount of 
the latter. The determination of this tariff raises a great number of 
technical problems, however, and the Treaty is of little help in re-
solving them. The Commission is to suggest solutions to the Coun-
cil 44 and reference must therefore be made to the work of the Com-
mission since the Treaty went into effect to know the context within 
which these problems are to be progressively solved. 
In the first place, a comparison of national tariff schedules must 
be made in order to define the bases upon which the arithmetical 
average is to be calculated. Present schedules, in fact, differ from 
one another. For instance, in one schedule duties are levied on cars 
in accordance with their weight, whereas in another the number of 
cylinders is determinative. One of the first tasks therefore was the 
juxtaposition of the various customs headings of the four tariffs 
of the Community: the result was the elaboration of a list com-
prising 20,000 headings, whereas an average tariff list rarely in-
cludes more than s,ooo. 
In the second place, a single tariff schedule must be established 
for the Community which will give a basis upon which the common 
tariff can be established. This schedule should normally comprise 
about 5 ,ooo headings. Obviously this will entail choices, in the 
sense that, to return to the example cited above, it must be decided 
whether for passenger cars tariffs are to be calculated according to 
weight or according to the number of cylinders. 
Thirdly, a "table of concordance" between the headings of the 
Community schedule and those of the national schedules must be 
created. Such a table will make calculation of the arithmetic'al aver-
age possible and, at the same time, will provide a basis for determi-
nation of the tariffs which each Member State will have to increase 
or decrease in the course of the successive stages of tariff equaliza-
tion. Determination of these tariffs obviously raises another delicate 
43 Treaty art. 24 • 
.. Treaty art. ZI. 
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technical problem, since certain Member States levy an ad valorem, 
and others a specific,45 duty on the same product. 
However, the calculation of the arithmetical average under these 
conditions may bring to light internal disequilibriums in national 
tariff structures. Indeed, a rational tariff structure should provide 
higher and higher tariffs on goods as they are subjected, beginning 
with the raw material, to progressively greater degrees of transfor-
mation. For example, there should be a progression in the amount of 
duties levied on raw wool, carded wool, wool yarn, wool cloth, and 
wool clothing. Application of the arithmetical average could, as far 
as the common external tariff is concerned, result, however, in the 
application of a duty to wool yarn which is lower than that appli-
cable to carded wool. An equilibrium must therefore be established 
within tariff schedules which will take account of the degree to which 
various goods have been finished. 
The work begun with this end in view almost two years ago by 
groups of customs experts was virtually completed by the beginning 
of 1960. It was, in fact, indispensable that the tariff of the Com-
munity be known by this time to permit G.A.T.T. tariff negotia-
tions to begin. 46 
4· LIST G: EXTERNAL TARIFF ITEMS YET TO BE 
NEGOTIATED AMONG THE SIX 
In the course of the Treaty negotiations, it was impossible for 
the Member States to agree on the application of the rule of the 
arithmetical average, or on a maximum ceiling, or on a common duty 
with regard to several products. These products are ennumerated 
in list G which was annexed to the Treaty. This list includes, most 
importantly, raw materials on which certain countries of the Com-
munity levy very high duties and others very low ones. Those states 
which apply high duties do so because the cost of their national 
production is in general much higher than the average world price. 
If a lower duty were put in effect, these countries would have to cease 
production, since they are unable to produce competitively. Serious 
economic, financial, and above all, social consequences would result. 
But should the external tariff of the Community be fixed at the level 
of the higher tariffs, the transforming industries of those countries 
45 A specific duty is one which takes into account the nature only and not the value 
of the product imported: for example, regardless of its value a given raw material 
is subjected to a duty of $I per pound or a given electrical appliance to a duty of 
$I per appliance. 
•• See text of this Part III, Section E at Subsection 5· 
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which levy a low, or even no, duty would be forced to procure the 
raw materials affected at a higher price than the present-that is, 
the world market-price. Their ability to compete in the sale on 
world markets of goods manufactured from these raw materials 
would be correspondingly diminished. 
The conflict among the Member States concerning list G exempli-
fies a more general problem which the Community as a whole faces. 
If the Community is to be a world commercial power, capable of 
exporting at competitive prices, its industries must procure raw ma-
terials at the most advantageous prices, which is to say, at world 
market prices. If these prices are to be increased by heavy duties, the 
export position of the interested industries will be worsened. If, on 
the other hand, the Community protects the raw materials it pro-
duces with high tariffs, it will encourage their exploitation even 
though they can only be sold at higher than world prices, and it will 
run the risk of developing tendencies toward autarky. 
Because the products in list G are, with regard to the determina-
tion of the common external tariff, subject to a special procedure, 
special Treaty rules were provided for them.47 The Treaty provides 
that the Commission shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that 
negotiations among the Member States will be undertaken before 
the end of 1959, and concluded before the end of 1961 (that is, 
before the initiation of the first changes in the tariffs of the Mem-
ber States directed at the establishment of the common external 
tariff). If, however, in the case of any product no agreement has 
been reached by that date, the Commission is to submit proposals to 
the Council recommending the duty to be levied. The Council is to 
accept or reject the proposals of the Commission by means of a 
unanimous vote during the second stage, and by means of a majority 
vote during the third stage. 
In any case, duties on products in list G must be determined by 
the end of the transition period at the latest. If problems are then 
still outstanding, political decisions will obviously be necessary to 
resolve them. The conclusion seems justified even now that the 
requisite compromises will, in one way or another, be achieved. 
Consequently, as long as the customs duties of list G were un-
known, the Member States could take no steps to reduce differ-
ences among the tariffs that each levied on these products-which, 
by definition, varied greatly from one another. For this reason they 
created the greatest risks that trade diversions would occur. On the 
47 Treaty art. zo. 
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other hand, since these products are generally of considerable im-
portance in world commerce, and since some third countries have a 
vital interest in exporting them, the uncertainty was particularly 
resented. This explains the lively criticism of list G within G.A.T.T. 
Finally, the lack of information on list G tariffs complicated the 
G.A.T.T. tariff negotiations initiated pursuant to the Dillon pro-
posal.48 
Because of these several difficulties the Commission did not wait 
until the end of I 9 59 to bring pressure on the Member States to 
begin negotiations. As a result of the Commission's initiative, nego-
tiations were in fact begun at the beginning of 1959. Working 
groups composed of the representatives of the Commission and of 
the governments of the Member States have met together on several 
occasions. Discussions of these groups involved-it may be added-
a profound examination of the situation of each product on the list: 
production, imports, exports, prices, capital invested in the pro-
ducing enterprises of the Community, labor expended, perspectives 
of development, possibilities for the increase of productivity, and 
the like. Ultimately, in March, 1960, the Six reached agreement on 
the tariffs of list G (with the exception of those on petroleum prod-
ucts). Their successful compromises in this sensitive area indicate 
their political determination to proceed with the establishment of 
the Common Market. 
B. THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE WITH 
THIRD CouNTRIES 
Strictly speaking the Treaty imposes no precise obligations on 
the Member States concerning quotas on imports from third coun-
tries. It merely indicates in general terms that the Member States 
shall coordinate their commercial relations with third countries in 
such a way as to bring into existence, not later than the expiration of 
the transitional period, the conditions necessary for the implementa-
tion of a common policy with regard to foreign commerce.49 It adds 
that the Commission shall submit to the Council proposals regard-
ing the procedure to be followed in the course of the transitional 
period to coordinate action, and to achieve a uniform commercial 
policy. The Council shall accept these proposals by unanimous vote 
during the two first stages of the transitional period, and thereafter 
by majority vote. Finally, the Treaty establishes, as a goal for the 
<s See note 46 supra. 
49 Treaty art. I II. 
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Member States, uniform lists of third-country products not subject 
to quotas which are as inclusive as possible. To further this aim the 
Commission shall make appropriate recommendations to them. 
The relative vagueness of these provisions, if compared with 
those which regulate the relations among the Member States and 
those relative to the common external tariff, may seem astonishing. 
It has in fact both legal and factual justification. 
One fact which justifies this vagueness is the extraordinary com-
plexity of the problem. The points of departure of the Member 
States were, in fact, very different when the E.E.C. Treaty was 
negotiated. On the one hand, the lists of liberated third-country 
products of each Member State differed among themselves and 
still differ. Germany's lists of liberated products imported from 
her partners in the O.E.E.C. differ from those of products imported 
from the dollar area, and neither is the same as that of products 
imported from countries which belong neither to O.E.E.C. zone nor 
to the dollar area. Italy has different lists for these areas, but, in 
addition, has lists in regard to products of countries which belong 
neither to the O.E.E.C. nor to the dollar area which differ among 
themselves. Moreover the differences in these lists in regard to a 
given area are differences in scope as well as of composition. The 
situations are even more disparate in regard to the relations be-
tween each of the Six and those countries which do not belong either 
to the dollar area or to the area of the O.E.E.C.-and this remark 
relates only to over-all percentages. If one examines the lists of 
products, a comparison becomes practically impossible. 
Firm obligations to unify lists of liberated products would create 
inextricable problems from a practical standpoint and have grave 
consequences with regard to commercial policy. In fact, if these lists 
were harmonized on· the basis of the lowest common denominator, 
some Member Countries would be forced to retrogress and to re-
establish quotas on a great number of products. They are not pre-
pared to do so, and moreover, as will be clear from the following 
discussion, to do so would be to violate international obligations 
imposed by O.E.E.C. and the G.A.T.T. If the lists were harmonized 
at the most liberal level, some Member Countries would be forced 
to make efforts which, either because of their balances of payments, 
or for reasons of national commercial policy, they are not in posi-
tion to make immediately or soon. If the mean between the two were 
chosen, it would be practically impossible to determine it. Each 
Member State has, moreover, bilateral commercial agreements with 
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most third countries in each area, fixing quotas on the imports of 
goods from them. In exchange for the import concessions involved, 
these third countries grant concessions in regard to Member State 
exports. The counter concessions obviously are different for the 
various Member States and also vary according to the third country 
granting them. If the lists of Member States of liberated products 
from third countries were made uniform, coordination of the bi-
lateral negotiations between the Six on the one hand and each of the 
third countries on the other should be a consequence. This would 
create complex problems which neither the Member States nor the 
third countries are now prepared to face. One of the avowed ob-
jectives of the Community is, of course, to achieve complete uni-
formity at the end of the transitional period. But the fact remains 
that it was not possible to write into the Treaty specific obligations 
of the Member States as to the steps to be taken in this direction 
during the transitional period. 
To these factual considerations must be added legal ones. The 
Six are members of the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) of 
G.A.T.T. and of the O.E.E.C. Each of these international organi-
zations has rules regarding quotas on commercial imports which 
increase the difficulties of achieving uniform lists of liberated prod-
ucts-at least as things stand at present. G.A.T.T. is an interna-
tional agreement to which approximately forty countries are parties 
and which has as its object the creation of something like a code of 
good conduct in international commercial relations and thereby a 
world as free of obstacles to trade as possible. Based on national-
treatment and most-favored-nation clauses, G.A.T.T. hopes to 
achieve its ends by outright prohibition of import quotas (except 
in cases of balance-of-payments difficulties) and by the reduction of 
tariff barriers through negotiation. 
Sixty-eight nations participate in the International Monetary 
Fund. Its purpose is to make possible the liberation of financial 
transactions on a world-wide and non-discriminatory basis ·and to 
create a better equilibrium of international financial relations, speci-
fically by means of realistic exchange rates. It has important resources 
at its disposal to aid countries suffering from temporary balance-of-
payments difficulties. Because these difficulties are often due to the 
internal management of the finances of member countries, it also 
has certain powers of inspection and recommendation. 
These two organizations were created at the end of the last war. 
Because of reconstruction needs and the situation which obtained 
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generally at the time of their creation-which made it impossible to 
apply their rules without reservation-th·ese rules were to become 
effective only gradually during periods of transition. The time is now 
coming when the end of these transition periods can be foreseen. 
O.E.E.C. imposes upon its members a level of liberalization at 
least equal to 90% of their I948 intra-European imports. At the 
time the Rome Treaty was negotiated, all Member States, with the 
exception of France, had effectively reached, and even largely sur-
passed, this level. But France was far from doing so. Indeed, after 
the Treaty was signed difficulties in her balance of payments forced 
France (in June, I958) to re-establish quotas on all imports. Thus, 
even if France-pointing to her difficulties and invoking the safe-
guard clause provided for this purpose by the rules of the O.E.E.C. 
-could suspend liberalization within the O.E.E.C., other Com-
munity countries, having no balance-of-payments difficulties, could 
not have invoked the same clause for the same purpose even if they 
had wished to do so. In December I 9 58, on the eve of the effective 
date (January I, I 9 59) of the first measures affecting commerce 
contemplated by the Treaty, France had-as to O.E.E.C. countries 
-achieved the 90% level. Since then she has gone even further, and 
has now reached 94%. Since each country is, according to O.E.E.C. 
rules, free to choose the products on which it abolishes quotas (pro-
vided it attains the obligatory percentages) the lists of liberated 
products within O.E.E.C. of the respective Common Market coun-
tries differ from one another, to the point that unification of these 
lists would : 
1) either force certain Member States to re-establish quotas on 
certain products and to fall below the 9oj·~ liberalization level 
without being able to invoke the safeguard clause to justify this 
regressiOn; or 
2) force other Member States to liberalize immediately certain 
products within the O.E.E.C.-which they are not now ready to do. 
Because, moreover, immediate liberation of these products would 
in their opinion create serious difficulties, even within the Com-
munity, the Treaty drafters established the rules for a progressive 
increase in quotas.50 
In relation to the G.A.T.T., the question is even more delicate, 
and its present development particularly interesting. The G.A.T.T. 
prohibits absolutely quantitative restrictions on imports, recogniz-
ing only tariffs as legitimate means of protection. This is its basic 
50 See Part II supra. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION 143 
principle, and only one exception is recognized: difficulties in bal-
ances of payments. Moreover, the G.A.T.T. categorically affirms 
the principle of non-discrimination in the administration of quanti-
tative restnctwns maintained or newly established by a country 
which is suffering from balance-of-payments difficulties. It recog-
nized derogations from this principle only to the extent that the 
International Monetary Fund also permits differences in treatment 
with regard to the restrictions on foreign exchange. 
In the post-war years, G.A.T.T. applied these two principles 
with a great deal of flexibility. Because of their reconstruction and 
development needs, most of the European countries had balance-of-
payments difficulties. Moreover, because of the absolute separation 
introduced before, during, and after the war among the monetary 
systems of countries, and the fact that transactions were effected ac-
cording to bilateral agreements-in short, because of non-transfer-
ability among currencies-G.A.T.T. accepted the maintenance of 
quantitative restrictions and their discriminatory application. It 
even went so far as to close its eyes to the intra-European liberaliza-
tion which the O.E.E.C. had introduced among its members, and 
which was in essence discriminatory in regard to the other contract-
ing parties to the G.A.T.T. since the O.E.E.C. countries abolished 
quotas among themselves without according, necessarily, the same 
treatment to other G.A.T.T. members. This tolerance on G.A.T.T.'s 
part was obviously motivated by the fact that the O.E.E.C. coun-
tries had made their currencies transferable among themselves by 
virtue of the creation of the European Payments Union, which also 
comprised a system of automatic credits among its members. 
However, as balances of payments of the countries of Europe 
improved, G.A.T.T. exercised an increasing pressure on them to 
liberalize their imports with respect to countries outside Europe. 
Indeed, the O.E.E.C. had itself contributed to this geographical ex-
tension of liberalization by urging its members to abolish quotas 
on their imports, notably those from Canada and the United States. 
With the disappearance of the European Payments Union, and the 
advent of external convertibility of most European currencies in 
December 1958, the pressure of the G.A.T.T. and of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund for integral and non-discriminatory lib-
eralization strongly increased. 
The result of the liberalization of their imports on a worldwide 
scale, which is gradually being achieved by the Six, is that the practi-
cal difficulties of a common quota policy are becoming greater and 
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greater. In fact, although the G.A.T.T. envisages the possibility 
that a customs union may create a preferential tariff system among 
its members, it apparently envisages nothing of the kind concerning 
quotas. The result is that, as things now stand, each country of the 
Community (as is true of the other countries of G.A.T.T.) is ex-
amined individually by the International Monetary Fund and 
G.A.T.T., and is encouraged to liberalize its imports towards all 
of the other countries of G.A.T.T. and of the International Mone-
tary Fund, in accordance with the state of its individual balance of 
payments. Since the decisions of G.A.T.T. are directed at individual 
countries, it may be that it will consider that one country of the 
Community should free all of its imports vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world but that another is justified in maintaining certain quotas 
provisionally-with the understanding that in conformity with the 
basic principle of the G.A.T.T. and the Monetary Fund, it must 
administer these quotas in a non-discriminatory manner as to all 
G.A.T.T. and I.M.F. members. This means that no preferential 
treatment shall be accorded to Community members. 
The legal and factual elements of the common-quota-policy prob-
lem which deserve emphasis are : 
I) the virtual impossibility of establishing a common policy of 
the Member States in regard to import restrictions, the only point 
on which, theoretically, coordination may be achieved in conformity 
with the obligations of these countries to G.A.T.T. and I.M.F. be-
ing a complete liberalization of imports from all G.A.T.T. and 
I.M.F. members; 
2) the gradual desuetude of those rules of the Treaty which re-
late to the progressive increase of quotas among the Member States 
of the Community. It is evident that if, under the pressure of non-
member states united within G.A.T.T. and the Monetary Fund, 
each Member State is led to abolish import quotas on industrial 
products originating in G.A.T.T. and I.M.F. countries, the com-
plex rules of the Treaty concerning the progressive relaxation of 
quotas among its Members will lose their justification. Naturally, 
each country of the Community, in removing quotas on imports 
from G.A.T.T. countries, will also remove them on goods from 
Community Countries, because Community Countries are members 
of G.A.T.T., and because the Treaty provides in Article 111 that, 
"if Member States abolish or reduce quantitative restrictions in re-
gard to third countries, they ... shall accord identical treatment 
to the other Member States." 
This is the current legal and factual context of the problem of 
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liberalization vis-a-vis therest of the world of the imports of Mem-
ber States. Three additional comments are appropriate. 
1) The legal situation described applies to the relations between 
the Member States of the Community and the countries of the 
O.E.E.C. and G.A.T.T. It does not apply to relations with those 
countries which do not belong to these organizations, meaning, 
largely, the countries behind the Iron Curtain. 
2) The situation has also been described on the assumption that 
in the years to come it will in fact be possible to apply in full the rules 
of G.A.T.T. and of the Monetary Fund. 51 
3) Safeguard clauses must also be considered. 
C. SAFEGUARD CLAUSES 
There are, strictly speaking, no safeguard clauses in the Treaty 
which relate specifically to the establishment of an external tariff and 
lists of liberated goods. The sole provision of any relevance is Arti-
cle 26 of the Treaty, which provides: "The Commission may author-
ize any Member State encountering special difficulties to postpone 
the lowering or the raising, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 23, of the duties on certain headings of its tariff." But the 
freedom of the Commission in this connection is limited by what 
follows in Article 26: "Such authorization may only be granted for 
a limited period and for tariff headings which together represent 
for such State not more than five percent of the value of its total 
imports coming from third countries in the course of the latest year 
for which statistical data are available." Obviously these provisions 
could come into play if one of the Member States should encounter 
difficulties in lowering a customs duty vis-a-vis third countries which, 
initially, was higher than the future common external tariff. These 
difficulties might result from the fact that some third country was in 
a particularly strong competitive position with regard to a product 
to which that duty was applicable. But if the Member State's do-
mestic industry cannot withstand the competition of third-country 
industries-even with continued customs protection-there is every 
chance that it is not in a position to withstand the competition of the 
corresponding industries of other Member States whose products 
will not, ultimately, have to cross customs barriers. Recourse to 
Article 26 is therefore more or less tied to recourse to Article 226.52 
51 At the moment, this is disputed, and the underlying theory of the work pursued 
within the Community for the elaboration of a common external commercial policy 
assumes non-application of G.A.T.T. rules. 
52 See text at note 36 supra. 
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But the most interesting problem is the one which balance-of-
payments difficulties of a Member State could create, given the obli-
gations of that state to the Monetary Fund and G.A.T.T. One aim 
of the rules of the Treaty is to avoid, or failing that, to delay as long 
as possible, situations in which one Member State will be forced, 
by balance-of-payments difficulties, to adopt protective measures in 
regard to its imports from Community countries. The first action 
envisaged for the Community will, it is true, be designed to allow 
the country in question to maintain as liberal an import policy, vis-a-
vis non-Community countries, as possible. Specifically, the first meas-
ure envisaged 53 consists in concerted action with those international 
organizations to which Member States may have recourse. Should 
one of these organizations, for example, grant credits to the coun-
try in difficulties, that country would have to follow the organiza-
tion's recommendations concerning its commercial policy towards 
non-Community participants of the organization. 
If such steps prove inadequate, the Treaty provides other means· 
to prevent trade diversions when the country in difficulties main-
tains or re-establishes quotas on products from non-Community 
countries. This implies that the country in question will be able to 
re-establish quotas on non-Community products but that it will not 
do so on Community products, particularly if Community countries 
grant mutual assistance. Only in the absence of mutual assistance, or 
in case of its inadequacy, could the Commission authorize the coun-
try in question to re-establish quotas on Community goods. Even 
here the implication of the Treaty's spirit is that quotas on Com-
munity goods should be less rigorous than those applicable to non-
Community goods. 
One may well wonder, however, whether these provision can be 
given effect in their entirety, in view of the obligations of the Com-
munity countries towards I.M.F. and G.A.T.T. now that European 
currencies have become convertible. If it is true that, on the one 
hand, the rules of the G.A.T.T. relating to customs unions do not 
contemplate the possibility of preferential treatment within the 
union in regard to import quotas, 54 and on the other hand, that the 
import quotas applied by countries subject to balance-of-payments 
difficulties must be applied in a non-discriminatory way, it is legally 
impossible for a Member State to impose quotas on non-Community 
goods and not on goods originating in other Community countries. 
'"'See text at note 35 and following paragraphs . 
.. See pp. 142-44 supra. 
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From a legal viewpoint it would seem that this will continue to be 
true so long as the Member States have separate currencies and 
separate quotas in the eyes of I.M.F. 
These are legal conclusions, and it is not absolutely certain that 
the Six would agree with the interpretations of G.A.T.T. here sug-
gested. It is quite possible, however, that events will obviate the 
need to consider such problems, for at present both the Six and the 
other industrial countries of Europe are moving towards as com-
plete and rapid an elimination, on a non-discriminatory basis, of 
the whole quota system as is possible. 
D. THE PRINCIPLEs OF THE CoMMON 
CoMMERCIAL PoLICY 
In establishing their customs union, the Six of course had to take 
into account its repercussions on their commerce with third coun-
tries. This preoccupation became more and more central as the 
months passed, and it is now the major one of the Community and 
of its European and non-European associates. 
A number of Treaty articles define the Community position in 
regard to the important international commercial problems raised. 
Article I 8 provides: "Member States hereby declare their willing-
ness to contribute to the development of international commerce and 
the reduction of barriers to trade by entering into reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the reduction of 
customs duties below the general level which they could claim as a 
result of the establishment of a customs union between themselves." 
Pursuant to this article the Community can negotiate reductions of 
its common external tariff in exchange for similar reductions by 
third countries. The G.A.T.T. negotiations in 1960 pursuant to the 
Dillon proposal will be undertaken in accordance with Article I 8. 
Similarly, Article 29-the last in the section of the Treaty dealing 
with the common external tariff-states that in carrying out the 
tasks entrusted to it, the Commission shall be guided by: 
(a) the need for promoting commercial exchanges be-
tween the Member States and third countries; 
(b) the development of competitive conditions within 
the Community to the extent to which such develop-
ment will result in the increase of the competitive 
capacity of the [sic] enterprises. 
Allusion to the competitive capacity of Community enterprises 
recurs in Article I 10, which reads as follows: 
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By establishing a customs union between themselves the 
Member States intend to contribute, in conformity with 
the common interest, to the harmonious development of 
world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
it?-ternational exchanges and the lowering of customs bar-
ners. 
The common commercial policy shall take into account 
the favourable incidence which the abolition of customs 
duties as between Member States may have on the in-
crease of the competitive strength of the enterprises in 
those States. 
If the over-all result of the creation of the Community is an increase 
of the productivity of Community enterprises as a whole, they will 
in fact need less tariff and quota protection against non-Community 
competition than they now enjoy or even than that which the estab-
lishment of a common external customs tariff based on the arithmeti-
cal average of present tariffs will afford. 
In addition to these declarations of principle, the Treaty provides 
procedures for the adoption of a common policy and for establishing 
relations with third countries. Article 111 provides that the Mem-
ber States shall coordinate their commercial relations with third 
countries in such a way as to create, by the end of the transitional 
period, the conditions necessary for a common foreign commercial 
policy. The Commission must submit to the Council proposals con-
cerning the procedure to be followed during the transitional period 
to ensure common action and the unification of commercial policy. 
The Commission is also to submit to the Council recommendations 
concerning tariff negotiations with third countries affecting the com-
mon tariff. These negotiations are to be conducted by the Commis-
sion in consultation with a special committee designated by the 
Council to assist the Commission. Finally, Article 111 provides that 
the Member States shall, in consultation with the Commission, take 
all necessary measures to adjust prevailing tariff agreements with 
third countries in order that the common external tariff may be put 
into effect without delay.55 
Finally, the Treaty makes clear that the Member States must, in 
respect to all matters of particular interest to the Common Market, 
act in common in international economic organizations ( I.M.F., 
G.A.T.T., O.E.E.C., Food and Agriculture Organization, the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council, and international groups concerned 
55 This problem, which relates to rights already vested, is treated in this Part III, 
Section E in Subsection 5 dealing with the Dillon proposal. 
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with basic raw materials) .56 During the transitional period, Mem-
ber States are to consult with each other in order to coordinate their 
action and, as far as possible, to adopt common positions. 
The provisions contained in these articles of the Treaty require 
no special comment. They make abundantly clear that the objective 
of the Treaty is, in regard to questions of commercial policy, to 
make of six states one. The following section of this chapter, deal-
ing with the history from its inception of the relations of the Com-
munity with third countries, illustrates how these provisions have 
worked until now and what problems Community and non-Com-
munity countries face under existing circumstances. 
E. THE ExTERNAL CoMMERCIAL PoLICY oF THE 
CoMMUNITY SINCE ITs CREATION 
I. NEGOTIATIONS WITH REGARD TO A 
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA 
The problem of the relations of the Community with other Euro-
pean countries arose before the Treaty was signed (March 19 57). 
In July r 9 56, the Council of the O.E.E. C. decided to study the pas~ 
sibilities of creating in Europe a free trade zone associating, on a 
multilateral basis, the customs union envisaged by the Six and the 
other countries of the O.E.E.C., who would not belong to the union. 
An expert report published by the O.E.E.C. in January 1957,57 
concluded that the establishment of such an area was a practical 
possibility. 
In a free trade area, as is true of a customs union, all barriers to 
trade-notably, customs duties and quotas-are abolished in regard 
to goods from the countries which compose the area. In contrast 
to a customs union, the free trade area does not involve the estab-
lishment of an external tariff common to the countries of the area. 
Each member state continues to set its own tariffs on goods originat-
ing outside the area. 
If the free trade area had been established, the result would have 
been a vast European area, including the Six, within which goods 
would have circulated freely. The Six would, at the end of the tran-
sitional period, have applied the same tariff to goods originating 
outside the area as they now will-the tariff of the Community-
56 Treaty art. I 16. 
07 Report on the Possibility of Creating a Free Trade Area in Europe. O.E.E.C., 
Paris, ] anuary, 1957. 
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while each of the other countries would have applied its national 
tariffs. 
Why did O.E.E.C. envisage the creation of a free trade area 
rather than the formation of a customs union among its members, 
that is, rather than a geographical extension of the union contem-
plated by the Six at that time? The reasons were both political and 
economic. The European Economic Community is not merely a cus-
toms union, and its aims include political unification of Europe in 
forms which prevent the association of several European countries 
for various reasons (for instance, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland 
for reasons of neutrality). 
Moreover, several European countries are low-tariff countries. 
Should they become members of the Community, they would be 
forced to raise their tariffs to the level of the future common ex-
ternal tariff of the Member States. This they are not ready to do. 
Finally, the United Kingdom for obvious reasons could not relin-
quish the preferential system of the Commonwealth-which she 
feared would be necessary in order to join the Community. 
The choice of a free trade area as the vehicle for unification was 
imposed by G.A.T.T. rules. As to tariff questions, G.A.T.T. is based 
on the principle of the most-favored-nation clauses. This principle 
prohibits new tariff preferences, with the exception of customs un-
ions (which the Six chose) and areas of free trade. These O.E.E.C. 
countries which are not part of the Community could not agree to 
form a customs union and had, therefore, only one choice-the free 
trade area. 
The maintenance within a free trade area of different external 
tariffs in each country of the area obviously raises an important 
problem which is nonexistent in a customs union once its common ex-
ternal tariff is effective. Since this common external tariff is the same 
for all customs union countries, all goods originating outside the 
union pay the same duties regardless of the country of entry into the 
union. Consequently, such goods may pass from country to country of 
the union, either in their original form, or after transformation, 
without the necessity of establishing their origin, since they will have 
paid-at whatever point of entry into the union-the duty con-
templated by the common external tariff. 
In a free trade area this would not be the case. The countries of 
the area maintain autonomy over external tariffs. Some of these 
countries would necessarily apply lower tariffs to given goods im-
ported from outside the area than would others. As obstacles to 
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free trade within the area are abolished, goods coming from out-
side the area might enter through the country with the lowest tar-
iffs, or with none at all, passing thereafter into the other countries 
of the area, and arriving therein at a lower cost than they would 
have paid had they entered directly. 
Where this is possible, the creation of a free trade area could 
entail abnormal upheavals within the commercial structure. To 
avoid this, a mechanism is necessary which will permit determina-
tion of those products which are absolved from paying duties when 
traded within the area (such products being considered as having 
originated in the area) and those which continue to pay duties when 
they pass from one country of the area to another (these products 
being considered as having origin a ted outside the area). 
Within a customs union then, all products will circulate freely at 
the end of the transitional period, whereas, within the free trade 
area, customs barriers will be maintained indefinitely between the 
various countries of the area in order 
I) to determine the origin of goods, and 
2) to collect duties on those goods which are not considered to 
have originated within the area. 
The situation within the customs union during the transitional 
period is analogous to that which obtains permanently in a free 
trade area. The Six have solved these problems by the rules relative 
to libre pratique, but, as has been indicated,58 the countries of the 
Community have found it difficult to resist the temptation to verify 
the origin of goods. It must be emphasized, however, that the prob-
lem is transitory in a customs union and permanent in a free trade 
area. 
Initiated as early as July 1956 (before the Treaty was signed), 
pursued in other forms in the spring of I 9 57 (after the signing of 
the Treaty), taken up again in the fall of 1957 (after the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty by the Parliaments of the Six), the negotiations 
relating to a European free trade area, including the Six, were 
finally suspended in December I 95 8. The fundamental reasons for 
this failure cannot be examined in detail here. One, among others, 
was the opposition of France, which had strongly criticized the very 
concept of a free trade area, viewing with a jaundiced eye the pos-
sibility of subjecting her industry not only to the competition of the 
other five Member States but also to that of other European coun-
tries. Moreover, the creation of a free trade area including the 
"'See p. 125 supra. 
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customs union of the Six would have, in the view of some, weakened 
the Community to the point where it would have lost its special 
character, thereby compromising the realization of those political 
objectives which it is also pursuing. 
More significantly, however, the European countries were unable 
to agree on a system of definition and determination of the origin 
of goods. Moreover, it ultimately became clear that this problem is 
directly related to the problem of the freedom of the countries of 
the area to modify, during the existence of the area, their com-
mercial policies vis-a-vis third countries. A system of origin defini-
tion designed to avoid diversions of trade, and taking account of 
tariff levels of the respective countries of the area, might well be-
come ineffective if these countries were to preserve absolute free-
dom to alter tariff levels vis-a-vis third countries. 
Assume, for example, that one country of the zone applies a duty 
of 20% and another a duty of 30% to imports of a given raw ma-
terial from countries outside the area. If, according to the rules of 
the area, products manufactured from this raw material will be 
considered to have originated in the area if their value is double 
that of the raw material, the difference in customs costs incorporated 
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this difference may not be thought to falsify competitive conditions, 
because transportation costs and levels of productivity may com-
pensate, and the difference can therefore be absorbed. If the coun-
try which applied a duty of 20% now reduces it to zero, the differ-
ence in customs costs becomes 3o% or r 5%, which represents a 
2 
substantial difference in the cost of bringing the product to market. 
This difference could cause diversions of trade and other commer-
cial activity, and the only way to alleviate its effect would be to 
change the rules concerning the determination of origin-for ex-
ample, by providing that a finished product cannot be considered to 
have originated in the area unless its value is five or six times that 
of the imported raw material which it contains. In order to avoid 
the necessity of constant modification of the rules for determining 
origin and to keep countries from abusing their freedom to modify 
tariffs at a moment's notice, that freedom must be limited. 
All of the European countries were ready to agree that freedom 
in this area should be limited by controls or sanctions, but they were 
unable to agree on the scope of the limitations to be imposed. Some 
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wanted a rule that no member could alter its tariffs on goods from 
non-members without prior agreement of the other members. 
Others, rejecting controls of this kind, suggested that it should be 
possible to change the rules concerning definition of origin if a coun-
try were to change tariffs vis-a-vis third countries to an extent which 
would create trade diversions within the area. In such a case, it 
would be possible to deny to the relevant goods the customs benefits 
otherwise granted by members of the area to goods of the others. 
The suspension of the free-trade-area negotiations created cer-
tain difficulties in Europe, and no one yet knows how they can be 
resolved. After the negotiations had been broken off, seven countries 
of Europe which do not belong to the Community (Austria, Den-
mark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) 
discussed the possibility of creating among themselves a free trade 
area which would be independent of the Community,5~t and the Com-
munity found itself confronted by a new situation which brought 
it to adopt concrete measures with regard to third countries, and to 
take up the general problem of its relations to non-Community coun-
tries with a particular sense of urgency. 
2. SPECIFIC MEASURES TAKEN ON JANUARY I, I959, 
WITH REGARD TO THIRD COUNTRIES 
The halting of the free-trade-area negotiations, the European 
crisis which resulted, the accusations of discrimination brought 
against the Community, and the fact that it was considered guilty 
by many of provoking a split of Europe into two groups-all 
motivated the Community to take certain measures vis-a-vis non-
Community countries on January I, I959· On that date-it should 
be recalled-the Six were required, as among themselves, to 
I) lower their customs duties by 10% and 
2) increase import quotas by zo% on Community goods (hav-
ing first combined those applying to goods from the other five into 
single global quotas). 
By a decision dated December 3, I958, the Council ruled that the 
Member States should, on January I, 1959, reduce by 10% duties 
on industrial products with a rate higher than that of the future 
common external tariff but not to a level below that of the common 
external tariff. This reduction was effected in regard to O.E.E.C. 
members, G.A.T.T. members and non-members of G.A.T.T. who 
have most-favored-nation treaties with Member States of the Com-
""An appendix to this chapter examines the Europe an Free Trade Association 
(E.F.T.A.) organized by these seven countries. 
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munity. The decision of December 3 provided that, subject to the 
reciprocal grant of like benefits, Community countries should in-
crease quotas on industrial products from O.E.E.C. countries by an 
amount equal to 20% of the total value of quotas of each of the 
Six in favor of other O.E.E.C. countries. Within the framework of 
this over-all increase, it was required that each quota should be 
increased at least 10%. The second instalment of 10% was not 
necessarily to be applied to each quota, but could be used for prod-
ucts of special interest to the country in question and in particular 
for those products which are subject to insignificant quotas or in 
regard to which no quotas have been opened. 
These measures meant-as far as tariffs were concerned-that: 
I) by decreasing duties on imports from non-Community coun-
tries by ro% (as they had in regard to Community goods), the 
Member States avoided discrimination against non-Community 
countries in implementing the E.E.C. Treaty; 
2) by limiting this decrease to duties on those products which 
were subject to a higher duty than that of the future common ex-
ternal tariff of the Community, they took the first step, as of January 
r, I 9 59, towards the creation of a common external tariff (although 
the Treaty provides only that the first decrease of external tariffs 
should take place on December 3 I, I 96 I), thereby anticipating by 
three years-and on their own initiative-the Treaty schedule, al-
though nothing required them to do so; and 
3) by restricting the decrease to duties which were higher than 
the duties of the future common external tariff, the Member States 
have nevertheless introduced differences of treatment of Commu-
nity and non-Community countries since they also reduced by I o% 
duties on Community goods which were inferior to the common 
external tariff without extending this reduction to third-country 
goods. It would, of course, have been foolish to extend this reduc-
tion to third-country goods since such a reduction would have af-
fected duties which, on December JI, I96I, would have to be raised 
again in order to progress towards the level of the future common 
external tariff. 
These tariff measures affecting third-country goods, having been 
thus determined, were duly put into effect on January I, I959, at 
the same time that the tariff reductions on Community goods were 
effected. In fact, however, their implementation in some sectors has 
been retarded, because the future external tariff of the Community 
was not yet known. This forced the Member States to fix approxi-
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mate duties, choosing levels which seemed likely to be higher than 
those of the future common external tariff. A special difference in 
treatment resulted in certain cases from the fact that as to a few 
products some of the Member States took as a base the duties ap-
plied on December 3 I, I 9 58, whereas these duties had been partially 
or totally suspended on January I, I957, the determinative date of 
basic duties under the Treaty. Since the duties to which the 10% 
reduction was applied were different, the result was, of course, that 
lower duties were put into effect on Community goods than on non-
Community goods. 
Country by country, the situation was this: 
I) Germany had of her own accord reduced duties on a great 
number of imports from the entire world. These reductions, ef-
fected after January I, I 9 57, were taken into account in applying the 
provisions of the Treaty, and Germany had to make only a few 
new tariff reductions on imports from Community, as well as from 
non-Community, countries. These few were made and, as far as 
industrial products were concerned, in a generally non-discrimina-
tory manner. 
2) Tariffs of the Benelux countries were, in general, lower than 
the future common tariff of the Six. Benelux reduced its tariffs by 
10% within the Community, but, of course, did not effect the same 
reduction on all third-country goods. Where the then applicable 
tariff was higher than the future external tariff of the Community, 
however, the same 10% reduction applicable to Community goods 
was put into effect. 
3) Italy gave effect to the w% reduction on goods from third 
countries, but made exceptions of a great number of products in 
regard to which it was difficult to predict whether the external tar-
iff of the Community would be higher or lower than the applicable 
Italian tariff. 
4) France's procedure was similar to Italy's. She had, in I957, 
however, reduced or suspended duties on certain products (paper 
pulp, kraft paper, boxes) but these reductions and suspensions were 
later repealed. Under the terms of the Treaty, France was obligated 
on January I, I 9 59, to fix tariffs within the Community 10% lower 
than those actually applied on January I, I957· As to non-Com-
munity goods she put into effect tariffs which were 10% lower than 
those provided for by law on December 3I, I958. This difference 
can be fairly important. For instance, on raw pulp the legal duty of 
22% had been suspended on January I, I 9 57, and one of 6% was 
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in fact applied. On January I, 19 59, the tariff to be applied to Com-
munity goods was therefore fixed at 5.4%, while the one applied to 
third-country goods was fixed at 19.8%. 
The decision of the Six of December 3 meant, as to quotas, that 
these countries offered to other O.E.E.C. members bilateral nego-
tiations concerning the application of the Treaty rules, with the 
exception of the rule of 3% relating to small or nonexistent quotas. 
This negotiation in fact fixed the over-all increase of quotas at 20%, 
whereas the implementation of the 20% rule resulted in an increase 
of much more than 20% of the quotas among the Six. No unanimous 
decision of the Council of the O.E.E.C. could be reached concern-
ing this offer to negotiate, and each country was left free to initiate 
bilateral negotiations with one or another of the Six. Actually, such 
negotiations took place only between France, and most of the 
countries now constituting the E.F.T.A. Their result was a 
substantial increase in the quotas opened by France to these coun-
tries subject to the grant of reciprocal benefits by them-an in-
crease which in the French-British case, far surpassed the 20% 
max1mum. 
3· THE REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF 
FEBRUARY 1959 ON FUTURE RELATIONS OF THE 
SIX WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Following the suspension of the negotiations concerning the free 
trade area, the Council gave the Commission the task of preparing 
a report concerning possible solutions of the problem of relations 
between the Community and the other European countries. The re-
port of the Commission was submitted in February 1959, and even 
though it was not approved by the Council, it is highly interesting 
in that it indicates what preoccupies the Commission. 
The report states in particular that the relations of the Com-
munity with the other European countries should be viewed within 
the framework of a general world-wide policy. From this point of 
view, protectionism would be an inconceivable Community policy. 
It is incumbent on the Community to pursue a liberal policy in regard 
to Europe and the rest of the world and to translate its intentions 
into actions. Noting that the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the Community carry on almost one half of world trade, the 
Commission stated that these great industrialized economic entities 
have a particular responsibility in maintaining the economic equilib-
rium of the world. The major part of the world is, it continued, 
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composed of countries which are still in the throes of development, 
and it is doubtful whether they can, on their own, develop their na-
tional economies satisfactorily. Therefore, freer trade in the world 
will only be possible if it goes hand in hand with active and co-
ordinated development programs. Experience demonstrates that 
free trade alone is not equal to the task of eliminating too-great 
disparities. On the contrary, if other steps are not taken, free trade 
may result in widening the gaps between rich and poor countries. 
The Commission therefore proposed a common policy to be fol-
lowed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Com-
munity, with a view to lowering tariffs on a world-wide scale, to 
furnishing technical and financial assistance to developing countries, 
primarily by means of export credits, to stabilizing the prices of raw 
materials, and to assuring world-wide coordination of policies de-
signed to meet problems created by business cycles. 
Having placed the problem of the relations of the Community 
with the other countries of the O.E.E.C. in the more general frame-
work of relations with the world as a whole, the Commission never-
theless reaffirmed the absolute political necessity of European soli-
darity. Although it rejected the concept of the free trade area as a 
means of associating the Community with other European countries, 
it nevertheless proposed some concrete tariff measures in order to 
establish a modus vivendi among O.E.E.C. countries. 
Primarily because the propositions of the Commission were in-
adequate at the European level, the Council could not approve the 
Commission's report. In March 1959 it therefore appointed a 
special committee to formulate suggestions for reviving negotiations 
with other O.E.E.C. countries directed at the creation of a multi-
lateral association between them and the Community. This special 
Committee has not as yet completed its work, and in the meantime, 
seven countries of the O.E.E.C. have decided to create among them-
selves a free trade area. 60 
4· THE PROBLEM OF THE HARMONIZATION OF 
COMMERCIAL POLICIES IN REGARD TO 
CERTAIN COUNTRIES 
Even though the Community has often reaffirmed its intention of 
pursuing liberal commercial policies in regard to non-Community 
countries, the lack of a common commercial policy during the tran-
sitional period will create certain problems. Bt;cause one of the Six 
00 See appendix at ~nd of this chapter, 
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applies a more liberal tariff or quota to a given non-Community 
product than another, a risk of trade diversions within the Com-
munity, which will provoke lively reactions on the part of the pro-
ducers, will result. The highly-developed countries which make up 
the Community are particularly afraid of the competition of three 
groups of countries: 
I) those which have abnormally low salaries and wages (that 
is, the developing countries in Southeast Asia) ; 
2) those where the state enjoys a commercial monopoly (the 
countries behind the Iron Curtain) ; 
3) those which use artificial methods of a kind which falsify the 
price of exported products (for instance, countries with multiple 
exchange rates). 
The risks of trade diversion during the transitional period are 
connected to the problem of fibre pratique within the Community, 
and, in the cases of trade diversion, the countries may invoke the 
safeguard clauses of Article I I 5.61 
Confronted with these problems, the institutions of the Com-
munity have assigned the Economic and Social Committee (a con-
sultative organ which represents ec~nomic and professional inter-
ests) the task of dealing with them. In July of I959, this Com-
mittee submitted to the Commission an opinion representing the 
viewpoint of economic and professional groups on these problems. 
This opinion indicates that, if the agreement of the Six on a com-
mon commercial policy (which, according to the Treaty, is the ulti-
mate goal for the distant future) cannot be reached immediately, 
lack of coordinated action in regard to the three groups of coun-
tries mentioned above may well cause free trade in certain prod-
ucts 62 within the Community to fail. The reason for this is the 
possibility of recourse to the measures contemplated by Article 
I I 5 of the Treaty. The coordination of commercial policies of the 
Member States, which the Treaty foresees for the transitional 
period, should, in general, be effected without delay, according to 
this opinion, and ought to be begun immediately in cases where the 
above-mentioned danger threatens. 
In this connection, the Economic and Social Committee has 
formulated a certain number of proposals which, it seems, have 
not as yet been seriously examined by the Community institutions. 
61 See text at note 32 supra. 
62 The products in question are both industrial and agricultural, for example, 
natural or artificial textiles, optical goods, certain metal products, sewing machines, 
ceramics, rubber footwear and toys. 
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It is interesting to note that the spirit of these recommendations 
is to some extent protectionist in regard to the exports of the coun-
tries in question. Increased protection against exports of certain 
countries-and notably of those whose economies are in the throes 
of development-plainly seems to contradict the liberal declara-
tions of principle of the Commission and to negate its professed de-
sire to contribute to the development of these countries. No hasty 
conclusions should be drawn, however, since these are special cases 
which do, in fact, create problems of a certain gravity for the Euro-
pean industries affected. 
5· THE DILLON PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTION OF THE 
TARIFFS OF THE PARTIES TO G.A.T.T. 
At the session of G.A.T.T. held late in 1958, Mr. Dillon, as head 
of the United States delegation, submitted a proposal looking to 
a new multilateral tariff conference (analogous to those held at 
Annecy, Torquay, and Geneva during the last ten years) which 
would permit the President of the United States to utilize the 
powers, granted him by the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Extension 
Act of 1958, to reduce existing U.S. duties 20% on all products 
(with the exception of those duties which have reached the "peril 
point.") These powers expire on June 30, 1962. 
In accordance with this proposition, G.A.T.T., during the winter 
of 1958-59, studied the possibility of organizing such a conference. 
The interest of this proposition obviously lay in bringing about a 
lowering of U.S. duties, as well as those of European countries, 
and particularly, those of the Common Market, thereby making 
new progress in the direction of liberalized world trade. 
Realization of the Dillon proposal will create problems, how-
ever, from the point of view of the Community. The first of these is 
whether the Member States should negotiate on the basis of their 
present tariffs or on the basis of the future common external tariff. 
The answer is, as it were, imposed by the future common external 
tariff. In view of the fact that during the years to come the Treaty 
requires Member States to raise their duties on some of their prod-
ucts, and to lower them on others in order to establish their future 
common external tariff, it would be illusory to obtain concessions 
from them with regard to duties which they will, in any case, have' to 
lower or with regard to others which they must in any case increase 
later. 
A second question results from one of the rules of G.A.T.T. The 
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countries of the Community will have to increase certain duties to 
place them at the level of the common external tariff. A large num-
ber of these duties have been "bound" by each Member State vis-
a-vis third countries. These commitments resulted from prior tar-
iff negotiations-a given Member State agreeing, in exchange for 
counter-concessions by other G.A.T.T. countries, to reduce and 
"bind" certain of its duties, that is, not to increase them. It is clear 
that if one of the Member States is to increase a "bound" duty 
in order to carry out its obligations within the Community, then 
it must either give up such counter-concessions or offer other com-
pensation. This compensation may, of course, result from the fact 
that another lVIember State must lower corresponding duties to 
place them at the level of the future common external tariff, and 
G.A.T.T. expressly provides that situations of this kind should be 
taken into account. 
The effect of these provisions is that the ultimate establishment 
of the future common external tariff of the Community requires not 
only that the Member States shall fix this tariff in accordance with 
the complex rules already described, but that the "bound" tariff 
headings which the Member States intend to increase to the level 
of the future common external tariff should be re-negotiated with 
the countries of G.A.T.T. which are not members of the Com-
munity. This tariff will, in effect, be modified following these re-
negotiations because the Member States of the Community will have 
to offer compensation to their G.A.T.T. partners. 
Consequently, if negotiations are undertaken pursuant to the Dil-
lon proposal on the basis of the future common external tariff, it 
will be necessary to carry out successively two separate negotiations 
-one to re-negotiate the "bound" tariff headings of the Com-
munity members, and the other, on the basis of the external tariff 
of the Community resulting from such re-negotiations, to lower the 
common external tariff in exchange for counter-concessions by the 
United States and other countries. 
By a decision of May 5, 1959, the Council decided to accept the 
offer of Mr. Dillon so that new tariff decreases can be effected in 
the interest of developing world trade. The Council considered 
that this objective is perfectly in accord with the intentions of the 
Member States as expressed in the Treaty, according to which the 
Common Market should contribute, in conformity with the public 
interest, to the harmonious development of world commerce, and, 
especially, to the reduction of customs barriers. 
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At its I959 spring session, G.A.T.T. was able, therefore, to de-
cide to hold a new world tariff conference. This is to begin on Sep-
tember I, I 960, at which time the "bound" duties which the 
Member States of the Community intend to raise will be re-nego-
tiated. The conference should end by Christmas I96o. In January 
I 96 I, the negotiations of the Dillon proposal itself will begin. They 
are to be terminated in time to make it possible for the President of 
the United States to use his powers to lower U.S. tariffs. 
This schedule plainly has meant that the Member States have 
had to accelerate their decisions regarding the projected common 
external tariff. This tariff had to be ascertained as soon as possible 
in order that the countries of G.A.T.T. could know which tariff 
headings were to be re-negotiated, and what concessions would be 
asked of the Member States, either by virtue of an "unbinding" of 
these headings or in order to obtain from the Six reductions of their 
future common external tariff (within the framework of the Dillon 
proposal) in exchange for appropriate counter-concessions. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A. DIFFICULTY OF FoRMING JuDGMENTS 
An examination of those provisions of the Treaty which relate 
to the elimination of obstacles to trade among the Member States 
and to the establishment of a common external tariff and commer-
cial policy indicates that, although the Six were successful in estab-
lishing fairly precise rules concerning their relations with each other, 
they were forced to leave vague the greater part of the rules affect-
ing relations with third countries. This is understandable-among 
themselves the Six could undertake firm mutual obligations, because 
each was in a position to evaluate the benefits to be received in ex-
change for benefits granted, and to give effect to the benefits it prom-
ised. On the other hand, the establishing of a common external 
policy raises complex problems in view of the very different initial 
positions of the Member States, some traditionally liberal and 
others traditionally protectionist. Moveover, this is a field in which 
the countries in question have only partial control since they are 
bound by other international obligations and since foreign policy 
may only be defined in relation to constantly evolving situations at 
home and abroad. 
It is practically impossible to take stock now of the effect of the 
internal rules of the Common Market. The goal is clearly enough 
I 62 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
defined-the establishment of a single economic unit grouping highly 
industrialized countries whose population, economic power, and 
technical capacities will make it the third-ranking economic power 
in the world. But how will this be accomplished? Will the rules of 
the Treaty governing the abolition of tariffs and quotas be strictly 
applied? What scope will be given the safeguard clauses invoked? 
In particular, will the clause relating to difficulties pertaining to a 
particular sector be applied sparingly or will it be used to shield 
large areas of economic life from the full force of the Treaty? 
Doesn't the flexibility of the system for the abolition of tariffs in· 
volve the risk of postponing the solution of the thorniest problems 
until the end of the transitional period and, won't the consequence 
be virtually insoluble difficulties? It must be remembered that some 
Member States have long protected their industries extensively, 
and exposure now to competition with those of other Member States 
will create real problems. 
It is also clearly difficult to estimate the effects of the rules gov-
erning the elimination of obstacles to trade among the Member 
States without taking other rules into account. For example, the 
rules concerning state competition and competition among enter-
prises must be considered. All state subsidies to industries are to be 
abolished, but how is this principle to function and what will be its 
consequences? Again, cartels and all forms of understanding be-
tween private enterprises are, as a matter of principle, prohibited. 
But, in spite of this prohibition, isn't there a risk that enterprises of 
the various countries may come to understandings dividing markets 
among themselves in order to avoid competition which is too lively 
for their tastes? What will be the impact of the ultimate answers to 
these questions on the structure of enterprise-will the smallest dis-
appear, victims of powerful combinations, or will small enterprises 
be able to survive? What effects will this have on commerce? What 
kinds of professional groups will be established? 
Another and a related question-what will be the balance of 
power between producers and consumers within the Common Mar-
ket? For the time being, it seems that producers have more rapidly 
recognized the importance of what lies ahead and that they are 
organizing effectively at the Community level. No similar organi-
zation seems to exist among consumers. The unions are divided by 
politics, and not yet ready to take advantage of the new situation 
to increase international trade-union cooperation. However, things 
may change-though how and when no one can tell. 
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Even though the Treaty envisages some harmonization of the 
fiscal policies of the Member States, it imposes no firm obligations. 
It is therefore difficult to imagine what will happen in this area, 
since these policies will obviously exert great influence on any 
changes in the structure of enterprises, on their possibilities of in-
vestment, and on their respective competitive capabilities in the 
various countries of the Community. 
Under these conditions, although in theory it is possible to assert 
that the creation of the European Economic Community will 
strengthen the economic power of its Member States by increasing 
the competitive capability of the whole and by raising the standard 
of living of Community inhabitants, it is difficult to determine to 
what extent and at what pace this will be accomplished, and also 
what sacrifices will be necessary and what economic upheavals will 
precede it. Will productivity rise faster or will wages-or will the 
two be subject to a "see-sawing" effect? And to what extent will 
balance-of-payments crises obstruct the course of events? 
In this respect, it is obvious that the key to success in establishing 
the Community is the maintenance of a high level of economic ac-
tivity. Only within the framework of a continuous increase of pro-
duction, productivity, and total consumption will th,e countries of 
the Community be able to accept the necessary economic and social 
changes. If marginal enterprises have to shut down, it is essential 
that, through the continual progress of the economy as a whole, the 
workers thus freed may immediately find other employment. The 
Common Market could not survive a major unemployment crisis. 
The resulting political and social reactions would immediately force 
the governments to take protective measures, particularly with re-
gard to imports, which would negate the very principles of the Com-
munity and would lead to its failure. But it is impossible for the 
Six to study economic trends in isolation-they must consider those 
in the rest of the world, and particularly those in the United States 
and the sterling zone. The internal success of the Community there-
fore depends directly upon policies adopted beyond its boundaries. 
This raises the problem of the external policy of the Community 
itself. The provisions of the Treaty in this respect are vague. More-
over, the future common external tariff of the Community will give 
rise to negotiations the over-all results of which cannot be fore-
seen-all the more reason why it is impossible to predict what tariff 
will be applied to any particular product. 
How will the external policy of the Community be determined? 
I 64 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
In the first place, the degree of success of the Community's internal 
policy will be a factor. If, in the abolition of the obstacles to the 
free flow of goods among themselves, the Member States encounter 
great difficulty, a protectionist attitude towards the rest of the world 
will automatically result. If they succeed in eliminating commercial 
obstacles smoothly, however, there is every chance that their atti-
tude towards the rest of the world will be more liberal. The Treaty 
itself provides that, in establishing its external commercial policy, 
the Community shall keep in mind the increase of competitive capac-
ity which would normally be expected to result from the establish-
ment of the Common Market. 
The common external policy of the Community will also be in-
fluenced by its obligations towards its own overseas and associated 
territories. In so far as it wants to give the latter preferential treat-
ment, it will have to maintain barriers against third countries. 
The policy will also depend on the policies of other countries, both 
commercial and other. In this respect, initiatives such as the Dillon 
proposal and the creation of the free trade area of the Outer Seven 
will undoubtedly have an effect. 
Finally, other international obligations of Community members 
will also play an important part. The provisions of the Treaty re-
lating to the abolition of quotas among the Six, as well as the prob-
lem of a common quota policy, appear today in an entirely different 
light than they did at the time the Treaty was negotiated. There is 
no excessive optimism in the statement that, within a relatively short 
period, European countries in general, and those of the Community 
in particular, will most likely give up the system of quotas as a sys-
tematic means of protection against imports. This movement will 
be to the advantage of third countries, especially the United States. 
It will also result in a more liberal orientation of the Community 
than could have been expected only a short time ago. Another con-
sequence, however, will be an increase in the importance of tariffs 
which will remain the only means of protection for Community 
products. 
However, the freeing of imports and the durability of measures 
of liberalization are in direct correlation with stability in balances of 
payments and dependent upon financial, monetary, and economic 
policies adopted both by the Member States and by the larger non-
member countries. In case of recession, general recourse by Com-
munity states to quotas will seem normal and is virtually certain. 
Here again, a coordination of economic policies of Europe and the 
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United States is imperative to avoid serious troubles and a retreat 
from the liberalization of world commerce. 
The countries of the Community are all large importers of basic 
raw materials, and these imports should normally increase as the 
economic strength of the Community increases. The role of the Six 
in the commerce and economic development of the underdeveloped 
countries will therefore be an essential one. The Community is well 
aware of this role, 63 but to play it adequately, the Community must 
pursue liberal import policies vis-a-vis these countries-a necessity 
which creates conflicts. 64 For some Member States want to maintain 
or even increase their production of some raw materials, but many 
such enterprises could not survive third-country competition. The 
Community also wishes to maintain preferences in regard to the 
African territories with which it is associated. How these conflicts 
will be resolved no one can guess. 
To sum up, and granting the uncertainties remaining in regard 
both to the internal development of the Community and to its re-
lations with the rest of the world-and in spite of the setbacks which 
it may suffer in the course of its evolution-one cannot doubt that 
the formation of a new economic group as powerful as is the Com-
munity marks a major event in the history of the economic and com-
mercial relations of the world. 
Its formation will in all likelihood substantially strengthen the 
competitive capacity of the enterprises of the Community. In addi-
tion, the products of each Member State will benefit from tariff 
concessions of the others, for-in contrast to non-Community goods 
-they will ultimately be free from import duties. Consequently, 
the competition of Common Market producers will be more and 
more active both in Community markets and those of third coun-
tries. This competition, however, should provoke a lively competi-
tive reaction in third countries, and it is to be hoped that in the end 
the main beneficiaries will be consumers in the Western world as a 
whole. The spectacular rise in the standard of living in Europe that 
occurred after the Marshall Plan was inaugurated ought logically to 
continue, and it will entail a substantial increase in the needs of 
European countries for basic raw materials as well as for machinery 
and consumer goods. All in all, although the nature of trade currents 
may change, it is unlikely that their volume will decrease. 
These are the general conclusions usually drawn with respect to 
63 See the "Hallstein Report," discussed in Part III, Section E, Subsection 3· 
64 See the discussion concerning List G in Part III, Section A, Subsection 4· 
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the creation of the Community and, subject to the maintenance of 
boom conditions in the world, there is reason to believe that these 
conclusions will be verified by experience. 
The existence of this new group will certainly involve some gen-
eral problems for the United States concerning both the world's 
political and its economic balance. It is difficult to say how the over-
all balance of payments of the United States will be affected. Some 
American industries will encounter greater competition in Commu-
nity markets as well as in third-country markets and even in those 
of the United States. The demand for the products of other indus-
tries will increase. On the other hand, if the countries of the Com• 
munity participate increasingly in financing investment in under-
developed countries, the United States' share of the burden will, 
perhaps, be relatively lightened. 
The conduct of the United States will greatly influence the poli-
cies of the Community. A shift towards protectionism would pro-
duce a similar shift in the Community, and a resolutely liberal U.S. 
policy will encourage liberal tendencies in the Community. More-
over, coordination of policies to control economic cycles will be an 
essential element of the effort to free trade throughout the world. 
Increased American investment in the Community alone will not 
compensate for the potential harm to U.S. industries which the crea-
tion of the Community could cause. Above all the United States must 
seek bases for active cooperation with the European countries di-
rected at the maintenance of world prosperity, assistance to under-
developed countries, and total freedom of trade. In this audit of the 
uncertainties which weigh so heavily on the future of the Com-
munity these conclusions alone are certain. 
B. LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF 
THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE COMMUNITY 
Can one draw conclusions from the history of the first months 
of the Community? Probably not, but it is certainly useful to isolate 
outstanding factors, since they will dominate its evolution in the 
months or years to come. 
The first tariff reductions and quota increases within the Com-
munity were, generally speaking, carried out according to the rules 
of the Treaty. They seem to have raised no difficult problems for 
the Member States, nor of themselves to have had serious conse-
quences for other countries. 
These reductions and increases were, of course, fairly modest 
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in terms of absolute values. A 10% reduction of tariffs reflects a 
minimum effort at best. The increase of quotas was more impressive 
-in fact, larger than the Treaty provided for, but it occurred in 
circumstances which necessarily made its effect negligible. On the 
other hand, these advantages have also been granted in a relatively 
non-discriminatory manner to third countries. 
The conditions under which this was done in regard to tariffs 
have already been indicated. The efforts to be made by the Benelux 
countries, Germany, and Italy in regard to quotas were of only 
minor importance, but, particularly as a consequence of the con-
vertibility of currencies (and in the case of Germany, under pressure 
of G.A.T.T.), these countries have in general liberalized quotas on 
third-country goods to the same extent as quotas on imports from 
O.E.E.C. members. 
France, who in 1958 applied a strict system of quotas on all im-
ports, achieved 94% liberalization within the O.E.E.C. within a 
few months, and 70% vis-a-vis the dollar area. As to products not 
yet liberated, she increased quotas within the Community in ac-
cordance with the Treaty. She also increased quotas on imports from 
various other European countries in keeping with bilateral agree-
ments. Because of the devaluation of the French franc and the very 
strict policy of financial orthodoxy since pursued, as well as by reason 
of the renewal of confidence created by the government of General 
de Gaulle, the rapid and extensive removal of restrictions on im-
ports was not followed by a disturbing increase of purchasing 
abroad. 
In sum, then, the Treaty and the measures taken with regard to 
third countries had no noticeable effect on the volume of imports or 
on the direction or nature of the flow of trade either within or with-
out the Community. 
Indications of a tendency towards protectionism within the Com-
munity on the one hand, and a psychological climate favorable to 
some deflection of the normal flow of trade on the other have already 
been noted. Protectionism manifested itself in the difficulties which 
arose in the calculation of the increase of quotas among the Six 
in accordance with the rules of the Treaty, and especially in regard 
to the so-called 3% rule. In other areas (particularly agriculture) 
some states have manifested a tendency to replace tariff or quota 
protection by consumer taxes on imported products. This develop-
ment has had the incidental effect of drawing attention to the need of 
a more immediate and thorough supervision by the Community of 
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the fiscal policies of its Members than was contemplated at the time 
the Treaty was negotiated. 
Changes in the flow of trade have been accompanied by two 
groups of contradictory phenomena. On the one hand, cartel agree-
ments have been concluded between or among competing enterprises 
within a particular country, as well as within the Community. Ap-
parently these agreements are of a financial and technical nature and 
it is often suggested-although to prove it is impossible-that these 
firms are organizing to "rationalize" competition among them. 
Whether these arrangements conceal clauses enjoining excessive 
competition or providing for a division of markets is also impossible 
to state. 
On the other hand, preparations for an increased exchange of 
products among the Six are going forward. Business firms of the 
Six are setting up commercial networks of agents, distributors, and 
concessionaires in the Community, which, if not yet active, are mak-
ing preparations for future conquests of markets. The newspapers 
in each of the Community countries are filled with publicity concern-
ing products manufactured elsewhere in the Community. All of 
this is new because exporting firms were never sure in the past 
whether they were going to get import permits from neighboring 
countries or not. Now they have an almost absolute guarantee that 
the import policy of the other countries of the Six will become more 
and more liberal as time goes on. Consequently, they are prospect-
ing markets and organizing outlets to an extent which they would 
never have considered a short while ago. Finally, because of the 
preferential tariff system which will progressively take effect, Com-
munity agents, representatives, concessionaires, and old clients of 
non-Community exporters seem tempted to abandon established 
contacts in favor of new ones with Community exporters. This 
tendency is obviously not easy to check on, but it is recurrently al-
luded to. 
When the Treaty went into effect, a psychological shock to the 
public opinion of the Member States doubtless occurred. Public 
interest is indicated by the abundance of literature on the Com-
mon Market and also in the rapprochement of the Six, not only in 
industrial and commercial areas but also in areas where it would 
have been difficult, a priori, to imagine that there would be a need 
for professional organization. It is certainly normal for producers 
of chemical products, of industrial equipment, and the like, or for 
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wholesale and retail merchants of the Six to form professional or-
ganizations to deal with their problems. It is somewhat astonishing, 
however, that doctors, pharmacists, and lawyers of the Six are also 
forming professional groups. 
Facts of this kind are evidence of the existence and personality 
of the Community. There is, indeed, a decided tendency within the 
Community to assert the existence of this per'sonality by protection-
ist measures. Without going so far as to defend autarky as an ideal, 
the partisans of the Community, during its first months, defended 
relatively high tariffs, as well as the maintenance of quotas on non-
Community goods on the basis of a need to set the Community off 
from the rest of the world. The political objectives of the Com-
munity obviously serve to support such theories, which were ex-
pressed (especially in France) most forcefully at the time when 
negotiations were in progress to unite Community and European 
non-Community countries in a free trade area of the seventeen 
O.E.E.C. countries. One of the arguments against this area was 
that it would absorb the Community in larger entity and would 
ultimately obliterate its distinctive characteristics. 
It is all the more interesting to note that, in reaction against this 
theory, the Member States have in fact extended to third countries 
a very substantial part of the benefits of the tariff reductions which 
they made available to each other on January 1, 1959, and that all 
the members, and notably France, have made a great effort to apply 
liberalized quotas on a far broader geographical basis than that 
of the Community. According to the statements of its leaders, the 
Community also intends to commit itself resolutely to a liberal com-
mercial policy. 
These declarations of the intentions of the Community are ex-
plained by several important factors: 
I) The suspension of negotiations concerning the free trade 
area among the seventeen countries of the O.E.E.C. caused a crisis 
in Europe-the gravity of which is clear to all-and the Six wish 
to resolve it. A few of them, and particularly Germany and the 
Benelux countries, have very potent economic reasons for wanting 
to maintain and develop close cooperation with the other countries 
of the O.E.E.C. by lowering commercial barriers. 
2) The convertibility of European currencies established in De-
cember I 9 58, as well as the considerable increase of dollar reserves 
in the countries of the Community, did away with the justification 
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for a quota system on imports, whatever their origin, and the Six 
are bound by their other international obligations to make further 
efforts to liberalize trade. 
3) The increase of the competitive capacity of European busi-
ness and its success in the export trade, especially in U.S. markets, 
have eased the fears of European producers concerning foreign 
competition, and have led them to look forward more optimistically 
to a world-wide liberation of trade. 
4) The reversal of the balance of payments of the United States 
has weakened the conviction that Europe will eternally be a debtor 
of the dollar area, and has also reminded the countries of Europe 
of their obligations to the United States, which has contributed so 
much to their prosperity, notably by means of the Marshall Plan. 
This reversal should be considered in connection with the necessity, 
ever more evident, that Europe share with the United States the 
burden of aiding the under-developed countries by adopting, vis-a-vis 
these countries, liberal commercial policies. 
A progressively developing tendency towards commercial liberal-
ism is evident in Europe, then, and particularly among Community 
countries. At the same time specific demands for protection in vari-
ous areas have been voiced. Nevertheless the tendency to liberalism 
persists, and may well be intensified by rivalry between the Com-
munity and the free trade area of the Seven. Developments in these 
two groups will be extremely interesting to watch-particularly the 
measures which they adopt in regard to tariffs on July I, I 960. 
Finally, the tariff concessions which European countries are pre-
pared to consider within the framework of negotiations on the 
Dillon proposal will be a very important element for the future of 
European neo-liberalism. 
C. THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMON MARKET 
The effects of the Common Market on the United States have 
already been the subject of a great deal of discussion. Commercial 
consequences as well as the consequences for the U.S. balance of 
payments have been considered. The general opinion seems to be 
that the United States accepted the Common Market for political 
reasons, and that its effects will be harmful in the short run for 
American exports to Europe and elsewhere. In the long run, how-
ever, it will slowly become advantageous as consumption in Europe 
increases. To avoid the possible harmful effects of the Common 
Market and to profit from the expected burgeoning of economic 
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power and prosperity of the Six, many American firms are develop-
ing investments in the Common Market. 
These views of the probable effect on the United States are per-
haps realistic, but, for the reasons already indicated, a prediction 
that they will prove to be well-founded is difficult to make. It is even 
more difficult to indicate whether in any particular sector of the 
economy, or in regard to any type of product, American exporters 
and producers will show a profit or loss, whether long, short, or 
medium term. Such a prediction would necessitate a structural study 
of each sector as well as knowledge of the future fiscal, tariff, and 
investment policies of the Member States. 
If it is assumed that conditions will remain static, one can in 
fact guess that some trade which presently flows in long-existing 
commercial channels will be deflected, since consumers of one Com-
munity country will find it advantageous to buy in other Commu-
nity countries, given the fact that imports therefrom will eventually 
be duty free, whereas imports from third countries will be subject 
to the common external tariff. Moreover, one may suppose that the 
competitive capacity of Community enterprises will increase, that 
marginal enterprises will disappear, and that the concentration of 
enterprises and mass-production possibilities for a wide market will 
make Community firms increasingly dangerous competitors for 
American producers. Indeed, this is the declared aim of the Com-
munity. Finally, however, it might also be predicted that, as the 
European standard of living approaches that of the United States, 
an increased demand will cause a new surge forward of interna-
tional commerce, from which American business may also benefit. 
What is more important, however, is to know whether and how 
the United States can influence the commercial policy of the Com-
munity, working in cooperation with it and with the other European 
countries, in order to permit the Community to evolve without set-
backs and to create a favorable climate in the Western world for 
the development and maintenance of prosperity within a liberal 
trade structure. Action of the United States will be decisive in two 
spheres: in selecting policies to control the ebb and flow of economic 
trends; and in freeing the movement of goods. 
In this respect the Dillon Proposal for international tariff nego-
tiations was a first step in the right direction. The maintenance of 
a liberal import policy by the United States is a vital political and 
psychological element in stimulating the development of liberal ten-
dencies within the Community and in the other European countries. 
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However, it will be necessary to go further and adopt plans to in-
crease financial and monetary cooperation among the countries of 
the free world, in order to avoid economic crises which would cause 
an immediate return to protectionism. The forms of such coopera-
tion are subject to discussion, but the need of it is beyond dispute. 
Increased competition between the enterprises of the Community 
and those of the United States will, then, clearly call for serious ef-
forts by Americans if they intend to maintain and develop markets. 
However, these are the "rules of the game" of private enter-
prise to which the United States is firmly committed. It depends very 
much on the United States whether the creation of the Community 
-which aroused serious misgivings among non-Community nations 
because they sensed, and with some reason, protectionist sentiment 
within it-will mark a trend towards the lasting creation of a lib-
eral system of world trade and payments. 
APPENDIX 
THE EuRoPEAN FREE TRADE AssociATION (E.F.T.A.) * 
(THE LITTLE AREA OF THE "SEVEN") 
As suggested earlier in this chapter, the possible association of 
the six members of the Common Market and the eleven other mem-
bers of the O.E.E.C. in a free trade area was under discussion within 
the O.E.E.C. as early as July of 1956. Negotiations towards that 
end were suspended in December 1 9 58. 
In the spring of 1959 seven of the eleven members of the 
O.E.E.C. who are not members of the European Economic Com-
munity (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and Great Britain) began study of the possibility of forming 
a free trade area among themselves. During a meeting of Ministers 
convened in Stockholm on July 20 and 21, 1959, the seven govern-
ments decided that the objective of their free trade area negotia-
tions should be a treaty which could be signed and ratified by their 
respective parliaments in time to permit the area to begin function-
ing on January I, I96o. On November 20, I959, the Convention 
establishing a European Free Trade Association was initialled by 
the Ministers in Stockholm and it came into force in spring I 960 
upon completion of the ratification process. 
*The text of the Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association 
appears at the end of Volume II of this book. 
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Now that this project has been realized, the countries of the 
O.E.E.C. are divided into three groups: 
1) those of the Common Market: Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy; 
2) those of the "little free trade area" (the E.F.T.A.); and 
3) the still-developing countries-Greece, Ireland, Iceland, and 
Turkey to which Spain was added at the end of July, 1959, when it 
became a member of the O.E.E.C. 
In creating the Association, the Seven declared that their aim 
was to facilitate future negotiations with the European Economic 
Community as well as with other members of the O.E.E.C. (that is, 
with the still-developing countries) which have particular problems. 
The object of these negotiations would be the elimination of customs 
barriers among all members of the O.E.E.C., and the establishment 
of a multilateral association including all of them, which would make 
it possible for O.E.E.C. members to increase their economic co-
operation and at the same time to further the expansion of world 
commerce. 
The free trade area created corresponds to the general principles 
of the G.A.T.T. definition of such an area. It contemplates the 
elimination of the obstacles to trade among its members, who, never-
theless, retain their freedom in regard to questions of commercial 
and customs policies towards third countries. In order to obviate 
deflections of trade-which might result from disparities in the 
commercial and tariff policies of the various participants towards 
the rest of the world-a definition of origin has been introduced. 
By virtue of this definition only those products, on passing from one 
country of the Area into another, which are considered to have 
originated in the former country will benefit from customs reduc-
tions or immunity. 
To facilitate the negotiations which may bring together the 
E.F.T.A. and the Common Market, the seven countries have agreed 
to rules eliminating obstacles to trade among themselves which are 
as nearly similar as possible to the corresponding rules of the Com-
mon Market. Given the fact that no attempt is made to create in-
stitutions of the kind involved in the European Economic Commu-
nity, the Seven wanted the application of these rules to be as nearly 
automatic as possible. They therefore made no provision for succes-
sive stages in the transitional period during which customs tariffs 
are to be progressively abolished, thereby rendering unnecessary de-
cisions of the Council of Ministers of the E.F.T.A. concerning the 
termination of each stage. 
I 7 4 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
The following paragraphs will outline the rules of the E. F. T.A. 
concernmg: 
I) the abolition of tariffs, 
2) the abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports, 
3) the definition of origin, and 
4) the safeguard clauses. 
The rules relate only to industrial products. Special arrangements 
govern agricultural products and fisheries. 
A. ABOLITION OF TARIFFS 
A "basic duty" is fixed. It is the duty which was in force on Janu-
ary I, I 960. In contrast, therefore, to what was done in the E. E. C., 
the date determining this duty was not made retroactive. Thus a 
delay was provided for between the elaboration of the E.F.T.A. 
Convention and January I, I96o, in the course of which the members 
could, as far as their other international obligations permitted, raise 
their customs duties or re-instate those which had been temporarily 
suspended wholly or in part. The Seven considered the question, 
however, whether the basic duty is to be the legal duty or the duty 
actually applied (that is, one taking into account still existing tem-
porary suspensions). They have adopted a solution which consists in 
principle in retaining the duty in fact applied, conceding, however, 
that for certain products individual countries might have legitimate 
motives for departing from the general rule. A procedure before the 
Council of the Association is to ensure collective examination of such 
derogations. 
The Seven contemplate a progressive abolition of customs as 
among themselves, which will take place in the following manner: 
I) a 20 percent reduction will be effected on July I, I960. In this 
connection it may be noted that the Six reduced tariffs among them-
selves by ro percent on January I, 1959, and that the second over-all 
reduction of I o percent (with a minimum of 5 percent on any single 
customs duty) is to be effected on July I, I96o. In lowering their 
tariffs by 20 percent on July 1, 1960, the Seven hope to catch up with 
the Six and to fix the tariff reductions which they will at the same time 
effect among themselves, at the same level as those of the Six ( al-
though the plan of the Seven does not manifest the same flexibility as 
that of the Six) .1 
2) Later reductions will follow successively-Io percent reduc-
1 For the decision by the E.E.C. Council of Ministers to accelerate tariff reduction 
see Chapter I supra. 
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tions on January 1, 1962, July I, 1963, January I, I965, January I, 
I966, January I, I967, January 1, I968, January I, I969, and Jan-
uary I, I 970. 
This schedule and method mean that the rate of tariff elimination 
is automatic, allowing no possibility of extension of the transitional 
period or any part thereof. It means, that the transitional period is 
much shorter for the Seven than for the Six. It means, finally, that 
the process is also both automatic and rigid: all customs duties must 
be reduced at the given dates by the same amount of 10 percent. The 
Seven have not provided a flexible system of the sort established by 
the Six. The advantage of the method of the Seven is that it is 
simpler, avoiding the complex calculations of total customs revenue, 
and from the outset both governments and businessmen know what 
to expect. It also avoids the risk of pressure being brought to bear 
on the governments by special interests. The disadvantage is that 
recourse to the safeguard clauses in case of particular difficulties of 
individual industries may be more frequent. 
As does the E.E.C. Treaty, the E.F.T.A. Convention provides 
that each member declares its willingness to lower its customs duties 
as against the other members more rapidly than required by the 
rules, if its economic and financial situation and that of the sector 
concerned so permit. It also provides that the Council may at any 
time decide that any import duties shall be reduced more rapidly or 
eliminated earlier and that between July 1, 1960, and December 3I, 
I 96 I, the Council will examine whether it is possible so to decide in 
respect of duties applied on some or all goods by some or all of the 
members. 
The Seven have also provided for the progressive abolition of 
drawbacks, that is, of rebates of duties levied by one member coun-
try on goods imported from outside the Area which are subse-
quently re-exported to another member of the Area after transfor-
mation or manufacture. This abolition should be completed by the 
end of the transitional period. 
B. ABOLITION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS 
The Seven have, like the Six, provided for a standstill in regard to 
import quotas. The members may not take steps which would mark 
a retreat from the level of liberalization reached as of January 1, 
I 960. Secondly, they contemplate, as do the Six, the complete aboli~ 
tion of all quantitative restrictions on imports within the Area at 
the latest by the end of the transitional period. To this end they 
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have agreed to suppress gradually during this period all quotas 
as between themselves. They hope thereby to avoid neutralizing the 
advantages obtained by the successive reductions of tariffs on im-
ports and to avoid having to deal with difficult problems at the end 
of the transitional period concerning quotas which might still be in 
effect. 
To attain these objectives, the Convention contains the following 
rules: 
1) Any quota opened by one of the Seven to another member of 
the Association must be increased by at least 20 percent per annum; 
2) Quotas opened not only in favor of other members but also 
in favor of third countries must be increased each year by an amount 
equal to at least 20 percent of the trade actually carried on, within 
the framework of these quotas, with the other members of the As-
sociation; 
3) If, for a particular category of goods, a member has provided 
no quota, or a quota so small that an annual increase of 20 percent 
would not suffice to achieve complete elimination of the quota by the 
end of the transitional period, then that member must establish ade-
quate quotas by July I, 1960. This rule corresponds to the so-called 
"3 percent rule" for small or non-existent quotas of the E.E.C. 
Treaty. 
4) The increasing of quotas will begin on July I, 1960, and it 
will be applied to the quotas in force on December 3 I, I 9 59· 
In addition, the Seven foresaw two particular quota problems. 
They recognized that in exceptional cases serious difficulties result-
ing from the obligation to increase quotas are conceivable within 
the Area. They are concerned particularly with the case of develop-
ing industries, for which a substantial degree of continuing protec-
tion may be justified, and with cases where a country applies a very 
low tariff or none at all, depending solely on quotas as a means of 
protection. In these cases, the Seven foresaw special arrangements 
to be authorized by the Council which would permit the complete 
abolition of quotas by the end of the transitional period and which 
would not hinder the progressive lowering of tariffs from generating 
a reasonable rate of trade expansion and which would not create 
difficult problems towards the end of the transitional period. 
The second problem is that of the application of other interna-
tional obligations, in particular those of the G.A.T.T. and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (I.M.F.). The Seven have paid more 
attention to these obligations than have the Six. Of course, their 
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Convention was negotiated at a time when the problem of a world-
wide elimination of quotas was being seriously discussed in quite 
concrete terms whereas when the E.E.C. Treaty was negotiated, the 
prospects for a world-wide liberalization of trade (made possible in 
December I 9 58 when the European currencies became convertible) 
were still remote. 
The Seven declare that they have international obligations concern-
ing the use of quantitative restrictions and that, in establishing the 
free trade area, they have no intention of modifying those obliga-
tions. In particular, they do not propose to use quantitative restric-
tions in any way to create a preferential regime among themselves. 
This apparently is the reason for the provision in the Convention 
according to which quotas opened both to countries of the Area and 
to third countries will be increased by 20 percent; in fact, although 
the 20 percent increase is calculated only by reference to that part 
of the quota used by the other countries of the Area, the quota as 
calculated will apparently be open to goods from third countries as 
well as from other members. Moreover, the Seven envisage that 
during the next ten years the majority of the members of the 
G.A.T.T. may proceed, in accordance with their international obli-
gations, to abolish quantitative restrictions on a large part of their 
imports. Accordingly the Council will, by December 3 I, I 9 6 I, and 
periodically thereafter, examine whether the rules concerning the 
progressive elimination of quotas continue to be appropriate, and 
whether, taking account of events occurring after the effective date 
of the Convention, these rules will effectively lead to the abolition 
of all quantitative restrictions by the end of the transitional period. 
· The problem of the relationship of the rules adopted by the Seven 
concerning the abolition of quotas with the rules of the G.A.T.T. is 
also raised by the safeguard clause concerning balance-of-payments 
difficulties. 
C. DEFINITION OF ORIGIN 
The most difficult technical problem in a free trade area is the 
definition of the origin of goods. The only goods which are free of 
customs duties on passing from one country in the area to another 
are goods which originate within the area. Goods coming from one 
member which did not originate within the area continue to be sub-
ject to customs duties on entering the territory of another member, 
just as if they came from a third country. It must therefore be possi-
ble to distinguish products which originate within the area from 
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those which do not, otherwise so-called deflections of trade would 
result. In distinguishing goods which originate within the area from 
those that do not, there are, in the first place, two simple cases: 
1) goods coming from outside passing from one to another coun-
try in the area unchanged. There is no doubt here: these goods do 
not originate within the area; 
2) goods completely manufactured within the area from raw 
materials produced within the area. There is equally no doubt here: 
they originate within the area. 
The more difficult, and more frequent, case is where the goods 
are manufactured within the area from raw materials or parts which 
originate outside the area, or which contain certain elements which 
originate outside the area. In these cases the problem of the defini-
tion of origin is particularly acute. The principle adopted by the 
Seven is that a product of this sort is to be considered as originating 
within the Area when the value added within the Area to the raw 
materials or parts imported from outside is at least equal to a given 
percentage of the total value of the product concerned. This is the 
"added-value criterion." 
The fixing of a minimum percentage of added value constitutes 
in a sense an acceptance of the idea that the effect on the value of 
the finished product of the differences between the duties levied on 
its constituent raw materials-because they entered the area through 
a member country with a high tariff rather than a low one or vice 
versa-gradually decreases as the amount of transformation within 
the area increases. If the minimum added value required to qualify 
a product as of area origin were too low, some diversion of com-
mercial activity could result. In fact, it would be profitable to estab-
lish transformation industries in those countries which apply the 
lowest tariffs on raw materials and assembly parts. If this happened, 
such industries would be competing with their counterparts in coun-
tries which apply higher tariffs on raw materials and parts under 
artificially created economic conditions. 
Because this is true, the minimum added value required to combat 
disparities between the tariffs of the members on raw materials and 
parts coming from outside should be calculated in each case on the 
basis of the amount of tariff disparity and the degree of work done 
within the area. The higher the tariff disparity, the greater amount 
of work would have to be done within the area in order that a fin-
ished product could be considered as originating within it. Con-
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versely, the smaller the disparity, the smaller the amount of work 
which should be required. 
With a view to simplification, the Seven adopted as a general rule 
the criterion whereby a product is considered as originating within 
the Area when so percent of its final value (on the basis of the 
f.o.b., or the free-at-frontier, price) results from transformation 
operations carried out within the Area. 
The smaller the disparity between the national tariffs of the mem-
bers on a particular raw material, the smaller should be the amount 
of work required to qualify the product as of area origin. If tariffs 
of the various countries on a given raw material are the same, a cus-
toms union rather than a free trade area exists and a very slight 
transformation, adding only a very low percentage to the product's 
value, would be enough to qualify the product as of area origin. The 
same result may be reached if it is agreed that, whether their true 
origin be internal or external, raw materials to which the members of 
the area apply an identical or a very similar external tariff are to be 
considered as originating within the area when they are incorporated 
in a product manufactured within the area. For this reason the Seven 
also established a list of basic materials which, whatever their true 
origin, would be considered as originating within the area for pur-
poses of determining whether finished goods, of which such basic 
materials are constituent parts, qualify for customs exemptions in 
passing from one E.F.T.A. country to another. In addition, certain 
transformation processes effected within the Area are considered to 
add sufficiently to the value of the material imported so that the re-
sulting product may automatically qualify as of Area origin. For 
example, the spinning and weaving of wool imported from outside 
the Area will confer Ar-ea origin, since spinning and weaving pro-
duce cloth with a value which is more than double the price of the 
imported wool which it comprises. 
The Seven consider that these rules concerning added value should 
be as liberal as possible. With this in mind, they decided to review 
periodically these rules in a liberal spirit, and that in any case a 
member of the Area may on its own initiative apply more liberal 
rules than those agreed to in regard to imports from the other coun-
tries of the Area. 
Clearly, the more liberal the rules, the greater the number of 
products which may circulate freely within the Area. For European 
countries which are comparatively poor in raw materials, the liberal-
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ity of the rules and the establishment of as broad a list of basic ma-
terials as possible are particularly important. 
Once rules of origin have been established, the problem of super-
vising their application arises. Such supervision requires a certain 
number of formalities-for example, showing customs officials 
documents of origin-but to avoid hindering commerce within the 
area these formalities must be kept at a minimum. The Seven have 
decided that it is up to the exporter to prove that the product origi-
nates within the Area and he may do so by means of any of the above 
criteria. 
Despite all precautions, deflections of trade or commercial activ-
ity caused by disparities between the external tariffs of the countries 
of the Area are still possible. To control these the Seven have further 
provided: 
I) A "code of good conduct," by the terms of which members 
promise to abstain from any step which might have as a principal 
effect a deflection of trade. For example, they may not deliberately 
undertake a systematic lowering of their tariffs as against the rest of 
the world in order to put their industries in a more favorable com-
petitive position than those of the other members. 
2) An appeal procedure whereby a country suffering from seri-
ous deflections of trade because of tariff disparities may submit its 
case to the E.F.T.A. Council. The latter may make recommenda-
tions to the other members with a view to remedying the causes of 
such deflections. In such cases, the rules of origin could be modified 
and made less liberal, but other remedies could be adapted. 
D. SAFEGUARD CLAUSES 
As did the Six, the Seven have created "two categories of safe-
guard clauses, one relating to difficulties in balance of payments, and 
the other relating to difficulties arising in particular sectors of the 
economy. 
I. DIFFICULTIES IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Recourse to the E.E.C. safeguard clause is subject to a complex 
procedure designed to permit strict supervision of such action of a 
country in difficulty (in theory, except in urgent cases such recourse 
must first be authorized by Community institutions), to render such 
recourse as rare as possible and to stress the solidarity of the Six 
by making "mutual assistance" available. The corresponding clause 
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adopted by the Seven is infinitely more flexible. Indeed the Conven-
tion provides : 
r .... any Member State may, consistently with its 
other international obligations, introduce quantitative re-
strictions on imports for the purpose of safeguarding its 
balance of payments. [Emphasis added.] 
2. Any Member State taking measures in accordance 
with paragraph I of this Article shall notify them to the 
Council, if possible before they come into force. The 
Council shall examine the situation and keep it under re-
view and may at any time by majority vote, make recom-
mendations designed to moderate any damaging effect 
of these restrictions or to assist the Member State con-
cerned to overcome its difficulties. If the balance of pay-
ments difficulties persist for more than I 8 months and the 
measures applied seriously disturb the operation of the 
Association, the Council shall examine the situation and 
may, taking into account the interests of all Member 
States, by majority decision, devise special procedures to 
attenuate or compensate for the effect of such measures. 
J. A Member State which has taken measures in accord-
ance with paragraph I of this Article shall have regard to 
its obligation to resume the full application of Article IO 
[i.e., the Article requiring the elimination of quantitative 
import restrictions J and shall, as soon as its balance of 
payments situation improves, make proposals to the 
Council on the way in which this should be done. The 
Council, if it is not satisfied that these proposals are ade-
quate, may, by majority vote, recommend to the Member 
State alternative arrangements to the same end. 
Admittedly these provisions incorporate notions identical with 
those in the Rome Treaty; for example, aid of the members to a 
partner in difficulties. But they are presented in a less systematic and 
less obligatory form than in the E.E.C. Treaty. Moreover, and 
this is important, in the Association recourse to the safeguard clause 
is unilateral, the member in difficulties being obliged only to give 
prior warning to the others if possible. Finally, whereas in the Rome 
Treaty the Community institutions determine the measures that the 
country having difficulties may take to protect itself, methods of ap-
plication, and the like, in the Association each country has complete 
freedom of choice, subject only to its other international obligations. 
The reference to other international obligations is important. 
The other international organizations concerned are, of course, the 
I.M.F., the G.A.T.T. and the O.E.E.C. They maintain relatively 
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strict control over the measures taken by a country in balance-of-
payments difficulties, such measures consisting of the imposition of 
quantitative restrictions which are to be administered in a non-dis-
criminatory manner. Two of these organizations, the I.M.F. and 
the O.E.E.C., also practice what the Six in their Treaty call "mu-
tual assistance"; the I.M.F. may grant credits and the O.E.E.C. 
can also appropriate credits (through the intermediary of the Euro-
pean Fund of the European Monetary Agreement), as well as rec-
ommend to its members measures for facilitating the import by them 
of the exports of the country having difficulties. In addition, both 
the I.M.F. and the O.E.E.C. may recommend to the country in dif-
ficulties internal financial measures (cutting back public expendi-
tures, restriction of credit, modification of discount rates, and the 
like) which will enable it to regain equilibrium in its economy. They 
may condition the granting of credits on the institution of a plan 
to stabilize the country's economy. Finally, the O.E.E.C. may even 
go so far as to fix the time limits within which the country, which has 
had to re-establish quantitative restrictions on its imports because of 
its balance-of-payments difficulties, is again to liberate imports. 
In view of this existing framework the Seven thought it useless to 
make special arrangements for the Association. In so deciding they 
had certain things in mind. 
1) They wanted to manifest their desires to respect their other 
international obligations, and in no way to use quantitative restric-
tions to create a preferential regime amongst themselves. 
2) The Seven wanted further to show their desire to continue to 
cooperate with the Six, within the framework ~f the other inter-
national organizations, and in particular of that of the O.E.E.C. 
In fact, it is this organization which has worked out the most de-
tailed rules concerning safeguard clauses for balance-of-payments 
difficulties. Since I 948 these rules have functioned well, thanks to 
constantly strengthened examination and control procedures, to pro-
cedures permitting systematic review of the interrelationship of the 
economic and financial policies of its members which in turn permit 
preventive examination of possible balance-of-payments difficulties, 
and appropriate measures of cooperation to be recommended; and 
thanks finally to the existence, first of all, of the European Payments 
Union and later of the European Fund, which on several occasions 
permitted the appropriation of substantial credits to countries in 
difficulties. Since the Association of the Seven has as its aim the es-
tablishment of a broad association uniting, within the O.E.E.C., 
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the Seven, the Six, and the underdeveloped countries of the 
O.E.E.C., the Seven thought it natural to base themselves, as con-
cerns balance-of-payments difficulties, on the system of cooperation 
already tested in the O.E.E.C.; 
3) Finally the Seven wanted to avoid the need for new interna-
tional arrangements, since, in their opinion, those of the O.E.E.C. 
will normally suffice to cover both their own needs and those of the 
larger association of the eighteen countries of the O.E.E.C. which 
they hope to see formed. 
Although their answer to the problem of restrictions imposed to 
counter balance-of-payments difficulties relies essentially on the 
other international institutions, the Seven were nonetheless forced 
to consider the possibility that protective measures of one of them 
might be maintained, despite the rules of the other institutions, over 
a long period of time. Such measures, if long maintained, could seri-
ously disturb the functioning of the Association, and the Seven there-
fore concluded that E.F.T.A. institutions should supervise their ap-
plication. They concede that it may become necessary, in the light of 
experience, to work out special procedures to attenuate or counteract 
the effect of these protective measures, although it is clearly impos-
sible to foresee at present what such procedures might be. None-
theless the gradual development of the Association of the Seven 
will obviously bring about an ever closer solidarity and interde-
pendence among the members and their economies. 
2. DIFFICULTIES ARISING IN A PARTICULAR SECTOR 
Although the clause concerning balance-of-payments difficulties 
in the E.F.T.A. is more flexible than the comparable clause in the 
E.E.C. Treaty, the E.F.T.A. Convention clause concerning diffi-
culties of a particular economic sector is both more complete and 
more rigid than its E.E.C. counterpart. This is largely because the 
Six decided to leave to the institutions of the Community-and in 
particular to the Commission-a very large measure of discretion in 
this field; since the E. F. T.A. will be institutionally much less cen-
tralized and less supranational, the Seven, on the other hand, wanted 
to establish precise rules at the outset in order to avoid giving their 
institutions too much discretionary power. They found, however, 
that there are limitations on the precision with which such rules can 
be defined. 
In the first place a definition of this kind of difficulty was neces-
sary. The Six refer simply to "serious difficulties which are likely to 
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persist in any sector of economic activity or difficulties which may 
seriously impair the economic situation in any region." The Seven 
were more precise, the relevant clause providing: 
1. If, in the territory of a Member State, 
(a) an appreciable rise in unemployment in a particu· 
lar sector of industry or region is caused by a sub-
stantial decrease in internal demand for a domes-
tic product, and 
(b) this decrease in demand is due to an increase in 
imports from the territory of other Member 
States as a result of the progressive elimination 
of duties, charges and quantitative restric-
tions ... , 
that Member State may, notwithstanding any other pro-
visions of this Convention, 
( i) limit those imports by means of quantitative 
restrictions to a rate not less than the rate of 
such imports during any period of twelve 
months which ended within twelve months of 
the date on which the restrictions come into 
force; the restrictions shall not be continued 
for a period longer than eighteen months, un-
less the Council, by majority decision, auth-
orises their continuance for such further period 
and on such conditions as the Council considers 
appropriate; and 
(ii) take such measures, either instead of or in ad-
dition to restriction of imports in accordance 
with sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph, as 
~he Council may, by majority decision, author-
Ise. 
2. In applying measures in accordance with paragraph 
I of this Article, a Member State shall give like treat-
ment to imports from the territory of all Member States. 
If the country concerned is to take protective measures, the harm 
caused must take the form of substantial unemployment, and a 
spectacular fall in domestic demand, resulting from an increase in 
imports from the other member countries, must be the proven cause 
of such employment. 
The Seven, it should be noted, defined the kind of protective meas-
ures that a member country may apply, and the duration of their 
application. The Six, on the other hand, gave the Commission full 
discretion. 
It is interesting to observe here that recourse to the clause, in the 
Association of the Seven, is unilateral, whereas in the Community 
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it is subject to prior authorization by the institutions. Nevertheless, 
to limit possible abuses, the Seven were forced to limit the duration 
of protective measures. They also provided that, beyond the I 8-
month period, protective measures may be continued only with the 
approval of the Council. This point is important, for it implies the 
possibility of active intervention by the institutions of the Associa-
tion. In effect, the other countries of the group, or a majority of 
them, must consent to continued protection by the country concerned 
of the sector or the region in difficulties. Thus even the Seven, who 
are hostile in principle to supranationality and excessive institutional 
intervention, were forced to envisage fairly strict institutional con-
trol in this area. 
In the same vein, the Seven provided that: 
3· A Member State applying restrictions ... shall no-
tify them to the Council, if possible before they come into 
force. The Council may at any time consider those restric-
tions and may, by majority vote, make recommendations 
designed to moderate any damaging effect of those restric-
tions or to assist the Member State concerned to overcome 
its difficulties. 
4· If at any time after Ist July, I96o, a Member State 
considers that the application of sub-paragraph (a) of 
paragraph 2 of Article 3 [i.e., the prescribed reduction 
in tariffs] and paragraph 3 of Article 6 [i.e., the pre-
scribed elimination of protective elements in internal 
charges and revenue duties] to any product would lead to 
the situation described in paragraph I of this Article, it 
may propose to the Council an alternative rate of reduc-
tion of the import duty or protective element concerned. 
If the Council finds that the proposal is justified, it may, 
by majority decision, authorise that Member State to ap-
ply an alternative rate of reduction, provided that the ob-
ligations relating to the final elimination of the import 
duty or protective element . . . are fulfilled. 
At the same time that they make unilateral action by the country 
concerned possible, these measures indicate the Seven's intention 
that the institutions should, wherever possible, intervene before such 
action is taken, and the further intention that the countries of the 
Association should grant aid to one another to overcome difficulties. 
But the institutions of the Association will also be able to authorize 
measures other than quotas to protect a sector or a region in diffi-
culties, or to permit it to adapt itself to external competition-for 
example, by subsidizing production. 
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In the Seven as in the Six, the safeguard clause concerning bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties is valid after the end of the transitional 
period as well as during that period. Moreover, and again like the 
:Six, the Seven provided that the safeguard clause concerning par-
ticular difficulties would only be applicable during the transitional 
period. The Seven did, however, provide that before the end of this 
period the Council will consider whether similar arrangements may 
be thereafter necessary. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
As things stand it is difficult to guess at the consequences of the 
creation of the E.F.T.A. The rules determining origin will not be 
finally defined for some time to come, and it is quite probable that 
they will be in a constant state of evolution during the transitional 
period and even, no doubt, thereafter. That definition is, of course, 
fundamental, for it will determine the real substance of the Area, 
that is to say, the volume of products, in relation to total trade be-
tween the member countries, which is to benefit from customs exemp-
tions when passing from one country in the Area to another. 
In the view of its promoters the E.F.T.A. is not, moreover, an 
end in itself. It is essentially a means of "thawing" the situation 
created by the suspension of negotiations for the establishment of a 
large area including the European Economic Community and the 
other countries of the O.E.E.C. No one can guess whether the de-
sire of the Seven to resume talks with the Six will be realized or not. 
But the future of the E.F.T.A. obviously depends on whether or 
not the eighteen countries establish this larger association. 
This being said, the most interesting question is obviously whether 
a free trade area is, as such, a viable concept. In the course of the 
negotiations in the O.E.E.C. for the establishment of a larger area, 
the viability of such an enterprise was fiercely attacked, particularly 
by France. Later, the then Finance Minister of France, M. Pinay, 
declared that in his opinion the free trade area was an artificial con-
·cept, illogical and completely incapable of working. It will be in-
teresting to see whether the Seven can show that it is technically 
·possible to make a free trade area work. Verification of origin, and 
the formalities this necessitates, will make commerce among the 
members of the Association even more difficult than at present, de-
spite the removal of quotas and customs duties. Clearly the major 
preoccupation of the Seven must now be to reduce these formalities 
as much as possible. 
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The experience of the Seven in regard to deflections of activities 
will be equally interesting. In its present form the E.F.T.A. groups 
together the United Kingdom, a world commercial power which pro-
duces about everything that modern techniques make possible and 
which applies, in general, quite high tariffs, and six small countries, 
mostly with low tariffs, each of which has attained an extremely high 
degree of productivity. On the one hand, there is a risk that the 
United Kingdom will have a quasi-monopolistic position within the 
Area for certain products since she will enjoy customs immunity in 
the other six, whereas her great world competitors (the United 
States, Germany) will continue to pay customs duties however low. 
On the other hand, the United Kingdom will suffer both from her 
high customs duties towards the rest of the world and, in certain 
sectors, from the extremely active competition of her partners in the 
Area; and she will no longer be able to protect herself by customs 
duties on products in relation to which the competitive strength of her 
partners is greatest-for example, on aluminum, special steels, clocks 
and paper. Will deflections of activity within the area occur to the 
detriment of the United Kingdom? Or will the latter gradually 
achieve pre-eminence over her partners, thereby creating an ever 
more monopolistic situation? It is impossible to foresee what will 
happen without making detailed studies, sector by sector; and such 
studies will be made more difficult by the uncertainty, which will 
persist for a long time, concerning the development of the commer-
cial policy of the countries of the Area towards the rest of the world. 
Whereas it was possible to give extensive consideration to the ex-
ternal commercial policy of the European Economic Community, 
the problem of the external commercial policy of the E.F.T.A. must 
be passed over in silence, since, by definition, it has none, each coun-
try reserving the liberty to determine as it sees fit its commercial, 
tariff and quota policy, subject to its other international obligations. 
The E.F.T.A. undoubtedly involves preferences among its mem-
bers as to tariffs, but these are acceptable to the G.A.T.T. Third 
countries are nonetheless protected to a certain extent against the 
consequences of the creation of the Association: 
I) by the fact that no member of the Association if it wants to 
achieve increased protection vis-a-vis the rest of the world, can do 
so except within the framework of its international obligations 
(G.A.T.T., O.E.E.C.); 
2) by the declared intention of the Seven not to use quotas as a 
means of establishing a preferential regime among themselves. The 
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manner in which they have handled the problem of the safeguard 
clause in the case of balance-of-payments difficulties is interesting 
and reassuring; 
3) by the underlying possibility of competition in the progressive 
lowering of customs tariffs that the Seven may well provoke among 
themselves to avoid deflections of trade or industrial activity. The 
fact that a country like the United Kingdom is going to find itself, 
without any tariff protection, in competition with the very special-
ized industries of low-tariff countries like Sweden, Norway or Swit-
zerland, will naturally compel it to increase its competitive strength 
so that it may lower its own tariff vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
Above all, like the European Economic Community, the E.F.T.A. 
aims at stimulating competition among its members, eliminating 
marginal activities, increasing productivity and production, raising 
the standard of living of its population and increasing consumption. 
The more the competitive power of its members increases, the less 
they will have to use administrative measures to protect their in-
dustries. They will also no doubt be motivated to reduce tariffs 
slowly as the E.E.C. is to do. In this sense, without being accused 
of undue optimism, one might say that the movement set off in Eu-
rope within the framework of the E.E.C. and within that of the 
E.F.T.A. may stimulate a new movement along the road towards 
freedom of world trade. During the transitional periods, third 
countries may well believe that their interests are being harmed. 
It is almost certain, however, that, given a state of reasonable 
financial stability in which cooperation between the great powers 
is an essential factor, a new era of increased prosperity will open 
to the countries of the Western world. Their responsibilities 
towards the underdeveloped countries will increase correspondingly. 
These general observations may now appear somewhat arbitrary. 
And it will only be possible to verify their validity by experience. In 
this respect, the measures which the Six, and the Seven adopt in re-
gard to tariff matters and the manner in which these measures are 
applied towards third countries are and will be instructive, as will 
be the extent of cooperation in the G.A.T.T. negotiations concern-
ing the Dillon proposal. 
Chapter IV 
Exchange Control Regulations In France* 
Fernand Charles leantet t 
Although it is more than twenty years since the beginning of 
W 9rld War II many countries of the world still exercise some con-
trol over the international payments of private citizens and over 
international private investments. This is true of nearly all the 
European countries west of East Germany, including Great Britain, 
France, and West Germany, of most of the Middle Eastern coun-
tries and of many countries in the Western Hemisphere. Even such 
traditionally liberal countries as Switzerland have, although less 
conspicuously, exercised control over their international payments 
to and from countries with exchange controls by means of bilateral 
payments agreements. 
Exchange control regulations have become a part of a general 
regulatory system aimed at close supervision of national economies 
-which in practice means control of its industrial and commercial 
activity, a certain amount of control of its agricultural production, 
plus credit, price, and employment controls. A new field of law, 
known on the Continent as economic law, has come into existence. 
For a long time only practitioners paid any attention to this law, and 
even they were concerned only with those laws, statutes, and regula-
* When this book was originally conceived, a survey of exchange controls in the 
Six against the background of the E.E.C. Treaty seemed an obvious need. By the time 
plans became concrete the need had become questionable-exchange controls had been 
dramatically relaxed almost everywhere. Nonetheless no one felt that a subject which 
had been of overriding importance to American investors in Western Europe and 
which is the focus of important provisions of the Treaty could be ignored. The com-
promise finally adopted defines the scope of Professor J eantet's chapter as a description 
of exchange controls in one of the Six providing an example of what the problem 
of exchange controls has been in a Community country, an indication of how that 
problem has been affected by the Treaty, and a suggestion of what it may be should 
future balance-of-payments difficulties occur under the Treaty. Some of the most recent 
developments which took place after the completion of this chapter are mentioned in 
the footnotes.-THE EDITORS, 
t A vocat a Ia Cour d' Appel; Charge de Cours de Droit Economique a l'lnstitut des 
Sciences Juridiques et Financieres Appliquees aux Affaires de l'Universite de Paris. 
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tions which directly affected their fields of activity. It was believed 
that these laws would all disappear soon after the end of the war. 
But that expectation was frustrated; a certain amount of control 
is still a necessity and probably will be for a long time, either be-
cause political evolution is increasingly favorable to governmental 
intervention in the economic life of nations, or because active hos-
tilities have been succeeded by the "cold" war, or for both reasons. 
Steps have been taken, however, if not to abolish controls, at least 
to make them more flexible. The organization of the European 
Economic Community represents a very important step. 
This chapter deals with only one part of the whole body of eco-
nomic laws whose interdependence makes exchange control regula-
tions, when viewed separately, seem both complex and abstract. It 
will be limited to a description of the exchange control laws and 
regulations in France, and will be divided into the following sec-
tions: 
f A General Survey of Exchange Control Laws and Regula-
tions; 
II. International Payments; 
III. International Trade; 
IV. French Investments Abroad; 
V. Foreign Investments in France; 
VI. Sanctions ; 
VII. Probable Evolution Under the European Economic Commu-
nity Treaty. 
I. A GENERAL SURVEY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
War was responsible for the introduction in France of the first 
exchange control regulations. Such regulation had been in effect in 
Germany for many years prior thereto. The Law of July I I, 1 9 3 8, 
concerning the general organization of the country during wartime 
provides in Article 46 that, in case of a state of war, decrees issued 
by the President of the Republic may regulate or suspend the im-
port, export, transfer, use, or sale of certain resources, that is, all 
goods and services, including money.1 
1 Journal Officiel de Ia Republique Fram;aise (hereinafter cited as J.O.) July 13, 
1938. The Decree of July 3, 1915 prohibited the export of gold, the Law of Aug. x, 
1917 created controls on exchange operations and was completed by the Law of Jan. 
7, 1918. All of these were abrogated, however, by the Law of Mar. 30, 1929. Art. 46 
of the Law of July II, 1938 has been completed by Art. 5 of the Order of Jan. 7, 
1959, (Jan. IO, 1959] J.O. 
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Soon after the declaration of war, a decree dated September 9, 
1939,2 prohibited or regulated for the duration of the war the 
export of capital (currency or other assets), exchange transactions 
and transactions in gold. A decree dated the same day required 
French citizens to declare their assets abroad to the newly created 
Exchange Control Office. The first of these decrees 3 was ratified 
by the National Assembly and has the same force as a statute. It 
has remained in force in spite of the end of the state of war 
(May 10, 1946) ,4 and other texts have been added to it-namely, 
seven orders 5 and two statutes.6 Application of these basic texts 
is effected by thirty-one decrees of the Head of the Government, 
thirty-two ministerial decisions of the Finance Department, more 
than seven hundred regulations of the Exchange Control Office, 
nearly nine hundred instructions and five hundred notes of the same 
office. The rules which are presently in force represent about a 
thousand pages of printed matter. 
In itself this calls for explanation and comment. 
A. THE HIERARCHY OF TEXTS 
It should be understood that such statutes, orders and the Decrees 
of September 9, 1939, are "laws" in the technical sense of the word. 
The main consequence of that fact is that they are not subject to 
judicial review, and they alone provide for penalties (although the 
definition of the offense is given by administrative rules). 
Decrees, ministerial decisions and regulations are as binding 
as statutes, but only to the extent that regulations are in conformity 
with ministerial decisions, ministerial decisions with decrees and 
decrees with the statutes. They represent a hierarchy of rules 
and, unlike statutes, if they violate requirements of form, involve 
an abuse of power, or are contrary to law, a private claimant can 
2 (Sept. 10, 1939] J.O. 
3 Modified by several decrees or laws: Decree of Apr. 24, 1940, [May 2, 1940] J.O., 
Law of Apr. 15, 1942, (Apr. 16, 1942] J.O., Law of Feb. 2, 1948 arts. I, 3· [Feb. 3, 
1948] J.O. 
• Law No. 46-2154 of Oct. 7, 1946, art. 178 [Oct. 8, 1946] J.O.; see Cour de Cassa-
tion, (Ch. cr.), July 9, 1953, [1953] Dalloz 2 Jurisprudence (hereinafter cited as D.) 
553· 
0 An "order" ["ordonnance"] is, under French constitutional law, a law made by 
an individual to whom legislative power has been delegated, normally by Parliament. 
Such delegations were made to General de Gaulle as head of the French Govern-
ment. These were the Orders of Oct. 7, 1944, [Oct. 9, 1944] J.O.; Jan. 15, 1945, Jan. 16, 
1945 and Jan. 17, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] J.O.; May 30, 1945, [May 31, 1945] J.O.; 
Nov. 2, 1945, [Nov. 4, 1945] J.O.; and June 24, 1958, [June 25, 1958] J.O. 
• Of Dec. 26, 1945, [Dec. 27, 1945] J.O. and of Feb. z, 1948, [Feb. 3, 1948] J.O. 
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seek recourse in the competent court, the Conseil d'Etat.7 Illegality 
of a regulation could also be urged before the Criminal Court and 
Criminal Court of Appeals in case of criminal prosecution under 
such a regulation. 
Instructions and notes are comments of the competent govern-
mental department and are not binding, except on the department 
itself. Accordingly, no claim in court is normally possible. Be-
cause some of these instructions appear in fact to be as important 
as regulations themselves, there is a tendency, however, in the 
decisions of the Conseil d'Etat to admit appeals based on illegality 
or abuse of power against instructions.8 
Individual decisions of the competent department may also be 
attacked on the ground they are illegal or constitute an abuse of 
power.9 
B. THE GENERAL EFFECT OF THESE RuLEs 
The existence of this hierarchy of rules is suggestive of the tech-
nique of regulation. The law provides very broad definitions and 
applicable penalties and gives the government broad powers to 
prohibit or regulate certain operations. The government provides 
more precise (but still broad) definitions. Generally it forbids al-
most any operation which comes within the scope of its powers but 
delegates to the Ministry of Finance, who subdelegates to the Ex-
change Control Office, power to grant general (by regulations) or 
special (by individual decisions) exceptions. The result is the con-
verse of the normal rule-instead of "all which is not prohibited 
is permitted," the rule is virtually "all which is not expressly per-
mitted is forbidden." Such a formulation is inelegant and burden-
some for private persons but places the governmental agency on 
the safe side in cases of omission. 
This formulation also affords the agency concerned another ad-
vantage: it allows adaptation to special circumstances and to fre-
quent changes in the economic situation. It is, indeed, one of the 
prominent features of economic laws that they give broad powers to 
1 See Conseil d'Etat (hereinafter cited as C.E.) Feb. 28, 1951, [1952] D. 454; C.E. 
Mar. 28, 1952, [1952] D. 455; C.E. Apr. 17, 1953, [1953] Gazette du Palais {herein-
after cited as G.P.) II. 9· 
8 C.E. Mar. 28, 1952, [1952] Jurisclasseur Pratique {hereinafter cited as J.C.P.) 
II. 7132. 
• C.E. May 16, 1951, [1951] Recueil Lebon (hereinafter cited as Rec. Leb.) 268; 
C.E. Nov. 12, 1954, [1954] G.P. II. 414; C.E. Feb. 11, 1955, [1955] Rec. Leb. 82; C.E. 
Feb. 20, 1956, [1956] Rec. Leb. 513. 
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the competent agencies and that the agencies constantly modify the 
rules. Private citizens must, therefore, constantly re-check what is 
permitted and what forbidden, and uncertainty about the future 
necessarily results. 
A distinction must be made, however, between basic principles 
and current rules-the former being fairly stable and the latter 
changing frequently. Because a study of exchange control regula-
tions might otherwise promptly become obsolete, this chapter con-
tains statements of basic principles as distinguished from current 
rules.10 
The regulations now in force greatly increase the rights of pri-
vate investors granted by the legislative and administrative texts 
establishing the basic principles. The policy of the Fifth Republic 
is to follow sounder finance practices, strengthen national exchange 
rates, and promote private trade and investment. Two important 
sets of regulations have been promulgated to these ends: the first 
included Regulation 669 on foreign investments in France, issued 
at the beginning of 1959, and the second, published in the Journal 
Officiel of July 26, 1959, included four regulations which greatly 
facilitate monetary payments to and from the franc area. 
C. THE AUTHORIZATIONS DELIVERED BY 
THE EXCHANGE CONTROL OFFICE 
One consequence of the above-described system is the need for 
practitioners to have an accurate knowledge of the essential ex-
change regulations in order that they may know what kind of 
authorizations are necessary and how they may be obtained. These 
are of three kinds. The principal kind of authorization covers trans-
fers of funds to and from the franc area. Indeed, one could imagine 
exchange control regulations which would apply only to such trans-
fers, since the main purpose of such regulations is to maintain a 
satisfactory balance between the general debit and credit account 
of France in relation to the rest of the world. The transactions 
primarily affected are the conversion of francs into other currencies 
and vice versa, and the actual transfer of funds back and forth 
10 The more important principles are contained in the following texts: the Decree of 
Sept. 9, 1939, [Sept. 10, 1939] J.O.; the Order of Jan. 15, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] J.O. 
concerning foreign investments in France; the Order of May 30, 1945, [May 31, 1945] 
J.O. concerning penalties; the Law of Feb. 2, 1948, [Feb. 3, 1948] J.O.; the Order of 
June 6, 1958, [June 25, 1958] J.O. concerning French investments abroad; and, most 
important of all, Decree 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, [July 20, 1947] J.O., amended by 
decree 59-1440 of Dec. 21, 1959, which contains a statement of most of the basic rules 
along with the Ministerial Decision of the same date, [July 20, 1947] J.O. 
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between the franc area and other monetary areas of the world. 
Crediting and debiting foreign accounts is part of such transfer. 
But it is difficult to exercise effective control over transfers, which 
for the most part represent payments, if obligations between one 
area and another may be freely assumed. This is why international 
trade itself is controlled-that is, why the second kind of authori-
zation, licenses to import and export goods are required. 
In the third place foreign investments in the franc area are also 
controlled, not to implement old-fashioned notions of protectionism, 
but because foreign investments mean debts for the future which 
might one day upset the national balance of payments. 
During periods of emergency, special measures have been ap-
plied to French citizens residing in France. Thus foreign invest-
ments could be requisitioned in order to supply the state with the 
necessary foreign currency. No requisition orders are presently in 
force, but French citizens residing in France must still declare their 
assets abroad 11 and all residents must repatriate their income. 
D. THE VARIOUS AGENCIES 
Authorizations are issued by the Exchange Control Office, which 
is the principal competent agency, the Department of Finance, 
through its Section for Exterior Finance (Direction des Finances 
Exterieures) being another. The Exchange Control Office, which 
is a separate and autonomous agency of the state/2 is supervised by 
the Department of Finance but has been given authority to issue the 
necessary regulations and make individual decisions. Decisions are 
very often made upon the advice of the competent ministries 
(mainly the Department of Commerce and Industry and the De-
partment of the National Economy). Each of these departments 
has to appoint representatives to a special Investment Commit-
tee, which is consulted by the Minister of Finance when large 
investments are in question. 
Aspects of the mission of the Exchange Control Office are dele-
gated to several other administrative bodies. One of the most im-
portant is the customs administration which controls all physical 
transfers, be they imports or exports. Monetary transactions are 
11 Since this chapter was written, exceptions to this rule have been created. 
,. Created by a statute dated Oct. 18, 1940, [Nov. I, 1940] J.O. Since this chapter 
was written, however, the Exchange Control Office has been eliminated as an autono-
mous agency and legal entity by Decree 59-1438 of Dec. 21, 1959. Prior functions of 
that Office are now exercised by the Bank of France, under the supervision of the 
Department of Finance, or directly by the Department itself. Whenever the Exchange 
Control Office is referred to, it must be deemed to mean, therefore, either the Bank 
of France or the Department of Finance. 
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effected by the Office itself and for it and for the Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Fund by the Bank of France, which is wholly state controlled. 
Applications have to be filed with the Exchange Control Office by 
interested parties or by their duly appointed agents or attorneys. 
But only French or foreign banks which have been designated as 
"Authorized Intermediaries" (practically all the major ones) are 
permitted to carry out the actual transactionsY These Authorized 
Intermediaries receive a special delegation of authority from the 
Exchange Control Office to receive deposits of foreign currencies 
and negotiable instruments, to buy them, to open and keep the ac-
counts in francs of non-residents, to receive and make international 
payments for the accounts of clients, to buy foreign currencies on 
the currency market for clients' accounts, to handle export and im-
port licenses, and to keep, for the Exchange Control Office, ap-
propriate records of their transactions. They very often receive 
authorization from the Office to carry out transactions subject to 
their acceptance of a duty of supervision and responsibility therefor. 
As such, "Authorized Intermediaries" have mixed status, part pri-
vate part public, and consequently they assume special responsibili-
ties.14 
Since exchange control regulations apply to the whole franc area 
and not to France only,15 a definition of the franc area and of cer-
tain basic notions is at this point necessary. 
E. THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "FRANC AREA" 
Pursuant to the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the Ex-
ecutive Council of the French Community of States (La Com-
munaute) was created on December 19, 1958.16 The Executive 
Council on June 12, 1959, issued the following Decision: 
Exchange control regulations shall be common to all 
Member States of the Community. Treaties concerning 
payments shall include all such States. 
The Decision provides further: 
all public and private resources in foreign currencies shall 
be put at the disposal of the Community. They shall be 
assigned to each State by the department in charge of the 
13 Decree 59-1440 of Dec. zx, 1959. This decree replaces title VIII of the Decree of 
July 15, 1947, [July zo, 1947] J.O. 
"See Cour d'Appel, Toulouse, July x, 1957, [1957] J.C.P. II. xozo6. 
""Because local offices have been created. The "Caisse Centrale de Cooperation 
:Economique," formerly known as the "Caisse Centrale de Ia France d'Outre-Mer," is 
their central office. 
16 See Order 58-1254 of that date. 
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economy and finance of the Community, with a view to 
an appropriate satisfaction of the needs of each. Such de-
partment issues the appropriate regulations. Import and 
export programs shall be determined by each State which 
shall also issue the appropriate authorizations. 
The Executive Council of the French Community decided on the 
same date that the franc was the common monetary unit of all 
members of the Community, it being understood that each may have 
a separate currency with a parity base in relation to the French 
franc. This parity may only be modified by a decision of the Presi-
dent of the Executive Council. Currencies of the members of the 
French Community are freely convertible among themselves, and 
funds are freely transferable. 
The franc area thus includes the territory of the French Re-
public-that is Metropolitan France-the Overseas Departments 
such as Guiana and the Departments of Algeria, and all Member 
States of the French Community. But it also covers a larger area, 
which includes countries which either use the franc as a monetary unit 
or currencies of their own (Morocco, Tunisia,17 Guinea, Cambodia, 
Laos, and Viet N am). The parity base is not the same for all 
"francs." For example, the C.F.A. francs which are used by African 
Member States of the Community are worth two Metropolitan 
Francs. 
A complete study of the problems raised by the definition of the 
franc area (contained in a regulation 18 ) would go far beyond the 
scope of this work. All rules mentioned in this chapter normally 
apply to the whole franc area. There are occasionally minor dif-
ferences, which however, it will not be possible to explain. As used 
in this chapter the term designating all the world outside the franc 
area is "abroad," franc means the French franc, and France means 
the territory of the French Republic and Monaco. 19 
F. THE DEFINITION OF "RESIDENCE" 
Exchange control regulations attach little importance to national-
ity, except in regard to compulsory declaration and requisition of 
assets abroad. Instead they are concerned with the usual place of 
17 Countries like Tunisia and Morocco are developing exchange control regulations 
of their own, but they-and this is even true of Guinea-continue to be parts of the 
franc area. In sum the situation is in transition. See Regulation (hereinafter cited 
as Reg.) 497, [May 17, 1951] ].0.; Reg. 579, [Oct. 31, 1954] ].0.; Reg. 673, [May 21, 
1959] ].0.; Reg. 678, [July 5, 1959] ].0. 
18 Reg. 644, [Feb. 22, 1958] ].0. 
19 Decree of July 15, 1947, art. 73, [July 20, 1947] ].0. 
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residence (residence habituelle)' since an individual's residence 
is considered a more realistic indication of the location of his main 
interests and of the likelihood that he will withdraw income or the 
proceeds of assets situated elsewhere. Normally, payments between 
residents do not involve an international transfer of funds, whereas 
a payment between a resident and a non-resident sooner or later 
will. 
A resident is a person who habitually resides in the franc area; 
a non-resident is a person who habitually resides abroad. But there 
is no definition of residence in the exchange control laws and regula-
tions. The Exchange Control Office stubbornly refuses to give such 
a definition. Where French nationals are concerned, the Office vir-
tually never considers a change of residence subsequent to Septem-
ber I, 1939 as bona fide. 
French non-residents who establish a residence in France must 
declare their foreign assets within six months after doing so. Re-
cently, in giving instructions concerning the purchase and sale of 
real estate in France by non-residents 20 the Exchange Control Of-
fice decided that a four-year effective residence or non-residence 
could be considered, but it took great pains to explain that this was 
not a general definition of residence. It has even gone so far as to 
create a special franc account, the "Interior Non-residents Account," 
which must be used by French citizens who have a temporary resi-
dence abroad 21 and by foreigners who have a "temporary" 
residence in France. Since the words "resident" and "habitual resi-
dence" are used by the law itself, only courts can finally decide, in 
each case, who is or is not a resident under exchange control regu-
lations. For all practical purposes, however, residence coincides 
with the location of one's main center of activity, provided that his 
physical presence there is in the aggregate of sufficient duration. 
Strangely there has been no litigation on the question, parties pre-
ferring, because of the uncertainty, to settle disputes.22 Establish-
ments of foreign companies or corporations in France are also 
considered to be residents, whereas the foreign establishments of 
French companies or corporations are deemed to be non-residents. 
This treatment of establishments, like the notion of "residence" 
20 See Part V, Section B, infra. 
21 Since this chapter was written, Reg. 700 of Jan. 23, 1960 has authorized French 
citizens who have resided four years abroad to open "foreign accounts" in France 
with the authorization of the Bank of France. Four years' residence abroad thus ap-
pears as the decisive criterion of non-residence-at least for the purpose of Reg. 700, 
[Jan. 23, 1960] J.O. · , 
""See Part VI, infra. 
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itself, is familiar to specialists in tax law, and they know its diffi-
culties. It means in practice that for financial purposes, as for tax 
purposes, such an establishment must be considered autonomous, 
with separate assets and books, as if it were a separate legal entity 
-indeed, as if it were a subsidiary.23 
G. THE MEANING OF SoME FREQUENTLY UsED 
EXPRESSIONS 
1. French assets abroad ( avoir franr;ais a l' etranger) mean 
all kinds of property, real or personal, all goods, all rights of a 
pecuniary nature which are located abroad and owned by a resident 
of French nationality or a French branch of a foreign corporation or 
company. 
2. The corresponding expression is "foreign assets in France" 
( avoir etranger en France). 
3· Currency assets ( avoir en devises) mean foreign currencies 
and short-term negotiable instruments which represent foreign cur~ 
rencies.24 
II. INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS 
By "international payments" is meant monetary payments which 
involve a transfer of funds across the frontiers of the franc area, 
but they may also include payments by a private debtor who is 
deemed to be a "resident" of the franc area to a non-resident pri-
vate creditor or vice versa. 
Since international transactions nearly always involve interna-
tional payments, knowledge of the proper channels and procedures 
for making such payments under exchange control regulations is 
vitally important. Only the most general rules will be considered in 
this section. More specific rules will be examined in the sections 
concerning international trade, French investments abroad and 
foreign investments in France. Special rules resulting from the 
23 For the use of the words "residents," "non-residents," "habitual residence," see 
Decree of Sept. 9, I9391 [Sept. IO, I939] J.O. concerning assets abroad, art. I; Order 
of Oct. 7, I9441 [Oct. 9, I944] J.O., art. 3; Order of Jan. IS, I94S (foreign invest-
ments), art. 2; and Order of Jan. I6, I94S (assets abroad), arts. 7, 9, IO (art. IO con-
cerning the transfer of residence), [Jan. I9, I94S] J.O.; Order of Nov. 2, I94S. [Nov. 3, 
I94S] J.O. art. I; Decree of Feb. I31 I946, [Feb. I4, I946] J.O.; Decree of June 4, 
I946, [June s, I946] J.O.; and Decree of July 26, I946, [July 28, I946] J.O. art. I 
(all three on requisitions); Decree 47-I337 of July IS, I947 (codification) arts. 24, 28, 
32, 48, s2, 59; Ministerial Order of July IS, I9471 art. I, 3° and 4•, [July 20, I947] J.O. 
"'Other or more complete definitions appear in the following sections of the text. 
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existence of bilateral monetary or payments treaties or interna-
tional clearing agreements are not included. 
The franc area could be thought of as a monetarily closed unit. 
Payments to and from it must be made through appropriate chan-
nels, closely supervised by the Exchange Control Office. It not only 
supervises payments but authorizes them (when they are made 
from the franc area to a creditor abroad). It also authorizes resi~ 
dents to buy the necessary foreign currencies. 
A. BAsic RuLEs 
The basic rules are set forth in the following hierarchy of texts : 
The Decree of September 9, I 939,25 prohibits or regulates the ex-
portation of capital and all transactions involving the exchange of 
money and gold, but the definition of capital exportation is left to 
decrees. 
Article 27 of the Decree of July IS, I947, now in force 26 specifies 
that "All payments addressed abroad are subject to the authoriza-
tion of the Exchange Control Office." Article 2 of the same Decree 
also prohibits all physical exportation or importation of money, 
gold, negotiable instruments, or titles of debt, except as authorized. 
Thus, transfers of funds to and from the franc area are controlled 
in their entirety. To make such control still more effective, Article 
I 5 requires all foreign currencies or "instruments which represent 
foreign currencies" to be deposited with an Authorized Intermedi-
ary. Article 30 provides, however, that whenever transfers of funds 
are allowed (which they automatically are in the case of payments 
to be received from abroad, while payments to be made abroad 
must be specifically authorized), such transfers must be made 
through an Authorized Intermediary. 
The Ministerial Decision dated July IS, I947, which specifies 
the scope of application of this Decree, provides for certain ex-
emptions, for example, in regard to travellers and tourists. It also 
regulates such matters as the opening of accounts to non-residents, 
the functions of Authorized Intermediaries, and the like, which are 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter. 
These basic rules expressly refer to transfers of funds (or of 
legal instruments which, for this purpose, are treated as funds) to 
and from (mainly from) the franc area. They also concern pay-
ments in foreign currencies within the franc area which are directly 
""Modified by a Law of Apr. 15, 194z, [Apr. 16, 194z] J.O. 
26 Decree 47-1337, [July zo, 1947] J.O. 
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prohibited 27 or prohibited by virtue of other provisions, such as 
the obligation to deposit foreign currencies. 
But no mention is made of payments in francs, within the franc 
area, between a resident and a non-resident. And indeed, such pay-
ment should not be considered as a contemporaneous exportation 
(or importation) of funds, although a payment in francs made to a 
non-resident may necessarily involve a future exportation of funds. 
A regulation of July I I, I9S4,28 was the first to provide that pay-
ments in francs between residents and non-residents (tourists ex-
cepted) should be made through the Authorized Intermediaries, 
thus identifying such payment with the exportation or importation 
of funds. 
The validity of this provision is questionable. Whether it is still 
in force is still more questionable in the light of a new regulation,29 
which applies to transfers of funds between the franc area and for-
eign countries. The new regulation does not say that any specific 
part of the earlier one is abrogated, but it provides that parts of 
the earlier one 30 (which concern payments "between residents and 
non-residents") shall be replaced by more favorable provisions in 
the new regulation.31 The earlier regulation remains in force, how-
ever. The substituted provisions do not refer to payments between 
residents and non-residents, but only to transfers of funds to and 
from the franc area. Accordingly it can be concluded that payments 
in francs within the franc area, between residents and non-residents, 
are free of regulation. But considering that penalties are very heavy 
in case of infringement of the exchange control regulations and 
since it is easy to obtain the {perhaps) necessary authorization, pay-
ments between residents and non-residents without authorization 
would be ill-advised. 
Non-resident tourists are authorized to bring into France any 
amount of any kind of currency, including francs. They may not 
use foreign currencies directly for payment, but must first sell their 
currencies through an Authorized Intermediary, except when goods 
are delivered outside customs limits ( hors douane). In such cases 
the rate of exchange is also more favorable because of tax differ-
ences. They may freely use the proceeds of such sale, or imported 
francs, for their own personal needs. They may sell foreign cur-
27 Decree 47-1337, art. 59· 
28 Reg. 574, (July 11, 1954] ].0. 
29 Reg. 682, (July 26, 1959] ].0. 
30 Title I, chapter 1, paragraphs I and II of Reg. 574-
31 Title I, chapter I of Reg. 682. 
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rency of one kind against foreign currency of another kind, provided 
they operate through an Authorized Intermediary. They may physi-
cally re-export such currencies, but it is safer for them to obtain the 
necessary documents in order to be able to prove that they are ex-
porting currencies actually brought in by them. 
Recent regulations make it possible for residents to import freely 
any amount of any type of currency and to keep it. But since they 
can neither re-export foreign currencies nor use them for payments, 
the sole possible use is for sale through Authorized Intermediaries.32 
As far as transfers of funds are concerned, the rules in force may 
be summarized as follows: Except for tourists and the importation 
of currencies, all payments which involve a transfer of funds, or 
legal instruments which represent funds, must be authorized and 
made through designated channels, that is, through Authorized In-
termediaries. Authorization is, however, not necessary for payments 
received from abroad. Any resident to whom a payment is made is 
obliged to repatriate it, through appropriate channels, within one 
month, and to sell the foreign currency to the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund. 
There is one other important rule. Payments made to and from 
a foreign account in francs are considered as a transfer of funds 
from or to the franc area, but general authorizations are provided 
for, which greatly facilitate such payments.33 
The corollary to these rules is the prohibition of compensation be-
tween payments to be made to and from the franc area.34 "Private" 
or unauthorized compensation is a major offense. 
B. THE CuRRENCY MARKET 
Because residents do not have the necessary foreign currencies to 
pay their foreign debts, because they must sell their foreign cur-
rencies to the Exchange Stabilization Fund, and because non-
residents who invest in France must normally sell foreign currencies 
and buy francs in order to invest in France, it has been necessary to 
create an official currency exchange which is supervised by the Bank 
of France. But an increase in demand and in offers resulting from 
the increase in the volume of private international trade has made 
32 For details see Reg. 697, [Jan. 23, 1960] J.O. 
33 Foreign accounts and general authorizations are explained more fully in the fol-
lowing discussion. 
34 E.g., a resident of France collects money due in France to an American and the 
American in turn collects money due the resident of France in the United States. The 
two collections compensate for each other in an amount equal to the lower of the two. 
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possible the creation of a "Free Currency Market" to which, how-
ever, only Authorized Intermediaries have access. Under the rel-
evant regulation 35 the Free Currency Market is now the sole 
currency market in France. 
This market is closely supervised for a number of reasons. The 
first is to maintain rates of exchange between the franc and other 
currencies at a level which is fairly close to official rates. Since the 
market is "free," its rates are determined by buy and sell offers, and, 
whenever necessary, offers to buy or sell are made by the Bank of 
France for the account of the Exchange Stabilization Fund itsel£.36 
This system presupposes that the Bank has the necessary monetary 
reserves in the currencies quoted on the market. If its reserves are 
exhausted, a devaluation may eventually become necessary. 
Another purpose of the close supervision of the Free Currency 
Market is to keep a check on the legality of sales and purchases in 
order to make certain that the appropriate authorizations have been 
issued, and that funds are used in accordance with such authoriza-
tions. Unused foreign currencies must in due course be resold on 
the Market, and when they are, the profits, if any, must be refunded 
to the Exchange Stabilization Fund. No one is allowed to buy for-
eign currencies merely for speculative purposes. However, Author-
ized Intemediaries may set off their gains against their losses, and 
profits are only refunded when they are in excess of a certain per-
centage ( 2% at the present time). 
Sales and purchases on the Free Currency Market may be made 
for cash or on account, according to the authorizations granted. 
The number of foreign currencies quoted on the Market is, how-
ever, restricted. 
They are presently divided into two main categories: (I) Foreign 
currencies from the so-called "convertibility zone" and ( 2) those of 
countries with which France has reached a bilateral payments agree-
ment. The first group includes U.S. and Canadian dollars, the pound 
sterling, the Swiss and Belgian francs, the Deutsche Mark, the Por-
tuguese escudo, the Mexican peso, the Italian lira, the Austrian Schil-
ling, the Dutch florin and the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian 
crowns. Recent regulations (of July 26, 1959) have put all of 
these currencies in a single category, which means that authoriza-
tions to buy such currencies are equally available and that conversion 
from one to the other is easy. 
The so-called "bilateral group" includes only Czechoslovakia and 
36 Reg. 657, [June 21, 1958] J.O., as modified by Reg. 665, [Dec. 28, 1958] J.O. 
88 For details see Reg. 697, [Jan. 23, 1960] J.O. 
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Yugoslavia. Payments between France on the one hand and Chile, 
Ecuador, or Uruguay on the other, are made in U.S. dollars. 
C. FOREIGN AccOUNTS IN FRANCS 
Payments abroad do not always involve a purchase of foreign 
currencies on the market and their transfer to a creditor's account 
outside the franc area. They may also be made to a franc account of 
the creditor held in France by an Authorized Intermediary. 
The basic rules governing this transaction are set forth in a 
Ministerial Decision 37 concerning the application of Decree 47-
I 337.38 The present reach of the rules is defined by a recent regu-
lation.39 
The matter has been considerably simplified by these rules. Four 
types of "foreign" accounts (accounts of a non-resident), still exist, 
but only one type is common, the "Foreign Account in Francs." The 
three others are: "the Foreign Account in Foreign Currency," which 
an Authorized Intermediary may hold for a non-resident, under spe-
cial authorization of the Exchange Control Office; the "Temporary 
Account" held for non-residents to which payments in francs may 
always be made; 40 and the "Interior Non-Resident Account" 
( I.N.R.) created to meet the special situation of foreigners who 
have a temporary residence in France or French citizens who have 
a temporary residence abroad. 
The normal foreign account in francs is now called either "foreign 
account in convertible francs" or "foreign account in bilateral 
francs" (hereinafter "convertible account" and "bilateral ac-
count"). 
A basic rule must be kept in mind concerning such accounts: a pay-
ment made from such an account to a resident or by a resident to 
such an account is an international payment as defined under ex-
change control regulations. Accordingly, the same kind of general 
or special authorizations must be obtained for such payments as 
for international payments. 
Three situations must be considered in regard to each type of 
foreign account: the opening of the account, transactions resulting 
in a credit to the account, and transactions resulting in a debiting of 
the account. 
87 Arts. 19-30, Ministerial Decision (hereinafter cited as Min. Dec.) of July 15, 
1947, concerning the application of Decree 47-1337. 
88 See note 10, supra. 
•• Reg. 683, [July 26, 1959] J.O. 
•• Such accounts are said to be blocked because they may only be used in cases of 
emergency when an international payment is not authorized. A special authorization 
of the Exchange Control Office is necessary to withdraw money from such accounts. 
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I. CONVERTIBLE ACCOUNTS 
a. The opening of an account by an Authorized Interme-
diary for a non-resident who has his residence in the "convertible 
zone" is permittedY A special authorization must be obtained, how-
ever, if the account is opened by a non-resident French citizen or by 
residents of certain countries which have special payment agree-
ments with France. 
b. Such an account may be freely credited with the proceeds 
of sales of foreign currencies of the "convertible zone" on the Free 
Currency Market, or by debiting another convertible account. 
c. Such an account may be freely debited: to pay for the pur-
chase of currencies of the "convertible zone" where currencies ob-
tained on the Free Currency Market are used, or to credit another 
convertible account, or to make a payment in the franc area. 
Convertible accounts are, then, free from governmental inter-
vention in the sense that deposits are readily convertible and with-
drawn. These accounts serve as a kind of anteroom to the franc 
area and general authorizations 42 indicate how far the door of this 
anteroom is open into it. 
Another important feature of these accounts is that they have no 
nationality. Such an account may be opened in the name of anyone, 
provided he is a foreigner residing in the convertible zone, and 
provided he does not belong to a country which has special exchange 
regulations preventing him from doing so. 
Overdrafts on such accounts must be specially authorized by the 
Exchange Control Office.43 Such authorization is freely given when-
ever the overdraft is connected with exports. Conversion between 
currencies of the convertible zone is free, and it is also possible to 
buy Czech or Yugoslavian currencies with assets in these accounts. 
2. BILATERAL ACCOUNTS 
a. Accounts of this type may be opened freely in the name 
of non-residents residing in one of the countries of the so-called 
"Bilateral Group": Albania, the East Zone of Germany, Bulgaria, 
Chile, Ecuador, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Rumania, 
Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R., Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Special rules 
apply for Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay, payments being made to 
and from these countries in U.S. dollars. 
n By the general authorization given in Reg. 683, [July 26, 1959] }.0. 
'"Reg. 700, [Jan. 23, r96o] }.0. See the section concerning foreign investments in 
France, infra. 
'"Reg. 683, [July 26, 1959] }.0. 
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b. Bilateral accounts may be freely credited: with the pro-
ceeds of sale on the Free Currency Market of any currency of the 
convertible zone, or of the currency of the country where the owner 
of the account has his residence, or by debiting an account of the same 
nationality. 
c. Bilateral accounts may be freely debited in order to buy on 
the Free Currency Market the currency of the country in which the 
owner of the account has his residence or to credit an account of the 
same nationality, or to make a payment in the franc area, provided 
the true debtor is a resident of the country in which the owner of 
the account has his residence and the true creditor is a resident in the 
franc area. 
The difference between the two types of accounts, convertible on 
the one hand, and bilateral on the other hand, and the reasons 
therefor are obvious.44 , 
III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The above-described rules are applied to international payments 
involved in international trade, and the necessary authorization to 
make such payments is linked with the authorization to import or 
to export goods, both of which are generally prohibited. 
A. ORIGINS OF THE PROHIBITION 
A basic Decree of November I I, I 944, prohibits both the ex-
portation and importation of goods. 
This prohibition was made necessary by the state of war then 
prevailing. It has since been used to control the economy of France. 
During the post-war recovery period authorizations to import goods 
were reserved for basic raw materials, equipment and supplies such 
as coal, oil products, heavy equipment and certain food products. 
Imports were to be made in accordance with the Plan for Recon-
struction, popularly known as the "Monnet Plan," and the hierarchy 
of needs established by that Plan. Even now there is a priority for 
imports which are in keeping with the present five-year plan. 
There has been a tendency, moreover, to use that control as a 
means of protecting national industry, although there is also a coun-
ter movement towards free international trade. The Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation ( O.E.E.C.) has worked un-
"It is also obvious that all countries of the world are not mentioned in the above 
rules (for example, Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and Egypt). Special rules apply to 
those countries as a result of special payments agreements with France. 
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ceasingly to get its members to accept a progressive liberalization 
of trade among themselves.45 The Coal-Steel Treaty and the Treaty 
establishing the European Common Market have made, and will 
make, important contributions to the liberalization of trade 46 and 
international payments. 
B. THE ROME TREATY AND THE TREND TOWARDS 
LIBERALIZATION 
Under the Treaty trade among the Member States is to be com-
pletely freed during the transitional period. Each year, basic quotas 
must be increased, and restrictions on exports are prohibited.47 
Other obstacles to trade among Member States such as customs 
duties, currency restrictions and the like must also be removed and 
a uniform tariff is to be applied to trade with non-member states. 
Article 67 of the Treaty provides that members of the Community 
must gradually remove restrictions concerning transfers of funds 
among residents of the Community, to the extent necessary for the 
proper functioning of the Common Market, and that, during the 
first four-year stage, current payments among Member States must 
be entirely freed. In case of disturbance of the financial market of 
one of the Member States or in case of financial difficulties, emer-
gency measures may be authorized, however.48 
These rules have been given effect in all Community countries 
and liberalization in France in fact goes beyond the requirements 
of the Treaty and has accrued to the benefit of non-European as well 
as Community countries.49 Indeed, liberalization has now reached 
the point where quotas constitute the exception rather than the rule. 
Exports, upon which there are no restrictions, have increased 
steadily. Two devaluations have boosted them by reducing French 
prices in relation to world prices, and will probably permit increased 
imports without damage to France's balance of payments. These 
rules relate, nonetheless, to a transitional period, and they therefore 
provide for emergency measures and do not require that all cur-
rency controls be supressed. They require only that all necessary 
authorizations shall be granted. 
In sum liberalization of currency control has made the regula-
tions more flexible and made available more liberal allowances of 
•• See Chapter III supra. 
•• Ibid. 
'
7 Chapter III, Part II, supra. 
•• Treaty art. 73· See Section VII, infra. 
•• See Chapter III supra. 
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS IN FRANCE 207 
foreign currencies to those applying for authorizations. But ex-
change control laws and regulations remain for a number of reasons. 
International trade is considerably freer, but it is not yet wholly 
free. Supervision and control of international transactions helps 
to keep a check on them. It also provides a check rein, if necessary, 
on the economic development of the country, and helps to acquire 
the statistical data which forms the basis of the five-year economic 
plans.50 Last, but not least, it gives the government a means of ef-
fective and immediate action in case of emergency. The system of 
exchange control laws and regulations in France makes it easy to 
make the necessary changes. Regulations can be promptly modified, 
and departmental instructions, pursuant to a change of adminis-
trative policy, may introduce virtual freedom by making the grant-
ing of authorizations almost automatic. 
Such flexibility is considered necessary, but it also makes-and 
probably unavoidably-import and export transactions somewhat 
complex. 
C. IMPORTATION 
1. As a rule, an authorization ("license") must be obtained 
from the Exchange Control Office and detailed rules are set forth in 
the relevant regulation 51 for doing so. Special forms must be filed. 
Then the competent department, usually the Department of Com-
merce and Industry, passes on the application. The granting or re-
fusal of an import license is discretionary, but if discretion is abused, 
or if the principle of equality among applicants is violated, appeal 
to the administrative court, the Conseil d'Etat is possible.52 
The import license is a non-transferable administrative docu-
ment. Its validity is limited to a maximum of six months, which 
means that the goods must have been shipped to France before the 
six months have elapsed. The license must be checked by customs 
authorities at the time the goods enter French territory. 
When a license is granted, it automatically gives the beneficiary 
the right to buy, through an Authorized Intermediary, the amount 
of foreign currency corresponding to the price mentioned on the 
50 These plans are not state imposed, but are, rather, detailed forecasts which guide 
the action of the competent departments and nationalized enterprises. 
51 Reg. 483, [Jan. 4, 1951] J.O., modified by Reg. 685, [July 26, 1959] J.O. 
52 C.E. Mar. z8, 1952, [1952] J.C.P. II. 7132; C.E. May 16, 1951, [1951] Rec. Leb. 
z68 and C.E. Feb. 20, 1956, [1956] Rec. Leb. 513; C.E. Feb. II, 1955, [1955] Rec. Leb. 
82. When imports have been freed by a regulation, as is now usual, the granting of 
a license is no longer discretionary but automatic. 
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license. There are strict rules, however, to avoid an illegitimate use 
of the foreign currency thus acquired. 
The purchase of foreign currency may be made for cash or on 
account. But it can only be made on account until a credit on docu-
ments has been obtained. If the license is not utilized in due time, 
the foreign currency must be resold and the profit, if any, resulting 
from differences in the rate of exchange, credited to the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund. When goods have been shipped directly to 
France (or, in certain cases, through Antwerp, Amsterdam, or 
Rotterdam), payment becomes effective by transfer of the funds 
to the account of the sender of the goods. This rule has no excep-
tions. Alternatively a transfer of francs to an account in France 
of the sender is possible. The amount of money so transferred must 
never exceed the C.I.F. price of the goods. 
2. In certain cases, the maximum six-months' validity of im-
port licenses is inadequate-for example, when the goods to be im-
ported consist of heavy machinery the manufacture of which can-
not be completed within six months' time. In such cases, moreover, 
the foreign manufacturer often requires a payment by installments, 
beginning before the goods are delivered or even shipped. 
A special procedure has been adopted for such cases, that of 
"Prior Authorizations." They are granted only when the importer 
can support his application by producing a written agreement be-
tween himself and his seller. The authorization makes possible the 
purchase of foreign currency, on account, within six months prior 
to the time the installment to be paid is due. The grant and use of 
such authorizations are very closely supervised. 
3· When imports of certain goods have been freed, the same 
procedure must still be followed, but another regulation 53 declares 
that the necessary licenses for such goods are to be automatically 
issued. Whether "Prior Authorizations" are also to be automati-
cally issued is not quite clear, but experience indicates that they are 
easily and promptly obtainable. 
Goods bought for cash with a value inferior to 350,000 francs 54 
or those which are paid for on an E.F.A.C. account 55 are handled 
more rapidly. In such cases it is sufficient to produce the invoice at 
the Customs Office and at the offices of an Authorized Intermediary 
53 Reg. 68o, [July 21, 1959] ].0. See also Reg. 698, [Jan. 23, 1960] ].0. in regard 
to procedures concerning "import certificates." 
04 This amount has been raised to 5,ooo new francs (equivalent to soo,ooo old francs) 
by Reg. 696, [Jan. 23, 1960] ].0. unless otherwise stated, "francs'' means "old francs." 
One "new franc" equals 100 "old francs." 
"" See text at note 64, infra. 
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS IN FRANCE 209 
in order to import and pay for such goods. A similar procedure is 
applicable in importing spare parts which have a value less than 
so,ooo francs. 
4· Another special procedure applies to goods not subject to 
quotas. This is the case for goods which are temporarily imported 
into France and are to be re-exported with or without modification, 
for those which technically are not considered as imported goods 
(for example goods in transit), and for certain privileged goods 
(furniture in case of a change of domicile, goods with diplomatic 
status, small postage parcels, and the like). The same procedure 
also applies to goods which have been freed pursuant to rules of 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and to coal 
and steel products subject to the Coal-Steel Treaty. In such cases an 
import certificate is automatically granted by the Exchange Con-
trols Office. A certificate is a much simpler document than a license. 
Like licenses, certificates authorize the entry of goods into France 
and the purchase of the necessary amount of foreign currencies. The 
rules applicable to such purchases are very similar to those already 
described above, 56 with minor modifications-for example, the cer-
tificate is valid for three months only. 
5. One apparently simple case of importation is specially 
treated by the Exchange Control Office-importation without pay-
ment. A special authorization is required since imports of this kind 
are not considered normal. They may involve illegitimate payments, 
made out of assets which have not been declared, or unlawful pri-
vate compensation. When imports are linked to exports, the trans-
actions are submitted to special scrutiny, to make sure that both are 
legal. Sometimes the Exchange Control Office grants import licenses 
with the proviso that the raw materials or parts so imported shall 
be re-exported within a specified time in the form of manufactured 
products. When equipment or finished products are imported in 
connection with foreign investment in France, payment authoriza-
tion becomes part of the authorization to investY 
6. The above procedures apply to goods which may be physi-
cally imported, but intangible goods may also be imported. The 
most important example is that of industrial property rights-
patents, trademarks, technical data, and such services as are linked 
with the communication of know-how.58 In such cases, only the pay-
ment of the price, royalties, or fees must be authorized. But the 
56 See section C, subsection I, supra. See also Reg. 698 of Jan. 23, 1960. 
57 See Part V, infra. 
•• See Chapter V infra. 
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usual practice, greatly favored by the Exchange Control Office, is 
to submit a written contract for approval. The approval given to 
such a contract, which is very closely examined by the competent 
authorities, means that when application is made for authorization 
to make payment it will be granted upon a showing that the pay-
ment is in conformity with the approved contract. There is no known 
instance of the refusal of such an authorization. Considering the 
wording of such approvals, it is questionable, however, whether 
they commit the Exchange Control Office legally. 
Special rules also apply to insurance premiums,59 transportation 
costs, and the like. For example, residents are not allowed to ex-
port from France more than 25,000 francs at one time nor more 
than the equivalent of so,ooo francs 59a in foreign currency per year 
for purposes of travel. 
D. ExPORTATION 
The only reason why exports still require licenses or some kind 
of similar authorization is that the Exchange Control Office wants 
to make certain that the total counter value of exported goods is 
repatriated into France, and that the foreign currencies thus ob-
tained are introduced into the exchange market and put at the dis-
posal of the Exchange Stabilization Fund. Moreover, exports are 
normally made against payment in the currency of the buyer. When 
that currency is "convertible," whether it or another currency is 
in fact used is not very important. But in certain cases, and due to 
special international agreements, the buyer must pay in United 
States dollars, although he does not reside in the dollar zone. Spe-
cial supervision is also exercised over exports made to countries 
of the bilateral group, and to countries whose currency is weak, in 
order, as far as possible, to balance exports to, against imports from, 
such countries. 
For this reason, the exporter must as a rule commit himself to 
repatriate the price of the exported goods and such repatriation 
must be made through an Authorized Intermediary within a month 
from the date payment is received. The normal duration of the ex-
port license is three months, and payment must usually be obtained 
within six months after the delivery of the goods to the purchaser. 
Special authorizations may be obtained for consignments abroad, 60 
•• Instruction No. 823, [Nov. 2, 1959] J.O.; Reg. 692, [Dec. 19, 1959] ].0. 
•••This amount has now been raised to r,5oo new francs (r5o,ooo old francs). 
00 Reg. 686, [July 26, 1959] J.O. 
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and special procedures have also been devised for exports which 
require a longer lapse of time before payment. As is true of im-
ports, moreover, simplified procedures have been established for 
certain exports of small value. 
The French Government makes every effort to promote exports. 
For example, applicable industrial and commercial credit restric-
tions are not applied to export activities. 61 Moreover, credit in-
surance and export insurance can be obtained from special organi-
zations controlled and financed by the government 62 and deprecia-
tion rates are accelerated when applied to equipment for the 
manufacture of products for export. (One of the most important 
incentives for exporting is the fact that exported products are not 
subject to the turnover tax, the tax on added value, the nite of which 
is zo%.) 63 
Exchange control regulations also grant a special right to ex-
porters: they may retain, in a special account called an E.F.A.C. 
Account, 64 a percentage of the foreign currencies earned by their 
exports. The percentage is 12% in the case of exports to the United 
States. The foreign currencies obtained by an exporter can be used 
to pay, without going through a complex procedure, the commis-
sions of agents abroad (which otherwise could only be paid on 
special authorization), business travel expenses, and advertising. 
They may be used, upon special but easily obtainable authorization, 
to purchase equipment for the enterprise of the exporter, and they 
can be converted into other currencies. But the currencies of 
E.F.A.C. Accounts cannot be transferred to a third party and such 
accounts are kept, under strict rules, by an Authorized Intermediary. 
Every three months the exporter must sell on the exchange market 
at least 10% of the unused balance of his E.F.A.C. Account. 
The legal theory of E.F.A.C. Accounts, as well as that of ac-
counts in which an importer or exporter holds foreign currencies for 
certain purposes, has yet to be articulated.65 He certainly is the 
61 The National Credit Council ("Counseil National du Credit") fixes credit terms-
duration, interest and maximum amounts-which banks grant to private enterprises, 
and it has facilitated export credits, e.g. by the Decision of Feb. 5, 1959 fixing the 
Bank of France interest rate for export transactions at 3% instead of 4.25% and 
permitting longer term bills of exchange. 
•• French Insurance Company for Foreign Commerce ("Compagnie Fran~aise d'As-
surance pour le Commerce Exterieur" or "Coface") created by Decree of June 17, 
1946. See also Law of July 21, 1950. 
63 Min. Dec. of Dept. of Finance of Oct. 25, 1957. 
64 Export and Accessory Expenses Account ("Exportation-Frais Accessoires 
Compte"). 
65 See Cour de Pontoise, Oct. 22, 1957, [1957] G.P. II. 389. 
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owner of the assets, but an owner who must use them for designated 
purposes. His right of ownership does not have the same content 
as in private law. It is restricted by state controls, and is exercised as 
if it were a social function; fortunately the restrictions are only 
temporary in the sense that the proceeds, in francs, may be freely 
disposed of. 
IV. FRENCH INVESTMENTS ABROAD 
"French investments" are investments which are or have been 
made by physical persons of French nationality who habitually re-
side in the franc area, or by companies, and other such entities, on 
behalf of their establishments located in the franc area. 
A. EvoLUTION SINCE WoRLD WAR II 
The general policy of the various laws and regulations applica 
ble 66 is quite simple: 
All assets abroad owned by French residents must be declared to 
the Exchange Control Office.67 
Certain assets which are physically in France such as foreign 
currencies, letters of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, and stock 
insured abroad are considered as "assets abroad." 
Whenever possible or, in other words, whenever the assets con-
sist in negotiable instruments, such assets must be deposited with an 
Authorized Intermediary in France or in an establishment abroad 
of an Authorized Intermediary. 
All income having its source abroad, including proceeds of ex-
ports, must be repatriated and the corresponding foreign currency 
sold to the Exchange Stabilization Fund. This rule applies to all 
residents, French or non-French. 
Assets abroad may be subject to requisition against due payment. 
Acquisition and transfer of assets abroad are subject to prior 
authorization. Transfer and all other transactions must be made 
through an Authorized Intermediary. However, current trans-
actions for purposes of exploitation and maintenance are author-
ized. 
When exchange control regulations were first introduced in 
France, their purpose was merely to prevent the flight of .French 
66 A policy which has been summarized in Decree 47-I337 of July IS, I9471 (July 
20, I947] J.O. 
61 Decree 47-I337 of July IS, I947· But important exceptions to this rule have been 
created by Reg. 702, [Jan. 23, I96o] J.O. 
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capital, but at the end of World War II a different problem arose. 
At that time-the French economy was ruined-stores and factor-
ies were either physically destroyed or obsolete; there was a con-
siderable shortage of foreign currency; the level of exports was at 
the lowest point it had been for a long time whereas imports in sub-
stantial quantities were sorely needed. Accordingly, the government 
wanted to be able to use French assets abroad to aid recovery. 
Requisition was considered both necessary and legitimate, the more 
legitimate since those who had invested abroad had suffered less 
from the consequences of the war. As time went on, requisition no 
longer appeared necessary, but the French economy still fluctuates 
seriously as the number of devaluations indicates. It is therefore 
still imperative to prevent substantial flights of capital, and the 
continued existence of a permanent canvass of French investments 
and assets abroad is thought necessary to help to keep track of 
transfers abroad from France. It also aids supervision by the tax 
authorities, and, since French payments to other countries have 
only in the last few months been fully balanced by export trade 
receipts, such a canvass is still necessary to make effective the obli-
gation to repatriate the income of French investments abroad. But 
exchange control authorities are quite aware of the necessity to 
develop French enterprises and investments abroad to further na-
tional prosperity and security. Thus general prohibitions have been 
maintained in principle, but exceptions have become more and more 
frequent. 
B. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
The result of the above-described evolution is that reqms1t10n 
of assets abroad has since 1950 been practically eliminated. It has 
never been applied to residents other than those of French nation-
ality, and its practical scope has always been limited to cash (of 
the so-called "hard" currencies) or such assets as could be easily 
transformed into cash. Residents have never been obliged to sell 
real property nor to dismantle their enterprises abroad. N onethe-
less, compensation for requisitions was at the official rate of ex-
change, at a time when that rate was much lower than the rate of 
exchange prevailing outside France and, for that reason, requisition 
was deeply resented. 
The three effectuating 68 decrees were those relating to the req-
uisition of foreign currencies in cash,69 the requisition of assets in 
.. Under Law 45-0140 of Dec. 26, 1945, [Dec. 27, 1945] J.O. 
•• Decree 46-177 of Feb. 13, 1946, [Feb. 14, 1946] J.O. 
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gold kept abroad,70 and the requisition of certain foreign stock and 
bonds.71 These have not been abolished, but their application de-
pends on regulations of the Exchange Control Office.72 Ownership 
and transfer of gold inside France is unregulated; but gold cannot 
be freely acquired or transferred abroad; nor transferred abroad, or 
from abroad, from or to the franc area. 
The obligation to repatriate income-which as a matter of prac-
tice is an obligation only of residents of French nationality, although 
theoretically all residents are subject to it-is less resented now than 
it was for the simple reason that the free rate of exchange has ceased 
to be higher than the official rate. 
The obligation to declare assets abroad, which does not apply 
to non-French residents of France,73 is still in effect. Such assets 
must be declared within six months of their acquisition (in some 
cases they can be acquired without authorization) or within six 
months of the establishment of residence in France, for French per-
sons who resided outside the franc area prior thereto. 
Despite very heavy penalties, which may include five years im-
prisonment, confiscation of assets and a fine many times their value, 
the enforcement of the obligation to declare assets abroad has been 
very difficult. Declaration has been looked upon as the first step to 
present or at least future requisition, and French owners of such 
assets have therefore been reluctant to declare them. Very often 
the result of such legislation has been to prevent them from being 
repatriated. 
From time to time therefore Finance Ministers have taken a 
realistic view of the situation, and a law has been adopted granting 
amnesty to non-declared assets in order to encourage their repatria-
tion. Such is the case of the "permanent" amnesty resulting from a 
1948 law.74 Under this law as modified assets which are illegally 
abroad-that is, those which were not declared in due time or which 
were acquired without due authorization-can be repatriated with-
out other consequences than a 2 5% fine, which it is in most cases 
advantageous to pay because the fine also covers all taxes, includ-
ing heavy inheritance taxes, which were due. A special procedure 
70 Decree 46-1293 of June 4, 1946, [June 5, 1946] J.O. 
11 Decree 46-1698 of July 26, 1946, [July 28, 1946] J.O . 
.,.Reg. 440, [Jan. 25, 1950] J.O.; Reg. 451, [Mar. 21, 1950] J.O.; Reg. 471 and 
Reg. 472, [Sept. 21, 1950] J.O. have stopped requisitions except for gold. 
13 Order 45-86 of Jan. z6, 1945; Order 45-87 of Jan. 17, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] J.O. 
See also Reg. 702 of Jan. 23, 1960. 
"'Law 48-178 of Feb. 2, 1948, [Feb. 3, 1948] J.O., modified by Law of July 5, 1949, 
art. 25. 
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has been devised to permit anonymous repatriation. A new order 75 
has extended in two ways the benefit of the amnesty: (I) it applies 
to assets which were not declared prior to June 24, I 9 58, and ( 2) 
the 25% fine is eliminated. Repatriation must, however, be made 
through appropriate channels to enjoy the benefits of the amnesty. 
C. A NEw FLEXIBLE PoLICY CoNCERNING AssETS 
ABROAD 
Some flexibility has been introduced into the regulations applying 
to the management of assets abroad: 
Foreign currencies can be freely introduced into France by resi-
dents (introduction by non-residents is a fortiori free) and they do 
not have to be deposited. 76 
Foreign stocks and bonds quoted on the Paris Stock Exchange 
(they are more and more numerous) can be freely acquired, but 
the negotiable instruments themselves are not physically delivered 
to the buyer. 
Authorizations for the purpose of subscribing for increases in capi-
tal stock are more and more freely granted, through general or 
special authorizations, to shareholders of foreign companies, al-
though the shares must be deposited. Whenever such stock is quoted 
on a foreign stock exchange, it is easy to sell it, provided the sale is 
made under the supervision of an Authorized Intermediary and 
provided the proceeds are either invested in similarly quoted stock 
or repatriated. 
Real property abroad may be freely sold to a non-resident or even 
to a non-French resident, provided there is a deed of sale, provided 
the sale is made for cash in convertible currency or in currency of the 
country where the property is located, and provided the proceeds are 
duly repatriated. 77 Income from real property may, without authori-
zation, be used to meet expenses or taxes, insurance premiums and 
repair costs of real estate (but not improvement and management 
costs). 
These rules make clear that exchange controls are at present 
slight. All purchases, sales, encumbrances, payments and gifts are 
normally subject to authorization. In case of death the appropriate 
76 Order No. 58-544 of June 24, 1958, [June 25, 1958] J.O. See also Reg. 506, [Sept. 
2, 1951] J.O. 
76 Reg. 652, [Mar. 22, 1958] J.O.; Reg. 699, [Jan. 23, 1960] J.O. specifies the con-
ditions under which it may be introduced and makes explicit that this freedom is not 
a right but at the sufferance of the government. When money introduced represents 
income, it must be sold on the Free Currency Market. 
77 Reg. 584, [Feb. 19, 1955] J.O. See also Reg. 701 of Jan. 23, 1960. 
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inheritance laws are applied and legacies are unregulated. The 
drafters of the exchange control laws and regulations have indicated 
embarrassment in connection with transfers by inheritance of assets 
abroad. Authorization is required of "any act the aim of which is 
to dispose of" or modify the substance of assets abroad or to reduce 
"the rights in such assets." 78 Application of the appropriate law of 
inheritance does not, accordingly, result in the application of ex-
change regulations. But the creation of a legacy is an "act," and al-
though there is no known example of difficulty in such cases, there is 
no doubt that difficult problems could be raised by certain disposi-
tions of the will of a resident-for example, certain types of trusts 
which would prevent normal repatriation of income by resident 
beneficiaries. The Ministerial Decision of July I 5, 194 7, authorizes 
"the taking over of assets abroad acquired by inheritance." This is 
a clear acknowledgement that, at least in so far as the acquisition of 
assets by inheritance is concerned, exchange control regulations do 
not affect substantive rights. 
But a deed of partition of an estate among heirs must be submit-
ted to the Exchange Control Office if resident heirs, under the ap-
plicable law, must agree to accept a reduction or merely a modifica-
tion of their rights. 
The above rules permit strict control of new investments abroad. 
As a matter of practice new investment consists in the opening of a 
branch, the creation of an independent or subsidiary company or the 
increase of funds invested in such branch or subsidiary. In such cases 
special authorization must be obtained, and to obtain it, sufficient 
evidence of the commercial interest of the new enterprise or of its 
enlargement must be supplied. Normally the Exchange Control 
Office gives the authorization on the condition that a report shall 
be made each year on the development of the project, including a 
balance sheet and an income statement, and that normal dividends 
shall be repatriated and distributed. 
When all provisions of the Rome Treaty have been given full 
effect, it is to be expected that all restrictions to French investments 
in the states of the Community will disappear, but, prior thereto, 
only "progressive steps" towards liberalization are to be antici-
pated.79 
'"Decree 47-1337, art. 58, [July 20, 1947] ].0. 
"' See Section II, supra. 
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V. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS lN FRANCE 
80 
Under the French Civil Code, as applied by a long line of de-
cisions, foreigners may freely acquire assets of any kind in France, 
as well as any private rights that are recognized by French law, and 
they may exercise any trade or profession, except where expressly 
prohibited by statute. Such prohibitions are rare in the commercial 
trades and exceptions to these are often permitted. Special rules do 
apply, however, to such occupations as banking, mining, the manu-
facture of pharmaceutical products, and the publishing of maga-
zines or newspapers. No law requires that the president or the gen-
eral manager or the majority of the directors of a company be 
French, except in a very few cases such as companies which operate 
public utilities or companies which enjoy long-term licenses for the 
importation of crude oil and oil products, and practically no law 
requires a majority or even a minority of shareholders of a com-
pany organized in France to be French. A foreigner who wants per-
sonally to exercise a trade in France, or who wants to become chief 
executive (president, or manager, or head of a branch) of a com-
pany which does business in France, must obtain a "commercial 
permit," from police authorities. He must also obtain a "labor 
permit" if he wants to work in France as an employee. But com-
mercial and labor permits are normally granted and abusive refusals 
are scarce. 
Under exchange control laws and regulations, however, non-resi-
dents, whether foreign or of French nationality, cannot always 
freely acquire assets in France. This section deals with the problem 
of acquiring assets in France, with investments, and also with the 
management rights of inventors under exchange control regulations. 
A. BAsic RULES 81 
An order 82 attempts to give a definition of the "foreign assets 
in France" to which it applies. According to it, those words mean 
all movable or immovable, all tangible or intangible assets which 
are "located in France, including negotiable instruments," and also 
"all rights which can be exercised in France," provided the owner 
80 "Foreign investments" here means investments in France by non-residents. 
81 The basic rules are set forth in Order 45-85 of Jan. 15, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] 
J.O. concerning "foreign assets in France," Decree 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, arts. 48-51 
and Min. Dec. of July 15, 1947, arts. 19-36. The main Regulation presently applicable 
to foreign investments in France is Reg. 669, [Jan. 21, 1959] J.O. 
82 
Order 45-85 of Jan. 15, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] J.O. 
2 I 8 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
of such assets or rights is a non-resident.83 Difficult questions may 
arise in connection with the location of intangible assets. They (for 
example, bearer shares of stock) are located in France when they 
are physically there, or when they (for example, the rights of a 
partner in a partnership) are rights to an asset located in France. 
The trend of exchange control regulations as far as stocks, bonds 
and debentures are concerned is to take into account those which are 
issued in France and payable in francs. 
One order 84 went so far as to authorize the Minister of Finance 
not only to regulate the acquisition and transfer of such assets 85 
but also to impose compulsory declaration of assets in France held 
by non-residents and even to regulate the acquisition and transfers 
of assets held by companies organized in France, whenever non-
residents participated in the management of such companies.86 But 
the decrees and ministerial orders which put these provisions into 
effect have been abolished.87 
In I 94 7 88 authorization of the acquisition or assignment of the 
following kinds of assets was made compulsory: 
a) Real property: land, buildings and rights in land and build-
ings considered in France as "immovables." Leases were not in-
cluded. 
b) Assets of a going concern: this phrase normally includes com-
mercial premises (fully owned or under commercial lease), commer-
cial name, installation, tools or equipment, goods, trade-marks and 
the like, each single element being considered as a means of building 
the assets of a going concern. 
c) Stocks, bonds or debentures, issued by a French company or 
issued by a company organized abroad when such shares or stock 
are physically located in France. Subscription is, naturally, consid-
ered as an acquisition. These regulations also require the opening 
of accounts for non-residents to be authorized. 
When the requirements for opening a convertible or bilateral ac-
count 89 or for paying francs into such accounts are not met, a "tem-
porary" account may be opened, but such an account is blocked, and 
special authorization is necessary to withdraw money from it. The 
sole use which may be made of such funds is the purchase of stock 
83 /d., art. z . 
.. Order 45-Ss of Jan. 15, I94S· 
85 !d., art. 3· 
86 /d., art. 4-
87 Decree of July IS, 1947, art. 70, 3°, [July 20, 1947] ].0. 
88 /d., art. 51 and Min. Dec. of July IS, 1947. 
89 See Section II, supra. 
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on the Paris Stock Exchange, provided the stock purchased is it-
self placed in a temporary blocked account. Transfers from a 
blocked account to another blocked account of the same nationality 
is possible. 
Since it has become possible 90 for non-residents in all cases to 
open convertible accounts to which the proceeds of the sale of con-
vertible currency on the French currency market is credited, and 
since such accounts may be used to make any kind of payment in 
France,91 a non-resident may freely acquire in France all assets 
other than those mentioned in the above list, provided, of course, 
that the assets so acquired are not exported from France. Further-
more, non-residents may acquire assets in France by operation of 
law: for example, by virtue of laws of inheritance, or tort law. 
The freedom to acquire is linked with the freedom to assign the 
asset, thus assignment of the assets listed above must be authorized. 
Normal exploitation and acquisition of the income of an asset 
are unregulated, but problems arise in regard to the utilization of 
such income in France and its withdrawal from France and in regard 
to utilization and withdrawal of the proceeds of the sale or assign-
ment of legitimately acquired assets. 
Withdrawal is subject to authorization. Credits to Foreign Ac-
counts of Francs which have a source other than the sale of foreign 
currencies or another foreign account are not permitted.92 It is not 
certain that even if income or the payment for an asset sold is in 
francs that these may be used without authorization for other pay-
ments in France. If one considers that the provisions of Regula-
tion 574 93 are still in force, such a payment must be made to an 
account of the non-resident, and an authorization is therefore re-
quired. The alternative would be to pay the funds into a temporary 
blocked account. But if those provisions have been abrogated, then 
a payment may be made in cash and such cash may be used freely 
(except for transactions of the kind listed above) . 
General authorizations have become more and more frequent, 
and even where authorization is still necessary-and this is true in 
regard to withdrawal from France of income or the proceeds of the 
liquidation of an investment-it is easily obtained. The basic rules 
remain, then, but recent regulations and instructions have increas-
ingly reduced their effect. 
90 Reg. 683, [July 26, 1959] J.O. 
91 Similar rules apply to "bilateral accounts." 
92 Reg. 683, supra note 90. 
93 Title I, chapter I, paragraphs I and II. See text at note 29, supra. 
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Among the liberalizing rules are those which encourage invest-
ment in France.94 An examination of the status of the principal kinds 
of foreign investments in France under presently applicable rules 
is at this point necessary. 
B. REAL PROPERTY 
Real property in France may be acquired freely by a non-resident 
provided the acquisition is paid for in cash from a convertible ac-
count or from a bilateral account (in the latter case the account 
must be of the same nationality as that of the residence of the 
buyer) and provided the acquisition is made through a notary. No-
taries in France have a special status which makes them officers of 
the state in certain respects. If the property is acquired from an-
other non-resident, the necessary amount of foreign currency of the 
buyer must be transferred in France through appropriate channels 
to pay transfer taxes and other legitimate costs of the deed of sale. 
Real property legitimately owned by a non-resident may be sold 
to a resident for francs, and such francs may be credited to a Foreign 
Account of the vendor (if the vendor resides in the convertible 
zone, a convertible account must be opened; if in the bilateral zone, 
a bilateral account of the same nationality as that of the residence of 
the vendor). The sale must be made through a notary. In short, 
"disinvestment" may be freely effectuated.95 
Leases are unregulated, whether the non-resident is the lessor or 
the tenant, but transfer of commercial leases may be considered a 
transfer of assets of a going concern. 
C. STocK, BoNDs, AND DEBENTURES QuoTED 
ON THE PARIS STOCK EXCHANGE OR ON 
THE PARIS BROKERs' ExcHANGE 96 
Provided it is paid for from a Foreign Account (even a blocked 
temporary account) and through an Authorized Intermediary, the 
stock, bonds, or debentures issued by a French company may be 
freely bought. The corresponding certificates are placed in a con-
vertible account or a bilateral account, or a blocked account, ac-
•• Reg. 669, [Jan. 21, 1959] J.O. 
""/d.; Instruction to Notaries, Jan. 21, 1959. 
•• "Paris Brokers' Exchange" is a free rendering of "Marche des Courtiers en 
Valeurs." "Paris Stock Exchange" renders "Marche Ofliciel." Brokers on the "Marche 
Ofliciel" are called "Agents de Changes" and their status dates back to 1810 (but is 
now principally regulated by the Decree of Oct. 7, 1890). Both "Agents" and "Cour-
tiers" are brokers but the "Agents" have special privileges and more restricted duties, 
although both are under supervision of the same committee, the "Comite des Bourses." 
The reasons for the difference in status of the two is mainly historical. 
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cording to the origin of the funds. All dividends are automatically 
paid into the same kind of foreign account as the one in which 
certificates are kept, as are proceeds of sales made through appro-
priate channels. An authorization is necessary when such assets are 
not sold through official channels. Subscription to the increase of 
capital of French companies is equally free when the shares are 
quoted on the Stock Exchange or the Brokers' Exchange and when 
subscription is made through appropriate channels. Non-residents 
are authorized to buy French stock on the Stock Exchange or 
Brokers' Exchange, not only for cash but also on margin.97 If stock 
is bought on margin, the usual guaranty must be deposited and may 
be composed of funds originating from a Foreign Account or stock 
on the Exchange which is itself in a Foreign Account. 98 As the re-
sult of a general authorization,99 various convertible currencies 
amounting in value to hundreds of millions of dollars were invested 
on the Paris Stock Exchange in a recent six months' period. 
Non-residents are authorized to withdraw from France legiti-
mately acquired stock, debentures, and bonds issued there in franc 
denominations. In case of withdrawal, dividends are freely trans-
ferred through an Authorized Intermediary. Physical transfer of 
certificates and coupons must always be made through banks and 
Authorized lntermediaries.100 Owners must keep in mind that any 
assignment of the stock, bonds, and debentures which they have thus 
taken out of France must be authorized. 
D. PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN COMPANIES 
ORGANIZED IN FRANCE 
Stock of or interests in French companies may also be purchased 
directly and increases of their capital subscribed to. By "interests" is 
meant the rights of members of partnerships ( socihes en nom col-
lectif, sociites en commandite) or in limited liability companies 
( sociites a responsabilite limitee). Such interests may not be is-
sued in the form of certificates or negotiable instruments and, of 
course, cannot be quoted on exchanges. Shares of stock, on the other 
hand, are issued by stock companies ( socihes anonymes) in bearer 
or registered form, are negotiable instruments and may or may not 
be quoted on the exchanges. 
While purchases on the Stock Exchange normally involve port-
folio investments only, the purchase of interests in companies or 
97 "Marche a terme." 
98 Reg. 669, [Jan. 21, 1959]; Instructions 773 of Jan. 21, 1959 and 785 of Feb. 25, 1959. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Instructions 772 and 773 of Jan. :n, 1959. 
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non-quoted shares generally represent decisions to participate ac" 
tively in business ventures. Such investments, which create new 
enterprises or enlarge existing ones, are very much encouraged by 
France, since they increase employment and contribute generally to 
the country's prosperity. They are especially encouraged outside 
the Parisian industrial zone, and when the enterprises to be created 
are to be located in areas where employment opportunities are 
scarce. Tax reductions, extensive credit, and even subsidies may 
often be obtained in such cases. Large foreign companies are thus 
motivated to make France their base of operations within the Euro-
pean Common Market. 
These investments are subject to the authorization of the Ex-
change Control Office. This authorization is required by law for 
the purchase of or subscription to shares not quoted on the Stock 
Exchange or Brokers' Exchange. Control in this area is in fact 
exercised by the competent technical ministries, through an In-
vestment Committee, however. Application for authorization in-
volves a description of the venture, special emphasis being given 
to the .amount of the contemplated investment, its technical con-
tribution (for example, know-how, industrial experience) to 
France, the need for French-manufactured equipment and supplies, 
the location of the plant, the expected size of the labor force, the 
expected sales volumes and the contribution which the venture will 
make to the reduction of imports and the increase of exports. Such 
ventures often involve not only an application to buy or subscribe 
to shares, but also to import heavy or highly technical equipment. 
The applicant must also give information on the expected means 
of financing, and particularly on the amount of bank or other credit 
which may be needed, and whether the investment is to be made un-
der a guaranty of the United States International Cooperation Ad-
ministration. It must also be indicated whether the investment is 
purely foreign or involves French capital-which may help in 
achieving acceptance but is not a necessity. The application sub-
mitted does not, except in extreme cases, constitute a commitment, 
but the future attitude of French authorities towards the new enter-
prise will naturally be affected by the bona fides with which the proj-
ect submitted to them is carried out. 
When authorization is obtained, the interests or stock may be 
acquired, and the rules already described for their acquisition then 
apply. Newly-acquired stock may be transferred abroad, or de-
posited in a bank in France, or held by the company itself. Divi-
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dends and other proceeds are transferable and convertible provided 
the owner of the stock is a resident in the convertible zone. If the 
stock is not deposited with an Authorized Intermediary, a certifi-
cate of residence must be produced for transfers, which must always 
be effected through an Authorized Intermediary. Transfer of stock 
dividends remains subject to authorization-which is easily obtain-
able if the relationship of stock to dividends is reasonable. 
Assignment of such interests and stock is also subject to authori-
zation of the Exchange Control Office, as is the withdrawal of the 
proceeds in case of "disinvestment." The requirement of authoriza-
tion is retained to make certain that transactions resulting in with-
drawal are legitimate.101 
E. OPENING OF A BRANCH IN FRANCE 
The opening of a branch does not, of itself, require authorization 
since no new company is organized. In fact, however, authorization 
may be necessary-for example, because the assets of a going con-
cern are acquired. 
The transfer of profits is subject to authorization, but the initial 
authorization normally provides that further authorization shall 
be automatic. The sale of a branch is also subject to authorization 
since it involves the sale of the assets of a going concern. 
F. LOANS 
Loans in francs up to roo,ooo,ooo francs need not be authorized 
if made from convertible accounts,102 if for a term of not more than 
five years and if the interest rate is not higher than the lower of: 
s%, and d-f times the rate of interest applied by the Banque de 
France for loans against securities. 
Mortgages may be obtained through a notary. Interest and prin-
cipal payments are transferable and convertible through the original 
convertible account out of which the loan was made. Assignments 
of loans are subject to authorization, and authorization is also neces-
sary for loans which do not meet the above requirements. 
G. EFFECT OF THE E.E.C. TREATY 
The above rules apply to non-residents in general. When non-
residents are resident~ of a Community country, the provisions of 
101 But Reg. 419, which applied to dollar investments and has been superseded by 
Reg. 669 of Jan. 21, 1959, was more precise as to the purely technical character of the 
supervision to be exercised at the time of "disinvestment." 
102 See Part II, supra. 
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the Rome Treaty apply. Under Article 52 "restrictions on the free-
dom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the terri-
tory of another Member State shall be progressively abolished in 
the course of the transition period." Article 58 provides that com-
panies organized in accordance with the law of "a Member State 
and having their registered office, central management or main 
establishment within the Community" enjoy the benefit of, inter alia, 
Article 52. Progressive elimination of restrictions includes the elimi-
nation of all restrictions to the creation of agencies, branches, or 
subsidiaries. 
Since these provisions require no immediate action on the part of 
the Member States, special rules have not yet been established for 
investments in France of nationals of the other five Member States. 
A problem might arise, however, if, contrary to the prohibition 
against new restrictions to establishment (Article 53) or to a pro-
gram established by the Council (pursuant to Article 54) authoriza-
tions were refused, since, under the French Constitution, the Treaty, 
and, therefore action of the Council pursuant thereto, supersedes 
regulations and even laws.103 In any case Regulation 669 104 may be 
considered a step in the direction of the progressive abolition of 
restrictions to establishment envisaged by the Treaty. 
VI. SANCTIONS 
Penalties for infringement of exchange control laws and regula-
tions may be heavy, but the Ministry of Finance has the right to 
settle for a conventional fine, so that court decisions concerning 
penalties are not frequent. Infringement may also affect the validity 
of a contract or prevent or invalidate its performance. Here again 
court decisions are rare-obviously because parties do not like to 
become involved in court cases which may have penal consequences. 
A. PENAL SANCTIONS 
Two texts are here relevant. One, 105 of very general effect, con-
cerns the prevention of infringements of exchange control regula-
tions. The other one 106 applies only to infringements of regulations 
applicable to French assets abroad. 
108 French Constitution (hereinafter cited as Fr. Const.) 1958 art. 55· See text, infra 
at note 123. 
10
' See note 8r supra. 
105 Order 45-1088 of May 30, 1945, [May 31, 1945] J.O. 
106 Decree of Sept. 9, 1939, [Sept. ro, 1939] J.O. art. 4, as modified by Law of Apr. 
IS, 1942. 
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Penalties consist in fines of a minimum of I so francs and of a 
maximum of 3oo,ooo,ooo francs and imprisonment of from one 
month to five years (or up to ten years for repeating offenders). 
The court must, moreover, confiscate the corpus delicti or, upon re-
quest of customs officials, it may impose fines of an amount equal 
to the value of the corpus delicti. 
Fines are somewhat smaller in cases involving French assets 
abroad 107 and in such cases the criminal court is not bound to con-
fiscate the corpus delicti. Attempted violations, when so character-
ized by a court, may be prosecuted and accomplices may also be 
charged.108 
The general principles of the French Penal Code apply to these 
sanctions, but derogations from the Code make them more strin-
gent. A complete review of the derogations is beyond the scope of 
this work. Nonetheless it can be generally stated that the sanctions 
of economic laws and regulations are severe, and that the defendant 
has less protection against a rigorous application of the rules than 
he does in regard to other offenses. The reason is widely accepted. 
Violations of economic rules and regulations do not seem, prima 
facie, as unethical as other offenses, and it requires a very strong 
deterrent to frighten people into abstaining from actions which 
formerly were considered legitimate, and which are so directly to 
their advantage. 
One of the most striking features of the penal provisions of this 
legislation is that proof of an intention to commit the forbidden 
action (dolus penalis) is not a necessary element of a conviction. 
Naturally an insane person or anyone deprived of will may not be 
considered responsible; but for all others these laws are applied in 
the same way as traffic regulations-violations are, so to speak, auto-
matically punished. Needless to add, the old principle nemo cen-
setur ignorare legem (no one is deemed to be ignorant of the law) 
is strictly applied. 
The other prominent feature of these statutes is that their en-
forcement is intended to be a weapon in the hands of the competent 
government agencies. This explains most of their special provisions. 
In the first place, infringement itself is not defined in a statute 
enacted by the French Assembly, but by an administrative body. It 
is provided that "Infringements of exchange control regulations 
are punished as provided in the present order." 109 Thus, the normal 
107 Cases in which the Decree of Sept. 9, 1939 is applicable. 
'''Order 45-1008 arts. 20, 21, [May 31, 1945] J.O. 
'"'Order 45-1088 art. 2. 
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French principle Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (no crime, 
no penalty, absent a law) is only in part respected. The "crime" 
is defined in a regulation, and in consequence of its official publica-
tion 110 everyone is presumed to know all of the subleties of com-
plex and changing rules. 
Secondly, broad powers are granted to certain administrative 
officials to discover and make an official record of infractions. These 
are not only the normally competent police officers, but also the 
customs officers and officials of the Ministry of Finance and Ex-
change Control Office. Such officials have power to investigate, ob-
tain information from other governmental agencies (with respect 
to suspected offenses) and to go through postage parcels addressed 
abroad or sent from abroad.111 
Thirdly-and this is probably the best proof of the true aim of the 
statutes in question-prosecution depends on the decision of the 
Minister of Finance (or his representative) and the Ministry may 
choose to settle for a conventional fine, even after a judicial sen-
tence has been handed down, 112 unless the accused has been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment in which case the court's decision is final. 
Settlements occur very often, not only because there are doubtful 
cases, but also because the government agency itself considers that 
its proper function is not to obtain heavy judicial penalties, but to 
recover assets which would otherwise be lost to the French economy. 
The policy of the exchange control administration is the same as 
that of a bureau of taxation. This is why, in case of death of a de-
fendant, the possibility for prosecution does not disappear: confisca-
tion of assets in the estate of the deceased person may be possible.U3 
Moreover, companies are jointly liable for fines to which their of-
ficers have been sentenced, when the infraction was committed in 
the interest of the company.114 It is only in the more extreme cases 
that judicial intervention is sought. 
B. CIVIL LAw CoNSEQUENCES 
Contracts which violate certain prohibitions are void (under 
French law). In other cases, for example where payment in a 
foreign currency must be authorized, the law may make performance 
impossible, although the contract may not be void. 
110 In the Journal Officiel. 
111 See Order 45-1088 arts. 3-7. 
112 !d., arts. 8-xo. 
113 /d., art. 11. 
mId., art. 12. 
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The first category includes provisions 115 which subject all assign-
ments of real property rights, all acquisitions of goodwill, stock, 
debentures and bonds issued in France or located in France, and all 
subscriptions to such stock, debentures, or bonds to prior authori-
zation when a non-resident is a party to the operation. It also prob-
ably includes the provisions, 116 under which all acquisitions and all 
acts, of which the purpose is the assignment or substantial modifica-
tion of assets abroad, are subject to authorization when a French 
resident is a party to such act. Indeed, as a rule French courts will 
hold void transactions in violation of law, at least when a penal 
sanction is attached to the prohibition violated.117 In one case,118 
for example, the court declared that a subscription to the shares of 
a company made by a resident acting as a straw-man for a non-resi-
dent was void because the necessary authorization had not been ob-
tained. Under French law such a result is not subject to question, 
and, since the nullity is the result of a criminal offense, any interested 
party may bring an action to have the transaction voided. 
Such consequences are harsh, and it has been argued that, since 
the nullity depends upon the lack of the necessary authorization of 
the Exchange Control Office, and since prosecution depends upon a 
decision of the Ministry of Finance, such a transaction should not 
be voided until that office has definitely refused its authorization. No 
court decision supports this theory, but it can, at least, be argued 
that if the Exchange Control Office grants its authorization a pos-
teriori, but before a final court decision has been reached concern-
ing the validity of a contract, the contract could not be declared 
void. Since the criminal offense has been purged, it can no longer be 
said that the contract involves a breach of law. 
The nature of the nullity is important. It does not result from an 
incapacity to act, but from a violation of French public policy 
(i.e., l' ordre public). For that reason unauthorized transactions by 
French residents abroad should not be void, at least when, accord-
ing to the relevant choice-of-law rules, such transactions are not 
subject to French law. 119 Many regulations of the Exchange Con-
trol Office specify that transactions which are subject to the ex-
115 Decree 47-133 7, art. 51, [July 20, 1947] J.O. 
u• I d., art. 58. 
117 This rule has been applied in many instances of violation of the exchange con-
trol regulations. Cour de Ia Seine [Ch. Civ.] Mar. 14, 1949, [1949] J.C.P. II. 5038. 
Court de Belfort [Ch. Civ.] Feb. 6, 1952, [1952] G.P. II, Table analytique 166. 
us Commercial Court of the Seine, Jan. 3, 1951, [1952] J.C.P. II. 6846. 
119 Unless they are subject to Article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment concerning the International Monetary Fund which provides for the unenforce-
ability of exchange contracts prohibited by regulations of the signatory states. 
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change control regulations of another state must also conform with 
such regulations. 
When exchange control regulations affect only the performance 
of certain obligations, the consequences may be very difficult to 
foresee. The most frequent and interesting case is the one concerning 
the prohibition of unauthorized payments. If, for example, a license 
contract, which provides for royalties to be paid by the French li-
censee to his foreign licensor, has not been submitted to the Ex-
change Control Office before it is executed, difficulties may be ex-
pected at the time an authorization for transfer of the first royalties 
is applied for. If the contract is under French law, and if it does not 
clearly provide that payment must be made in foreign currency, 
the French debtor will have performed its obligations under French 
law by a payment of the corresponding amount of royalties into a 
"temporary" account, which is blocked. On the other hand, if it is 
clear that payment must be made in foreign currency, non-perform-
ance may lead to a cancellation of the contract. Since, however, the 
contract will have been in force for a period of time, royalties will 
have accrued, or in certain circumstances damages will be payable. 
A French court would certainly grant such damages, but they could 
not be transferred without authorization. 
Another dispute between the parties is possible. A non-resident 
may argue that it was the resident's duty to apply for the necessary 
authorization in due time. The resident may answer that the exist-
ence of exchange control regulations in France is well known, and it 
was up to the non-resident to stipulate such terms and conditions as 
he deemed necessary. There has been a great deal of theoretical dis-
cussion of this question, but each case requires its own solutions. 
Precedents are, for example, of little help in regard to the most 
frequent cause of litigation in this area-losses due to a sudden 
change in the rate of exchange between the currency of the debtor 
and that of the creditor. One case is, however, clear: if a loss is 
suffered because of the negligence of the debtor, he must make such 
loss good. 120 
VII. PROBABLE EVOLUTION UNDER THE E.E.C. 
TREATY 
New exchange control regulations in France which have created 
more freedom in international trade, payments, and investments 
120 Court of Appeal of Colmar May 28, 1952, Revue Critique de Droit International 
Prive 1952, p. 723. 
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since the end of the year I 9 58, were not introduced solely to com-
ply with the Rome Treaty. Their scope is, in fact, broader than that 
of France's Treaty obligations-to which the regulations make no 
reference. 
Consideration of the effect of the Treaty on those regulations 
is therefore indicated. Three points should be stressed: I) The 
provisions of that Treaty are mandatory, and, at least to the extent 
that they are self-executing, must now be considered part of French 
exchange control laws; 2) The implementation of the Treaty is pro-
gressive; 3) The effect of the Treaty is to shift from national 
authorities to Community authorities the bulk of the power to regu-
late international trade, payments, and investments, both among 
Member States and, to a large extent, between the Community and 
third countries. 
A. FRENCH LAw AND CoMMUNITY LAw 
It is important to realize that the hierarchy of French texts ap-
plicable to exchange control 121 is now affected by the provisions of 
the Treaty which have become a part of internal French law. It 
is a clear principle of French constitutional law that when a Treaty 
has been duly ratified, its provisions prevail over any contrary 
provision of a prior or subsequent law. Accordingly the self-exe-
cuting provisions of the Treaty are binding on French citizens and 
must be applied by courts whenever appropriate. That principle was 
expressly stated in the Constitution of 1946, Article 26: "Diplo-
matic treaties duly ratified and published have the same force as a 
law even though they be contradictory of internal French law, and 
no legislative act is necessary to their enforcement beyond that re-
quired for ratification." 122 
The new I 9 58 Constitution is different but no less precise. Article 
55 under the Title "Treaties and International Agreements" reads: 
"Treaties or agreements duly ratified and published have, as soon 
as they are published, an authority superior to laws, provided, for 
each treaty and agreement, that it shall be so applied by the other 
party thereto." 123 
Accordingly, articles of the Treaty which concern foreign ex-
change control are part of French law and a person to whom the 
benefit of these provisions accrues may have recourse to the com-
petent court to vindicate his rights. 
Ht See text at note 7· 
122 Fr. Const. 1946. 
123 Fr. Const. 1958, art. 55· 
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B. A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 
During the transitional period powers of exchange regulation 
are to be progressively shifted from the Member States to Com-
munity institutions. Since the purpose of the Treaty is to establish 
an economic community, a single market common to the Six, it is 
to be expected that the power over economic decisions, which de-
termine the need and form of exchange control regulations, would 
also be shifted to the Community. Indeed, the powers given to the 
Community institutions to make economic policy are great, while 
those which directly concern exchange control regulations, curiously 
enough, appear weaker. Exchange control measures are plainly sub-
ordinate, however, to questions of economic policy. 
A thoroughgoing study of the Treaty would accordingly be neces-
sary to indicate the probable effect of the Treaty on exchange con-
trol regulations. Some examples of the Treaty provisions concern-
ing international trade, investments, and transfers of funds will, 
failing that, suggest the kinds of progressive changes which can be 
expected to influence exchange control regulations. 
Increases of quotas and reductions of tariffs pursuant to the 
Treaty began on January I, I959, and bilateral quotas were merged 
by each Member State vis-a-vis the five other Member States, into 
global quotas which were increased by zo% ( 10% for each prod-
uct). A similar increase must be effected at the beginning of each 
succeeding year. 124 All quotas must disappear by the end of the 
transitional period. State monopolies of a commercial character 
must be organized in such a way that they do not constitute an 
obstacle to progressive liberalization.125 Services rendered across 
national boundaries are also to be freed of restrictions/26 but since 
modification of national laws may be necessary in certain cases (for 
example, as to pharmacology) the Council will establish a program 
to facilitate the exchange of services from country to country.127 
Tariffs and charges of similar effect were first subjected to a gen-
eral reduction of 10%. At the beginning of the two I8-month pe-
riods subsequent to January I, I959, and one year after the begin-
ning of the last of these periods a new 10% general reduction must 
be made (of at least 5% as to each product, or I o% if the rate is 
higher than 30%). The reduction on each product should reach 
zs% at the end of the first stage and so% at the end of the second 
12
' Treaty arts. 31-33. 
125 Treaty art. 37· 
"
16 Treaty art. 59· 
""Treaty arts. 6o-63. 
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four-year stage (the timing of the reductions in the second stage 
again to be I8 months, 36 months, and 4 years after its beginning). 
In calculating those percentages duties which are not designed to 
protect national industry (i.e., duties of a fiscal nature) may not be 
taken into account.128 Import duties are to be completely abolished 
by the end of the transitional period. 
Investments are similarly to be freed of restrictions.129 Existing 
restrictions may not, moreover, be made more restrictive after 
January I, 1958. But the freedom of establishment, which is ac-
corded powerful protection by the Treaty both in regard to physical 
persons and to companies, may raise technical problems. For this 
reason the Treaty provides, as it does as to services, that the Coun-
cil shall, before the end of the first stage, lay down a program for 
the progressive implementation of the freedom of establishment. 
Since this program must be adopted by a unanimous decision of the 
Council, the Treaty also provides for a way to establish a program 
during the second period if unanimity has not been achieved prior 
thereto.130 
It is clear, then, that at least as of the second stage, transfers of 
funds among the Six will be facilitated. 
Article 67 of the Treaty provides, moreover, that restrictions 
on monetary transfers within the Community by residents of a Com-
munity country must progressively disappear, but the implementa-
tion of this provision is to be very cautious. Article 67 itself specifies 
that restrictions must be abolished "to the extent necessary for the 
proper functioning of the Common Market." What is asked from 
Member States is not, at least during the transitional period, to 
abolish restrictive regulation but to apply it in such a way that it 
does not result in an obstacle to free trade and investment within 
the Common Market: exchange authorizations are to be granted 
"in the most liberal manner possible." 131 In the same way Article 
67 provides that total freedom shall be granted current payments no 
later than the end of the first stage-this rule to be implemented 
pursuant to Article 106 according to which each Member State 
pledges itself to authorize payments in the currency of the country 
in which the creditor has his residence. Article 71 provides, more-
over, that "Member States shall endeavor to avoid introducing 
within the Community any new restrictions." 
The caution here manifest is explained by the evident fear of 
128 Treaty art. 17. 
'"' Treaty art. 52. 
'"
0 Treaty art. 56. 
181 Treaty art. 68. 
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further monetary troubles. The Treaty contains many safeguard 
clauses which may be invoked to deal with emergencies,m and 
principally with balance-of-payments difficulties, which France in-
sisted upon.133 
C. PROBABLE EFFECT OF A TRANSFER OF POWERS 
It is accordingly probable that present national exchange con-
trol laws and regulations will not be immediately abolished, at least 
not by reason of the Treaty provisions. As has been indicated, the 
effect on French exchange control regulations has been to make 
them more flexible, but not to abolish basic laws. This could also be 
said of the exchange control regulations of the other Member 
States. Nevertheless, implementation of the Treaty will sooner or 
later result in virtually complete freedom of international payments 
and of the transfer of funds within the Community (absent emer-
gencies, and the Community institutions are to decide, subject to 
decision by the Community Court, whether emergencies exist) .134 
A further result will also be achieved. In order to create a COTQ-
mon market it is not only necessary to abolish internal obstacles, it 
is also necessary to establish a common economic policy. Many steps 
must be taken to this end pursuant to the Treaty. One of the most 
striking is the progressive establishment of a common external 
tariff.135 An economic community, however, far exceeds the bounds 
of a customs union. The Treaty therefore envisages decisions by 
the Council concerning economic trends (the politique de conjonc-
ture) 136 and negotiations by the Community (through its Commis-
sion) not only of customs but of commercial treaties with third 
states.137 
A special body, the Economic and Social Committee,138 has been 
established to assist the Council and the Commission in their eco-
nomic functions, and special means to implement Community 
economic policy are provided for. Foremost among these aids are 
the European Investment Bank 139 and certain funds. 140 Little by 
little the Member States are either divested of their economic 
132 Treaty arts. 26, 73, 93, 108, 109, 226. 
133 See Protocol Concerning France annexed to t'· e Treaty. 
1
"' See, e.g., Treaty arts. 73, 109 and 226. 
"'"See Treaty arts. 18, 19 and 23. 
136 Treaty arts. 103 ( 3). 
131 Treaty art. II 3· 
138 Treaty art. 193· 
139 Treaty art. 129. 
''"Treaty arts. 199 and 132(3). 
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powers or must exercise them under the direction, or at least under 
the supervision, of the Commission or of the Council. The second 
yearly Report on the Activities of the Community by the Commission 
lays special emphasis on this aspect of its functions and stresses the 
important role of the Community in discussions with the O.E.E.C. 
and with G.A.T.T. 
Under these conditions, it will be difficult for any of the Member 
States to maintain an independent set of exchange control rules and 
regulations, even in regard to relations with third countries. For 
example, the Treaty provides that after December 31, 1960, na-
tionals of any one of the Six shall be accorded national treatment in 
any of the other five Member States in regard to financial partici-
pation in companies of the latter.H1 The words used to designate 
"nationals" (in French, ressortissants) may apply as well to com-
panies as to physical persons, 142 and if that construction is accepted 
by the court, a company formed in France would be free to subscribe 
to the capital of a company formed in Italy, even though the 
"French" company's stock was wholly owned by U.S. investors. It 
would accordingly be meaningless for Italy to apply to investors 
from outside the Common Market prohibitions which would be 
stricter than those of France and correspondingly it would be mean-
ingless for France to maintain stricter rules of investment than 
those of any of the other Six. The consequence of this logic has in 
fact already made itself felt even if the regulations do not yet re-
flect it. It is accordingly probable that, during the transitional period 
which ends in 1970 or at least no later than 1973, French exchange 
control laws and regulations will either be profoundly modified or 
abolished. 
m Treaty art. 221. 
142 Some doubt might be expressed as to the accuracy of the opinion expressed in 
the text, given the usual translation of the word "ressortissants" as "nationals" and 
given the wording of Article 58 of the Treaty, to which Article 221 expressly refers. 
Article 58 states that "for the purpose of this chapter," which differs from that of 
Article 221, companies which are described in the first paragraph of Article 58 are 
assimilated to "natural persons being nationals of Member States" which seems a 
contrario to exclude such assimilation in other chapters. But ( r) at least in French, 
"ressortissants" does not denote physical persons only; (2) the very wording of Article 
58 indicates that when physical persons are meant it must be specified that the "res-
sortissants" concerned are physical persons; and (3) there would be no point in pre-
venting a French company formed by U.S. citizens from subscribing to the capital of 
an Italian company, since practically the same results could, thanks to Article 58, 
be reached by forming in Italy a branch of the "French" company. 
Chapter V 
Industrial Property 
Stephen P. Ladas* 
I. PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The establishment of the European Common Market has raised 
many questions in the United States with respect to its effects on 
patent, design, trademark, and other industrial property rights. 
This is particularly so because the six members of the Common 
Market Community are, with Great Britain, the foreign countries 
in which ownership and exploitation of industrial property rights 
by American firms and their foreign subsidiaries are most extensive. 
Patents are sought in these countries not only with licensing or 
the establishment of manufacturing facilities in mind, but also be-
cause manufacturers in Western Europe enjoy strong competitive 
positions in world markets in part by means of foreign patents, and it 
is therefore vitally important for Americans to seek patent protec-
tion in this source of exports. Similarly, the acquisition of trademark 
rights through registration in the six countries prevents misappro-
priation and eliminates a source of dissemination of infringing 
marks to the rest of the world. 
The acquisition and maintenance of industrial property rights in 
these six countries have assumed an even greater importance in the 
period following World War II because of the very significant shift 
in American business methods in this part of the world. Instead of 
exporting goods manufactured in the United States, American en-
terprises are in increasing numbers licensing manufacturing sub-
sidiaries or independent manufacturers located in Europe. It is a 
*Member of the New York Bar; LL.D. Athens University; A.M. School of Political 
Science, Paris, 1923; LL.B. Harvard, 1926, S.J.D., 1927; member of Langner, Parry, 
Card & Langner, New York City; chairman, Commission for Protection of Industrial 
Property, U.S. Council of International Chamber of Commerce; secretary of Interna-
tional Patent and Trademark Association; author of a number of publications on 
industrial property law. 
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matter of personal knowledge that licensing agreements in this 
period have increased by more than IOoo% as compared with the 
pre-war period. 
The acquisition and maintenance of industrial property rights in 
the Six present many difficulties. Some are caused by the fact that 
each of the Six is an industrial country competing with other indus-
trial countries. All are technologically advanced; their populations 
are highly inventive; and each has large industrial concerns which 
file many patent applications and use or register a large number of 
trademarks. 
Other difficulties stem from the fact that their laws and proce-
dures are not uniform, so that the American inventor, designer or 
trademark owner encounters different problems in each of the Six. 
Further, their laws are based on economic and political philosophies 
or applied in keeping with judicial traditions and administrative 
procedures which differ from ours. For instance, a patent specifica-
tion as filed in any of these countries may differ considerably from 
one which would be acceptable in an American patent application. 
The United States patent system permits independent product 
claims not limited to the process of manufacture. In most of the 
European countries such independent claims are not permitted. The 
American system imposes neither penalties for failure to work 
patents, nor annual taxes during the term of the patent in order to 
maintain it. The Common Market countries impose both. A symbol, 
device, or word which may be registered as a trademark in the U.S. 
Patent Office may not be admitted to registration or validly regis-
tered in some Common Market countries and the laws governing 
licensing and assignment of trademarks differ from American law. 
What bearing will the creation of the Common Market have on 
these and other problems? Will the European Community adopt uni-
form patent, design, or trademark laws or will it seek only "har-
monization" of the laws of its individual members? If "harmoniza-
tion" is attempted, how will the attempt be made? Will the Com-
mon Market countries adopt special arrangements for the benefit of 
Community nationals, and will American nationals also enjoy the 
benefits of such arrangements? 
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to give some answers to 
these questions. 
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B. ROME TREATY PROVISIONS 
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
seeks to abolish economic boundaries between Member Countries. 
To this end, Article 3 foresees as one goal of the Community the 
"approximation of national legislation to the extent necessary for 
the functioning of the Common Market." The Treaty, in addition 
to providing for the removal of barriers to the free movement of 
goods, persons, services, and capital in the Common Market coun-
tries, contains a number of specific provisions envisaging coordina-
tion of national legislation to facilitate free movement. The Treaty 
does not provide specifically for harmonization or unification of 
industrial property law. Any development of this kind will only be 
effected by action of the institutions pursuant to the general pro-
visions of Articles 100 and 235· 
Article 100 provides that the Council of the Community, voting 
unanimously on a proposal of the Commission, 
shall issue directives for the approximation of such leg-
islative and administrative provisions of the Member 
States as have a direct incidence on the establishment or 
functioning of the Common Market. 
In addition Article 235 provides: 
If any action by the Community appears necessary to 
achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one 
of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty 
has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the 
Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a pro-
posal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been 
consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions. 
Action by the Council in the field of industrial property may in-
deed be necessary if the disparities among the laws of the Six create 
substantial obstacles to the proper functioning of the Common 
Market, or if the harmful effect of such laws on the free movement 
of goods in the Common Market is to be reduced to a minimum. It 
would seem illogical to abolish national economic boundaries by 
means of the Treaty and yet permit the barriers created by private 
industrial property rights to continue to exist. 
Pending such action by the Council, the only important limitation 
to which industrial property legislation is subjected by the Treaty 
(with the possible exception of that imposed by Articles 8 5 ff. 
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which are discussed later in this chapter) is that imposed by the last 
sentence of Article 36. The drafters intended that otherwise the 
regulation and protection of industrial property should be left to the 
Member States, as Article 36 makes clear. 
Following provisions prohibiting quantitative restrictions on the 
importation or exportation of goods (Articles 30-34), Article 36 
provides: 
The provisions of Articles 30-34 inclusive shall not be 
an obstacle to prohibitions or restrictions in respect of im-
portation, exportation or transit which are justified on 
grounds of public morality, public order, public safety, the 
protection of human or animal life or health, the preserva-
tion of plant life, the protection of national treasures of 
artistic, historical or archeological value or the protection 
of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions 
or restrictions shall not, however, constitute either a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States. (Italics added). 
Article 36, it will be noted, is stated in negative terms. It does not 
say that Member States retain under the Treaty full and virtually 
unrestricted power to maintain and create legislation concerning 
industrial property, but the effect is the same as if it so provided. 
This is clear since the bulk of the Treaty's provisions is directed at 
the removal of prohibitions and restrictions in respect of imports, 
exports, and transit and Article 36 places such prohibitions andre-
strictions, which are aimed at the protection of industrial or com-
mercial property, beyond their reach. Ultimate definition of the 
limitation on this legislative freedom imposed by the last sentence 
of Article 36 is left to the Community Court by Article 177. 
Article 36 is probably derived from, and corresponds to, Article 
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.). 
Article XX provides that the Agreement shall not be construed to 
prevent the adoption or application by the contracting countries of 
measures necessary for the protection of public morals, of health, 
and of life; or of laws or regulations relating to "the protection of 
patents, trademarks and copyrights"; or of measures "proper to 
prevent practices of a nature to induce to error." 
Article 36 refers to "the protection of industrial and commercial 
property." "Industrial property" is an expression which has an ac-
cepted meaning. "Commercial property" is not. Although the mean-
ing of "prohibitions or restrictions . . . justified on grounds of 
h . f '1 " . . . t e protectiOn o . . . commercra property . . . seems 
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broader, this clause is probably a restatement of what Article XX 
of G.A.T.T. expresses by the terms "measures proper to prevent 
practices of a nature to induce to error"; that is, it is probably di-
rected at protection against unfair competition. 
Reference also must be made to Article 234 of the Treaty, the 
first paragraph of which provides: 
The rights and obligations resulting from conventions con-
cluded prior to the entry into force of this Treaty between 
one or more Member States, on the one hand, and one or 
more third countries, on the other hand, shall not be af-
fected by the provisions of this Treaty. 
One of the Conventions to which this Article may be deemed to 
refer is certainly the International Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, commonly known as the Paris Union Con-
vention, originally adopted in 18 8 3, and periodically revised in the 
ensuing years. The revision which last went into effect prior to the 
signing of the Rome Treaty was that of London in 1934. A more 
recent revision of the Paris Union Convention was made at Lisbon 
on October 3 r, 1958. Member States of the Common Market are 
required, by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 234, to take 
all necessary steps to remove any incompatibility between the Paris 
Union Convention and the Treaty. 
In view of this provision and also of the provision of Article roo 
which contemplates action by the Council to harmonize those laws, 
regulations and administrative rules of the Member States which 
directly affect the operation of the Common Market, and therefore 
to harmonize their industrial property laws, it is necessary to review 
the systems of industrial and commercial property in the Six result-
ing from municipal legislation and regulation and from international 
treaties. This review will not examine the systems of the Six in their 
entirety but only those aspects which may involve prohibitions or 
restrictions capable of frustrating the purposes of the Common 
Market. 
C. PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
BASED ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
National industrial property laws are territorial in character, 
that is, the territorial scope of the rights they grant and the obliga-
tions they create is limited to the areas in which those laws obtain. 
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The validity of a patent granted in Germany cannot extend beyond 
Germany's boundaries. A trademark right acquired in France is 
effective only in France. 
The national law applicable in the territory of a state determines 
the subject matter of protection, the formalities and conditions of 
protection, the administrative procedure governing the acquisition 
of various rights, the scope of protection, the means of enforcement, 
and the duration of the right. All of these are determined by each 
state in the light of its political structure, its legislative, judicial 
and administrative traditions and policies, and its internal economy. 
In the history of law industrial property legislation is compara-
tively recent. Generally such legislation was first introduced dur-
ing the latter half of the last century 1 as new conditions of indus-
trial and commercial life developed which demanded recognition 
of new claims and the satisfaction of new interests. Because these 
claims and interests were generally similar, it was possible for coun-
tries to model their industrial property laws on those of other 
countries whose general laws and legal phraseology were akin to 
their own. Certain type-groups of industrial property legislation are 
therefore found throughout the world, the countries of each group 
having enacted legislation based on common principles which pro-
duced similar administrative regulations. 
But law consists not only of legislative texts or formal regula-
tions. It includes administrative practice, techniques in handling 
legal materials, and political and social ideas and ideals which nour-
ish and give life to legal materials and their administration. This 
makes industrial property laws, which are much alike in legislative 
texts-for example, those of France and Belgium-quite different 
in application. 
By the beginning of the last quarter of the last century, it was 
already clear that the strict territorial theory of industrial property 
law and the disparities among legal regulations resulting from vary-
ing legislative and administrative practice were not in harmony with 
the nature of industrial property which should not be restricted ir-
relevantly by national boundaries; that the great multiplication and 
development of means of communication were creating a unified 
world; and that no country could expect to satisfy the claims and 
protect the interests of its own people in this sphere without secur-
ing for them protection on an international level. 
This led to the adoption of the International Convention for the 
1 Switzerland passed its first patent law in 1888 and the Netherlands, not until 1910. 
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Protection of Industrial Property at Paris in I883. The interna-
tional regime of industrial property established by this Convention 
has been periodically revised in the three-quarters of a century that 
the Convention has been in existence, and it now constitutes an in-
ternational charter which is of extraordinary importance in inter-
national trade and international investment. 
This Convention has established two fundamental principles: 
(I) the principle of national treatment according to which na-
tionals of each contracting country enjoy in the other contracting 
countries the same protection and the same rights which those coun-
tries accord to their own nationals; and 
( 2) the principle that each country is required to extend speci-
fied special rights or advantages to the nationals of the other con-
tracting countries, the object of which is to establish either certain 
uniform standards or certain kinds of protection, both of which are 
made necessary by the fact that the contracting countries have di f-
fering laws, and that adequate protection of industrial property 
must transcend the boundaries of individual countries. 
The most important special rights and advantages for which the 
Paris Union Convention provides are: 
(I) the right of priority under which a foreign applicant for 
a patent, design or trademark may first file in one contracting coun-
try and claim the priority date of this first filing in another con-
tracting country upon the filing of a second application there, pro-
vided his subsequent application is filed within a certain term (twelve 
months for patents and six months for designs and trademarks, from 
the date of the first filing) ; 
( 2) the abolition of the forfeiture of a patent because of im-
portation of articles made by the patentee in another country and 
restriction of the sanctions for non-working of his invention in the 
country in which he has obtained a patent; 
(3) a period of grace for the payment of fees and annuities; 
(4) the abolition of penalties for failure to work a design and 
for importation of articles bearing the design; 
( 5) the abolition of the requirement of prior home registration 
as a condition of registration of a trademark in Member Countries; 
( 6) the validation of trademarks registered abroad, subject to 
certain exceptions; 
( 7) the protection of the owner of a well-known trademark 
against misappropriation even though the owner has no registration 
in the foreign contracting country; 
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( 8) the protection of trade names without the obligation of 
registration; 
( 9) protection against acts of unfair competition.2 
This remarkable list of rights and advantages was designed to 
establish a far-reaching uniformity of legislative treatment of in-
dustrial property rights throughout the 4 7 countries which are par-
ties to the Convention. The provisions of the Convention are given 
effect either on the theory that certain of them are self-executing 
or by legislation or administrative regulation. A number of signa-
tory countries have been lax in bringing their laws into conformity 
with the Convention, but where implementing legislation was neces-
sary, it has generally been enacted in each of the Six. Indeed, on 
the whole and in the long run, the growth of national law and prac-
tice which conforms to the Convention has been marked. 
Each of the Six has long been a party to the Paris Union Con-
vention of I 883, and each has ratified the revised London Text of 
I 934· All are therefore bound by it not only in their relations to 
each other but also to the other 41 countries of the Paris Union 
(including, therefore, the United States). The obligations created 
by the Convention are therefore of great significance in considering 
future industrial property developments in the Common Market. 
Fulfilment of these obligations will not, however, resolve the 
problem for the Common Market of economic barriers created by 
industrial property rights. On the other hand a logical and complete 
2 The following additional special rights and advantages are provided for in the 
Convention: 
(a) the independence of patents obtained in the various countries, so that refusal, 
forfeiture or cancellation of the patent in one contracting country does not 
affect patents obtained in other contracting countries; 
(b) the elimination of refusals to a patent and of the invalidation of patents on 
the ground that the sale of the patented product is subject to restrictions or 
limitations resulting from the domestic law; 
(c) the exemption from patent-mfringement rules of the use of a patented device 
on board vessels or aircraft temporarily entering the territory of a country; 
(d) the protection of process patents against the importation of products made 
in another country on the basis of such process patents; 
(e) the creation of an obligation of contracting countries to protect industrial 
designs; 
(f) the protection of armorial bearings, flags, state emblems, and official signs or 
hall marks against appropriation as trademarks; 
(g) the protection of service marks; 
(h) the permission to assign foreign trademarks with the local goodwill only; 
(i) the permission to license trademarks (although of very inadequate effect); 
(j} the protection of the trademark owner against misappropriation of his mark 
by a foreign representative or agent; 
(k) the protection of association or collective marks; 
(I) protection against false indications of origin. 
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answer to this problem would be the adoption of single patent and 
trademark laws, and a general unification of other industrial prop-
erty laws throughout the Common Market. It is unlikely that the 
Six will go so far in the foreseeable future. Industrial property law 
is intimately connected with civil, procedural, commercial and crimi-
nal laws of the countries in question. It cannot be fully unified unless 
large segments of those laws are also effectively unified. 
The question, then, is how far the Six may be willing to go in 
harmonizing their industrial property laws, and in considering this 
question two fundamental observations should be kept in mind. 
First, development in this field depends on choices among several 
vital alternatives of policy. Is the European Community to seek 
extensive or limited economic integration of the Member States, 
and in either case is it: to pursue a policy of free trade or one di-
rected at a controlled economy; to impose specialization of industry 
or encourage competition; to seek an economy of large or of small 
units? These general problems of policy will determine to a large 
extent the answers to the questions posed. 
Secondly, we must distinguish between unification or harmoniza-
tion of the law of industrial property directed at simplifying the 
obtaining, maintenance and enforcement of industrial property 
rights-goals which are plainly desirable whether or not a Com-
mon Market exists-and that which is specifically necessary or desir-
able in order to increase freedom of movement of goods or to re-
move obstacles to such movement in the Common Market 
II. PATENTS 
A. PATENT LAWS IN THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES 
A patent is a statutory monopoly granted to an inventor in ex-
change for the disclosure of his invention to the public in his applica-
tion for a patent. Ownership of a patent for a particular product or 
process in one country of the Common Market enables the patentee 
to stop at the borders of that country the importation of the sub-
ject matter of the patent from any of the other five. Differences in 
the patent laws of the Six are important from the point of view of 
administrative procedure for the grant of patents, patentability of 
inventions, subject-matter restrictions, annuities, working require-
ments and duration of patents. 
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I. ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURE 
The administrative procedures prescribed by the laws of the Six 
for grants of patents differ in important respects and the conse-
quences of these differences are significant. 
In two of the countries of the Common Market, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, there is no examination of an application, except with 
respect to formal matters. Administrative officials do not undertake 
to examine whether the invention is adequate or whether the claims 3 
are proper. The patent will be issued immediately, and determina-
tion of its validity is left to the courts. In France and Italy, examina-
tion is confined to subject matter,4 form, and unity of invention.5 In 
France, subject matter is considered only in the case of pharmaceu-
ticals, and in Italy only in the case of pharmaceuticals and foods and 
beverages. Prior art 6 is not cited in any of these four countries. In 
Germany and the Nether lands, on the other hand, examination is 
extremely strict as regards form, unity of invention, subject matter, 
and novelty; and domestic and foreign prior art may be cited. Op-
positions may be filed after publication of acceptance 
2. PATENTABLE INVENTIONS 
Whether or not the patent office examines an application in de-
tail prior to grant of the patent, the question of patentability of the 
invention may be litigated after the grant in each of the Six. A basic 
requirement in each country is novelty of the invention, but the defi-
nition of novelty varies. 
The existence of an issued prior patent or any other printed publi-
cation anywhere covering the same subject matter is a bar to validity 
in all six countries, except that in Belgium an importation patent 
may be granted, although a corresponding foreign patent has been 
issued, provided there has been no public use in Belgium prior to 
3 "Claims" in a patent application define the monopoly granted to the patentee. They 
tell the public the prohibited ground that the inventor claims for himself. If, for in-
stance, the specification describes machinery in its entirety, and does not state which 
parts the inventor claims as new, the patent will be void if any particular part turns 
out to be old. 
'"Subject matter" in a patent application means the field to which the invention 
relates, for instance, a new process for the manufacture of food products or new food-
stuffs or an invention in the chemical field or in the electronic field. 
5 "Unity of invention" means that the application does not purport to claim separate 
and distinct inventions. If more than one invention is covered, a separate application 
must be filed for each. 
• "Prior art" means the prior knowledge in the particular industry or technology. 
Such knowledge may be embodied in scientific or technical publications, patent spe-
cifications, issued patents, etc 
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filing there. In France, Italy, and the Netherlands, moreover, prior 
publicity of the invention anywhere sufficient to enable it to be 
worked is a bar. This is absolute in the sense that any publication, 
whether printed or not, and any public use is fataP In Belgium and 
Germany printed prior publication anywhere is a bar, while public 
use of the invention in other countries is not. In Germany, moreover, 
public use or any printed disclosure by the inventor during the six 
months preceding the filing date is not a bar and printed publications 
more than one hundred years old are not considered as affecting the 
novelty of the invention claimed. 
The standard of invention which will justify the issue of a patent 
in the strict-examination countries, Germany and the Netherlands, 
is of the highest. The patent office examiners in these countries must 
be convinced not only of the novelty of the invention but also that 
a requisite level of inventiveness is disclosed 8 and that the inven-
tion represents an advance in the art. The applicant is usually called 
upon to establish a "new technical effect" and must prove that the 
invention at the time of the application was not obvious to a person 
skilled in the particular art. 
3· SUBJECT MATTER RESTRICTIONS 
Restrictions relating to immoral inventions, financial schemes, 
and the like aside, significant differences in the laws of the Six relate, 
first of all, to the problem of process and product patents and, sec-
ondly, to exclusion of certain fields of invention from patent protec-
tion. 
Belgium is the only one of the Six which grants patents for new 
processes as well as new products, in the pharmaceutical field. On 
the other hand in Italy no patents may be obtained either for prod-
ucts or for processes in the pharmaceutical field. In Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and Germany inventions relating to chemical or 
pharmaceutical products and foodstuffs can only be protected by 
7 This is not true in the Netherlands. Its courts have held that a publication (or 
public use) is only fatal with respect to novelty if a Dutch expert could discover it, 
and the Patent Office takes the view that this may be prevented by factors of lan-
guage or place of publication. 
8 An invention necessarily involves an addition to the stock of knowledge, i.e., the 
public must be told something which it did not know before. No invention is involved 
in merely doing what has not been done before if it could have been achieved by a 
skilled workman as a matter of shop routine. Mere application of ordinary knowl-
edge or of obvious matter is not invention. There is no invention in the adaptation, 
without ingenuity, of a well-known idea in a well-known manner for a well-known 
purpose. There must be an exercise of inventive faculty and a display of thought, 
skill and design in working it out. But the quantum of such exercise or display re-
quired is not the same in all countries. 
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process claims. This was also true in France for pharmaceutical 
compositions and remedies, but a recent law passed on February 4, 
1959, authorizes special patents for pharmaceutical products. In 
the Nether lands, products and compositions in bulk form, so-called 
Stof, can only be protected by process patents. 
But while independent claims for products, as distinct from proc-
esses, are not allowed, claims covering the manufacture of given 
products are in effect permitted in Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg, in the sense that these products are an inherent part 
of the process claims. If an infringer is sued on the ground that he 
is using or selling a product made by the patented process, the burden 
of proving that it was made by the protected process is usually on 
the patentees if the product is old, but this burden is shifted to the 
defendant if the product was new on the date of the process patent.9 
4· ANNUITIES 
All six countries impose annual taxes on the patentee during the 
life of the patent. In Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Italy, these 
are payable annually from the filing date; in the Nether lands an-
nually from the date of grant (which may be two or three years 
after filing) ; and in Germany, annually beginning with the third 
year after the filing date. 
5. WORKING REQUIREMENTS 
In each of the Six the patentee has an obligation to work his in-
vention. The sanction for failure to do so is a restriction of his ex-
clusive right. This obligation and the sanction therefor are basically 
affected by Article 5 of the Paris Union Convention. Article 5 pro-
vides that each country has the right to enact legislation providing 
for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses-notably 
failure to work-of the exclusive rights conferred by patents. Under 
the text as revised at Lisbon, an application for a compulsory license 
may not be made, on the ground of failure to work or insufficent 
working, until four years have expired since the date of filing of 
the patent application or three years since the date of the grant of 
the patent, whichever period last expires. An application for a com-
pulsory license is in any case refused if the patentee justifies his in-
action. Revocation of a patent is not permitted except in cases where 
9 Such date being the date of the filing of the application or priority date of the 
process patent. 
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the granting of compulsory licenses is not sufficient to prevent abuses 
resulting from non-working. Even in such cases, however, a pro-
ceeding for revocation may not be instituted until two years have ex-
pired since the granting of the first compulsory license. 
Although the domestic law has not been revised in Belgium and 
Luxembourg in accordance with Article 5, the courts have held 
that its provisions are self-executing and must therefore be given 
effect. In France since 1953 and in the Netherlands since 1957 the 
law has conformed to the London text of the Convention. The Ger-
man law also reflects the provisions of the Convention. In Italy, 
however, the law governing working requirements is not conform-
mg. 
Italian law requires that a patent must be worked in Italy within 
three years from the date of grant. Failure to work within such 
term entails forfeiture of the patent. Patentees may void this result 
only by exhibiting the patented invention at one of the official Italian 
Fairs within the period fixed for working. The theory is that such 
an exhibition is in effect a working of the patent for the duration of 
the exhibition. Exhibition may be effective, however, only once. 
6. DVRATION OF PATENTS 
In Belgium, France and Luxembourg patents are granted for a 
term of twenty years from the filing date. Importation patents are 
granted in Belgium for the remainder of the term of the correspond-
ing foreign patent, if the term remaining does not exceed twenty 
years. In the Netherlands the term is eighteen years from the date 
of grant, and in Germany eighteen years from the day after the filing 
date. In Italy the term is fifteen years from the filing date. Patents 
of addition in all six countries are granted for the remainder of the 
term of the parent patent. 
B. PossiBILITIES OF UNIFICATION OR 
HARMONIZATION OF PATENT LAws 
IN THE CoMMON MARKET 
Patents create lawful monopolies by granting the patentee the 
exclusive right to control the subject matter of the patent through-
out the territory of the granting state. By the same token, patents 
restrain the liberty of others either to make and sell the same prod-
uct, in the case of product patents, or to utilize the process, in the 
case of process patents. Article 36 of the Treaty reserves to each 
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of the Six the power to enforce all prohibitions and restrictions to 
the free movement of goods required by the protection of patent 
rights. 
Is it possible, however, that no attempt will be made to unify or 
harmonize the six distinct patent systems of the Common Market? 
Such inaction seems unlikely, because the merging economic life of 
the Six must certainly create pressure to eliminate obstacles to the 
free flow of trade in the Community. 
Indeed, efforts at harmonizing patent law had already been initi-
ated before the conclusion of the Treaty, beginning in 1951 within 
the Council of Europe.10 A Committee of Experts on Patents was 
appointed by this Council to study unification, and on October 7, 
I 9 55 adopted the following resolutions: 
The Committee believes that the unification on certain 
points of the substantive law concerning patents is one 
of the conditions for the creation of a European patent 
to be issued either by a European Patent Office or by na-
tional Patent Offices. 
Unification, at least in the first stage, shall bear on: 
(a) the general conditions of patentability (industrial 
character, novelty, technical progress, inventive effort, 
effect of prior patents and patent applications) ; 
(b) the effect to be given to the specification and claimsY 
Before this resolution was adopted, various plans had been sub-
mitted by Longchambon (1949), Reimer (I953, I954), de Haan 
( r 9 54) and Was (I 9 54) ,12 These did not meet with approval. 
Then Dr. W. Lampert of Stuttgart suggested a project of unifica-
tionY This project contemplates the conclusion of a treaty permit-
ting an applicant to file a patent application in one of the contracting 
countries practicing prior examination, the filing to be effective in 
all contracting countries. The applicant would have the right to 
require that his application be communicated to the other contract-
ing countries so that they might examine it in accordance with their 
laws. The countries whose patent offices do not practice examination 
with regard to novelty could only advise the applicant that they 
10 67 LA PROPRIET!l lNDUSTRIELLE 19, 68 (1951) j 70 id. 59, 60 (1954). 
11 71 id. 236 (1955). 
'"Longchambon, Rapporteur of the Committee for Economic Questions of the Con-
sultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; Reimer, President of the German Patent 
Office; De Haan, President of the Dutch Patent Office; Was, Dutch Patent Attorney. 
13 See Report of Coordinatin{! Committee on Industrial Property Ri{!hts, [1957] AN-
NUAIRE DE L'ASSOCIATION lNTERNATIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION DE !.A PROPRIETE lN-
DUSTRIELLE 37i 74 LA PROPR!ETE lNDUSTRIELLE 33-39 (1958). 
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would deal with the copy of the application as if it were a national 
application, and the applicant would be granted a national patent 
after fulfilling the usual requirements. Any country which practices 
examination would have the choice of adopting as its own the ex-
amination made in the first country or of submitting the application 
to an examination of its own as soon as it was advised that the first 
country was ready to publish the invention. 
The Patent Commissioners of countries practicing examination 
have had a number of meetings. Among those present at the first 
of these, which was held at The Hague in April 1956, were the Com-
missioners of Germany and the Nether lands (as well as those of 
Britain, Austria, Norway, and Sweden). The following resolution 
was adopted : 
This meeting, taking notice that nearly all the European 
Patent Offices which undertake a search for novelty have 
difficulty in disposing of the present very large number of 
applications for patents because of the general shortage 
of technically-trained staff, and the increasing volume of 
search material and complexity of inventions, observing 
that when applications in respect of the same invention are 
lodged in more than one of these Offices the search for 
novelty has to be made in each of them, thus leading to a 
considerable repetition of work, and being of the opinion 
that this repetition of work might be avoided to some ex-
tent if the result of a search in one Office could be available 
to other Offices in which an application in respect of the 
same invention has been made, 
1. Recommends that these Offices should examine with 
interested parties in their countries whether powers, 
(a) to require an applicant for a patent to disclose 
the result of the search made in or on behalf of 
any other Office, and/ or 
(b) to enable Offices themselves to exchanQ"e search 
results would be of advantage to the Offices and 
would be acceptable in their countries. 
2. Requests the Government of the Netherlands to bring 
the resolution to the notice of the Secretary-General of 
the Council of Europe with the explanation that the meas-
ures proposed are of an exploratory nature. 
At a second meeting in Munich in April 1957,14 the Commis-
sioners accepted the Lampert project as the basis of a proposed first 
stage of unification. They appointed a sub-committee to prepare a 
11 73 LA PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 123 (1957). 
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draft Convention for Applications for a European Patent. The sub-
committee discussed the subject and submitted its conclusions to a 
third meeting of the Commissioners in Vienna in April 1958. 
The sub-committee agreed that a convention should be concluded 
providing for the filing of a joint patent application by any person 
entitled to file a national patent application. The joint application 
should be filed in the country of which the applicant is a national or 
in which he resides. He should indicate, on filing, the countries to 
which his patent application is to extend, and the application should 
contain a specification and claims. The fees to be paid would be the 
sum total of the fees payable to each of the countries covered by 
the joint application, and examination would be made by the patent 
office of the country in which the application was filed or by the 
International Institute of Patents at The Hague, the results to be 
communicated to the patent offices of the countries concerned. No 
patent office would be bound to accept these results, each therefore 
remaining free to make its own examination. A subsequent meeting 
was held in October 1959 in Vienna. This meeting discussed a modi-
fication of the previous plan under which a joint application is pre-
sented to the Patent Office of one country with a list of the countries 
in which protection is desired. A copy of the specification and full 
filing fees for each such country are remitted. The Patent Office 
receiving the joint patent application distributes the documents to 
the other countries and keeps them advised of the prosecution of 
the original application. The other countries may start their exami-
nation at any time or may await the results of the search in the 
original country. The meeting in Vienna decided to entrust a sub-
committee consisting of representatives of the Patent Offices of 
Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, and Swit-
zerland with the preparation of a draft Convention. 
In the meantime, an organization known as The Committee of 
the National Institute of Patent Agents ( C.N.I.P.A.) has pro-
duced its own plan, known as the "C.N.I.P.A. Plan." Its general 
outline is that an applicant filing application in one country shall be 
entitled to file in other countries, within the Paris Convention pri-
ority of twelve months, an inexpensive preparatory application to 
be completed within a prescribed period which will be long enough 
to allow him to receive the result of the official novelty search upon 
his first application. It is proposed that this period be six months. 
The preparatory application will include a copy of the specification 
on file in the originating application in the same language. After the 
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preparatory application is completed, a certified copy of the novelty 
search in respect of the first should be filed. This search may be 
undertaken by the Institute of The Hague. The usual documents 
and the regular fees must also be filed with the complete application 
which will then be examined, in accordance with the law of the 
country. The advantages of this plan are: original payment of small 
fees and saving of expenses of translation of specification which are 
generally quite high; a term of I 8 months for filing a complete 
specification in other countries. Ha 
The directors of the patent offices of the countries which do not 
practice examination also had a meeting in Paris in June I957.15 
They favored a simpler procedure, which would leave untouched the 
existing laws in each country and would provide only for a common 
novelty examination. Applicants would be entitled to file an inter-
national application meeting certain requirements: unity of inven-
tion, specification and claims, and the like. The national offices would 
then refer the application to the International Institute of Patents 
of the Hague for novelty examination. The findings would be com-
municated to the applicant who would then indicate in what coun-
tries he wished to obtain patent protection. Each country would 
then be free to proceed with the application and grant or refuse the 
patent. 
The directors of the patent offices of the Six have also decided to 
meet regularly to examine problems raised by the Common Market. 
Such meetings were held in Paris, Rome, Munich, The Hague, and 
Nice during the year I 9 58. At these meetings the directors discussed 
the conditions necessary for the harmonization of national laws, and 
particularly of the laws pertaining to working requirements within 
the Community; the possibility of common adoption of certain pro-
visions of given national laws; and a common procedure which 
would permit inventors to obtain protection more simply. 
Harmonization of patent law is, then, actively being sought. Un-
der the aegis of the Council of Europe, two Conventions have al-
ready been concluded: a Convention for Uniform Formalities of 
Patent Applications signed December I I, I953/6 and a Convention 
for the International Classification of Patents, signed December I 9, 
I954Y The first has been ratified by four of the Common Market 
ua 1960 ANNUAIRE DE L'ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION DE LA PRO-
PRIETE INDUSTRIELLE (n.s. No.9) 14-15. 
"'I d. at 205-206. 
16 70 id. 21-28 ( 195+). 
17 71 id. 3-5 (1955). 
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countries: Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and 
the second by :five: Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. 
A common search for novelty of claims for inventions is already 
operative in an informal way through the International Institute 
of Patents at The Hague, which was established by a Treaty of 
June 6, 1957. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
are parties to this Treaty. The Institute is an international non-
profit organization set up to carry out documentary research for the 
benefit of the governments of the member countries, of inventors, 
and of industry in general. The Institute functions independently of 
any government or state, and is staffed by qualified engineers and 
scientists of various nationalities who are engaged for specialized 
research in each of the different technical fields. Staff members are 
not permitted to perform any technical work other than that of the 
Institute. 
The Institute has access to the documentation system used by 
the Netherlands Patent Office which covers patent specifications of 
Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and the United States. Requests for searches 
may be made by the appropriate national patent offices or private 
persons and organizations of the countries which are parties to the 
Hague Agreement and also by persons of any nationality of a coun-
try which is party to the Paris Union Convention. 
Other attempts to simplify procedure, limited to the Common 
Market countries, are foreseeable. It is not unreasonable to ex-
pect that a plan may be worked out which will permit a Common 
Market inventor to make, at his option, a single filing in one coun-
try which will give him a filing date for all six countries, provided 
that the application satisfies requirements of form, content (proper 
description, claims, drawings, etc.) and certain other agreed require-
ments of the Six. It will probably be required, as in the Lampert 
plan, that copies of applications be transmitted by the patent office 
in which the application is first filed to the patent offices of the other 
Common Market countries. 
It will probably be agreed that applications for novelty examina-
tion may be submitted to the International Institute of Patents at 
The Hague and that it shall communicate its findings to the patent 
office in which the first application was filed, and, in accordance with 
the applicant's request, to other of the Common Market countries. 
Under such a plan the applicant would have to do nothing further, 
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in connection with his application, in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and Italy and his application would require only further examina-
tion in the Nether lands and Germany. 
Such simplification of procedure is plainly desirable. The greater 
the difficulties in filing applications and obtaining patents in the Six 
-whether due to language differences, methods of drawing up 
applications, requirements concerning the enumeration of claims, or 
other causes-the greater the advantage which large and financially 
strong corporations have over smaller firms and individual inven-
tors. If legal protection of inventions is justified, however, clearly 
it should be effected by the most efficient and equitable system pos-
sible, that is, one which enables everyone to obtain protection, and 
with a minimum of expense, trouble, and legal red tape. 
With regard to procedure the greatest difficulty lies in obtaining 
from Germany and the Nether lands agreement to adopt the proce-
dural system of the other four countries, or vice versa. It is difficult 
to believe that Germany and the Netherlands will agree to abandon 
their systems of examination. Nor would these two countries be 
willing to abolish their procedures for publication of inventions 
(the purpose of which is to make opposition by interested parties 
possible), even though the other four might be willing to subject 
applications to examination as to novelty, probably through the In-
stitute of The Hague. 
An agreement making it possible to obtain a single patent for 
the whole of the Common Market would increase freedom of move-
ment of goods since it would eliminate the barriers created by the 
acquisition of patents in some only of the Six or by the acquisition of 
patents for the same invention in the various countries of the Com-
mon Market by different persons. But such an agreement presup-
poses agreement among the Six on a single procedure for the ex-
amination of inventions with respect to novelty and patentability, 
and uniform definitions of novelty, patentability and subject matter. 
An agreement on uniform definitions will be even more difficult to 
obtain than agreement on procedure. 
If separate patents continue to be granted by each of the Six, 
harmonization of the law on these substantive points is highly de-
sirable to avoid the possibility that a patent right and its inherent 
statutory monopoly may be available in one or some of the coun-
tries of the Common Market but unavailable in others. If harmoni-
zation is not achieved, products freely made in a Member Country 
in which no patent may issue will not be able freely to cross the 
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boundaries of Member Countries which have granted patents on 
the particular subject matter-a negation of the Common Market's 
aims. Moreover, conditions to which enterprises in the various coun-
tries of the Six will be subject will thereby be made less equal and 
intra-Common-Market division of labor discouraged. If small tech-
nical improvements may be patented in France but not in Germany, 
technical improvements in France may be unduly restricted. If 
pharmaceutical products may be patented in France but not in Italy, 
economic inequality between the two countries may result. More-
over, the movement from Italy into France of such products, freely 
made in Italy, can be blocked. 
It would obviously be undesirable to lower standards by com-
promising the best laws with the worst. But any attempt to reach 
agreement as to what is the "best" law would encounter basic dif-
ferences of opinion, strongly entrenched habits of mind and reluc-
tance to change. 
One revision of the laws of the Six which suggests itself, however, 
is the adoption of certain uniform requirements as to patentability 
coupled with a provision in each of the laws of the Six that anything 
which is not patentable in one of them, because it is not considered 
novel, should be so regarded in the others. Patent protection as a 
means of encouraging invention in the Common Market territory 
as a whole would seem to be economic justification of such a revision. 
Uniformity of requirements of patentability may also be aided by 
resolving the problem of invention definition. In France, Belgium 
and Luxembourg the inventor describes the general operation or 
function of his invention and need not refer to all the features and 
advantages of the machine or device or product or to every new idea 
which is implied in every part of his invention or in the combination 
of different parts or details. No broad or detailed claims need be 
specified. A general resume, however, must end the description. 
More specific delimitation of inventions is left to judicial determina-
tion which will decide in a case involving the validity or scope of a 
patent whether a special function, operation, feature or idea is 
covered by it, taking into consideration the whole of the description 
and drawings. This is also true to a certain extent in Italy. 
In Germany and the Netherlands on the other hand, the inventor 
must make an enumeration of distinct claims, though these need not 
be too specific and detailed. The ambit of the claims depends on the 
nature of the result to be obtained by the device described in the 
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light of the common knowledge of the art at the date of the patent. 
A compromise between the two systems would not be impossible. 
Harmonization of other aspects of patent law is less difficult. 
Certainly a uniform term for patents may be adopted, particularly if 
a common examination system is agreed upon so that the term may 
be computed in all countries from the date of the grant of the patent. 
Such uniformity is desirable because it will mean that statutory 
monopolies of patents on the same invention will come to an end at 
the same time in all six countries, and freedom of manufacture and 
of movement of goods throughout the Common Market will thereby 
be simultaneously ensured in all. 
The necessity of paying annuities in each of the Member Coun-
tries for the maintenance of patents should be eliminated, moreover. 
Failure to pay the annuity in one Member Country may otherwise 
result in forfeiture of a patent there which continues in force in 
other Member Countries, again creating an obstacle to the free 
movement of goods. This problem could be effectively solved by 
providing for a single payment of annuities at a central office which 
would apportion it among the Six in accordance with an acceptable 
formula. 
Finally, the problems created by working requirements for pat-
ents in the Six require a solution. Under the Paris Union Conven-
tion and the present law in the Member Countries, outside Italy, 
the ordinary sanction for non-working is the grant of a compulsory 
license. The pressure will, therefore, be great on Italy to change its 
law by introducing compulsory licensing as the first sanction for 
non-working. 
Forfeiture of the patent will always threaten wherever it is pos-
sible that a Member Country may consider compulsory licensing 
insufficient to satisfy public interest in the subject matter of the 
patent. But forfeiture in one Member Country would leave an in-
dustry free to manufacture the subject matter of the patent in that 
country, although it would not be free to distribute such goods to 
other Member Countries where no forfeiture had occurred. 
A patent owner is rarely, if ever, forced to exploit his own patent 
in every one of the countries where working requirements exist. He 
seeks out willing and qualified licensees with whom he can enter into 
negotiated license agreements. An intra-Common Market arrange-
ment according to which working of the invention in one of the Six 
would be deemed to satisfy working requirements in all of the 
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others, would permit the owner of a patent to consider only eco-
nomic factors in selecting the country or countries of the Community 
in which he or his licensees should work the patent. This would 
further one basic aim of the Common Market-the rationalization 
of production. 
C. EFFECTS OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION ON 
AMERICAN INTERESTS 
The right to file a single patent application in a central Common 
Market office or in the patent office of one of the Six (which would 
transmit copies of the application to patent offices in the other Mem-
ber Countries) could be made available to the nationals of any coun-
try or only to nationals of Common Market countries. If the latter, 
justification would be sought in the Paris Union Convention. Article 
15 of the Convention provides that the countries of the Paris Union 
reserve the right to make separately, between themselves, special 
arrangements for the protection of industrial property insofar as 
these arrangements do not contravene provisions of the Convention. 
On the basis of Article I 5 a number of countries of the Union 
have concluded the Madrid Arrangement for the International 
Registration of Trademarks. So long as the United States is not a 
party to this Arrangement, its nationals cannot register at the In-
ternational Bureau.18 Similarly, an internal arrangement in the 
Common Market for a special patent filing system need not be open 
to Americans. 
By the same token a system of common search for patent anticipa-
tions and single examination as to novelty could be closed to Ameri-
can nationals. Since the natural result of such a system would, how-
ever, be to eliminate searches and examinations in each country, 
such a system would doubtless be opened to American patent appli-
cants, and it would be to their advantage. In order to ensure such 
advantage to its nationals the United States might, however, be 
required to adhere to the Arrangement of The Hague of I 94 7 
which established the International Institute of Patents. 
Adoption of a uniform duration for patents in the Six could not 
r€sult in a disparity between the duration of patents owned by non-
Community nationals and those owned by Community nationals be-
cause of the national-treatment clause of the Paris Union Conven-
tion. Therefore the advantages of uniformity in this area would 
18 This is the International Bureau of Berne set up by the Paris Union Convention 
as a central organ of the Union. 
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necessarily accrue to American owners of Community patents. The 
same may not be true with regard to any special system of payment 
of annuities in the Common Market countries, since such a system 
need not effect a change of the laws of the Six with regard to pat-
ents not obtained under a single filing system. The total amount of 
annuities paid by an American patentee in the Six might therefore 
be higher since he would be forced to continue to pay them to each 
of the Common Market countries. 
A serious question may arise with respect to working require-
ments. Germany and Switzerland have long had individual treaties 
with the United States providing that working of the invention in 
one country exempts the patent from the requirement of working 
it in the other. Other countries of the Paris Union cannot claim the 
benefits of these treaties in Germany and Switzerland because they 
are special arrangements under Article I 5 of the Paris Union Con-
vention. Similarly the Six may invoke Article I 5 and provide that 
working of a patent in one of them will be deemed to satisfy work-
ing requirements in the other five. So long as each of the Six retains 
existing working requirements for its own nationals, the national-
treatment clause of the Paris Union Convention would not entitle 
American nationals to claim the benefits of such an arrangement. 
This would put American patentees at a disadvantage in the Com-
mon Market since they would continue to be bound to work the 
patent in each of the Six and not only in one of them. 
III. INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS AND MODELS 
A. INDUSTRIAL DESIGN AND MODEL LAWS 
IN THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES 
Whether in theory industrial designs should form a separate 
branch of industrial property or be classified as artistic property is 
a problem which has long been discussed 19 and is at present the 
subject of serious consideration by an international coordinating 
committee organized by U.N.E.S.C.O. As a matter of fact, how-
ever, Article I of the Paris Union Convention includes industrial 
designs in its definition of industrial property, and most countries 
have special legislation for their protection which involves regula-
tions of a hybrid nature related to both patent and copyright law. 
In any case, the protection of designs involves the creation of legal 
monopolies granting an exclusive right to make copies of the design. 
19 See LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 367 (1930). 
2 58 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
The possibility that such monopolies, because of differences 
among the laws of the Six, may impede the functioning of the Com-
mon Market requires consideration. Two of the Common Market 
countries, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, have no special legis-
lation at all on designs,20 and no protection of designs is given in 
their territory to either nationals or foreigners. At the last con-
ference at Lisbon, the Paris Union Convention was revised for 
the first time to require all signatory countries to protect designs 
(new Article 5 quinquiens), and it may reasonably be expected that 
upon ratification of the revised Convention, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands will adopt legislation on designs. Indeed it has recently 
been announced that a Benelux industrial-designs law is under prep-
aration. 
The essential differences among the laws concerning industrial 
designs in the other four countries of the Common Market relate to 
administrative procedure, subject matter, scope of the right and 
duration of protection. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
In Belgium and France, industrial designs are treated as artistic 
works. A special law in each country 21 provides for optional deposit 
of designs, but even without such deposit designs are protected by 
the copyright law. No examination whatsoever is made of the de-
posit application. Indeed, the deposit may be made under seal. Since 
the basis of protection is copyright, originality of creation rather 
than novelty is material. Therefore, prior publication or public use 
of the design by the author or owner of the design does not affect 
the validity of the deposit. 
In Germany and Italy 22 designs are, in the first place, protected 
under special legislation for the protection of designs and models. 
In Germany, in addition, copyright protection is possible if the de-
sign achieves a certain artistic standard. As a result, cumulative 
protection both by the design and the copyright law is in many 
cases possible. 
In Italy, an artistic design or work of art applied in industry is 
subject to copyright protection only if the design is a work of art 
00 Designs can sometimes be protected under general torts provisions or, in special 
cases, by the copyright law. 
21 France, Law of July 14, 1909, [1909] Bulletin des Lois pt. I, at 1231; Belgium, 
Royal Decree of January 29, 1935, [1935] Moniteur Beige No. 39· 
22 Germany, Law of January II, 1876, [1876] Reichsgesetzblatt II; Italy, Royal 
Decree of August 25, 1940, 7 Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti del Regno 
d'Italia 5948 ( 1940). 
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conceptually separable from the industrial product in which It IS 
embodied as another entity. Cumulative protection in Italy by both 
the design law and the copyright law is not possible. In any case, 
protection of given subject matter as an industrial design requires 
compliance with the special legislation on designs which in turn re-
quires registration. Novelty is essential. 
In Germany applications for registration of designs must be filed 
before their public use in Germany or publication anywhere, and in 
Italy before public use or publication anywhere. While examination 
to determine novelty or registrability is not made, examination to 
determine compliance with formal requirements-in regard to the 
adequacy of representations, or to the proper titles of designs, for 
example-is made. 
2. SUBJECT MATTER 
In Belgium and France a design must, like any other creation en-
titled to copyright under the law concerning artistic property, be 
original. In Germany and Italy the courts have held that the design 
must satisfy the artistic taste and sense of the public. 
The German, French, Belgian and Italian laws contain no other 
limitations of subject matter, and on the whole it may be said that, 
subject to the requirement of novelty in Germany and Italy, a par-
ticular design when registered will be protected in all four countries. 
In Belgium and France it will be protected even without registration. 
3· SCOPE OF THE RIGHT 
The scope of protection in Belgium and France is measured by 
the copyright law. Therefore, any "copying" which would be an 
infringement of a work of art is also an infringement of a design. 
Also, the right is measured not by the deposit but by the creation as 
embodied in the design itself. The exclusive right in the design is 
measured in Italy by the deposit, and the rights and protection of 
the owner are similar to those of a patentee. It follows that in Italy 
protection is limited to the application of the design to the particular 
product or article for which the design is registered. 
4· DURATION OF PROTECTION 
The fact that basic concepts of designs differ-some countries 
viewing them as essentially artistic property, others as a separate 
branch of industrial property-accounts for the difference in the 
terms of protection. In France a design may be deposited for a 
260 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
term of five or twenty-five years at the applicant's option, renewal 
making possible a maximum total term of fifty years. In Belgium 
the term is the same as for artistic works in general, that is, the 
life of the creator plus fifty years after his death, except that designs 
created by corporations are limited to fifty years and that foreigners 
are limited to the term of protection enjoyed in their country of 
origin. In Germany, the applicant has the choice of a term of three, 
ten, or fifteen years; a term of less than fifteen years may be renewed 
for a maximum of fifteen years. In Italy, designs are registered for 
a term of two years, renewable for another two years, or initially 
for four years. Moreover, in Italy protection is conditioned upon 
a working of the design within one year from grant. 
B. PossiBILITIES OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION OF 
LAWS RELATING TO DESIGNS IN THE COMMON MARKET 
As already stated, the whole subject of design protection is 
now under review by a coordinating committee organized by 
U.N.E.S.C.O. It is not unlikely that the Six will find it possible, 
under the impetus of this review and in response to the necessities 
of the Common Market, to harmonize their laws. 
Four of these countries, Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
Nether lands, are already parties to the Arrangement for the In-
ternational Deposit of Designs concluded at The Hague in 1925 
by some of the member countries of the Paris Union.23 Under this 
Arrangement nationals of the contracting countries may deposit 
directly at the International Bureau of Berne designs which they 
desire to have protected in all countries which are parties to the 
Arrangement. It is reasonable to expect that Luxembourg and Italy 
may now accede to this Arrangement. This will resolve for the 
Common Market countries the problem of a single filing office for 
designs. A revision of the Arrangement of The Hague is planned 
for November 1960 which, it is hoped, may attract a wider adher-
ence to it from among countries party to the Paris Convention. 
The adoption of a uniform law on designs by the Benelux coun-
tries may also advance significantly the harmonization of substan-
tive and administrative law concerning designs in the Common Mar-
ket a~ a whole, particularly if the Benelux law contains certain con-
cessions by Belgium altering the too-liberal character of its present 
design law. Such concessions might enable Germany and France to 
harmonize their laws with the new Benelux law. The largest effort 
23 The United States is not a party to this arrangement. 
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to improve the protection of designs must be made by Italy, whose 
present law is very inadequate. 
C. EFFECTS OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION 
OF LAWS ON AMERICAN INTERESTS 
IN INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 
Unification or harmonization of the law concerning industrial 
designs throughout the Common Market should, on the whole, be 
beneficial to American interests in designs. Under a unified Common 
Market law American nationals would have to obtain only one reg-
istration for all six countries, thereby substantially reducing costs. 
Harmonization of the law should at the least mean that designs 
would henceforward be protected in Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands, and that the term of protection in Italy would be longer than 
it is at present. It is not likely that the Common Market countries 
will conclude other arrangements among themselves which benefit 
only their own nationals. 
IV. TRADEMARKS 
A. TRADEMARK LAWS IN THE COMMON MARKET 
COUNTRIES 
The protection of trademarks is an aspect of the protection 
against unfair competition, and the principles of fair dealing and 
avoidance of deception of the public are therefore fundamentals 
of it. Trademarks are symbols which distinguish the goods of one 
manufacturer or merchant from those of another. With use on goods 
of such symbols goodwill accrues to them which the law recognizes 
and protects as a property right. Free enterprise depends in large 
measure on the legal recognition of this right. Competition would be 
virtually impossible if competing goods were not distinguished from 
one another, since purchasers would thereby be deprived of a means 
of choosing among them. In protecting trademarks, the law pro-
tects owners against infringement, but it also shields purchasers 
from confusion and fraud. 
All six countries of the Common Market recognize the funda-
mental principles of trademark protection, but their laws are by no 
means uniform and the territoriality principle may create conflicts 
even more serious than those created as to patents. Trademarks are 
more numerous than patents; while the latter have an average ef-
fective life of five to six years, trademarks are theoretically per-
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petual. Insofar as trademarks create exclusive rights in certain 
symbols or words, and insofar as they require for their protection 
the exclusion of others even from the use of similar marks or from 
the use of the same symbols or words with regard to similar goods, 
they may operate as serious impediments to the free movement of 
goods in the Common Market. Impediments resulting from the 
recognition in one Member Country of trademark rights in symbols 
or words which other Member Countries consider unregistrable, 
and therefore available for use in trade, could be particularly seri-
ous. Avoidance of conflicts in this area is essential, and harmoniza-
tion of the laws of the Six must therefore be sought. 
Apart from the Paris Union Convention, little conscious effort 
has been made to harmonize trademark laws in the Six. Administra-
tive habits and traditions of the various countries, rather than dif-
fering political or economic philosophies, have been allowed to re-
flect themselves in the regulation of trademarks. The laws and 
practice of the Six have drifted apart from one another and each 
country has become excessively jealous of its own way of resolving 
the conflicts of interest between trademark owners and the trade. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
Formalities of application for registration of trademarks are 
simple and any differences among them in the Six of no moment. The 
procedure for dealing with such applications is of two kinds. In 
Belgium, France and Luxembourg, the owner deposits what 
amounts to a claim to a trademark. The registering authority makes 
no examination to determine the registrability of the mark, either 
with regard to its character or in the light of prior registrations. 
In Italy only questions of form are considered. In Germany both a 
formal examination and an examination to determine registrability 
of the trademark in accordance with the law are undertaken. When 
these are completed, the applicant is advised of any prior registra-
tions, but the application is not rejected if prior registrations have 
been found. The application is published, and interested persons 
may oppose it. In the Netherlands, the mark is examined as to regis-
trability both in terms of its character and prior registrations, and 
the application may be rejected as a result of either examination. 
No publication to permit opposition is effected but once registered 
the mark is published and interested persons may demand cancella-
tion by a complaint filed in the District Court of The Hague. Such 
complaints are heard in summary proceedings. 
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Germany requires proof of prior registration of the trademark 
in the home country of the applicant as a condition of registration 
of the same mark in Germany (except where exemption from this 
requirement has been officially promulgated on a reciprocal basis). 
Similarly, in Belgium and France courts have held that the validity 
of a registration by a foreigner is predicated upon the existence of 
a prior corresponding registration in his home country. Recently, 
however, the OMEGA decision of the Cour d' Appel of Paris, af-
firmed by the Cour de Cassation on February 3, 1959, interpreted 
the law of France differently. 24 In the other countries of the Com-
mon Market there is no requirement of prior home registration. 
2. REGISTRABILITY 
Views in the Six differ as to what constitutes a registrable trade-
mark. While generally descriptive or generic words are not proper 
trademarks which may be validly registered, Germany and the 
Netherlands apply a much stricter test in this regard than do the 
other countries. In Belgium and France the mark is not validly reg-
istrable only if it is the usual and necessary description of a product 
(or if it is deceptive or misdescriptive). Letters per se or numerals 
per se are not registrable in Germany except when they have attained 
secondary meaning. Three dimensional marks are not registrable 
in Germany and the Netherlands, but they are in Italy. Whether 
registration in Italy may prevent others from putting goods on the 
market having the form shown in the representation is a subject of 
controversy. Combinations of colors without other distinctive ele-
ments are not registrable in Germany and the Nether lands. Names 
in Belgium and France are validly registrable only when represented 
in a special or distinctive manner. 
Obviously, these differences mean that a certain mark may be a 
valid trademark and validly registrable in some countries of the 
Common Market while it cannot be the subject of an exclusive right 
of use in others. 
3· EFFECTS OF REGISTRATION 
In all the Common Market countries except Germany, property 
in a mark is acquired by use, and registration is only "declaratory" 
of title to the trademark. Therefore, registration may always be 
•• Societe Omega v. Societe Omega Louis Brandt et Freres, Cour de Cassation (Ch. 
civ., sect. comm.), February 3, 1959, [1959] Bulletin des arrets de Ia Cour de Cassation 
56, [1959] Semaine Juridique II. uooo, [1959] GRUR Ausl. 299. 
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contested by a prior user, and, if he proves his prior use, he may 
cause the registration to be cancelled. In Germany ownership is 
based on registration, and the first applicant is therefore entitled to 
registration and may maintain it as against a prior user, unless the 
mark of the prior user has become commonly and generally known 
in the trade as distinguishing the goods of the owner. In Italy, the 
rigor of the principle of prior use as the basis of ownership has 
been mitigated by the provision that a registration uncontested by 
a prior user for a period of five years from the date of registration 
becomes incontestable and conclusive. This is now also the system of 
most countries of the world including the United States. 
The scope of the registrant's right is generally measured by the 
description of the goods for which it is registered, but two excep-
tions should be noted. In all six countries, the applicant may file 
for any description, but registration is not necessarily limited to the 
products for which the mark is in fact used or for which its use is 
proposed. (In Germany and the Netherlands, however, the goods 
listed in the application must fall within the applicant's business 
activity) . In general, therefore, registration may result in too broad 
coverage. 
In the second place, protection extends in principle to similar 
goods but similarity is more narrowly construed in France and Bel-
gium than in the other four countries. With regard to marks of ex-
ceptional reputation the protection may extend to dissimilar goods 
in Germany, the Netherlands, and-in quite exceptional cases-in 
Italy. This protection is based, however, on the law of unfair compe-
tition rather than on trademark law. 
4· USER REQUIREMENTS 
A condition of the continued protection of his registered trade-
mark in some of the Six is the owner's use of his mark. There are 
no user requirements in the trademark laws of France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and Germany, but non-use for three years may cause 
forfeiture of the registration in Italy and the Netherlands. In Bel-
gium, however, prevailing judicial opinion is that the trademark 
right is lost by an unjustified non-use for a long period of time, and 
in Germany marks that are not being used (reserve and defensive 
marks) are protected by the courts only under special conditions. 
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5· TERM OF REGISTRATION 
The term for which registration is granted to an applicant is ten 
years in Germany and Luxembourg, fifteen in France, twenty in 
the Netherlands and Italy and perpetual in Belgium. Renewal of 
registration is always possible for a similar term prior to expira-
tion of the previous term. 
6. ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES 
Assignment of a trademark is permitted in France with or with-
out the goodwill of the business. In Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg 
the "establishment" attached to the mark must be transferred with 
it. Since 19 57 in the Netherlands it has been sufficient that the part 
of the enterprise situated in the Netherlands be transferred with 
the trademark. In Germany, the entire business of the owner or a 
part of it must be transferred to the assignee. 
Licensing of trademarks is freely permitted in France and the 
Netherlands. In Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy a license is deemed 
an assignment of the right to use, and to be valid it must be accom-
panied by a communication to the licensee of specifications, formulae 
and the like, which will permit the manufacture of equivalent prod-
ucts. In Germany the position is probably the same, but there has 
been no judicial sanction of licensing as yet. 
B. PosSIBILITIES OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION 
OF TRADEMARK LAWS IN THE COMMON MARKET 
A certain degree of harmonization of the trademark laws of the 
Six has already been achieved by two national treaties: the Paris 
Union Convention, and the Madrid Arrangement for the Inter-
national Registration of Trademarks (the "Madrid Arrange-
ment"). Each of the Six is a party to both of these agreements. 
By virtue of the latter particularly, nationals of, and persons 
domiciled or having a bona fide and effective industrial or com-
mercial establishment in, any of the Six may obtain an international 
registration at the International Bureau of Berne for any trade-
mark which is registered in their home countries. These persons, 
therefore, need no longer apply for a national registration of their 
marks in each of the Six. Filing through the Bureau of Berne, how-
ever, does not eliminate the substantive differences of the law of 
the Six. Countries practicing prior examination may refuse an in-
ternational registration and in the others the validity of the inter-
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national registration may always be contested by an interested 
person under the provisions of the local Trademark Law. 
At the last revision of the Madrid Arrangement at Nice on June 
I 5, I 9 57, a provision was inserted that any of the signatory coun· 
tries may notify the Berne Bureau that an international registration 
may not extend to it unless the owner of the mark specifically re-
quests such an extension in his application for international regis-
tration. The purpose of this amendment was to make possible ter-
ritorial limitation of international trademarks which, prior to the 
amendment, had automatically extended to all twenty-one signa-
tory countries. Even assuming that any of the Six will send such 
notification to the Berne Bureau, it is to be expected that applicants 
for international registrations will specify that they request pro-
tection in all six countries. 
Mention also should be made here of the Arrangement for In-
ternational Classification of Goods for Trademarks, also adopted 
at Nice on June IS, I957· This Arrangement adopts the classifica-
tion of goods used by the International Bureau of Berne for the 
international registration of trademarks and requires the signatory 
countries to adopt it in regard to national registration of trade-
marks. France and Italy have already done so, and since Luxem-
bourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands have had no classification in 
the past, it should be easy for them to follow suit. Only Germany, 
therefore, must abandon its own classification in order to adopt the 
international classification. 
By virtue of the Paris Union Convention the following aspects of 
trademark law do or will receive uniform solution in the Six: 
(1) Requirement of Prior Home Registration: The present re-
quirement in Germany, Belgium, and France for prior home regis-
tration will be eliminated as a result of the amendment of the new 
Article 6 of the Convention at Lisbon. 
(2) Effect of Prior Home Registration: Article 6 of the Con-
vention (new Article 6 quinquies in the Lisbon revision) establishes 
the rule that a mark registered in the country of origin of the appli-
cant must be accepted for registration in other signatory countries 
subject to stated exceptions. These exceptions constitute in effect a 
negative definition of what is not properly registrable as a trade-
mark. The provision has left unresolved many differences among 
national laws concerning registrability, but it has been helpful. 
(3) Prior Registration. versus Prior User as Determinative of 
Ownership: The rigor of the German law which bases ownership in 
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a trademark on prior registration rather than prior user is mitigated 
as a result of Article 6 his of the Convention in the sense that the 
prior user of a well-known mark is permitted to contest an infring-
ing registration. (The theory of the protection of "get-up" 25 of 
Article 25 of the German Trademark Law, which results in the 
protection of a reputation acquired in the trade with respect to a 
mark, has a similar mitigating effect.) 
( 4) Assignment of Trademarks: The provision of Article 6 
quater concerning the assignment of trademarks is a uniform deter-
mination of the validity of an assignment of a trademark in a foreign 
country. Thus, a national of one of the six countries may validly 
assign his trademark in the other five countries, provided he trans-
fers the local goodwill or establishment. 
(5) Grace Period for Fees Payments: A period of grace of six 
months for payment of fees for the renewal of registration is pro-
vided for in Article 5 his and must be given effect in the signatory 
countries. 
But there is a substantial scope for further unification of trade-
mark law in the Common Market. Differences still exist among the 
laws of the Six concerning: acquisition of ownership in a trademark 
by prior use or prior registration, registrability, user requirements, 
terms of registration, and licensing. These differences may impede 
the free movement of goods within the Common Market. 
The logical solution of the problems created by these differences 
is the adoption of a uniform trademark law applicable in all six 
countries. The Benelux countries have been working toward the 
adoption of a Benelux Trademark Law for some years, and it has 
recently been announced that the text of such a law had been ini-
tialled by the three governments and was to be submitted to their 
parliaments. Should this project result in a uniform trademark law 
for all three countries, it might give impetus to a movement to adopt 
a uniform trademark law for the Six. 
In the meantime, other possibilities are open. A common search 
bureau for trademarks, combining the search facilities of the Six, 
is wholly feasible. A committee established by the Berne Bureau 
has for some time now been discussing ways and means of creating 
such a search center.26 The essential problems are those of money 
"""Get-up" is understood under German law to be "a device considered in com-
mercial circles as a sign of identification of the same or similar goods of another 
person," and this has been broadly interpreted to cover any distinctive sign including 
trademarks. 
211 74 LA PROPRIETI; INDUSTRIELLE 29-33 ( 1958). The Lisbon Conference of 1958 
appears to have killed the proposal for a search center at the Berne Bureau. 
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and time required to establish such a center, and these may be mini-
mized if the center's sphere of operation is limited to the Six. 
The adoption of a uniform term of registration is also a possible 
improvement, given the fact that terms in the Six range from ten 
years to perpetuity and that for international registrations at the 
Berne Bureau the term is twenty years. Uniform provisions on as-
signment and licensing of trademarks are also possible and highly 
desirable. Agreement could be reached on a quantum of goodwill 
which must accompany transfer of a trademark and on basic require-
ments of a valid license-which should include an obligation to 
record the license for the information of the public. 
The only subject on which general agreement will be truly diffi-
cult is registrability. Based on differing concepts of what best suits its 
own needs, each of the Six has struck a different balance between the 
interests and claims of individual traders and those of the trade 
generally. Must three-dimensional marks, that is, new forms of con-
tainers or products, be registrable? Must monopolization by the 
first user or applicant of numerals and letters, color combinations, 
slogans, surnames and geographical terms be permitted? 
It is essential to arrive at a unified standard of registrability for 
the Common Market. Otherwise goods, bearing a word or symbol 
which is open to the trade to use or common to the trade in one of 
the Six, may be stopped at another's borders because that word or 
symbol is the subject in the latter country of a statutory monopoly 
resulting from its registration as a trademark. Such a uniform stand-
ard could be achieved by an arrangement among the Six providing 
that a mark refused registration in one of them, on the ground that 
it is not a proper trademark, shall not be admitted to registration 
or protection in the others. Another possibility would be to establish 
a Bureau analogous to the International Institute of Patents at The 
Hague which would give opinions on registrability controlling in 
all six countries. 
A third possibility would be to adopt the revised provision in the 
new Article 6 quinquiens, para. C ( I ) of the Paris Union Conven-
tion, as a basis for unification. This provision permits the owner of a 
trademark to prove that his trademark has acquired distinctiveness 
by long and exclusive use; and any trademark, be it a three-dimen-
sional mark or a mark consisting of numerals, letters, slogans, sur-
names, or geographical terms, may be admitted to registration on 
that basis, although it may not have been originally registrable when 
first adopted and used. 
Similarly the differences among the laws of the Six on user re-
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quirements for trademarks may be reconciled by the adoption by 
each of a provision (which would have been voted into effect as 
part of the Paris Union Convention at the Lisbon Conference but 
for the objection of Japan) that the registration of a trademark 
may be expunged from the register on proof that the mark has not 
been used for a period of five years. The provision could add that 
use in one of the Six would satisfy user requirements in the others. 
Uniformity of the law on all of the subjects hereinabove dis-
cussed may be brought about, short of the adoption by treaty of a 
single Common Market trademark law similar to the proposed 
Benelux law, in two ways: by amendment of the trademark legis-
lation in each country through the adoption of uniform provisions 
pursuant to a directive of the Council or through the conclusion of 
a Common Market trademark arrangement which would provide 
for a single search and single registration at a common trademark 
bureau and would cover such points as registrability, basis of own-
ership, opposition, user requirements, assignments, licenses and term 
of registration, leaving to each country to determine by its own law 
other matters such as infringements, remedies, fees, renewals, and 
the like. 
C. EFFECTS OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION 
OF THE LAWS OF THE SIX ON AMERICAN 
INTERESTS IN TRADEMARKS 
The adoption of a single Trademark Law (like the proposed 
Benelux Trademark Law) for the whole of the Common Market 
would be in many respects beneficial to American interests. Euro-
pean Common Market trademarks would replace separate French, 
German, Dutch, Italian, Belgian and Luxembourgean trademarks. 
Reduced registration and renewal expenses and the simplification of 
procedure for the obtaining of registration and for the recording of 
assignments and changes of name would result. American nationals 
would be treated as Community nationals would be, and would, in 
addition, be entitled to the benefits of the Paris Union Convention. 
If, instead of adopting a single law, the Six should merely amend 
their national laws in order to harmonize them on certain material 
points (registrability, duration, user and the like), American na-
tionals would also be benefitted, since advantages accruing to Com-
munity nationals as a result of harmonization would also accrue to 
American nationals by virtue of the national-treatment clause of the 
Paris Union Convention. 
Certain problems for American trademark owners would arise 
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only if the Six concluded a treaty arrangement containing provisions 
taking precedence over the national trademark laws of the Six. 
Any such provisions which were applicable only to nationals of any 
one of the Six seeking protection in the others would not change the 
protection afforded by each country to its own nationals. Therefore 
national-treatment protection of the Paris Union Convention could 
not be invoked. Moreover the compatibility of such provisions with 
the Convention might be defended by contending that they consti-
tute a special arrangement sanctioned by Article 1 5. One result of 
such provisions would be discrimination against American owners 
of trademarks in the Community Countries. 
Such an arrangement might provide that use of a trademark in 
one of the Six shall be deemed to satisfy the user requirements of 
the other five countries. This would discriminate against American 
trademark owners who would continue to be required to satisfy the 
user requirements provided for by the law of any of the Six on pen-
alty of forfeiture. 
It is impossible to believe, however, that provisions of an intra-
Common Market arrangement can be adopted which will not be 
accompanied by a change of the national law of each of the coun-
tries. For instance, it is wholly unlikely that Germany will agree to 
an arrangement under which a trademark belonging to a French 
national may be freely assigned without goodwill and yet continue 
to consider invalid a similar assignment of a German national's trade-
mark. Equally unlikely would be its agreement to an arrangement un-
der which a French national might register in Germany a three-dimen-
sional mark, even though German nationals continued to be unable 
to do so. 
V. OTHER RIGHTS OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
A. PROTECTION OF TRADE NAME 
A trade name purports to distinguish the commercial activity of 
a person as distinct from a trademark which distinguishes the prod-
ucts of a manufacturer or trader from similar products of another. 
The concept of a trade name is broader under the law of some coun-
tries than under that of others, but the protection of trade names is 
generally ensured by the general law of unfair competition. The 
formalism and technicalities which have developed with reference· 
to trademark protection are, therefore, not encountered.27 
21 The Netherlands has a special Trade Names Act of 1921. 
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Registration of trade names in the commercial register 28 of the 
place where the business is located is required either for the recog-
nition of the right in a trade name or simply as a means of inform-
ing the public. In Germany, Belgium, and France trade names are 
registered in the Commercial Register, in Italy with the Registry of 
Companies and in the Netherlands with the Registry of the Cham-
ber of Commerce. 
Conflicts in trade names, like conflicts in trademarks, may create 
obstacles to the free movement of goods in the Common Market. 
In this connection it should be noted that Article 8 of the Paris 
Union Convention provides : 
the trade name shall be protected in all countries of the 
Union without obligation of deposit or registration, 
whether or not it forms part of a trademark. 
Thus, a French or a German national may be required under his 
own national law to register his trade name in order to protect it, 
whereas he will be assured of its protection in other Union countries 
without registration. But does this also mean that a trade name 
adopted and used in France must be protected in the other Union 
countries without the fulfillment of any other condition or require-
ment as against the adoption and use of the same or a similar name 
by another? Is protection in the entire Common Market based on 
prior use anywhere in the Common Market or on first use also in 
the other countries in which protection is sought? Article 8 of the 
Paris Union Convention is not clear, and these questions are in 
dispute. 
The extent of protection is left to the laws of each country. Thus 
they control the protection of trade names consisting of or contain-
ing surnames as against the adoption and use of similar trade names 
by persons lawfully entitled to the same surname, the scope of pro-
tection of trade names with respect to the businesses in which they 
are used, the protection of generic trade names and the like. 
For the purposes of the Common Market the most important 
problem to be solved is that of protection of trade names through-
out the Six upon their adoption and use in one of them. Failure to 
solve it may create conflicts of rights and obstacles to the free move-
ment of goods. The problem is a difficult one, particularly when a 
trade name consists of or contains a surname which two firms, estab-
lished in two different countries in the Common Market, have an 
28 The commercial register in civil law countries is maintained by the clerk of the 
commercial tribunal. 
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equal right to use. One possible solution would be to require regis-
tration of trade names in a central trade name bureau, or to central-
ize in such a bureau for search purposes all trade name registrations 
made in the individual countries. The other possibility would be to 
interpret Article 8 of the Paris Union Convention to mean that the 
person who first adopts and uses a trade name in one of the Six 
shall be protected against the use of the same or a confusingly simi-
lar name by another in the others. Article 8 was recently so inter-
preted by an Austrian TribunaJ.29 If deemed necessary, this inter-
pretation could be adopted for the Common Market by an agree-
ment among the Six. The scope of protection of trade names and 
remedies against infringement may be left to determination by the 
laws of each Member Country. 
No unification or harmonization of the laws of the Six concern-
ing trade names can involve discrimination against American trade 
names, again because of the national-treatment clause of the Paris 
Union Convention. 
B. REPRESSION OF FALSE INDICATIONS OF ORIGIN 
Goods originate not only from particular manufacturers or 
traders but also in particular places where these products are pro-
duced, manufactured, grown, or otherwise derived. This latter ori-
gin is indicated by appropriate expressions affixed to the goods. 
These are of two kinds: indications of geographical source which 
arc direct or indirect indications of the places (country, region, 
locality) from which the products or merchandise come; 30 and 
appellations of origin which are geographical names of the places 
(country, region, locality) where the products are grown, manu-
factured, or otherwise obtained and which by virtue of their soil, 
climate, or techniques give such products their qualities.31 
Indications of geographical origin which are false or misleading 
-for instance, the use on a perfume of the indication "Made in 
France" although the perfume was not, in fact, made in France, or 
"Swiss Watch" on a watch not made in Switzerland-deceive the 
purchasing public. If the products are of inferior quality or other-
20 Judgment of September 16, 1958, [1958] 0 PatBI. 189. It is to be noted, however, 
that this is based also on Articles IO and 22B of the Austrian Trademark Law. Fur-
thermore, it involved a family name rather than a trading name. 
""For instance, the indication "Made in U.S.A." or the marking of an address of 
establishment or factory, such as "Detroit." 
31 For instance, "Moselle wine" or "Roquefort cheese." 
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wise unsatisfactory, they may also damage the reputation of the 
particular country or locality whose name is thus falsely used. The 
law in all countries generally prohibits false or misleading indica-
tions of origin of this kind. In the Six, the general provisions of the 
unfair competition law and penal provisions on mismarking or 
fraud may be invoked to suppress such false or misleading marking. 
Difficulties with respect to the second kind of indications of origin, 
appellations of origin, are of two kinds: those involving delimita-
tion of the area of the locality or region within which producers 
may use the appellation in question; and those involving a determi-
nation of the cases in which a geographical term or name is a true 
appellation of origin, and not merely an arbitrary designation or a 
generic or descriptive term. 
An appellation of origin is a badge of distinction when, either 
because of some natural advantage of its soil or climate, or because 
of traditional techniques and the skill of its producers, a locality or 
region has created a special reputation for its goods. Goodwill at-
taches to such appellations of origin in favor of the producers of 
that locality or region which the law seeks to protect. The right to 
the exclusive use of an appellation of origin by the producer of a 
given region or locality and the correlative right to prevent others 
from using it were not recognized earlier as industrial property 
rights. National legislation and regulations defining the rights by 
delimiting the region in question and by controlling the use of appel-
lations of origin are developments of the twentieth century. By the 
time such definition had been effected, however, a number of such 
appellations had lost their distinctiveness and had become generic 
terms indicating merely that the goods in connection with which 
these appellations were used had certain characteristics or qualities. 
The difficulty today is to decide whether in a particular country the 
geographical designation in question is still an appellation of origin 
or has become a generic term. For example, Eau de Cologne and 
Suede Gloves are now generally admitted to be generic terms of 
special kinds of goods. But the generic character of other names, 
such as Champagne, Cognac, Camembert, Roquefort, Pilsner, and 
Porto is still subject to controversy. 
Italy and Germany have some interest in the protection of appella-
tions of origin but France has a far larger stake in such protection 
than any other country because of the exceptional reputation many 
French local or regional names enjoy, particularly those used in 
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connection with wine and cheese products. France has also gone 
much further than any other country in defining the right to the use 
of such names and in controlling their use. 
Generally four countries of the Common Market protect appel-
lations of origin in a uniformly effective manner either by legisla-
tion or by international treaties among themselves. These are 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy. The Netherlands and Ger-
many look to deception of the public rather than to property rights 
in appellations of origin as the basis for protection. 
The Paris Union Convention does not go very far in the protec-
tion of appellations of origin. Article 10, as revised at Lisbon, pro-
hibits "the direct or indirect use of a false indication of origin," but 
this leaves open the question whether the use of a particular appel-
lation in a certain country must be deemed false. The claim that a 
particular term is used in trade as a generic term and is not an ap-
pellation of origin may, therefore, always be made. 
With a view to obtaining more effective protection and enforcing 
stricter rules for the protection of appellations of origin, certain 
countries of the Paris Union have concluded among themselves the 
Madrid Arrangement for the Repression of False Indications of 
Origin. Generally, it permits the tribunals of each country to decide 
whether an appellation of origin by reason of its generic character 
cannot be protected, but it specifies that regional appellations of 
origin of wine products may not be so treated. They must always be 
protected, and no allegation that such an appellation has become 
generic will be considered. Germany, France, and Italy are party to 
this Arrangement. It is not unlikely that the Six will agree on uni-
form protection of appellations of origin. Free movement of goods 
in the Community would be seriously hampered by the failure to 
reach such an agreement. 
A new Arrangement was also adopted at the Lisbon Conference 
by some countries for the international registration at the Berne 
Bureau of appellations of origin. Any appellation of origin recog-
nized and protected in the country of origin may be so registered. 
The other countries may refuse protection by an appropriate moti-
vated declaration addressed to the Berne Bureau within a year. If 
they make no objection, the appellation of origin thus registered at 
the Berne Bureau must be protected in the contracting countries, and 
they are not free to assert later that it is a generic term. At Lisbon, 
only France and Italy among the Common Market countries signed 
this Arrangement. It is not unlikely that the other four countries 
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may accede to it or that it may, in a modified form, be adopted as a 
particular agreement among the Six. This may prevent American 
producers from exporting to the Six certain products in connection 
with which appellations of origin are used generically (for instance, 
Champagne, Sauterne or Burgundy for wines). Theoretically such 
trade was possible in the past-but this is hardly a significant factor 
in American trade. 
C. PROTECTION AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION 
In contrast to patent, design and trademark law, where by legis-
lation, regulation or administrative technique the Six have developed 
differences which create serious obstacles to uniformity, the funda-
mentals of the law of unfair competition-the requirements of good 
faith toward competitors and the public-are in many respects uni-
formly viewed by the Community countries. The reasons are his-
torical. The French Revolution abolished guilds and merchant cor-
porations, and the principle was recognized that every person should 
be free to engage in such business or to exercise such profession, 
art, or trade as he sees fit. Secondly, and as a corollary to the first 
principle, it was recognized that this freedom should be limited to 
those competitive efforts which are the results of one's own labor and 
merit and that the first principle should not be extended to sanction 
commercial benefits derived from usurpation of the fruits of a com-
petitor's labor. Thirdly, the need was recognized to make civil 
remedies available where either intentional or negligent usurpation 
had occurred. Articles I382 and I383 of the Napoleonic Code were 
broadly enough stated to do so. Article 1 3 8 2 reads: 
Any person who causes injury to another by any acts 
whatsoever is obligated to compensate such other person 
for the injury sustained. 
And Article I 3 8 3 provides: 
A person is responsible for damages not only for those 
acts which he has actually committed but also for any dam-
age caused by his negligence or imprudence. 
These provisions are still in the French and Belgian Civil Codes. 
They are also copied in Articles I40I and I402 of the Dutch Civil 
Code and Article 2598 of the Italian Civil Code of I942 (replac-
ing Article I I 5 I of the old Italian Civil Code). The courts of these 
four countries, with admirable resourcefulness and flexibility, have 
created a vast law of unfair competition by a body of decisions 
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which goes beyond anything we have been able to accomplish 
through the supposedly adaptable instrument of our common law.32 
Germany has a special Act against Unfair Competition of June 
7, 1909 (which served as a model for similar legislation in many 
other countries). Its first section contains the so-called general 
clause which, first of all, outlaws competitive conduct contrary to 
honest practices. In its subsequent sections the Act specifies and pro-
hibits various acts of unfair competition, such as deceptive and un-
fair advertising, the interference with contracts of employees, the 
discrediting of a competitor, his business or goods, the misuse of 
business secrets and acts causing confusion. German courts, even 
before this Act, had protected against unfair competition on the 
basis of general provisions of law.33 
Indeed, the Six already had a well-established system of law 
against unfair competition by the end of the last century so that they 
could readily agree on the inclusion of provisions in this area of law 
in the Paris Union Convention. These are contained in Article 10 




The countries of the Union are bound to assure to 
persons entitled to the benefits of the Union effective 
protection against unfair competition. 
Any act of competition contrary to honest practices 
in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an 
act of unfair competition. 
The following in particular shall be prohibited: 
I. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by 
any means whatever with the establishment, the 
goods or the industrial or commercial activities 
of a competitor; 
2. false allegations in the course of trade which are 
of such a nature as to discredit the establishment, 
the goods, or the industrial or commercial ac-
tivities of a competitor; 
3· indications or allegations the use of which in the 
course of trade is liable to mislead the public as 
to the nature, the manufacturing process, the 
characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or 
the quantity of the goods. 
This provision of the Paris Union Convention is self-executing, 
and, in the area which it covers, it summarizes the law of unfair com-
petition as enforced in the Common Market countries. But there are 
82 Derenberg, The Influence of the French Code Civil on the Modern Law of Unfair 
Competition, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. I (1955). 
83 KOHLER, DER UNLAUTERE WEITBEWERB (1914). 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
aspects of unfair competition which are not covered by this pro· 
vision, such as comparative advertising, enticement of employees, 
interference with contracts or advantageous relationships of com-
petitors, use of marks of great reputation on dissimilar products, 
reference to a competitor's name or trademark in the sale of spare 
parts, use of the original trademark on repaired or reconstructed 
products, servile imitation of appearance of products, and the like. 
In these areas the domestic law of each country is controlling. 
The Paris Union Convention obligates the contracting countries 
to assure "effective protection" against unfair competition. Does 
this imply the obligation to make injunctions or other summary pro-
ceedings available in addition to civil actions which may provide too 
slow a remedy? No such speedy remedy is available in France and 
Italy. The German Law of 1909 affords an extremely speedy remedy 
-the temporary injunction. In the Netherlands the general pro-
cedural law provides for provisional injunction by a summary 
proceeding before the District Court. In Belgium a special summary 
proceeding may be brought before the President of the Tribunal of 
Commerce under the Arrete Royal of December 23, 1934. 
The need to harmonize the laws of the Six concerning unfair 
competition is minor, since they are, except with respect to compara-
tive advertising, slavish imitation of products, regulation of prices, 
gifts and discounts and the like, generally uniform. The Commu-
nity should be little disturbed by differences of detail in the applica-
tion of such laws. On the other hand, because of the broad similarity 
of the law, a uniform law against unfair competition should not be 
difficult to adopt, and it would be useful, since it could ensure uni-
form treatment particularly of more recent problems created by 
competitive activity such as the novel problem of know-how. 
Americans would welcome any such efforts in the Common Mar-
ket. The existence of a uniform code for fair competition, and the 
attendant certainty that a given act would be uniformly condemned 
in every part of the Common Market, would be highly desirable 
from the American businessman's viewpoint, however strict the re-
quirements of good faith and fair competition. 
D. PROTECTION OF KNow-How 
Although still at the law's periphery, know-how is a subject of in-
creasing importance in international agreements and international 
investment. It is intimately related to patents, designs, and trade-
marks, is frequently included in licensing agreements and may, in-
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deed, be the only subject matter of such agreements. The success of 
an industry in the competitive market depends on the development 
of know-how by costly research of its own or on the availability of 
know-how developed by others. New inventions permit an industry 
to make rapid advances but not until new technology and new organi-
zational practices have been developed which make exploitation 
of the inventions technically and economically feasible.34 
The challenge of our times is the achievement of a greater eco-
nomic development and higher standards of living. The sharing of 
technical knowledge and experience-of know-how-is of essential 
relevance to such achievement. Manufacturers in economically de-
veloped, and even more in economically underdeveloped countries, 
are anxious to share and to acquire from others technical informa-
tion and experience, and thousands of agreements are today being 
concluded to accomplish this. The rules which determine the condi-
tions under which know-how is to be communicated, the restrictions 
imposed on the recipient, and the enforcement of these rules are 
obviously of material importance, therefore, in meeting the chal-
lenge we face. 
It is arguable that Article 36 of the Treaty includes protection of 
rights in know-how in the broad notion of "protection of commercial 
property." If this is so, the laws of each of the Six will determine 
the protection of these rights by virtue of the express provision of 
Article 36. In any case, no other provision of the Treaty contem-
plates action in regard to protection of rights in know-how by the 
authorities of the Community except, of course, Article 100 of the 
Treaty, the application of which could result in harmonization of 
laws relating to those rights. 
I. DEFINITION OF KNOW-HOW 
The English term appears to have acquired an international ac-
ceptance and is generally employed in contracts in languages other 
than English. It is generally understood to cover both tangibles-
recipes, formulae, designs, drawings, patterns, technical records, 
specifications, lists of materials, and the like-and intangibles-in-
formation concerning processes, practical procedures, details of 
workshop practice, technological experience and training. No dis-
.. For instance, a patent for an antibiotic may broadly define the organism, or 
describe its fermentation in a nutrient medium as demonstrated by laboratory experi-
ment, but commercialization of the subject matter will entail very considerable addi-
tional expense since practical manufacturing techniques must be developed which will 
permit production at a reasonable cost. 
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tinction is made in the legal treatment of these two elements of 
know-how in the countries with which we are concerned. In license 
agreements both elements, tangible and intangible, are covered and 
in the actual execution of these agreements, both may be furnished. 
Practically they differ in that the communication by the licensor to 
the licensee of tangibles is more readily proved, and in regard to 
problems of secrecy of the subject matter. 
In European countries, know-how, which is the subject of license 
agreements, is distinguished from industrial and business secrets. 
The latter are protected without regard to the existence or absence 
of contractual obligations, and such protection is available only if 
a betrayal of secrets or breach of confidence in bad faith has oc-
curred. The fact that industrial secrets may be the subject of license 
agreements can neither increase or decrease the protection afforded 
by these rules. 
There is general agreement that the elements of know-how in a 
given instance must be of practical commercial or industrial value to 
merit protection. But must they also be secret in the sense that prior 
to disclosure to the licensee they were known only by the licensor; 
or is it sufficient that they were unknown to the licensee only, or that, 
even though known to some competitors, they were also kept secret 
by them and were not, therefore, known to competitors generally? 
In Belgium and France, opinion is divided. In the Netherlands 
and Germany it may, perhaps, be sufficient that know-how is valu-
able to the licensee in that without the license he could only obtain 
the information and knowledge it comprises by expending time and 
money. In Italy exclusive knowledge of the licensor is not required, 
but there must be secrecy in the sense that the matter is not generally 
known to competitors or readily available to the licensee from 
normal sources. 
2. NATURE OF THE RIGHT IN KNOW-HOW 
Is the right in the know-how, as the subject matter of a grant, a 
property right or is it only a right based on a contractual relation-
ship? If know-how is considered to be property, certain consequen-
ces follow: transfer of possession only might be contracted for, the 
grantor retaining title; in such a case a third party without notice 
might be prevented from using or disclosing the know-how, and it 
would not be part of the goodwill of the licensee transferable along 
with other elements of goodwill. Moreover, creditors could not at-
tach it. If, on the other hand, title were transferred to the grantee, 
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creditors could attach the know-how. Here the distinction between 
tangible and intangible elements of know-how, as well as the con-
tract terms, might be of importance. 
In this field, as in others, the right is defined by the remedy avail-
able under law. In the Six the remedy available is one for a breach of 
contract. Breach of the obligation to respect secrecy may also be 
considered a tort, and the penal law affords a sanction as well. 
Articles I7 and I9 of the German Law against Unfair Competi-
tion provide for both civil and criminal sanctions, and injunctions 
are also available under its general provisions. In Belgium and 
France, an action for damages is available under the broad provi-
sions of Article I382 of the Civil Code, which is the basis of the law 
against acts of unfair competition. Article 309 of the Belgian Penal 
Code and Article 4 I 8 of the French Penal Code provide for crim-
inal punishment of anyone who fraudulently, or with intention to 
cause harm, communicates manufacturing secrets to third parties. 
In addition, Article 2 of the Arrete Royal of December 23, I934, 
of Belgium provides for a summary remedy akin to an injunction in 
certain cases of unfair competition, which include the unauthorized 
use of models, specimens, technical combinations, and formulae of 
a competitor, and generally, of all information or documents en-
trusted to another. In Italy, the general principles of unfair-com-
petition law based on Article 2598 of the Civil Code protect know-
how. A special provision in Article 2 I o 5 of the same Code affords 
protection against the divulging of information relating to the or-
ganization or methods of production of an enterprise. Anyone who, 
having had access by reason of his status or profession to informa-
tion intended to remain secret, communicates such information to 
others or exploits the same for his own benefit is subject to criminal 
punishment under Article 623 of the Penal Code, and damages may 
also be obtained. In theN etherlands, a contract or a tort action may 
be brought and there are also penal provisions (Articles 272 and 
273 of the Penal Code) against intentional divulgation of secret 
information which should be kept confidential because of the actual 
or previous professional position of the person who divulges or 
because a commercial or industrial enterprise had ordered that such 
information be kept secret. The courts also may enjoin the un-
authorized use of know-how. 
In the absence of recognition of property in know-how, a third 
party is not liable to action and may keep and use the know-how 
received from the communicatee so long as he has paid value for it 
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and had no knowledge of the contractual restrictions between the 
licensor and licensee. In Germany tortious conduct by a third party 
-for instance, the employing of a former employee of the licensee 
who was able, by reason of inadequate control, to obtain informa-
tion or documentary material relating to the know-how-exposes 
such third party to an injunction. 
Availability of know-how to the public, after communication to 
the licensee, which is not attributable to the fault of the licensee, 
terminates the right to obtain an injunction against the licensee in 
order to prevent violation of the license agreement under both Ger-
man and Belgian law, but damages may still be obtainable if the 
agreement is violated and if the contract makes no exception in re-
gard to public availability. The obligation to pay royalties in such 
cases may, however, cease under German law according to a decision 
of the Bundesgericht ( I 9 5 I, r 7 B.G.H. 2, p. 42), but not under 
Dutch or Belgian law, unless the contract provides otherwise. Even 
in Germany, however, there are exceptions in the case where the in-
tention of the contract was to give the licensee a time advantage or 
where it provides for a continuous flow of know-how to him and the 
royalty is presumed to be unaffected by the publication of a portion 
of know-how from time to time. 
The undertaking by the licensee not to use the know-how after 
termination of the license agreement is fully enforceable under the 
laws of Belgium and the Netherlands, but in Germany the right to 
use is so limited only during the period from termination of the 
agreement until know-how becomes generally accessible. 
3· RESTRICTIVE CLAUSES 
License agreements involving the communication of know-how 
may contain stipulations restricting the licensee for the term of the 
agreement or even after its termination. These include: 
(I) clauses prohibiting the licensee from selling the products 
made with the aid of know-how outside a defined territory; 
( 2) clauses prohibiting the licensee from communicating the 
know-how to subsidiaries or branches abroad; 
( 3) clauses restricting the licensee to use of the know-how in the 
manufacture solely of products, the components, ingredients or raw 
materials for which are supplied by the licensor; 
( 4) clauses prohibiting the licensee from manufacturing com-
petitive equipment or products for a period of years after termina-
tion of the agreement; 
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( 5) clauses obligating the licensee to use exclusively the t~ade­
mark or trademarks of the licensor; 
( 6) clauses requiring the licensee to use the know-how only for 
the manufacture of a certain type of products designated by the 
licensor. 
The German Law against Restrictions on Competition of June 
27, I957, is the only national law in the Community which purports 
to deal with restrictions to competition relating to know-how. Arti-
cle 2 I makes applicable to know-how the provisions of Article 20 
concerning agreements for patents. Article 2 I provides that these 
provisions of Article 20 apply in the case of: 
agreements concerning the cession or use of results of in-
ventive character not protected by law, manufacturing 
processes, constructions, other results enriching technique 
as well as results not protected by law which enrich cul-
tivation in the field of growing plants insofar as they 
represent commercial secrets. 
Under the provisions of Article 20, agreements are without legal 
effect if they impose restrictions on commercial activity which exceed 
the scope of the patent monopoly. Under this law restrictions re-
lating to the nature, the extent, the quantity, the area, or the period 
of the use of such commercial secrets are permissible. 
Of the six restrictive clauses listed above which may appear in 
agreements concerning know-how, numbers (I), ( 2), ( 5), and ( 6) 
are permissible under German law. Clause (3) is of doubtful legal-
ity, and Clause ( 4) is definitely illegal. The same answers obtain un-
der the French Law Decree of August I9, I953· Under Dutch law, 
any of these clauses are unenforceable if held contrary to public 
interest by administrative decision. On the other hand, in Belgium 
and Italy, in the absence of any law against restraints of competition 
and in view ofthe broad recognition of the freedom of contract, all 
six clauses would be fully enforceable.35 
VI. GENERAL QUESTIONS 
A. PROBLEMS OF TERRITORIAL ASSIGNMENTS AND 
LICENSES IN THE COMMON MARKET 
The assignment by a patentee or a trademark owner who has ob-
tained protection throughout the Common Market, of his patent or 
35 The International Chamber of Commerce through its International Commission on 
Industrial property is studying the whole subject of know-how with the view to adopt-
ing model provisions for insertion in agreements which would receive uniform enforce-
ment in all countries. 
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trademark rights in one or some of the Six, or his licensing of the 
use of such rights on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis raises new 
problems. One of these-whether such agreements are affected by 
the rules against restraint of competition under Articles 8 5 to 90 of 
the Treaty-will be considered in the next section of this chapter. 
A right of industrial property implies the power to exploit it 
commercially, and such exploitation includes the grant of assign-
ments or licenses for a particular country, which are valid under its 
industrial property laws. Such grants may, however, create much 
the same barriers to the free movement of goods as may result where 
adverse rights have been initially obtained by different persons. The 
question, then, is whether barriers which may be created by such 
assignments and licenses are sanctioned by Article 36 of the Treaty. 
Article 36 is directed at the powers of governments of the Mem-
ber States, reserving to each freedom to legislate in order to pro-
tect inter alia industrial property within its territory. Article 3 6 
therefore permits prohibitions and restrictions on importation, ex-
portation, and transit justified by legislative protection of industrial 
property. In short, it does seem to sanction barriers created by the 
assignment or licensing of patents or trademarks. 
Moreover, such assignments and licenses are, as a matter of 
policy, to be encouraged: they further economic progress and de-
velop competitive conditions. The assignment by a German patentee 
of his Italian patent to an Italian enterprise permits the establish-
ment of a new industry or the improvement of national production 
in Italy. Licensing by a Dutch trademark owner of his Belgian trade-
mark to a Belgian firm coupled with communication of the relevant 
know-how permits the establishment of a new industry in Belgium. 
The prohibition of such assignments and licenses would result in 
the retention in each country of the Common Market of all technical 
improvements achieved in it and therefore in a possible imbalance 
of economic development. Yet Article 29 of the Treaty specifically 
entrusts the Commission with the task of promoting: 
. . . (b) the development of competitive conditions 
within the Community to the extent to which such devel-
opment will result in the increase of the competitive ca-
pacity of the enterprises; 
. . . (d) a rational development of production and an 
expansion of consumption within the Community. 
The ultimate question is whether the geographical partitioning of 
industrial property rights which results from assignments and li-
censes can be permitted without creating obstacles to the free move-
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ment of goods within the Community. It can be, perhaps,. if only the 
right of the assignee or licensee to manufacture and sell is recognized, 
but not his right to prevent the free circulation of goods originating 
with the assignor or licensor. Denial of the latter right would permit 
purchasers of any goods lawfully placed in the market of one of the 
Six by the owner, assignee or licensee of a patent or trademark, to 
move them freely throughout the Community. 
The Treaty may, indeed, be found to embody such a denial, for it 
may be argued that restriction of the free movement of goods which 
have been placed in the market of one of the Six would constitute 
"a disguised restriction of trade" in the sense of the last sentence of 
Article 36. In any case it seems certain that the Council and the 
Commission will have to grapple with this problem.36 
B. RULES AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION AND 
THEIR EFFECTS ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
It is reported that a wave of consolidation, concentration, special-
ization and rationalization of industry in the Six is rising. A recent 
study lists sixty consolidations of industries in the Six and seventy-
one agreements between or among financial, industrial, commercial, 
and professional enterprises across Community borders involving 
the building of new plants and the sharing of technical processes.37 
Some of these arrangements will raise questions when viewed in the 
li~ht of the rules against restraints on competition of Articles 8 5-90 
of the Treaty.38 
Article 8 5 provides in general terms that agreements of all kinds 
which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the Common Market are incompati-
ble with the Common Market and void. Article 86 prohibits the 
abuse of a dominant position in the Common Market by one or 
more enterprises. Article 87 provides for machinery to establish, 
within three years, the regulations and directives necessary to give 
effect to Articles 8 5 and 8 6. Article 8 8 makes provision for the 
30 The suggested solution of the problem of territorial assignment and licensing would 
reflect also the position taken in the United States by the Department of Justice in 
U.S. v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), and embodied in H.R. 7234, 
86th Cong., rst Sess. ( 1959). The Supreme Court subsequently noted probable juris-
diction in the Guerlain case, 355 U.S. 937 (1958) and later vacated and remanded the 
case for consideration of a motion to dismiss by the United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958). 
31 N.Y. Times, March 29, 1959, § r, p. 19, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
38 A thorough analysis of these Articles is undertaken in another chapter. The possi-
ble significance of Articles 85 to 90 of the Treaty to industrial property agreements or 
to dominant positions centered in industrial property rights alone will be considered 
here. 
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period before the regulations contemplated in Article 87 are issued, 
requiring each Member State to pass upon agreements and the use 
of dominant positions in accordance with its own law and the pro-
visions of Articles 8 5 and 8 6. Article 8 9 provides for the policing 
of Articles 8 5 and 86 by the Commission. Article 90 applies only to 
public enterprises, fiscal monopolies, and similar non-private cor-
porate bodies. 
Whether these provisions apply in the field of industrial property, 
for example to license agreements involving patents, designs or 
trademarks, or to action by one or more firms based on a dominant 
patent position, has been debated. One argument has been that in 
excluding prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, ex-
portation or transit justified by the protection of industrial or com-
mercial property from the Treaty's reach, Article 36 must also ex-
clude those due to commercial use and exploitation of such property. 
Article 90 relating inter alia to enterprises to which Member States 
accord special or exclusive rights, has also been interpreted as ap-
plicable to industrial property, since the owner thereof must, by 
the nature of things, be deemed to receive from the Member States 
"special or exclusive rights." 39 
These views must be discounted. The terms of Articles 8 5 and 
86 are too general and broad to permit the assumption that they 
were not intended to apply to industrial property. Had there been 
such an intention, it would have been clearly indicated as, for in-
stance, is done in the British Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 
I 9 56 (Section 8) and in the German Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act ( Gesetz gegen W ettbewerbsbeschrankungen) of June 2 7, I 9 57 
(Articles I6, 20 and 2I). Article 36 of the Treaty leaves to the 
Member States the power to legislate to protect industrial prop-
erty rights, but this is not in conflict with Articles 8 5 and 86 which 
will affect the action or agreements of those entitled to industrial 
property rights which tend to restrict competition unduly. 
The real issue, therefore, is how far it is possible to reconcile two 
equally important objectives of the Common Market: the promo-
tion of economic progress and development by recognizing and pro-
tecting lawful monopolies involved in industrial property; and the 
elimination of concentrations of economic power and of agreements 
unduly restricting competition by enforcing anti-monopoly and anti-
trust rules. 
39 Gotzen, La Propriete lndustrielle et les Articles 36 et 90 du Traite instituant la 
Communaute Economique Europeenne," REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 261 
( 1958). 
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European jurists generally advocate special rules for restrictions 
related to industrial property rights, since such restrictions have 
always been accepted as a normal and necessary method of exploit-
ing industrial property. The owner of such rights, who is fully en-
titled to prohibit others from using his property, should also be able 
to grant limited rights-for instance, exclusive rights limited to 
one country only, or rights conditioned upon his control of produc-
tion by the licensee or upon sale by the licensee at fixed prices.40 
In the view of these jurists the regulations to be issued under Arti-
cle 87 by the Council should specifically except such "normal" ex-
ploitation of industrial property rights, and a list of clauses of agree-
ments which should be permissible has been suggestedY 
40 Bodenhausen, The Effect of the European Common Market and Free Trade Area 
on Industrial Property, British Group of International Association for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, Feb. 25, 1958. Professor Bodenhausen states the position quite 
forcefully: 
It is not only normal, but also in principle desirable, on account of the common 
interest underlying the recognition of industrial property, that the owner of such 
property, whose rights fully entitle him to prohibit others from using his property, 
should also be able to grant limited rights to certain selected parties, for instance 
in the form of exclusive licenses confined to one or more countries or by means of 
a series of non-exclusive licenses on mutually differing terms. In granting such 
licenses, production control, price fixing, and so on, are indispensable adjuncts. If 
such arrangements are no longer permitted, the owners of industrial property will 
either prefer to exercise their rights solely by prohibiting others from industrial 
property altogether, that is to say, they will apply for fewer patents or none at 
all and instead try to keep their inventions secret, or they will invest less in the 
exploitation and protection of trademarks. If this were to happen, industrial prop-
erty, which has hitherto been recognized as being in the public interest, would to 
some extent cease to serve its purpose. 
"The Commission d'Etudes de Ia Propriete lndustrielle of the Belgian Group of the 
International Association of Industrial Property attached to a report dated September 
6, 1958, the following appendix on what must be considered "normal exploitation of 
industrial property": 
I. In granting licenses the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to decide 
on the licensee and on the scope of the license which he wishes to grant. 
For example, he may 
(a) stipulate the geographical area; 
(b) stipulate the technical scope; 
(c) stipulate whether the.license shall be exclusive or not; 
(d) grant merely a sales license or limit the manufacturing license solely to li-
censee's own use or to sales in a specified territory; 
(e) fix the term on the license; 
(f) decide on quantity and quality. 
2. In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to stipulate 
conditions relating to the creation and keeping in force of those rights. 
3· In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty, in order 
to safeguard the commercial value of his rights, to stipulate the conditions under which 
the products or services covered by the license shall be traded or performed by the 
licensee. 
For example, he may stipulate 
(a) price conditions, possibly at second or further hand (think of branded goods); 
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Reference in this connection is made to the Treaty establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community which contains provisions, 
analogous to those of Articles 8 5 and 86 of the Rome Treaty, in 
Articles 6o, 65, and 66. The High Authority of the Coal and Steel 
Community in its Fourth Report on its activities covering the period 
April 1955-April 1956 on page 151, stated: 
The High Authority holds the view that agreements re-
lating solely to the working of patents are not to be 
regarded as a restriction to the normal operation of com-
petition within the meaning of the Treaty, and that accord-
ingly, the granting of exclusively regional rights in the 
present case is not at variance with the provisions of the 
Treaty. 
This statement of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Com-
munity is rather limited in its scope and cannot be cited in support of 
the general proposition that any agreement or action which does 
involve undue restraint is permitted so long as it is related to an 
industrial property right. 
(b) that the goods or services shall be used only for specified purposes or in 
specified territories; 
(c) that mention shall be made of the fact that the process, product or services 
are being traded or performed under the license. 
+ In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to fix the 
system of remuneration, which may e.g. take one or more of the following forms: 
(a) a lump sum payment; 
(b) payment of royalties; 
(c) agreement on a minimum remuneration; 
(d) a remuneration independent of the number or actual use of the industrial 
property rights to which the license relates; 
(e) a ceiling amount for the payment of royalties; 
(f) payment of fees necessary to keep the rights in force (think of the exclusive 
licensee) ; 
(g) acquisition of ownership of, or license on, industrial property rights belonging 
to the licensee. 
5· In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to impose 
conditions to safeguard the technical exercise of the industrial property rights. 
He may, for example, stipulate 
(a) quality control; 
(b) the obligatory use of specified raw materials, semi-manufactured products, 
components or tools. 
6. In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to attach 
the following conditions to the licfnses: 
(a) the licensee may be prohibited from concluding similar license agreements 
with others; 
(b) the licensee may be bound to supply to the patentee goods manufactured or 
services performed under the license, possibly limited to a specified quantity 
and/or at a specified price. 
7· It is admissible in itself to pool industrial property rights for the purpose of exploit-
ing them. 
In all the cases mentioned above, the holder is at liberty, when granting licenses to 
different parties, to vary the extent of the conditions from one licensee to another. 
2 8 8 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
Instead of this overly general proposition would it not be more 
reasonable to hold that insofar as agreements involving industrial 
property rights keep within the scope of the grant of the patent, 
design or trademark right, the making of such agreements consti-
tutes the exercise of the lawful monopoly embodied in such grant, 
but insofar as they go outside the scope of the grant, they may be 
prohibited by Articles 8 5 and 86? Fixing the price at which the 
licensee shall sell is not within the scope of the grant nor is a clause 
obligating the licensee to buy raw materials, available in the market, 
from the patentee. On the contrary, the grant by the patentee or 
trademark owner of a license limited to a particular territory is 
within such scope. 
Indeed, if industrial property rights are deemed to be agencies 
of economic progress and industrial and technical advance, then 
agreements granting rights thereunder would be agreements "which 
contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of 
goods, or to the prom<1tion of technical or economic progress" under 
paragraph 3 of Article 85 of the Treaty. As such they would not 
be prohibited, provided they: 
(a) 
(b) 
neither impose on the enterprises concerned any re-
strictions not indispensable to the attainment of the 
above objectives; 
nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition 
in respect of a substantial proportion of the goods 
concerned (Article 8 5 para. 3) . 
To European lawyers the concept of "restrictions of competition" 
is a novel one. In the Six, and particularly in the field of industrial 
property, the familiar concepts are "abuse of right" or "offense 
against the public interest." For example, in contrast to American 
patent law, which in no case does so, European patent laws penalize 
non-working of patents by compulsory licensing and enable the ap-
plication of restrictions to the patentee's rights for reasons of public 
interest (national security, promotion of public health and safety, 
and the like) . 
It is doubtful, however, whether Article 8 5 paragraph 3 will be 
interpreted, under the directives and regulations to be issued under 
Article 87, as incorporating only the ideas of "abuse" and "offense 
against the public interest." 
A further question is raised by Article 88 which provides that, 
pending the promulgation of appropriate regulations or directives 
under Article 87, the Member States shall pass upon agreements 
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(involving inter alia, industrial property rights) according to their 
own laws and to the provisions of Article 8 5, especially paragraph 
3. The domestic law of the Six plainly differs from the rules estab-
lished by Articles 8 5 and 86. Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy have 
no antitrust law of any kind 41n and certainly agreements of the "nor-
mal" type described above relating to industrial property rights 
would be entirely proper and valid. In the Netherlands, the law of 
June 28, 1956, requires agreements to be registered and the Minister 
of Economic Affairs has the right to annul, by means of an adminis-
trative decision, an agreement contrary to public interest. In Ger-
many, the law of July 23, 1957 declares all agreements in restraint 
of competition, with certain exceptions, to be in principle null and 
void. Among these are vertical price agreements in respect of trade-
marked goods (in Article I 6) and a number of restrictive clauses in 
contracts concerning the acquisition or use of patents (in Articles 
20 and 21). In France, the Decree of August 9, 1953, prohibits 
the fixing of minimum prices, but exceptions are permitted in cases 
of exclusive rights based on a patent, license or design. 
The Treaty goes well beyond the national law of the Member 
countries. Nonetheless it is difficult to conclude that at least "nor-
mal" agreements involving industrial property rights will be invali-
dated. This is true even if Articles 8 5 and 86 are held to be self-
executing and even if they are held applicable to industrial property 
agreements. 42 
The final definition of the scope of Articles 8 5 and 86 in regard 
to agreements relating to industrial property is of importance to 
Americans. The Common Market subsidiaries of U.S. corporations 
will, of course, be subject to Community law, even if they are beyond 
the reach of United States antitrust law. Moreover Community 
law will be relevant to the validity of agreements between Ameri-
can corporations and their subsidiaries or third parties in the Com-
munity. 
If regulations or directives issued under Article 87 exempt agree-
ments relating to industrial property rights or if such agreements 
ua By February 1960, antitrust bills have been introduced before the Parliaments 
of Italy and Belgium. 
'"Tuberies Louis Julien S.A. v. Van Katwijk's Papier-en carton verwerkende In-
dustrien, Rechtb, Zutphen, July II, 1959, [1958] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 984 
(Neth.) held that Articles 85 and 86 were not applicable, and that the existing do-
mestic law continued to apply. 
On the other hand, the decision in Judgment of February 19, 1959, 2 Beschlussabtei-
lung des Bundeskartellamts, [1959] GRUR Ausl. 252 held that the provisions of Arti-
cles 85 If. of t~e Treaty are applicable law in a case dealing with provisions in the 
license of a patent which limited competition. 
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are within paragraph 3 of Article 85, properly construed, American 
owners of industrial property rights may, on the one hand, be re-
quired by Common Market licensees to enter into the kind of agree-
ments which in the light of American decisions may be frowned upon 
by our courts. 
VII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
A THE LIKELIHOOD THAT CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY LAw WILL OccuR 
The adoption by the Six of a uniform patent, design or trademark 
law is unlikely in the near future. So, probably, is any major rewrit-
ing of their industrial property laws. These laws reflect a balance of 
the interests of those who own industrial property rights, the con-
suming public, and the state. Their amendment would shift this 
balance, and the reappraisal and attempted new reconciliation of 
interests which would necessarily precede it would be a difficult 
process even if the ends sought were purely domestic. Since goals 
in this context would be those of a community of six nations, the 
difficulties would obviously be far harder to overcome. 
It seems equally unlikely-as the above discussion has indicated 
-that industrial property law in the Common Market will remain 
unchanged. The question is how far changes will go and how soon 
they will take place. 
B. THE PROBABLE KINDS OF CHANGES 
It may be reasonably expected that procedure will be simplified, 
both as a result of forces which were already at work in Europe 
and of others which the Common Market will inevitably set in mo-
tion. The Conventions for Uniform Formalities and Uniform Classi-
fication of Patents will almost certainly be ratified by the few coun-
tries of the Six that have not already done so, but further simplica-
tion is possible. An agreement may be reached making it possible to 
institute a common search for novelty through the Institute of The 
Hague, or even to file a single patent application, copies of which 
would thereafter be communicated to the individual patent offices 
of the Six. 
These changes, however, are not of immediate significance to the 
principal goal of the Common Market-the creation of an area 
within which goods, persons, services, and capital can circulate with 
ever-increasing freedom. A second question is, therefore, whether 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
the law will be harmonized in order to avoid obstacles to the free 
movement of goods which industrial property rights, arising under 
six disparate legal systems, would otherwise tend to create. 
The probability of harmonization will be determined by two 
factors. The first-which will exert pressure in favor of harmoniza-
tion-is the fact that where industrial property rights are created by 
differing laws, obstacles to the free movement of goods do inevitably 
tend to result. The discussion in the previous pages of the problems 
resulting from differences in the laws of the Six makes this clear. 
The second factor which will determine the probability of har-
monization (essentially by determining what weight will be given 
to the first factor) is the direction in which the Common Market will 
evolve. The Treaty's effect should be ultimately to free trade, per-
mitting it to flow increasingly in natural economic channels and to 
conform to the logic of mass production, specialization, and centrali-
zation. But political and economic policies of the Member States 
may retard this process, and nationalistic attitudes may prevent ap-
propriate counteraction by Community authorities. If these pes-
simistic apprehensions do not materialize, integration should in-
evitably proceed. The Rome Treaty would then be only a beginning, 
and logic would compel extension of common action to new fields. 
Harmonization of industrial property laws in such an environment 
would necessarily follow. 
C. LAWS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE HARMONIZED 
Harmonization of the law is most likely where it is essential and 
therefore least likely to provoke vigorous opposition. Harmoniza-
tion of the patent laws of the Six may probably be expected, there-
fore, which will: 
(I) result in a uniform duration of patents; 
( 2) make possible a single payment of annuities to be appor-
tioned among the Six; 
( 3) create a system of working requirements under which work-
ing in one of the Six will satisfy requirements in each of the others; 
and 
( 4) result in a common definition of novelty of inventions. 
Harmonization even after the twelve to fifteen years transition 
period seems improbable in other areas of patent law. Some of the 
problems in other areas-opposition procedure, patentability, sub-
ject-matter-have been discussed. Others-inventions of employ-
ees, the treatment of inventions of additions or improvements by 
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others, the incontestability of patents after a certain period, com-
pulsory licensing for reasons of public interest-were not touched 
on. 
Harmonization of certain aspects of the laws of the Six governing 
designs may come about through the agreement now being discussed 
by the inter-Governmental Committee sponsored by U.N.E.S.C.O. 
Otherwise even an agreement on uniformity of duration appears 
difficult in view of the wide divergence between the fifty-year term 
in France and the four-year term in Italy. The only safe prediction 
is that Luxembourg and the Netherlands will pass legislation to pro-
tect designs. 
Harmonization of the trademark laws of the Six may be very ex-
tensive. I am advised that plans are already being discussed in 
Germany for the institution of a "European Community Trade-
mark., The adoption and registration of such a mark at a central 
office would be given effect throughout the Common Market area. 
The already existing system of international registration at the 
Berne Bureau should give added impetus to such a plan. 
The new Convention of Nice of 19 57 providing for a uniform 
classification of goods will most probably be ratified by all six 
countries. The creation of a common search center for trademarks 
of the Common Market countries to enable easy searches for antici-
pations should not, moreover, be difficult. Harmonization could also 
result in a uniform duration of trademark registrations, a provision 
that use of a registered trademark in one of the Six will prevent for-
feiture of the registrations of the mark in the other five. Finally, 
uniform provisions may be adopted defining the quantum of transfer 
of goodwill which will validate an assignment of a trademark and 
the requirements of a valid license. The latter may include recording 
in a central European office in order to ensure notice to the public. 
Leaving aside problems of trade names, appellations of origin, 
unfair competition, and know-how, harmonization of laws control-
ling territorial assignments and licenses and agreements involving 
industrial property, which may involve unlawful restrictions of 
competition, is also indicated. Free circulation of goods throughout 
the Common Market, once they have been lawfully placed on the 
market by the owner of the industrial property right, calls for uni-
form regulation. With regard to the application of Articles 8 5, 8 6 
and 88 to agreements involving grants of industrial property rights, 
it is assumed that the Council will issue directives under Article 87. 
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D. How HARMONIZATION MAY BE EFFECTED 
Harmonization of the laws may be brought about in two ways. 
The domestic law of the Six may be changed pursuant to directives 
of the Council. If this should be the avenue chosen, nationals of 
countries outside the Common Market, and therefore American 
nationals, will be entitled to the benefits of these changes by virtue 
of the national-treatment clause of the Paris Union Convention. 
On the whole, these changes will be advantageous to American 
owners of European industrial property rights since simplification 
and uniformity of procedural and substantive law will result. Be-
cause of the compromises which the changes will necessarily entail, 
some Americans may find new laws in individual countries less ad-
vantageous than are the present ones, however. 
A second means of bringing about harmonization of the proce-
dural and substantive laws of the Six would be intra-Common Mar-
ket arrangements extending defined reciprocal benefits to the na-
tionals of the other countries of the Six. If this means is chosen, the 
primary question will be whether such arrangements will be closed or 
open to countries which are not members of the Common Market 
Community. If closed, only American nationals and branches or 
subsidiaries of American corporations established in the six coun-
tries will be entitled to the benefit of such arrangements; if open, 
and if the United States becomes a party to them, Americans and 
American corporations established in the United States and else-
where may avail themselves of the provisions of such arrangements. 
It is not likely that there will be an attempt to conclude closed 
arrangements. Should closed arrangements be concluded, it is never-
theless probable that they will be followed by the enactment of laws 
in each Member Country making their provisions applicable to its 
nationals and consequently to persons enjoying national treatment 
under the Paris Union Convention. This conclusion is based on a 
number of considerations. 
First, it is plainly to the interest of each of the Six to extend to 
its own nationals in its own territory any benefits or advantages ex-
tended to other Community nationals. If Italy is to agree that the 
obligation to work a patent owned by a German national will be 
complied with if the patent is worked in Germany, Italian patentees 
will also want to be able to meet Italian working requirements by 
working their patents in Germany. If Italian patentees alone are 
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to continue to be required to work their inventions in Italy, they 
may be forced to transfer their inventions to associates in the other 
countries of the Common Market, or run the risk of forfeiture. 
Transfer or forfeiture in Italy for non-working would represent 
economic loss to Italy, destroying an Italian asset in the European 
Economic Community. 
When each country is a separate economic unit sheltered by eco-
nomic barriers, it may, moreover, make sense to require local manu-
facture of patented inventions. Having created a unified economic 
area within which products, services and capital may move freely, 
the Six can no longer justify working requirements, however. 
Secondly, a special arrangement among the Six extending recip-
rocal benefits to their nationals but leaving unchanged the domestic 
law in each country would, in effect, create discrimination against 
nationals of the other 41 Paris Union countries. It may be argued 
that such a special arrangement is authorized by Article I 5 of the 
Paris Union Convention, which reads : 
It is understood that the countries of the Union reserve 
the right to make separately between themselves special 
arrangements for the protection of industrial property, 
insofar as these arrangements do not contravene the pro-
visions of the present Convention. 
Examples of "restricted Unions" created under Article 15 are 
those of the Madrid Arrangement for the International Registra-
tion of Trademarks, the Madrid Arrangement for the Repression 
of False Indications of Origin, the Arrangement of The Hague for 
the International Deposit of Designs, and the Lisbon Arrangement 
for the International Registration of Appellations of Origin.43 
These Arrangements give the nationals of the parties thereto special 
advantages not available under the Paris Union Convention, but 
they remain open to accession by any Paris Union member. 
A special arrangement of the Six providing that working of a 
patent by a Community national in one of them would satisfy work-
ing requirements in the others, would obviously discriminate against 
patentees of the other 41 countries of the Paris Union. If the Six 
concluded such a closed Treaty, however, its conformity with the 
spirit of the Paris Union Convention would be questionable. Article 
I 5 does not require that special arrangements be open to accession 
by all countries of the Union, but the general qualification that such 
arrangements should not "contravene the stipulations of the Con-
.. The United States is not a party to any of these Arrangements. 
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vention" must be understood to imply that arrangements may not 
defeat the fundamental purpose of the Convention-the most com-
plete and effective protection of industrial property possible-nor 
may they substitute reciprocity for national treatment as the basic 
principle of the Union. 
Thirdly, even if such a closed treaty were permissible under Arti-
cle 15 of the Paris Union Convention, it would be self-defeating. 
For one of its main objects would be the removal of barriers to the 
free flow of Community trade and yet it would of itself encourage 
the creation of substantial trade barriers in the Community. For 
if a non-Community national could not avoid compulsory licensing 
or forfeiture of his patent by working it in only one country of the 
Six, he would be motivated to create barriers either by entering into 
exclusive license agreements with particular manufacturers in each 
of the six countries or by forfeiting his patent in some of the coun-
tries and retaining it in others, thereby preventing the free circula-
tion of the relevant goods in the latter. 
Finally, an attempt by the Six to create special rules for industrial 
property rights not applicable to non-Community nationals might 
provoke similar moves by others, for example, the Outer Seven. 
This would not only counter-balance the Community's action but 
might also be fatal to the Paris Union Convention. 
The only logical solution is therefore uniformity of the law on 
the points which may create obstacles to the free movement of goods 
in the Common Market so that the same benefits will be available to 
all owners of Community industrial property rights regardless of 
their nationality or domicile. 
For these reasons, American owners of industrial property rights 
should welcome progress towards harmonization of industrial 
property laws in the Common Market. 
Chapter VI 
Labor Law and Social Security 
Otto Kahn-Freund * 
INTRODUCTION 
It is the object of this chapter to consider the effect of the es-
tablishment and functioning of the European Economic Community 
on the legal principles and institutions governing labor-manage-
ment relations in the members of the Community. The Treaty of 
Rome contains a number of provisions on social policy, of which 
some are potentially very important, indeed perhaps indispensable 
to the functioning of the Community. At the time of writing ( 1959) 
the Community is, however, still at the beginning of its formative 
stage, and the social policies embodied in the Treaty are largely 
promises rather than achievements. Moreover, some of the provi-
sions of the Treaty are simply general statements of policy or of 
legislative programs-blanks to be filled in in accordance with eco-
nomic and political developments which cannot now be predicted. 
No prophecies of any kind will be attempted here; the following 
pages will within certain limits give an account of what has hap-
pened and of what is happening. They will leave it to the reader, 
if he is so inclined, to form his own judgement as to what is more or 
less likely to happen in the future. 
Nor will any attempt be made to analyze the details of labor law 
in the Six; there, as everywhere, labor law is extremely complex. 
Such details as are discussed will only serve to illustrate the broad 
principles and to explain the fundamental institutions of labor-man-
agement relations which are thought to be of interest to those to 
whom this book is addressed. A very brief account of the salient 
features of social security law will also be included. Social security 
"'Doctor of Laws, Frankfurt, 1925; Master of Laws, London, 1935. Professor of Law 
in the University of London, London School of Economics and Political Science, since 
1951; Visiting Professor at Yale Law School, 1955-56. Judge in German courts, 1928-33. 
Barrister-at-Law (Middle Temple), 1936-. Co-Editor, Modern Law Review. Author 
of numerous publications on labor law and other subjects. 
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law is not only complex, however, it is extraordinarily kaleidoscopic, 
so that everything said today may very well have lost its validity 
tomorrow. 
Accordingly this chapter falls under three headings, the last of 
which is an appendix. The first part is an attempt to analyze the 
Treaty itself and its impact on labor law and social security. The 
second is, as it were, a sketch map of the intricate landscape of 
the labor laws in the Six, including in particular the mutual re-
lations of constitutions, treaties, legislation, and collective bargain-
ing, the structure of unions, employers' associations, and their mu-
tual relations, the role of the law in the enforcement of collective 
agreements, the legal representation of employees at plant level, 
the settlement of collective and individual disputes, and the special 
problems relating to the termination of contracts of employment. 
The third part will deal with some features of social security law. 
None of these matters will be sufficiently analyzed to make pos-
sible the solution of practical issues. The object is to help the reader 
to ask the right questions rather than to give those answers which 
only the expert on the spot can provide. 
I. THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY ON LABOR LAW 
AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
A. GENERAL 
The report made to the foreign ministries of the Six on April 
21, 1956, by the Heads of the Delegations forming the Intergovern-
mental Committee set up by the Messina Conference (commonly 
referred to as the "Spaak Report") must serve in this field as the 
point of departure for an analysis of the Treaty itself.l The Re-
port emphasizes that the removal of internal tariffs and import 
quotas is in itself not sufficient for the creation of a common market. 
Other measures are required, and among these special importance 
attaches to provisions designed to promote mobility of labor and 
to those facilitating re-adaptation so as to protect workers from the 
"burdens and risks" attending progressive change. One of the aims 
of the Community must be the free circulation not only of goods 
and services, but also of the "factors of production themselves, that 
1 Comite Intergou'IJernemental Cree par la Confirence de Messine, Rapport des Chefs 
de Delegations aux M inistres des A/faires Etrangeres (April 21, 1956) [hereinafter 
cited as Spaak Report]. The Inter-Governmental Committee had been established by 
the Messina Conference in June, 1955, under the Chairmanship of M. Paul-Henri 
Spaak, then Belgian Foreign Minister. 
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is of capital and of men." "Thus we must give hope to an unem-
ployed labor force, which instead of being a burden for some coun-
tries, will be transformed into an asset for Europe." This, however, 
cannot be achieved overnight. "Transformations as fundamental 
as these cannot be accomplished without long delay. Within reason-
able limits, one year more or less makes no essential difference. The 
chances that the Common Market will be firmly established are 
all the better if the period provided for its establishment permits 
a gradual coalescence of monetary policies and of social policies." 2 
"A gradual coalescence of social policies" ( uune convergence 
progressive . . . dans les politiques sociales") appears in the 
Spaak Report not perhaps as an indispensable condition for the 
functioning of a common market, but as one of the elements which 
may greatly assist in giving it firm foundations. At the end of the 
transitional period labor should be free to circulate in the Commu-
nity and common social legislation for which the Treaty provides 
should have been enacted.3 
It is useful at the outset to bear in mind that, within the frame-
work of the Spaak Report as well as within that of the Treaty itself, 
the gradual assimilation of social and labor legislation and admin-
istration is intended to serve two related but distinct purposes: the 
removal of obstacles to migration of labor, and the removal of 
what are called "distortions" of competition. More will have to be 
said about the first point, especially with regard to social security 
law. The Spaak Report approaches the second problem with great 
caution. It deals with the "correction of distortions," pointing to 
the possibility that legislative and administrative measures, other 
than those of an openly discriminatory kind and those openly sup-
porting certain industries or enterprises, may in fact falsify "the 
conditions of competition between national economies as a whole or 
certain of their branches." 4 Yet, the Report is at great pains to 
point out that differential burdens-for example, through public 
expenditure or through social security programs-do not in them-
selves falsify the conditions of competition, since they may be com-
pensated for by rates of exchange. The Report also indicates that 
it is quite wrong to think that competition can develop only on the 
basis of equalizing the conditions which determine prices. "On 
the contrary: it is on the basis of certain differentials that equilib-
rium can be established and exchange be developed. It is thus for 
• I d. at 17-19. 
• I d. at 20. 
• I d. pt. I, tit. 2, ch. 2 at 6o. 
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example with differences in wage levels if they correspond to dif-
ferences in productivity." And the Report points to the common 
interest in establishing labor-intensive industries in regions where 
labor is abundant. The Report is strongly influenced by the expecta-
tion that, as the demand for labor rises where labor is cheapest, 
wage rates will tend to rise, and that, on the other hand, the free 
circulation of labor will gradually facilitate an equalization of con-
ditions of employment.5 
These passages of the Spaak Report are of fundamental impor-
tance for an understanding of the Treaty and of the policies to 
which its provisions seek to give effect. "Equalization, so far from 
being a condition precedent of the operation of the common market, 
is, on the contrary, its result. Hence it is useless to try somehow 
to modify by decree the fundamental conditions of an economy 
which arise from its natural resources, its level of productivity, the 
significance of public burdens. Part of what is commonly called 
harmonization can therefore only be the result of the functioning 
of the common market itself, of the economic forces which it re-
leases, and of the contacts between those interested to which it 
leads." 6 
This is clearly not intended to be a plea for laissez-faire. "De-
liberate and concerted action" is necessary for the functioning of 
the Common Market. But it must be "limited." It must consist in 
"correcting or eliminating the effect of specific distortions which 
further or hinder certain branches of (economic) activity." 7 
At first sight the problem here looks like that of the chicken and 
the egg-that is, is harmonization of labor conditions a prerequisite 
or a consequence of the Common Market? The answer given by 
the Report is clear-generally speaking new economic conditions 
should be allowed to have their impact on labor conditions, and 
"harmonization" should be resorted to only where there are "spe-
cific distortions." 
These policies are reflected in the Treaty, but not as clearly as 
might have been the case. This may be due to the fact that the 
relevant provisions were drafted only at the end of the crucial con-
versation between the French and West German Prime Ministers.8 
It seems to have been argued, especially by the French Government, 
"/d. at 6o-6r. 
• /d. at 6r. 
7 /bid. 
8 See Katzenstein, Der /lrbeitnehmer in der europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 
31 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1081 (1957). 
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that an elimination of gross distortions was not enough, but that 
it would be necessary to assimilate the entire labor and social legis-
lation of the Member States completely so as to achieve parity of 
wages and social costs. The relevant provisions show the traces 
of a compromise between these two policies, but the general policy 
of harmonization as visualized by the Treaty would not appear 
to run counter to the principles of the Spaak Report, and only 
one of the special clauses imposes upon the members a compul-
sory obligation to take any concrete steps towards its realization.0 
At the same time the Treaty places more emphasis than the Report 
on a deliberate policy of social improvement. 
This is the meaning of the key Article I I 7 which has obviously 
confronted the Commission with difficulties of interpretation. Arti-
cle I I 7 provides: 
Member States hereby agree upon the necessity to pro-
mote improvement of the living and working conditions 
of labor so as to permit the equalization of such conditions 
in an upward direction. 
They consider such a development will result not only from 
the functioning of the Common Market which will favor 
the harmonization of social systems, but also from the pro-
cedures provided for under this Treaty and from the ap-
proximation of legislative and administrative provisions. 
At first sight this Article seems to disinter "the chicken-versus-
the-egg" issue which had been so effectively buried by the Spaak 
Report. The first paragraph looks like a prescription and the sec-
ond is more nearly a prediction; the first purports to inaugurate a 
policy, the second expresses a prophecy. In the first paragraph the 
"equalization" of the living and working conditions "in an upward 
direction" is envisaged as one of the objectives of the Community, 
no doubt as being desirable in itself, and at the same time as a part 
of the foundation of the Common Market. This means that by 
appropriate measures the conditions are gradually to be improved 
until they are at the level of that Member State which has the 
highest standard. But the second paragraph seems to express the 
view, adumbrated to some extent, as we have seen, by the Spaak 
Report, that, if coupled with "the procedures provided for under 
this Treaty and ... the approximation of legislative and admin-
istrative provisions," the automatism of the Common Market itself 
9 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. II9 
[hereinafter cited as Treaty], 298 U.N.T.S. 14 (1958). 
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will produce the harmonization which in the first paragraph is seen 
as the end product of deliberate policies directed towards it. 
That this is very far from being a legal "point," a lawyer's quib-
ble, is shown by the attitude of the Commission, which has been at 
great pains to clarify the interpretation of Article II 7.10 The 
second paragraph might have been thought to be compatible with 
a policy by which conditions of employment are not forced up but 
forced down. Competition may produce a uniform level of prices and 
wages below that prevailing in any given Member State. One country 
may be forced to dilute its social security system so as to remain 
competitive with others. This interpretation has been emphatically 
rejected by the Commission. It 
... considers that Article I 17 provides for the equaliza-
tion in an upward direction of the living and working con-
ditions of labor, and a functioning of the Common Market 
which will favor the harmonization of social systems can-
not imply a levelling on a theoretical average standard of 
living, as this would, for example, force those countries 
with the most advanced economic and social development 
to hold up their social evolution till less fortunate coun-
tries have managed to catch up. Against this equalization 
should be placed the desire to encourage and help all 
peoples in the Community to improve their existing social 
situation, as the equalization provided for by the Treaty 
must be sought by means of more rapid progress in those 
areas where progress seems to be most needed.11 
This official view of the Commission was further expounded by 
Signor Petrilli, a member of the Commission and President of its 
Social Affairs Group. He added the significant observation that 
. . . the concept "equalization in an upward direction" 
constitutes neither a reason to hold up development in 
the countries at present most favored nor a Utopian yearn-
ing after mechanical equalization of living and working 
conditions. For the Commission, this concept means an ap-
proach directed to offering individuals, social groups, geo-
graphical areas and economic sectors equal opportunities 
to play their part in social progress.12 
This latter point is of importance. The "living and working con-
ditions" referred to in the first paragraph of Article I 17 are clearly 
10 
See (Sept. 18, 1958-Mar. 20, 1959] E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT 
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY, ch. 6 (hereinafter cited as SECOND GEN'L REP.]. 
11 I d. para. 169 at IO]-Q8. 
l2 See Petrilli, The Social Policy of the Commission, in Bulletin of the European 
Economic Commission, May 1959, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Bulletin]. 
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understood, and to be understood, as an aggregate, and it will thus 
be legitimate, for example, when comparing wage levels, to take 
into account the effect of social security schemes or of public serv-
ices (health, housing and the like) provided out of governmental 
funds. This has two significant consequences: In the first place, the 
Treaty does not inaugurate a policy of "mechanical" assimilation 
of legislation. It does not visualize uniformity of labor and social 
legislation, not even, necessarily, uniformity of social security bur-
dens as a condition for the functioning of the Common Market. It 
does not, after all, give effect to a general program corresponding 
to that aspect of French policy in this matter which, in a more special 
context, has found expression in the "Protocol relating to Certain 
Provisions of Concern to France." 13 In the second place, the inter-
pretation put on Article I I7 by the Commission, by the President of 
its Social Affairs Group, and also by the European Parliamentary 
Assembly, 14 effects, so to speak, a second burial of the problem of 
automatism and planned action which, needless to say, is not really 
a mere logical conundrum but a profound problem of economic and 
social policy. It reads Article I I 7 as an expression of the views ex-
pounded in the Spaak Report in the sense that the automatism of 
the Common Market is permitted to have free play as long as it 
produces an equalization of working conditions in an upward direc-
tion, but that corrective and planned action will have to be taken 
if it impedes social progress or-this is implied rather than ex-
pressed-leads to a deterioration in the conditions of the more ad-
vanced members. In so far, then, as Article I 17 thus interpreted 
permits and indeed demands conscious action not only to promote 
migration and to remove distortions of competition, but also to 
promote social progress, it constitutes a program which goes be-
yond that envisaged in the Spaak Report. 
But even with this third objective of equalization added to the 
first two, it is not a program for wholesale legislative and adminis-
trative uniformity. Such uniformity is neither one of the objectives 
13 Treaty, Protocol Relating to Certain Provisions of Concern to France, March 25, 
1957, pt. II, 298 U.N.T.S. 14, 133 ( 1958). 
"See its Resolution sur les questions sociales traitees dans le premier rapport 
general sur l'activite de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, pt. I, paras. 2-4, 
[1959] jOURNAL 0FFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES [hereinafter cited as J'L 
OFF.] 167. Numbers 4 and 5 of the Resolution reflect the dilemma discussed in the text. 
In the same Resolution (numbers 7-10), the Assembly also expressed the view that 
the Commission should urgently pursue a policy of developing the underdeveloped 
regions of Europe, and, in this connection, promote development programs transcending 
national frontiers, and cooperate in these matters with the Council of Europe and 
with O.E.E.C. 
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of the Community nor considered a necessary step to achieve the 
purposes of the Community formulated in Article 2 of the Treaty. 
"The approximation of their respective municipal law" appears in 
Article 3 (h) as one of the activities of the Community, but only 
"to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Mar-
ket." Any other attitude towards the unification of law would, it is 
suggested, be wholly unrealistic generally, and especially in connec-
tion with labor and social legislation. The important differences 
between the various systems of labor legislation and social security 
in the six countries are no doubt partly the result of disparities in 
economic development such as the authors of the Spaak Report 
and of the Treaty hoped gradually to overcome. To a very large 
extent, however, they are caused by differences in tradition, in politi-
cal outlook, in social mores-differences which are deeply rooted in 
the political and social history of Europe and quite incapable of be-
ing eliminated by a stroke of the pen of a legislator or treaty maker. 
The analogy with the evolution of the United States may be very 
misleading. There is all the difference in the world between develop-
ing the economy of a largely unpopulated continent for which a 
"common market" as well as a bond of political unity was provided 
in advance by a common constitution, and seeking to convert into an 
economic unit a continent enjoying the benefit, and suffering from 
the burden, of rich and manifold and very deep-seated traditions 
of thought and action. This may be a truism, but it happens to 
be a thought of special significance when contemplating the effect 
of the Treaty on social legislation. If, in two neighboring countries 
which are as closely connected economically as France and Western 
Germany, the structure and significance of collective bargaining and 
its relation to legislation, are very different (as in fact they are), 
the causes cannot, or cannot only, be found in economic disparities. 
They must be looked for in the political history and public opinion 
of these countries, and there is nothing to show that even a func-
tioning common market would, within an appreciable future, pro-
duce uniformity where for centuries there has been diversity. 
Although any thought of unification of labor and social legislation 
en bloc may, then, be dismissed at the outset, the "procedures pro-
vided for under this Treaty" and "the approximation of legislative 
and administrative provisions" are nevertheless expected-as Arti-
cle I I 7 indicates-to make a contribution to the equalization of 
living and working conditions in an upward direction. The "proce-
dures" here referred to are very obviously the steps which, in ac-
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cordance with Article 8, will be taken during the transitional period, 
that is, before the Common Market can be said to "function"; and 
the gradual reduction of customs duties and elimination of quantita-
tive restrictions within the Community, the gradual establishment 
of a common external customs tariff, the raising of agricultural 
productivity, the gradual freeing of the movement of workers, serv-
ices and capital are thought in themselves to be able to help towards 
the desired improvement. 
A closer look at the Treaty itself and at the Spaak Report is use-
ful, however, in order to determine what role has been assigned to 
the "approximation of legislative and administrative provisions," 
in the life of the Community and in the constitutional structure 
created by the Treaty. 
B. THE APPROXIMATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS 
In the Spaak Report 15 the "Assimilation of Legislation" is linked 
in one chapter with the "Correction of Distortions," though in a 
separate section. It is pointed out that distortions of competition 
can arise, for example, where in one country social security services 
are financed out of general taxation and in another out of contri-
butions with the result that labor-intensive industries in the former 
country enjoy an advantage compared with those in the latter. Dif-
ferent methods of financing social security and different conditions 
of employment-for example, the relation between male and female 
wages, hours of work, overtime pay, and holidays with pay-are 
especially mentioned as possible causes of distortion. But the as-
similation of legislation is not envisaged as the only primary remedy. 
Even where, as may be the case, several distortions do not so to 
speak cancel one another out, the Commission is, in the first place, 
not to go further than to propose that the governments concerned 
either recommend to the organizations adjustments in collective bar-
gaining or submit legislative changes to their parliaments. In the 
event of the rejection of its proposals the Commission is to have 
the power of agreeing to countervailing "escape clauses" permitting 
subsidies or delaying tariff reductions in proportion to the retained 
"distortions." Unification of legislation appears as an ultimate de-
vice where such measures do not promise success. 
In certain cases the best way of making the distortion dis-
appear will turn out to be to assimilate in the various coun-
15 Spaak Report, pt. I, tit. 2, ch. 2, §§ I and 2. 
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tries the legal provisions the disparity of which gives rise 
to the distortion itself. 
But even in such cases one ought to proceed with caution: 
One must not however lose sight of the effect on costs 
which such modifications of legislation may have; it will 
also be necessary to endeavor to give priority to different 
modifications which between them can in this respect pro-
duce an effect of mutual compensation.16 
Although the assimilation of legislation thus appears in the 
Spaak Report primarily as an instrument to be applied in the last 
resort for the elimination of distortions which cannot otherwise be 
removed, it is recognized that it may serve more far-reaching pur-
poses, for example, the removal of customs barriers (through unifi-
cation of revenue legislation), or the removal of obstacles to the 
free circulation of goods and persons through the unification of social 
security systems. It will be noted that the Spaak Report does not 
envisage simply the preservation of social security rights for mi-
grant workers (such as has already been largely achieved in the 
course of recent events) 17 but the unification of social security 
systems as a whole. These more far-reaching measures will, how-
ever, have to be adopted unanimously. 
No one can read the section of the Spaak Report which deals with 
assimilation of legislation without becoming aware that the two 
branches of the law which must have been foremost in the minds of 
its authors were revenue law and labor and social security legisla-
tion. As regards labor law in particular, the Report leaves no doubt 
at all that the Common Market is expected to bring about a high 
degree of uniformity. The relevant passages are important enough 
to be given here in extenso: 18 
As regards the conditions of labor, one cannot easily vis-
ualize the continued existence inside a common market of 
systems which are noticeably different from each other. 
The spontaneous tendency towards the harmonization of 
the social systems and wage levels and also the pressure 
exercised by the trade unions in order to obtain a co-ordi-
nation of the conditions of labor will be supported by the 
gradual creation of the Common Market. The unification 
which should proceed naturally, and without in any country 
encroaching upon the conditions of life and labor, will 
10 I d. at 64. 
11 Reglement N° 3 concernant Ia securite sociale des travailleurs migrants [1958] 
}'L OFF. s6x [hereinafter cited as Reg. No 3]. 
18 Spaak Report 6 5· 
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moreover contribute to facilitating to a considerable ex-
tent the gradual creation of freedom of movement of 
labor. 
Again we see, here more particularly with regard to legislation, the 
thought which runs like a leitmotiv through the Spaak Report, that 
assimilation must be the fruit primarily of economic development, 
subject, however, to the principle, more fully articulated in the sub-
sequent pronouncements of the Commission, that the development 
thus engendered will always be upwards and not in the direction of 
deteriorating conditions. And again, as previously in a more general 
context, there is a warning against precipitate action. 
On the other hand, one should not underrate the difficulty 
of solving these problems exclusively by governmental 
action and in accordance with a time-table rigidly fixed in 
advance. Thus, a shortening of the legal or normal work 
week constitutes in fact an increase of wages. Wage in-
creases, however, are not compatible with stable prices un-
less they either accompany an increase of productivity or 
can be carried into effect through an increase of the wage 
earners' share in the national income. The procedure 
which will have to be set in motion will have to give all 
the incentives which are necessary so as to make use of the 
given conditions in order to bring about an assimilation 
of the conditions of labor: it will in particular be a case 
of giving to such upward movements of wages as are 
compatible with stability a character which ensures the 
desired assimilation. 
These procedures will have to make it possible to take 
account of the diversities of economic conditions, working 
class traditions, and the elements which go into the making 
of a policy of raising the standard of living of labor in 
their entirety. It will therefore be necessary to entrust the 
Commission with the task of making proposals which will 
take into account the forms and the times of change which 
are most propitious. 
Here, as is true of the correction of distortions, these proposals 
will, during the first stage, require the unanimous consent of the 
Council representatives of the Member States; subsequently they 
can be adopted by a qualified majority vote. If there is in fact a 
distortion and if there is no agreement on the counter-measures 
proposed by the Commission, the state concerned should, in the 
opinion of the authors of the Spaak Report, be given by the Com-
mission the benefit of an escape clause. 
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The Treaty itself has, with some modifications, given effect to the 
policy formulated in the Spaak Report. The programmatic pro-
nouncement in Article 3 (h) is implemented in Part III, Title I, 
Chapter 3 of the Treaty which bears the heading "Approximation of 
Laws." This Chapter makes clear that the legal power of the Com-
munity to enforce an approximation of legislation is very limited in-
deed. It has no power to legislate in a "supranational" manner with 
direct effect upon the laws of the Member States. The Council is by 
Article 100 instructed to "issue directives for the approximation of 
such legislative and administrative provisions of the Member States 
as have a direct incidence on the establishment or functioning of the 
Common Market." "Directives," in contradistinction to "regula-
tions," are, of course, not directly applicable as part of the law of 
a Member State, but merely bind "any Member State to which they 
are addressed, as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to do-
mestic agencies a competence as to form and means." 19 Moreover, 
one exception apart, the Council can issue such directives only "by 
means of a unanimous vote" 20 so that each of the six members 
has an absolute veto. This is, of course, in line with the recom-
mendations of the Spaak Report. The Council must act "on a pro-
posal of the Commission," that is, a directive can only issue if a 
majority of the Commission 21 and all members of the Council are 
in agreement, and, where a directive involves legislative amend-
ment in any Member State, the Assembly and the Economic and 
Social Committee must be consulted. The Spaak Report recom-
mended that, after the first stage, proposals for unification of legis-
lation should be passed by the Council with a qualified majority, 
and this has-with some qualifications-been adopted, thereby 
creating the one exception to the principle of unanimity. Where the 
Commission has found that a disparity between the legislative and 
administrative provisions of the Member States distorts the con-
ditions of competition and thereby causes a state of affairs which 
must be eliminated, and where consultation between the Commis-
sion and the interested Member States has not resulted in an agree-
ment which eliminates the distortion (a situation which may, per-
haps, be regarded as not altogether unlikely in connection with 
social legislation), the Council will be able, after the first stage ends, 
to issue directives, acting by means of a qualified vote on a proposal 
10 Treaty art. I 89. 
""I d. art. 100. 
mId. art. 163. 
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of the Commission.22 Since the vote has to be by qualified majority, 
the issue of the directive could, of course, be vetoed by any two of 
the three Members which have four votes on the Council (France, 
Germany, Italy) or by any one of them with the concurrence of 
either Belgium or the Netherlands.23 A compromise between con-
flicting interests in the form of an amendment of the directive pro-
posed by the Commission requires either the concurrence of the 
Commission itself or a unanimous vote of the Council. 24 
It is certainly not the policy of the Treaty to make supranational 
legislation easy, and, as we have seen, this cautious approach to 
the problem corresponds not only to the attitude reflected in the 
Spaak Report but also to the needs of the situation. It would be 
unrealistic to place much reliance on the legislative powers of the 
Community as an instrument to assimilate social and labor legisla-
tion in the six countries. 
This, however, is in no way to imply that certain branches of the 
law cannot, or should not, be gradually assimilated to one another. 
In fact, in a Resolution passed on January rs, 1959,25 the Assembly 
expressed the view that importance should be attached to the har-
monization of conditions of employment in the Community, and 
that to this end the Commission should not only furnish the repre-
sentatives of the interests involved with the necessary documentary 
material, but should also take active steps to promote assimilation 
of the legal rules which apply in the various countries and should 
make contact with the relevant organizations with a view to achiev-
ing it. The Directorate-General of Social Affairs, which is the rele-
vant administrative service of the Commission,26 is actively engaged 
in a number of investigations, for example, of the existing legal situ-
ation with respect to the entry and the employment of foreign 
workers and their families, 27 of collective agreements,28 of the way 
in which the principle of equal remuneration for men and women is 
applied in the six countries,29 and of other matters. A certain meas-
ure of conformity among employment conditions in the Six may be 
22 I d. art. 101, para. z. 
23 I d. art. 148. 
"'I d. art. 149. 
25 Resolution sur les questions sociales traitees dans le premier rapport general sur 
l'activite de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, op. cit. supra note 14, pt. V, 
paras. 13-16, at 168-69. 
26 SECOND GEN'L REP. Annexes A, B, C. 
27 I d. para. 174. 
28 [January I, 1958-Sept. 17, 1958] E.E.C. CoMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON 
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY para. 108 [hereinafter cited as FIRST GEN'L REP.]. 
29 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 79• 
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the fruit of these endeavors. Whatever is achieved will more nearly 
resemble the efforts of the United States Commission on Uniform 
State Laws than those of the United States Congress. In other 
words, it will result from cooperation under the auspices of the 
Community rather than from any direct intervention by the Com-
munity. Article I I 7 may be, in sum, the expression of an aspiration 
rather than of a program of action. To say this is not necessarily 
to imply a defeatist attitude concerning the possibility of gradually 
assimilating the legislation of the Six, but may only be to suggest 
that voluntary cooperation is the most promising method of doing 
so. This means that the policy of Article r I 8 may be more significant 
than the (at first sight) more ambitious pronouncements of Article 
I I7. 
C. CooPERATION IN GENERAL 
Article I I 8 provides that "without prejudice to the other pro-
visions of this Treaty and in conformity with its general objectives, 
it shall be the aim of the Commission to promote close cooperation 
between Member States in the social field." 
The Treaty does not attempt an exhaustive enmuneration of 
methods envisaged to achieve this aim. Mutual advice may, of 
course, be sought and given directly between Member States, but 
the Treaty reflects the view that the Commission and its adminis-
trative services are the "chosen instruments" of assistance to Mem-
ber States and are to act as intermediaries, presumably adopting 
methods already well tested by the International Labor Office at 
Geneva and by the High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community. 
The Commission has already established contacts with both of 
these organizations. On July 7, I958, the European Economic Com-
munity entered into a very important Agreement with the Inter-
national Labor Organization,30 in which the two bodies agreed to 
consult regularly with one another on questions of mutual interest, 
to keep each informed about the other's programs, and to seek 
coordination of work. The I.L.O. also agreed to give the Com-
mission technical assistance. Since this Agreement was concluded, 
the Commission has established relations with the I.L.O. especially 
in connection with problems of safety, industrial hygiene, health 
protection, and vocational training, and the Commission has sent 
30 Accord Concernant Ia Liaison Entre !'Organisation lnternationale du Travail 
et Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne [1959] ]'L OFF. 521; FIRST GEN'L REP. 
para. 105· 
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observers to I.L.O. meetings at which problems of this kind were 
discussed. 31 
In regard to social as well as other problems close liaison has 
been established between the Commission and the High Authority 
of the European Coal and Steel Community 32 especially with re-
spect to the health and safety problems referred to.33 The history 
of what has so far been the most significant achievement of the 
Community in the field of social policy-the Regulations Concern-
ing the Social Security of Migrant Workers 34-indicates that the 
work done over the past few years by the Coal-Steel Community 
and especially by the High Authority is a very important basis for 
the work of the Commission. The comprehensive research done by 
and on behalf of the High Authority, particularly in the fields of 
labor law 35 and of social security,36 cannot fail to be of great bene-
fit to the future work of the Economic Community. As regards health 
and safety, contact has also been established between the Com-
mission of the Economic Community and that of Euratom, which is 
obviously faced in this area with very important special problems 
of its own.37 
The Commission must "act in close contact with Member States, 
by means of studies, the issuing of opinions, and the organizing of 
consultations both on problems arising at the national level and on 
those of concern to international organizations." 38 The extensive 
investigations which formed the basis of the two Exposes published 
by the Commission,39 on the Social Situation in the Community were 
31 SEcoND GEN'L REP. paras. 62, r86, 189; see also Bulletin, May 1959, ch. III, para. 33· 
•• FIRST GEN'L REP. paras. 39, 104. 
33 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 189. 
34 See below, and for the history; FIRST GEN'L REP. paras. II7-r8; SECOND GEN'L 
REP. para. 165. 
85 Especially the work of a group of six experts appointed by the High Authority. 
Three volumes have so far been published: They deal with sources of labor law, 
with workers' representation at enterprise level and with job security. It is under-
stood that a fourth volume on the law of strikes and lockouts is soon to be published. 
Each volume contains a detailed analysis of the law in each of the six countries, 
preceded by a general report. These volumes are of the highest quality and quite 
indispensable for any research in this field. 
36 Especially the two volumes of synoptic monographs on the social insurance systems 
of the six countries and of Great Britain. 
37 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 189. 
36 Treaty art. u8, para. 2. 
89 Pursuant to Treaty art. 122. The first EXPOSE SUR LA SITUATION SOCIALE DANS LA 
CoMMUNAUTE A L'ENTREE EN VIGUEUR DU TRAITE INSTITUTANT LA COMMUNAUTE Eco-
NOMIQUE EUROPEENNE, dated Sept. 17, 1958, describes the situation at the time of the 
coming into force of the Treaty (Jan. r, 1958); the second, dated May 1959, covers 
the development in 1958 and during the first three months (broadly) of 1959 [here-
inafter cited as First ExPOSE and Second EXPOSE]. 
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carried out with the assistance of the appropriate authorities in the 
six countries. This is also true of the series of preparatory studies 
which have been made or are now underway and to which reference 
is made in the Second Report of the Commission: for example, the 
studies of the legal and administrative situation in each of the six 
countries with regard to the entry and employment of foreign work-
ers and their families; the material collected in preparation of a 
legal instrument directed at the suppression of discrimination; the 
surveys concerning holidays with pay, hours of work, overtime pay; 
the legal situation in regard to collective agreements, equal pay for 
men and women; and the detailed analysis of the labor market and 
its prospects, of occupational training 40 and other matters. 
The employers' organizations and the trade unions of the Six 
have established permanent organs of liaison at the seat of the 
Commission. Through these, and, of course, through the Economic 
and Social Committee of the Community as well as the Social Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliamentary Assembly, contacts are 
established across the borders of the Member States, and between 
the Commission and its services on one side and representatives of 
the interests concerned, the "social partners," on the other. One of 
the most valuable features of the Community may be that it 
strengthens the ties between employers and unions in Europe and 
that it may give rise to an international set of "pressure groups" 
without which a modern constitutional organism is hardly capable 
of operating. The Treaty itself 41 requires the Commission to con-
sult the Economic and Social Committee before issuing opinions. 
The Assembly and especially its Social Affairs Committee have 
taken a very active interest in the social aspect of the work of the 
Commission.42 
Article I I 8 appears to place the Commission under a duty to aid 
Member States in shaping their policies with regard to the ratifica-
tion of I.L.O. Conventions and the application of I.L.O. Recom-
mendations.43 The Commission may conceivably also assist Member 
States in framing future reports required by the I.L.O. Constitu-
tion,44 and in formulating policies to be pursued at I.L.O. con-
ferences. 
Over and above all this, however, elucidation and compilation 
"'SECOND GEN'L REP. paras. 174, 178, 179, 181, 183. 
41 Treaty art. uS, para. 3· 
'"SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 161; see also ]'L OFF., passim. 
43 Adopted pursuant to I.L.O. CONST. art. 19. 
•• Id. art. 19, paras. s(c), (e); 6(b), (d); 7(b) (iii), (iv), (v). 
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of facts with regard to social and labor conditions, and comparative 
legal and statistical studies like those so successfully completed over 
a number of years by the Coal-Steel Community will be a major 
benefit which the Community can confer on all those interested in 
the economic and social situation in the Six. 
In Article 1 I 8 a number of matters are mentioned as particularly 
suitable for collaboration, but the Commission has emphasized that 
this list is enumerative and not exhaustive.45 It has pointed out that 
the Treaty provisions on "the action to be taken by the Community 
in the social field are in general less rigid than the provisions affect-
ing the economic field" and it considers that "this is in a way bal-
anced by the fact that the field of activity of institutions in the social 
sphere is not strictly delimited." On this basis the Commission has 
defined the scope of its activities: 
The European Commission has already been able to state 
to the European Parliamentary Assembly and to the Econ-
omic and Social Committee that it is not the Commission's 
intention that the interpretation (of the relevant Articles 
of the Treaty) shall be restrictive; it cannot conceive that 
the Community has no social purpose, and it has grounds 
for supposing that the other institutions of the Community 
share its views in this connection.46 
Among the items of collaboration expressly mentioned in Article 
I I 8, "employment" was given place of pride. This aspect of col-
laboration is closely connected with the implementation of the pro-
visions (especially Article 49 (d)) which serve the gradual creation 
of freedom of movement. The two Exposes on the Social Situation 
which the Commission has published to date in accordance with 
Article I 22 of the Treaty contain surveys of the employment situa-
tion in the six countriesY The Commission is, however, preparing 
a general detailed study of the labor market, and, so far as possible, 
forecasts by geographical and occupational sectors of what the man-
power situation in the next few years will be, taking into account 
economic data, demographic developments, and foreseeable techno-
logical changes.48 The study will be in two stages: the first will con-
sist in an analysis of the present situation, the second in the formu-
lation of forecasts. It will include an analysis of employment-of 
men and women separately-from I954 to 1958, and of the main 
'"FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 103. 
46 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 159· 
47 First EXPOSE ch. A.I.-B.I.; Second EXPOSE paras. 6-19. 
'
8 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 181. 
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lines of development (disparities in rates of expansion in different 
branches of activity or regions, changes in migration and the like) 
and a study of existing or proposed measures to establish equilib-
rium (for example, vocational training, decentralization, and re-
gional development). The study is being undertaken jointly by the 
Directorate-General of Social Affairs of the Commission and the 
Joint Statistical Office of the three Communities,49 with the assist-
ance of a group of statistical and labor experts of the various gov-
ernments who conferred in January 1959 and approved the scheme. 
These studies should, when completed, prove to be of great practi-
cal interest to all those concerned with the future of the Community. 
The Commission is also considering a general scheme to coordinate 
measures aimed at improving employment services.50 
The subject "occupational and continuation training" which is 
also singled out in Article I I 8 as a particularly important topic for 
cooperation is very closely connected with the problem of freedom 
of movement as well. As the experience of the Coal-Steel Commu-
nity shows, it is easier to create conditions of geographical mo-
bility for skilled than for unskilled labor. 51 Moreover, it is a com-
monplace that this is one of the decisive elements in raising the 
productivity of labor. Pursuant to Article I 2 5 (I) (a) it is one of 
the purposes of the European Social Fund 52 to cover one half of 
the expenses of a state or a public corporation in ensuring productive 
re-employment of workers by means of occupational re-training. 
Article 128 requires the Council, on a proposal of the Commission 
and after the Economic and Social Committee has been consulted, 
to "establish general principles for the implementation of a com-
mon policy of occupational training capable of contributing to the 
harmonious development both of national economies and of the 
Common Market." This power and duty of the Council is closely 
connected with one of the aims of the European Social Fund-
achievement of a higher degree of labor mobility in Europe not only 
in law but in fact. The two Exposes which have so far been published 
by the Commission in accordance with Article I 22 of the Treaty 
contain surveys of the institutions for occupational training which 
exist in the Six and of their significance in statistical terms. 53 In 
•• FIRsT GEN'L REP. para. 39; SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 19. 
60 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 182. 
51 Spaak Report pt. I, tit. 3, ch. 3, and esp. at 89. And on the labor policy of the 
E.C.S.C. in general, see HAAS, THE UNITING OF EuROPE 88 et seq. (1958); on the 
application of the here relevant E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 69, see p. 91 . 
.. See PART I, Section G of the text infra. 
63 First ExPOSE ch. B. II; Second EXPOSE paras. 2o-3 I; also see note 39 supra. 
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both, analysis of the training of apprentices and other young work-
ers on the one hand, and re-training, re-adaptation, or rehabilitation 
centers for adults on the other, are separately treated. In its First 
Report 54 the Commission expressed the view that, for the time 
being, no common occupational training policy was feasible, but 
that it would seek to achieve a measure of coordination, including 
exchange of information between governments and undertakings, 
and joint projects. The Second Report 55 indicates gradual progress: 
a general program has been drawn up which lays down an order of 
priority for such action as may be undertaken, but little has so far 
been done to implement Article I 28, which obviously confronts the 
Commission with a most difficult task. Under the regulations to be 
issued pursuant to Article I 2 7 for the purposes of the Social Fund 56 
the term "re-training" will have to be defined, a definition which 
will be of great importance for the social activities of the Commu-
nity. Draft regulations have, at the time of writing, been agreed 
on by the Commissioners and passed on to the Council. In these 57 
"re-training" is defined to include all measures concerning the train-
ing and adaptation of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers 
in accordance with a training scheme. The Commission also attaches 
great importance to the exchange of young workers which, accord-
ing to Article 50 of the Treaty, "Member States shall, under a com-
mon program, encourage." It proposes 58 a first program making 
it increasingly possible for young workers to spend a period of 
apprenticeship abroad, and then, through regular annual exchange 
programs, to enlarge the scope of such multilateral and bilateral 
arrangements as are already in existence, but this scheme is still 
in a preparatory stage.59 In connecti-on with all questions of voca-
tional training, the Commission 60 cooperates with other interna-
tional organizations and especially with the I.L.O. Meetings have 
been held under the auspices of the High Authority of the Coal-
Steel Community and of O.E.E.C., and these have been attended 
by observers from the Commission. From the point of view of the 
future prosperity of Europe this problem of occupational or voca-
54 FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 116. 
55 SECOND GEN'L REP. paras. 183-86. 
""See PART I, Section G of the text infra. 
57 They have not yet been published, but for a detailed summary, see Bulletin, 
Sept. 1959, paras. 4o-41, and on the point discussed in the text, the third sub-paragraph 
in paragraph 41. 
58 FIRST GEN'L REP. para. n6. 
50 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 185. 
~;o !d. para. 186. 
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tional training may well turn out to be one of the most important 
aspects of the Common Market. It is a matter of general knowledge 
that in some parts of Europe, especially in Italy, 61 unemployment 
and under-employment is most acute among unskilled workers for 
whose services there is comparatively little demand. 
Another subject mentioned in Article I I 8 as especially important 
for cooperation is "protection against occupational accidents and 
diseases." Such protection is closely connected with "industrial hy-
giene," (also mentioned in this context) and, of course, with social 
security. The Assembly showed its special interest in these matters 
in a resolution passed on January I 5, I 9 59,62 urging the Council 
to provide the financial means to enable the Commission to carry 
into effect a program for the prevention of occupational diseases and 
industrial accidents, and for compensation for both. The Assembly's 
Resolution also urged the Council to carry out in conjunction with 
Euratom and the Coal-Steel Community a program for the coordi-
nation of the existing health and safety services. In its First Expose 
on the Social Situation the Commission devoted a brief chapter 63 
to these problems containing a survey of recent legislative changes 
and administrative arrangements in the Six; this survey was brought 
up to date in the Second Expose,64 but a great deal of information 
in this field clearly remains to be collected. Here especially the 
extensive work done by the High Authority of the E.C.S.C.65 ought 
to be invaluable as an example, and the Commission reports 66 that 
it has established contacts with the High Authority, the I.L.O., and 
the Euratom Commission. The Commission is planning a number 
of general studies including one on the possibility of extending in-
surance to accidents and diseases not at present covered by social 
insurance legislation.67 In accordance with a special request of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Safety, Industrial Hygiene and 
Health Protection, a list of occupational diseases recognized as 
such in the Six has been drawn up by the services of the Commission, 
but this is considered to be only a "first working paper" for the study 
of occupational diseases. The Commission is to make a systematic 
61 Second EXPOSE para. 12. 
63 [1959] J'L OFF. 163. 
63 First ExPOSE ch. D.II . 
.. Second EXPOSE paras. 112-19. 
65 See, e.g., E.C.S.C HIGH AUTHORITY, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE Ac-
TIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY paras. 234-258 (1959). 
00 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 189. 
61 FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 121. 
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study of every disease and to publish a series of monographs on the 
subject. This in turn is to lead to a comprehensive study which will 
consider medical, legal, technical and statistical aspects.68 
The problem of geographical mobility of labor in Europe is over-
shadowed by the housing shortage, and like the High Authority 
of the E.C.S.C.,69 the Commission was almost compelled by the 
force of circumstances to give it special attention. The significance 
of the housing shortage is obvious to anyone who reads the espe-
cially informative passages on social housing in the First 70 and Sec-
ond 71 Exposes on the Social Situation. For some reason, this topic 
does not appear among those enumerated in Article I I 8, a fact 
which emphasizes the importance of the Commission's conclusion 
that this enumeration is not exclusive. In its First Report 72 the Com-
mission expressed its intention to devote special attention to hous-
ing problems (as well as to social services generally) and, in col-
laboration with the employers' and employees' organizations, to 
undertake as the first order of business a systematic collection of 
factual data. When the First Report of the Commission came be-
fore the European Parliamentary Assembly, questions were ad-
dressed 73 both to the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. and to the 
Commission with special reference to a passage in the latter's Report 
to the effect that the Commission would endeavor to stimulate the 
raising of additional funds. It was suggested that the two executive 
bodies should enter into consultation with a view to creating a joint 
housing service. The answer was to the effect that, although contact 
had been established in order to make the High Authority's ex-
perience available to the Commission and although the Commis-
sion would remain fully informed about the activities of the High 
Authority, a joint service was not feasible by reason not only of the 
different scopes of activity of the two organizations but also, and 
essentially, because the Commission lacked the financial resources 
which were at the disposal of the High Authority. The point was 
again made in the Second Report.74 This is clearly one of the essen-
68 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 190; Bulletin, Sept.-Dec. 19s8, ch. III, para. IS; 
Bulletin, Feb. 19S9, pt. III, para. so. 
09 See for recent developments of this important branch of the High Authority's 
activities: E. C. S.C. HIGH AuTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 6s, paras. 226-33. 
7° First EXPOSE ch. D.III (a). 
71 Second EXPOSE paras. 12o-27. 
72 FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 122. 
73 Question N° 19 & N° 20, [19s8] J'L OFF. S53-S4· 
74 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 192. 
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tial weaknesses of the European Economic Community compared 
with the European Coal and Steel Community. In a sense the in· 
terest the Commission is taking in "social dwellings for workers, 
large families, old people, refugees and repatriates, migrants and 
any other economically weak persons" is bound to be theoretical 
and to be restricted to obtaining and examining "the necessary in-
formation on which to base future action." It remains to be seen 
whether and to what extent the "re-settlement allowances" which 
will be payable out of the European Social Fund 75 will be able to 
bridge the gap. 
The Commission is also concerned with what in its Exposes 76 and 
Reports 77 are called "social services," that is, mainly the voluntary 
welfare services initiated either by individual firms or by charita-
ble organizations. In its Second Expose, 78 special attention was paid 
by the Commission to the training and status of welfare workers. 
As pointed out in the Second Report 79 this too is a matter very 
closely linked with migration problems. It stands to reason that, 
in the event that family migrations materialize, specialized welfare 
services will be necessary. A conference of senior officials in the 
field, of social service specialists, and of heads of social welfare 
schools and organizations was held under the Commission's auspices 
in Brussels in December I 9 58.80 
Other topics mentioned in Article I I 8 as subjects for "close co-
operation" include "labor legislation and working conditions" and 
"the law as to trade unions and collective bargaining between em-
ployers and workers." This may, of course, eventually lead to the 
creation of common standards which do not necessarily have to be 
legislative in character. Thus, consultation between the "social 
partners" organized by the Commission may in the fullness of time 
lead to assimilated collective bargaining practices, provided that 
trade union organization and the facts of labor-management rela-
tions in the Six are sufficiently similar-of which there is no evidence 
at present.81 Perhaps it may even lead to collective bargaining on 
a supranational level, or, on the pattern of the remarkable work 
done in this field by the I.L.O., 82 to supranational safeguards of 
75 Treaty art. 125 (1) (a) discussed infra in PART I, Section G of the text. 
76 First ExPOSE ch. D.III (b) ; Second EXPOSE paras. 128-34· 
77 FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 122 j SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 191. 
78 Second ExPOSE paras. 135-41. 
79 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 193· 
86 Bulletin, Feb. 1959, ch. II, para. 28. 
81 See PART II of this Chapter. 
82 See JENKS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM (1957). 
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freedom of organization, or even to supranational methods for the 
prevention or settlement of industrial disputes. 
This is only speculation, however. What is now certain is that 
the important work done by the High Authority of the Coal-Steel 
Community, in setting up a "working party" of distinguished aca-
demic lawyers and the extremely useful series of scholarly compara-
tive studies on "Sources of Labor Law," on "Stability of Employ-
ment," and on "Workers' Representation at Enterprise Level" 
which this group has so far produced 83 are more likely to serve as 
a pattern for the immediate future activities of the Commission's 
services in this area. The two Exposes of the Commission contain 
progress reports on labor legislation as well as on trends in trade 
union claims and in collective bargaining. In its First Report 84 
the Commission announced that it would have prepared (and would 
keep up to date) a series of comparative studies on labor law, trade 
union law, and collective bargaining, as well as on labor conditions, 
including wages and hours, with special emphasis on matters es-
pecially mentioned in the Treaty,85 that is, equal pay for men and 
women, holidays with pay, and overtime remuneration, as well as 
problems of techniques of production (including automation) and 
productivity. The Second Report shows that preparatory work on 
holidays, hours of work, overtime, and working conditions in the 
more important sectors of the Community is under way, and that a 
study on labor costs is contemplated. Studies on the law of collective 
bargaining and on equal pay for men and women have been begun, 
and a conference on automation is due to be held in the near 
future. 86 
D. SociAL SECURITY 
One of the most important fields of cooperation mentioned in 
Article I I 8, and in some respects the most promising, is "social 
security." The problem of social security has, within the framework 
of the European Economic Community, two distinct aspects: one 
is linked with the freedom of movement of workers within the Com-
munity and the other concerns the elimination of "distortions" and 
a gradual approach to the distant goal of "harmonization." 
"' See note 35 supra. 
"' FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 108. 
SG Treaty arts. 119, 120 and Protocol cited note 13 supra. 
"' SECOND GEN'L REP. paras. 178-80. 
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I. THE REGULATIONS CONCERNING MIGRANT WORKERS 
The Spaak Report attached some importance to the promotion 
of freedom of movement in Europe,87 and its authors pointed out 88 
that the machinery of re-adaptation 89 and of centralized financial 
assistance for unemployed workers might lead to a harmonization 
of unemployment insurance and that this in turn would facilitate 
freedom of movement. The Treaty itself went considerably beyond 
this modest prognostication. Its provisions are based on the insight 
that social security-like employment and re-training-vitally af-
fects the facts as distinct from the law concerning freedom of move-
ment. If a migrant worker loses a legally protected expectation of 
benefits acquired through payment of contributions, or if benefit 
payments cannot be made across the boundaries of Member States, 
a serious obstacle is placed in the path of that "free movement of 
workers" which, according to Article 48, "shall be ensured within 
the Community not later than the date of expiry of the transitional 
period." Even before 1957 a network of conventions had been con-
cluded in Western Europe-partly under the auspices of the Coun-
cil of Europe and partly under those of the Brussels Treaty and of 
Western Union 90-which were designed to protect the social security 
rights acquired by workers in one country and to make them trans-
ferable to another, as well as to facilitate the payment of benefits 
abroad. On December 7, 1957, the Member States of the Coal-Steel 
Community signed a Convention concerning the Social Security of 
of Migrant Workers, arrived at with the assistance of the I.L.0.,91 
and giving effect to these principles on a very broad scale. Although 
concluded under the auspices of the High Authority, this was merely 
a Convention; to become law it would have required ratification by 
the six parliaments. The Treaty of Rome, on the other hand, con-
tains a provision-Article 5 r-which, in regard to social security 
provision for migrant workers, permits the adoption of interna-
tional legislation in the strict sense. The Article requires the Coun-
cil to adopt, in the field of social security, measures to facilitate the 
free movement of workers: 
87 Spaak Report pt. I, tit. III, ch. 3, at 88. 
88 !d. at 91. 
89 See PART I, Section G of the text infra. 
90 HAAS, op. cit. supra note 51, at 374-75; and for an enumeration of these con-
ventions, see Reg. N" 3, op. cit. supra note 17, Annex D at 587. 
91 FIRST GEN 1L REP. para. I 17; SECOND GEN 1L REP. para. 165. 
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The Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a 
proposal of the Commission, shall, in the field of social 
security, adopt the measures necessary to effect the free 
movement of workers, in particular, by introducing a sys-
tem which permits an assurance to be given to migrant 
workers and their beneficiaries: 
(a) that, for the purpose of qualifying for and retaining 
the right to benefits and of the calculation of these benefits, 
all periods taken into consideration by the respective mu-
nicipal law of the countries concerned, shall be added to-
gether; and 
(b) that these benefits will be paid to persons resident in 
the territories of Member States. 
According to the wording of this Article, the "measures" taken by 
the Council with the object of encouraging freedom of movement 
among those in expectation or in receipt of benefits might have been 
"directives" only. Instead, the Council issued Regulations incorpo-
rating the Coal-Steel Community Convention of December, 1957, 
thereby automatically making its content law in the six countries.92 
It is no exaggeration to say that the Regulations concerning the 
Social Security of Migrant Workers of December 16, 1958,93 and 
the accompanying Regulations for their Application 94 are, at the 
time of writing (autumn I 9 59), not only the most important step 
taken by the Community in the fields of labor law and social secur-
ity, but by far its most significant achievement in legislation alto-
gether. The transformation of the E.C.S.C. Convention into E.E.C. 
Regulations had been envisaged in a Protocol to the former, 95 and 
the preparatory work for the Regulations to be issued by the Council 
of the E.E.C. had, so to speak, been done before the Community 
itself had seen the light of day. This was therefore a unique situa-
tion in which a very comprehensive piece of Community legislation 
could be carried into effect within a comparatively short time. As 
early as April 1958 the Commission made the requisite proposals 
to the Council, proposals without which, according to Article 51, 
the Council could not have acted. Some of the governments regis-
tered a number of reservations with regard to certain aspects of 
"See Treaty art. 189, para. z. 
93 Reg. N° 3, op. cit. supra. note 17. 
94 Reglement No 4 fixant les modalites d'application et completant les dispositions 
du reglement no 3 concernant Ia securite sociale des travailleurs migrants, [1958] 
J'L OFF. 597 [hereinafter cited as Reg. N° 4]. 
'"FIRST GEN'L REP. para. n8. This paragraph contains the history of the mak-
ing of these regulations which is epitomized in the text. 
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the Convention, but, after the European Parliamentary Assembly 
had, on June 26, 1958, urged the adoption of the Regulations and 
expressed its regrets that the unanimous consent of the six govern-
ments had not yet been forthcoming, the Council was able, on July 
2, to approve the Regulations in principle. All objections having 
been settled by agreement, the Council could then adopt them on 
September 25, 1958, by the requisite unanimous vote.96 The techni-
cal administrative Regulations 97 for the application of the new 
scheme were drafted with the aid of the I.L.O. and passed early 
in December, and on December I 6 bo.th sets of Regulations were 
published in the official journal of the Communities. In accordance 
with Article I 2 I the implementation of these measures was as-
signed to the Commission. For this, too, a unanimous vote of the 
Council was required, as well as prior consultation with the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, actions occurring on February 26 
and 27, 1959.98 It may be noted that the Regulations are expressis 
verbis based not only on Article 51, but also on Article 227, para-
graph 2 of the Treaty, and are applicable to Algeria and the "over-
seas Departments" of France (Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Mar-
tinique, and Reunion) as well as to metropolitan France itsel£.99 
The application of these Regulations has been entrusted to a Com-
mission of Administration with far-reaching powers.100 This Com-
mission consists of representatives of the six governments (who, 
even prior to the coming into force of the relevant part of the Regu-
lations, met as an informal group of experts; later they transformed 
themselves into a formal Commission) / 01 and they are assisted by 
technical advisers. A representative of the E.E.C. Commission and 
a representative of the High Authority of the Coal-Steel Commu-
nity take part in the work of the Commission of Administration, but 
only in a consultative capacity. The I.L.O. is to give technical as-
sistance in accordance with the Agreement of July 7, 1958, between 
the I.L.O. and the E.E.C.102 The Secretariat of the Commission of 
Administration is provided by the E.E.C. Commission by virtue 
of the decision of the Council of the 26th and 27th of February. 
96 Bulletin, Sept.-Dec. 1958, ch. III, para. 14. 
97 Ibid.; FIRST GEN'L REP. para. II9. 
08 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 167. 
99 Reg. N" 3, op. cit. supra note 17, Annex A. 
100 !d. arts. 43, 44; SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 166. 
101 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 168; Bulletin, Feb. 1959, pt. II, para. 26. 
102 Reg. N• 3, op. cit. supra note 17, art. 44 (I) ad fin em. For the Agreement of 
July 17, 1958, see note 30 supra. 
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY 323 
The functions of the Commission of Administration are, as 
pointed out in the Second Report of the European Commission, 103 
judicial, administrative, and financial. They are judicial inasmuch as 
the Commission of Administration is required to ensure a uniform 
interpretation of the Regulations in the six countries, by settling 
differences among them, by supplying authoritative definitions and 
the like. They are administrative because it is one of the tasks of 
the Commission of Administration 104 to draw up the forms of such 
documents as the certificates and declarations required by the Regu-
lations. The necessary documents for short-term benefits, especially 
for health insurance, were approved by the Commission of Adminis-
tration on December I9, I958, and published in the official journal 
of the Communities on January I 6, I959/05 whereas those for pen-
sions and other long-term benefits were published on May I 6, 
I 9 59.106 Lastly, the Commission of Administration has financial 
functions acting as a clearing house by effectuating the payments of 
the Member States to each other which, as a result of the new Euro-
pean scheme of social insurance for migrant workers, will fall due. 
For this purpose it will, for example, have to lay down criteria for 
the fixing of exchange rates and to settle the method of calculating 
certain lump-sum payments between the various social security in-
stitutions. This raises statistical problems which have been studied 
by a working party. They refer in particular to situations in which 
benefits are to be supplied or payments are to be made in one coun-
try in which the recipient resides on behalf of an institution in 
another country to which the relevant contributions have been or are 
being paid. 107 One additional function of the Commission of Admin-
istration is to initiate cooperation between the Member States in 
matters of health and social administration. 
As pointed out in the Second Report of the E.E.C. Commission, 
the Commission of Administration is not a mere consultative body, 
but a permanent institution, to some extent with executive authority, 
and part of the constitutional structure of the Community.108 Dur-
""SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 166. 
'"'Reg. No 4, op. cit. supra note 94, art. 2. 
106 Modeles de formules arretes par Ia commission administrative pour Ia securite 
sociale des travailleurs migrants pour !'application des reglements n°8 3 et 4. [1959] 
]'L OFF. 37-92; see also SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 168. 
106 Modeles de formules arretes par Ia commission administrative pour Ia securite 
sociale des travailleurs migrants pour !'application des reglements n°' 3 et 4. [1959] 
}'L OFF. 581-636 j see also SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 169. 
107 SECOND GEN'L REP. paras. 166, 169; Bulletin, Feb. 1959, pt. II, para. 27. 
10
' SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 166. 
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ing the initial period it has been meeting every month to assist in the 
solution of problems arising from the application of the Regula-
tions.109 
The above-mentioned agreement settled the objections of anum-
ber of Member States by incorporation into the Regulations of a 
number of very important reservations. Thus, the so-called ufronta-
liers"-workers who live in a frontier area and work in a neighbor-
ing country-and seasonal workers are largely,no if not entirely,m 
excluded as are seamen.U2 Other reservations refer to pre-existing 
international treaties on social security, 113 and to restrictions on 
payments of certain unemployment benefits outside the country of 
last employment.114 
The provisions setting up the Commission of Administration 
came into force on December 19, 1958,115 the remainder of both 
sets of Regulations on January I, 1959Y6 Their general effect is, 
in the words of the Commission, that "equality of rights between 
natives and foreigners is made general, periods in insurance are 
added together and in certain cases benefits are paid out in another 
Member State." "Consequently frontiers no longer prevent wage 
earners from benefiting from the rights acquired in the field of 
social security." 
2. ASSIMILATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY LEGISLATION 
The first step in fulfilling the much more ambitious and long-
term task of gradually assimilating the various social security legis-
lations must be to collect information concerning both the legal and 
the financial aspects of existing social security, and especially social 
insurance schemes. In this respect the High Authority of the Coal-
Steel Community has done pioneer work of very great impor-
tance 117 and paved the way for the further studies which the Com-
mission is contemplating.ll8 The work of the two organizations in 
this field will be closely coordinated. The Commission plans to em-
bark on a general analysis of the various systems of social insurance 
100 /d. para. 169; Bulletin, Feb. 1959, pt. III, paras. 44-46. 
110 Reg. N° 3, op. cit. supra note 17, art. 4, paras. 3, 4, 7, and Annex C. 
111 See on this: Bulletin, May 1959, pt. III, para. 3 I. 
112 Reg. No 3, op. cit. supra note 17, art. 4, para. 6. 
113 /d. art. 6 and Annex D. 
'"/d. art. 37 and Annex C. 
liS SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 165. 
liO /d. para. 164. 
117 Especially through the series of monographs on the systems of Social Security 
in the six Member Countries and in Great Britain. 
lis FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 120; SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 187. 
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law in existence within the Community, and on special studies-for 
example, concerning social security financing and the relationship 
between social security and labor law. One aim is to arrive at a 
statistical basis for the comparison of the total labor costs of enter-
prises, a comparison which presupposes not only an investigation of 
wages but also of social expenditure by employers.119 The Exposes 
on the Social Situation will, if one may judge by the two Exposes 
which have so far seen the light of day, contain valuable informa-
tion on current developments in this field. 120 The First Expose also 
contains a number of comparative tables 121 which should be of 
great assistance to the readers of this book. 
It is only when this preparatory and informative work is much 
further advanced that the Commission will be able to initiate sub-
stantive measures to assimilate legislation. The aim is in the first 
place to bring about a measure of uniformity in matters such as 
administrative procedures, age limits, various time limits, the lists 
of insurable occupational diseases and the like, and eventually, in 
application of the European Code of Social Security and the addi-
tional Protocol, prepared by, and adopted under the auspices of, 
the Council of Europe, 122 to coordinate the systems of social secur-
ity in the Member States and thus to contribute to an equalization 
of the conditions of competition. This, however, will obviously re-
quire years of study and preparation. Meantime the Commission 
considers that one of its objects is not only to keep an eye on the 
effect of social security on the functioning of the Common Market, 
but also on the repercussions which the operation of the Common 
Market may in turn have on the various aspects of social security. 123 
E. THREE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF HARMONIZATION 
Among the factors of "distortion" which should be eliminated 
by practical measures of assimilation, the Spaak Report 124 mentions 
with special emphasis "conditions of labor, such as the relation be-
tween the wages of men and women, the systems of working hours, 
overtime, or vacations with pay." The authors of the Report con-
sider these topics as particularly important in connection with the 
harmonization of legislation: 
119 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. r88. 
L."' First EXPOSE ch. D.I; Second EXPOSE paras. 107-1 r. 
121 There are three tables at the end of First ExPOSE showing the scope of Social 
Security legislation. 
""'See note r88 infra. 
,.. FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 120. 
124 Spaak Report pt. I, tit. 2, ch. 2 at 6g. 
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Even if the existing disparities did not give rise to distor-
tions, it would be necessary for the governments to make 
special effort gradually to harmonize the existing systems 
with regard to: 
i. the principle of equal pay of men and women; 
ii. the length of the normal working week beyond which 
overtime is payable, and the rates of overtime pay; 
m. the length of paid vacations.125 
If its proposals for the elimination of distortions are rejected, the 
Commission is, after the end of the first stage, to be entitled to 
agree to the application of escape clauses. For example it could 
permit subsidies or the delay of tariff reductions commensurate 
with the continuing distortions.126 Once more it is emphasized that 
"escape clauses" were, according to the Report, to be applied pri-
marily in connection with the three topics referred to above.127 
The Treaty has accordingly crystallized the general aspirations of 
the Community in the areas of labor law and social policy into more 
tangible policies in these three respects. It mentions (in Article I I9) 
"the principle of equal remuneration for equal work as between men 
and women workers," "paid holidays" (in Article I 20) and (in a 
very different form and in the Protocol relating to Certain Provi-
sions of Concern to France, No. II) working hours and overtime 
payment. 
I. EQUALITY OF THE SEXES 
Of these three provisions the only one to create at once a legal 
obligation among the Member States is Article I 19, the operative 
first paragraph of which is as follows: 
Each Member State shall in the course of the first stage 
ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the 
principle of equal remuneration for equal work as between 
men and women workers. 
The background of the provision is to be found not only in the 
proposals of the Spaak Report but also in the Preamble of the Con-
stitution of the International Labor Organization of 1946 128 and 
especially in the I.L.O. Equality of Remuneration Convention of 
= Id. at 6s-66. 
l2o I d. at 64. 
,.., I d. at 66. 
128 "And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship 
and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace 
and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those con-
ditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the ... recognition of the principle 
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I95 I 129 which has been ratified by Belgium, France, the German 
Federal Republic, and Italy, but not by Luxembourg or the Nether-
lands.130 The relationship between the obligations imposed by the 
I.L.O. Convention and those arising from Article I 19 of the Treaty 
is a matter of some complexity which has been studied by the com-
petent departments of the Commission's organization both in the 
light of the history and in the light of the wording of the two docu-
ments. The Commission hopes to analyze this relationship in a 
study of the problems raised by Article I I 9 which it will publish. 
The Treaty refers to "equal remuneration for equal work," whereas 
the Convention, in its Article 2, speaks of "equal remuneration ... 
for work of equal value," and one of the problems of interpretation 
is whether these phrases are to be treated as synonymous.131 
Before the Commission has completed the comparative legal 
and statistical investigation on which it embarked soon after the 
Treaty came into force/ 32 it is impossible to say to what extent the 
principle of Article I I 9 is a social aspiration and to what extent 
it represents aims which have already been achieved. That it rep-
resents a live issue is clear. The Second Expose of the Commission 
on the Social Situation in the Community indicates that, at any rate 
in some countries, trade unions are actively campaigning for the 
rule of equal pay,133 and an active interest in the problem has been 
shown in the Assembly. To aid it in elucidating the law and facts 
obtaining in the Six, the Commission has contacted the governments 
concerned, the I.L.O. and employers' associations and trade un-
ions.13~ 
The legal problems are complex because it is necessary not only to 
compare constitutional and legislative texts, but also case law and 
collective bargaining practices of the various countries with one 
of equal remuneration of work of equal value . ... " (Emphasis added.) The 
italicized words were not in the original I.L.O. Constitution of I9I9 but were added 
in I946. 
120 Convention (No. 100) concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women 
Workers for Work of Equal Value [hereinafter cited as Convention 100], I.L.O., 
Record of Proceedings, 34th Session, Geneva, I95I, at 65o-57; I.L.O., 34 OFFICIAL 
BULLETIN 9-I3 (I95I). See also I.L.O., I THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CODE I95I 
[hereinafter cited as I I.L. ConE I95I], arts. 233 (K) -233 (0) at I83-86 (I952). 
130 This was the state of ratifications at the moment of the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Rome and was still the state of affairs in the summer of I959· See also 
Reponse de Ia Commission de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, [I959] J'L 
OFF. 85I [hereinafter cited as Reponse]. 
131 For all this see Reponse, op. cit. supra note I30. 
132 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. I79· 
133 Second EXPOSE, para. 64 (Belgium), para. 74 (Italy). 
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' See Reponse, op. cit. supra note I30. 
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another. Many regulations and other subordinate legislation may 
also be relevant. Moreover, even a minutely detailed legal analysis 
will yield no conclusive results regarding the actual facts. This be-
comes clear from even a superficial comparison of some legal and 
statistical data. The Preamble to the French Constitution of I946 
laid down the principle that, in every respect, the rights of women 
should be equal to those of men/35 a principle incorporated with the 
rest of the I946 Preamble in the Constitution of I958/36 also em-
bodied in French legislation on collective agreements 137 and applied 
in the fixing of the National Minimum Wage.138 The Basic Law of 
the German Federal Republic of I949 in its Article 3 also provides 
that men and women have equal rights, and legislation at variance 
with this principle is unconstitutional, null and void.139 Moreover, 
the courts and most learned writers hold that the principle must 
be applied in collective bargaining.140 Yet, in I 9 52 an inquiry in-
stituted by the I.L.O. revealed that in France the average earnings 
of women workers amounted to only 9 I percent of those of men, 
whereas the corresponding figure for Germany was as low as 78 
percent (and for Great Britain 66 percent) .141 How much signifi-
cance attaches in practice to Article 3 7 of the I tali an Constitution 
of I 94 7 which guarantees equal pay for male and female workers, 
and to the prevailing view that this is a norm of positive law and 
not a mere program,142 is a matter for conjecture. The difference 
between embodying the principle of equal pay in law (even constitu-
tional law) and giving it practical effect is evidently great. 
We do not know, of course, how far the figures produced by the 
135 The Constitution of October 27, I946, "garantit a Ia femme, dans tous les 
domaines, des droits egaux a ceux de l'homme." See for the significance of this and 
of the Preamble: Durand, Les Sources du Droit du Tra'llail en France, in E.C.S.C. 
HIGH AUTHORITY, ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES SOURCES DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL DANS LES PAYS 
DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 9I-II3 (I957); BRUN & 
GALLAND, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 54 (I958). 
136 In the Constitution of 1958, "the French people solemnly proclaim their attach-
ment to the Rights of Man and the principles of N a tiona) Sovereignty as defined 
by the Declaration of I789, confirmed and completed by the Preamble to the Con-
stitution of I946." [Translation by Campbell & Chapman, Oxford (Blackwell) 
1958]. 
137 Law of Feb. II, 1950, [I950] Journal officiel de Ia Republique Fran,.aise [herein-
after cited as J.O.] I688 (Fr.) inserting into the CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. II, tit. II, 
inter alia, art. pg, second para., (I) (d). 
133
2 DURAND (with the concurrence of Andre Vitu), TRA!TE DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL 
64I ( I950) [hereinafter cited as 2 DURAND]; BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note 
I35• at 451. 
139 I NIKISCH, ARBEITSRECHT 302 (I955). 
14° For a detailed discussion: id. at 304. 
"'Quoted BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note I35, at 445, n. I. 
""MAZZONI, MANUALE Dl D!RITTO DEL LAVORO 140 (1958). 
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I.L.O. inquiry of 1952 should be attributed to disparities in wage 
rates rather than to differences in employment opportunities or 
(within piece rate systems) of actual performances. The Commis-
sion itself, in answering a relevant question in the Assembly, 143 
emphasized that one could not, on the basis of existing statistics, 
determine with any degree of precision how far in any given country 
the rule of equal pay had been given effect, and that one would have 
to undertake "case studies," presumably of selected industries. The 
Commission promised to prepare a general survey, based on collec-
tive agreements, regulations and the like, but it observed somewhat 
sceptically that no more than a general movement towards adapta-
tion of female to male wages could be reliably ascertained from the 
existing material. 
Although it creates binding obligations among the Member 
States, Article I I 9 is very cautiously formulated. The principle of 
equal pay for equal work does not ipso facto become part of the 
legal systems of the members, and the Council has not even been 
given power to issue regulations enacting it into law. The Member 
States have gone no further than to accept an obligation to each 
other and to the Community to transform their systems of wage 
rates so as to ensure application of the principle in the course of the 
first stage of the transitional period. Article I I 9 does not, therefore, 
confer any rights or impose any obligations on any individual based 
on the principle of equality. It does no more than to create an obliga-
tion binding the Member States in international law. Furthermore, 
it would appear that Article I I 9 implicitly incorporates the same 
rule which is expressed in Article 2, paragraph 2 of the I.L.O. Con-
vention of I95 I, that is, that the states are free to choose whatever 
method they wish so as to give effect to the principle. Thus, if, in 
practice, equality is achieved by collective bargaining, legislation is 
unnecessary. The principle is confined to "remuneration" and does 
not cover workers' rights of a different character, such as, for ex-
ample, representation on works councils, trade union membership, 
or membership of trade union committees or other governing bodies. 
The term "remuneration" is, however, defined very comprehen-
sively, and in this respect the relevant provision of the Treaty 144 
repeats verbatim the definition of Article I (a) of the I.L.O. Con-
vention. "Remuneration" includes not only the "ordinary basic mini-
mum wage or salary" but also "any additional emoluments what-
143 See Reponse, op. cit. supra note 130. 
1
" Treaty art. 119, para. z. 
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soever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by 
the employer to the worker and arising out of the worker's employ-
ment." This covers merit rates and skill differentials, family allow-
ances and bonuses of all kinds, and also "fringe benefits" such as 
vacation payments and participation in pension schemes. As re-
gards basic wage rates it means what is generally called the "rate 
for the job," or in the words of the Treaty: "remuneration for work 
at time rates shall be the same for the same job." 145 As regards piece 
rates the Treaty provides "that remuneration for the same work 
. . . shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of measure-
ment." 146 This is obviously intended to say that the same rate must 
be promised for identical units of work, or, in the words of the I.L.O. 
Convention, it "refers to rates of remuneration established without 
discrimination based on sex." 147 What it does not mean is that either 
time merit rates or piece rates have to be calculated in such a way 
as to make up for any differences in the average performance of men 
and women which may influence their aggregate earnings. It may 
even be arguable that an attempt to do so might itself be a contra· 
vention of the principle. In other words, wage rates must be fixed 
so as to give equal opportunities to all, but they need not, and per-
haps must not, even out such inequalities of opportunity as are the 
result of natural differences. The I.L.O. Convention 148 suggests 
"measures [to J ... be taken to promote objective appraisal of 
jobs on the basis of the work to be performed" and goes on to pro-
vide that "differential rates between workers, which correspond, 
without regard to sex, to differences, as determined by such objective 
appraisal, in the work to be performed, shall not be considered as 
being contrary to the principle of equal remuneration for men and 
women workers for work of equal value." This principle must, it 
is submitted, be considered as being implicitly incorporated in the 
Treaty. If this submission is well founded, there would, after all, 
be no difference between "equal remuneration for equal work" and 
"equal remuneration for work of equal value." 
2. HOLIDAYS WITH PAY 
The provision on holidays with pay is much more vague. Article 
I 20 requires Member States to "endeavor to maintain the existing 
equivalence of paid holiday schemes." During the negotiations some 
145 Id. art. I19, para. 3 (b). 
143 Id. art. II9, para. 3 (a). 
147 Convention Ioo, op. cit. supra note 129, art. I (b); see also I I.L. CoDE 1951, 
art. 233 (L). 
""Convention 100, op. cit. supra. note 129, art. 3; I I.L. CODE 1951, art. 233 (N). 
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expressed anxiety that differences in this area might lead to dis-
tortions of competition. In France,149 Belgium/50 and Luxem-
bourg 151 the employees' right to annual vacations is regulated by 
statute, whereas in Western Germany 152 and in Italy 153 it is entirely 
or mainly based on collective agreements. This is also true of the 
Netherlands,154 where, however, the Council of Mediators has cer-
tain powers to regulate holidays 155 and where a bill on annual vaca-
tions with pay is pending at the time of writing. The fact that in 
one country paid vacations are based on legislation and in another 
on collective bargaining does not in itself have any influence on the 
conditions under which the industries of those countries compete. 
Collective agreements are, however, plainly more adaptable than 
statutes to changing conditions of the market. This element of 
rigidity which is inherent in legislative as distinguished from auton-
omous industrial regulation may perhaps be considered as the 
most significant "distorting" factor arising from vacations with 
pay. 
This observation is especially relevant in connection with French 
law. The French legislation governing annual vacations is very de-
149 CODE nu TRAVAIL, bk. II, tit. I, art. 54 f, as amended by the law of March 27, 
I956, (I956] J.O. 3I20 (Fr.). See BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note I35, at 4I5; 
2 DuRAND, op. cit. supra note I38, at 492. 
150 The relevant Belgian legislation was consolidated by a Royal Decree of March 
9, I95I, [I95I] Recueil Des Lois et Arretes de Belgique 8I4, but there are ad-
ditional Decrees. See Horion, Les Sources du Droit du Travail en Belgique, in 
E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note I35, at 69. 
151 Law of July 27, I950, [I950] Pasinomie Luxembourgeoise [hereinafter cited 
as Pasin. Lux.] 236, concerning the regulation of the annual vacations of em-
ployees (manual workers as well as salaried employees), and, with regard to 
salaried employees, the provisions of Art. Io of the law of June 7, I937, [I937] 
Pasin. Lux. 540 on the contract of employment of salaried employees which are 
still in force in smaller undertakings. PEMMERS, LE CONTRAT DE TRAVAIL DES EM-
PLOYES DANS LE GRAND-DUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG, ch. V, paras. 24I-55, at I03-<l9 (2nd 
ed. I953). 
15
" I NIKISCH, op. cit. suPra note I39, at 442. Some of the Lander have since I945 
issued legislation on vacations with pay, but collective agreements remain of primary 
importance. There is no federal statute. For decades it has been customary to provide 
for vacations with pay in collective agreements (under the Nazis in collective 
"orders"). This has resulted in a principle that the employee is, by custom, im-
plicitly entitled to paid annual vacations, even in the absence of a particular pro-
vision. See I NIKISCH, op. cit. supra at 444· 
159 MAZZONI, op. cit. supra note 142, at 360. The provision in art. 2I09 of the 
Civil Code is a blank to be filled in by agreement or custom. The statute en-
visaged by art. 36 of the Constitution has not yet been passed. See Mengoni, Les 
Sources du Droit du Travail en ltalie, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra 
note I 35, at I22, I40. 
15
• De Gaay Fortman, Les Rapports Individuels du Travail aux Pays-Bas, Na-
tional Report to the znd International Congress on Labour Law (Brussels, 1958). 
See for the pending Bill, Second ExPOSE, para. 59· 
155 Under the "Extraordinary Decree on Labour Relations" of I9f5, tQ which 
reference is made below, in PART II. · 
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tailed, and, especially since the amendment of the Labor Code by 
a Law of March 27, I956, 156 is very favorable to the employee. The 
employee is entitled to one and a half days of paid vacation for 
each month he has worked for the particular employer, that is, I8 
days per year, a minimum which is subject to extension on various 
grounds. This rigid, detailed and (from the point of view of the 
employers) onerous system of paid vacations made it desirable from 
the French point of view to reduce the flexibility of the vacation 
schemes existing in other Members of the Community, and to en-
sure that the other Member States would at least do nothing to 
reduce the existing vacation rights conferred upon employees by 
legislation, collective bargaining, or usage. No attempt was made 
in this respect to produce anything like equality between members, 
an attempt which in view of the complexity and multiplicity of exist-
ing vacation schemes would, in any event, have been doomed to 
failure. Article I 20 envisages only that the existing basis of compe-
tition should in this respect be "frozen," that is, that nothing should 
be done to increase whatever distorting effect present vacation 
schemes may have on the competitive power of the Member States. 
Article I20 creates no more than a mutual obligation of the mem-
bers and an obligation of each towards the Community, and even 
this obligation is couched in terms of "endeavor" and not in terms 
of an undertaking. It is not very likely to play a major role in prac-
tice.157 What is significant, however, is that the existence of this 
Article I 20 has induced the Commission 158 to undertake surveys 
concerning vacations with pay and official holidays in what it calls 
"the more important sectors of the Community." This is no doubt 
a long term scheme which so far has reached the state of "prepara-
tory work only," but it is another illustration of the fact that in 
many areas the Treaty is most effective in providing the machinery 
to obtain better factual information on the conditions of competi-
tion. 
3· WORKING HOURS AND OVERTIME PAY 
With regard to working hours and overtime pay the Treaty it-
self is silent. It imposes no obligation to adopt the 40-hour week or 
any particular scheme of overtime pay, nor does it enable the Com-
munity to introduce such measures directly into the legal systems of 
156 For details, see BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note 135 at 418. 
157 Katzenstein, Der Arbeitnehmer in der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 31 
BETRIEBS-BERATER 1081, 1084 (1957). 
158 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 178, 
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the Member States. Yet, in fact, the French scheme of the 40-hour 
week, based on the famous "40-hour law" of I936/59 and modified 
by later legislation, especially by the Law of February 2 5, I 946/60 
has been treated by those participating in the negotiations as a kind 
of "signpost," 161 which should point the way for the members of 
the Community. If one considers that, according to French law, the 
compulsory overtime rate for each hour between 40 and 48 per week 
is time and a quarter, and for anything beyond 48 hours time and a 
half, it is possible to understand the anxiety of those representing 
French interests. This anxiety appears even in legal textbooks, 16~ 
and is probably a result not so much of the legal principle of the 
40-hour week itself, as of the system of overtime pay which, with 
working hours averaging somewhere around 45 per week/63 is 
thought to constitute a considerable handicap in international com-
petition. As the Exposes of the Commission show, working hours 
have, over the last few years, in France as elsewhere, 164 shown a 
downward trend-in France from 46 in 1957 to 45.6 in I958, and 
as of January I, I959, to 44·9· However, and this is not unimportant 
from the point of view of any given industry, the differences in 
actual working hours concealed by these averages are very consider-
able. On March I, 1959, about 37Y2% were estimated to work 
more than 48 hours, and only 8% less than 40 hours. 
Conditions such as these form the background of the-at first 
sight enigmatic-Part II of the "Protocol relating to Certain Pro-
visions of Concern to France" which is "an integral part" of the 
Treaty itself.165 The Protocol imposes no obligation on any Mem-
ber State, but it expresses an expectation on the part of the Member 
States 
... that the establishment of the Common Market will 
result, by the end of the first stage, in a situation where the 
basic level for overtime payment and the average over-
time rates in industry will correspond to those existing in 
France according to the average figures for the year 1956. 
No prescription, then, but once again a prediction. It is, of course, 
quite impossible to speculate on the chance that the prediction will 
159 Law of June 21st, 1936, [1936] ].0. 6699 (Fr.); CODE DU TRAVAIL, bk. II, tit. 
I, art. 6. For analysis, 2 DuRAND, op. cit. supra note 138, at 389. 
100 2 DURAND, op. cit. suPra note 138, at 406. 
161 Katzenstein, supra note I 57, at 1084, uses the word "Leitbild." 
1 
.. E.g., in the book by Brun & Galland, op. cit. supra note 135, at 397, whose very 
clear analysis of the law concludes on this note. 
103 I d. at 396. 
1
"' Second EXPOSE, para. 81. 
165 Treaty art. 239· 
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be fulfilled. The Commission, in an answer given in July I959 to 
a question in the Assembly, expressed the hope that it would be,166 
but also pointed out that it was taking the necessary steps to be pre-
pared, as it were, for the worst. This preparatory work now being 
done by the officials of the Commission consists in the first place in 
an attempt at a precise assessment of the average overtime rates 
paid in France in I956, a task which, in the opinion of the Com-
mission and of the French government experts assisting the Commis-
sion in this matter, presents no major difficulties. 167 The Com-
mission has also started preparatory work on surveys concerning 
working hours and overtime 168 and in the two Exposes on the 
Social Situation 169 it has already collected a certain amount of ma-
terial of interest in the present context. In France, where the normal 
week is 40 hours, weekly working hours averaged 45.6 in I958. In 
Belgium, on the other hand, the normal week of 4 5 hours (that is 
five days at nine hours each) was in I 9 58 the almost universal rule, 
and, in view of the recession, which hit Belgium harder than the 
other members of the Community, very little overtime was worked. 
In the West German Federal Republic the trade unions concentrated 
their demands in I957 on the reduction of the normal working week 
and succeeded during that year in obtaining, without loss of wages, 
a reduction for two thirds of all workers-in the usual case from 
48 to 4 5 hours. Average working hours (including overtime) were 
46.5 in I957 and 45-7 in 1958. Employees of the Bund (including 
railway, postal, telegraph, and telephone workers) and of the 
Lander have the 45-hour week, the metal, printing, and clothing 
industries a 44-hour week, and the coal miners in the Ruhr now 
have a 40-hour week. Information about Italy is not quite so spe-
cific, but it appears that in 1958 90.7 percent (as against 90.9 per-
cent in I 9 57) worked 40 hours or more, and only 9-3 percent (as 
against 9.1 percent in 1957) less than 40 hours. The average actual 
monthly hours were 168.07 in 1958 as against 168.58 in 1957. In 
Luxembourg, the working week is 44 hours for industry, and the 
unions are trying to achieve a 40-hour week without loss of wages. 
The 4 5-hour week prevails in the Nether lands, and the intention is to 
reduce it cautiously, gradually, and industry by industry or enterprise 
by enterprise with a view to taking account of individual conditions 
and to avoiding a major dislocation. 
1 
.. Reponse, op. cit. supra note 130, para. 5. 
161 I d. para. 6. 
168 SECOND GEN'L REP., para. 178. 
169 First ExPOSE, ch. C.I, para. 7 and ch. C. II, para. 16; Second EXPOSE, paras. 
79-85. The statistical material in the text is based on the Second ExPOSE. 
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In the light of such information only a prophet could predict what 
the situation is likely to be at the end of the first stage. The pos-
sibility cannot be ruled out that at that time working hours and rates 
of overtime pay may, in the countries of the Community, have 
reached a point at which the Protocol is of little significance, but on 
the other hand it may produce a crisis. It would be a fatal mistake 
to think that the vagueness of the prediction in the Protocol and the 
absence in it of any legally binding obligation deprive it of practical 
importance; far from it. If the prediction proves to be wrong, that 
is, if in any given branch of industry the basic level for overtime 
pay (the normal working week) and the average overtime rate do 
not throughout the Community correspond to those prevailing in 
France in 1956, then 
... the Commission shall [emphasis added] authorize 
France to take, in respect of branches of industry affected 
by the inequalities in payments for overtime, measures of 
safeguard of which the Commission shall determine the 
conditions and particulars. . . . 
What this obviously means is that, as already adumbrated in the 
Spaak Report, 170 France will have to be permitted to establish or 
re-establish tariffs or subsidies, or (a possibility not mentioned in 
the Spaak Report) quantitative import restrictions. 
The standard of comparison is the French basic level for over-
time pay and the average overtime rate of 1956, and any variations 
of either after 1956 are to be ignored. The working week and over-
time rates of the other members of the Community obtaining at the 
end of the first stage will have to be compared with the correspond-
ing French figures of 1956. 
Moreover, whereas the general prediction of the first paragraph 
of Chapter II of the Protocol refers to the French economy of 
1956 and the economies of the five other Member States as of the 
end of the first stage, each economy taken as a whole, the sanction 
contained in the second paragraph refers to "branches of industry" 
(usecteurs industriels"). No one seems as yet to know what this 
phrase means, and, in its answer in the Assembly in June 1959,171 
the Commission emphasized the need for an agreed definition. In 
order to be prepared for the situation at the end of the first stage, 
the Commission obviously will also have to be informed about work-
ing hours and average overtime rates in each "branch of industry" 
in the Six. 
170 Spaak Report at 64, 66. 
m Reponse, op. cit. supra note 130. 
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In one respect the French development since 1956 will have to be 
taken into account by the Commission in its delicate and difficult 
task of comparison at the end of the first stage. The Commission 
will have to compare the average increase since 1956 in the level of 
wages paid in the particular "branch of industry" in the various 
Member States other than France with the corresponding increase 
in that industry in France itself. If the increase outside France ex-
ceeds that in France "by a percentage fixed by the Commission with 
the approval of the Council acting by means of a qualified majority 
vote," then the Commission is not to authorize France to take 
"measures of safeguard" for that particular branch of industry, 
although the working week and average overtime rates outside 
France in that branch of industry do not correspond with the French 
situation in 1956. The Commission has informed the Assembly 
that 172 it has organized an inquiry into the cost of labor in a dozen 
industries which will yield the required data about wages. The in-
quiry is based on the pattern established by the Coal-Steel Commu-
nity for the investigations it has conducted for years, and the statisti-
cal methods of comparing real wages evolved by the Coal-Steel 
Community will also be used in assessing wage increases. The ques-
tionnaire and other aspects of the inquiry have been discussed and 
agreed on at two conferences with governmental experts. The gov-
ernments have been officially notified of the inquiry, and, to give it 
legal status, the Council will be asked for a decision under Article 
2 r 3 since, in the opinion of the Commission, such a decision would 
remove such legal obstacles to the conducting of the inquiry as might 
exist in the Member States. For example, in Germany this proce-
dure would, in the opinion of the Commission, obviate the need for 
special legislation with reference to the inquiry. The representatives 
of the employers' associations and trade unions have also promised 
their support. The Commission has expressly stated that the Mem-
ber State governments have been cooperative in this matter, since.in 
a parliamentary question in the Assembly some suspicion had been 
voiced that the Commission had met with difficulties.173 
In the present connection it may not be unimportant that, accord-
ing to the Second Expose on the Social Situation in the Community 
published by the Commission, 174 France is the only Member Country 
in which the level of real wages fell, however slightly, in 1958. This 
fall was accompanied by a rise in nominal wages (nominal wages 
172 !d. para. 3· 
173 Question ecrite N· 28, [1959] }'L. OFF. Sso. 
"'Second ExPos£, para. ror. 
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY 337 
also rose in the other members of the Community) and by a reduc-
tion in hours. The situation at the time of writing may thus be said to 
illustrate the difficulties which will confront the Commission at the 
end of the first stage in the event of its having to apply Part II 
No. 2 of the Protocol. Although the Protocol does not say so ex-
pressis verbis, it seems to be clear-and it seems to be the view of 
the Commission itself 175-that what will have to be compared will 
be real and not nominal wages. A comparison of nominal wages 
would be wholly unrealistic and it would also raise rate of exchange 
problems of a most delicate character. 
The concession made by the members other than France when 
accepting and signing this Protocol is formidable. How formidable 
it is one can see if one analyzes the constitutional situation which 
will arise at the end of the first stage. The Commission-acting if 
need be by a majority vote 176-is then under an obligation 
("shall") to authorize France to take protectionist measures to 
make up for disparities in working hours or overtime rates. But 
the countervailing exception, intended to account for disparities in 
the development of wage levels since 1956 favorable to French in-
dustry from a competitive point of view, can only be applied if the 
relevant minimum percentage is fixed by the Commission with the 
approval of a qualified majority of the Council, an approval which 
can thus be prevented, if she so desires, by France herself, provided 
she obtains the support of any one member other than Luxem-
bourg.177 
As a German commentator has pointed out,178 the immediate 
effect of the Protocol is admittedly nil. Neither the legislation nor 
the collective bargaining practice of any member of the Commu-
nity need be affected by it. Nevertheless, the sanction behind the 
expectation expressed in the Protocol is in a sense much more potent 
than that behind the obligations as to equal pay for the sexes or 
vacation with pay, laid down in the body of the Treaty. In a sense 
the entire future of the Common Market has been made to hinge 
upon the adoption, in all the six countries, of something like the 
40-hour week and the French overtime scheme. The scheme of over-
time rates conceivably may prove a more serious hurdle than the 
principle of the 40-hour week itself. 
These then are the directions in which the Treaty seeks to m-
175 Reponse, op. cit. supra note 130, passim. 
176 Treaty art. 163. 
177 I d. art. 148. 
178 Katzenstein, supra note 157, at 1082. 
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fluence conditions of employment. But the questions discussed so 
far do not exhaust those concerning labor and labor relations with 
which the Treaty deals. 
F. FREEDOM OF MovEMENT 
I. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
The principle that workers should be free to move from one coun-
try to another-a principle which when implemented will create a 
common labor market-is, of course, fundamental to the plan for 
the European Economic Community. The Spaak Report 179 empha-
sizes a psychological aspect, the need for destroying prejudices and 
for spreading the elementary truth that an influx of foreign workers 
may be a source of strength. The Spaak Report also observes 180 
that "liberation" of the movement of unskilled as well as skilled 
workers is necessary. In this respect-and in others-there is, as 
pointed out in the Spaak Report, a fundamental difference between 
the European Economic Community and the Coal-Steel Commu-
nity. The problem of defining skills in the latter was and is a mat-
ter of first importance, but a community which is not limited to two 
specific industries has, as the Spaak Report convincingly demon-
strates, an even greater interest in promoting freedom of move-
ment for the unskilled (who are especially exposed to the risk of 
unemployment) than for skilled workers. 
The Spaak Report also sounds a very necessary note of warning: 
it is dangerous to overestimate the magnitude of the actual move-
ment of labor even in a completely free market. The information 
published by the Commission in its two Exposes on the Social Situa-
tion in the Community 181 confirms the general impression that move-
ment of labor is as yet quite insignificant in Europe. It would be 
entirely unrealistic to attribute this exclusively or perhaps even prin-
cipally to legal obstacles. As the Spaak Report says, even within a 
given country-any European country-men and women are re-
luctant to change their occupations or their homes. Even if there 
were no housing shortage (as there is, and it must be counted as an 
overwhelmingly important factor) "mobility of labor" would not 
come naturally to people; it must be stimulated. This is not to say, 
1711 Spaak Report, pt. I, tit. III, ch. 3, at 88. 
180 Id. at 89. 
181 First ExPOSE ch. A .II, paras. 21-24; Second EXPOSE, paras. 15-17. And see 
Table 6 in the Statistical Appendix to the First EXPOSE, and Table 6 in the First 
Statistical Appendix to the Second ExPosE. 
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as the Spaak Report also points out, that it should always be stimu-
lated. The most recent tendency (of which the British Distribution 
of Industries Acts are an example) is to develop employment op-
portunities on the spot, that is to stimulate the migration of capital 
rather than of labor. The "European Social Fund" 182 is partly in-
tended to assist in this process and the relevant Treaty provisions 
thus complement those on freedom of movement. Given the psycho-
logical and cultural (including linguistic) inhibitions militating 
against geographical mobility of labor, it may be especially neces-
sary for an American observer to "think afresh" when considering 
Europe. It is, to say the least of it, possible that the reluctance to 
sever one's links with an accustomed environment is rooted in tra-
ditions and sentiments which Europe could forego only at the risk 
of losing the richness and variety of its civilization. 
Part II, Title III, Chapter I of the Treaty contains the provisions 
which are intended to remove the legal obstacles to freedom of 
movement within the Community, that is, in the words of the Spaak 
Report to establish 
... the right in all countries of the Community to accept 
work in fact offered and, in the event of obtaining a job, 
to live in the particular country without any restriction 
which does not apply in the same way to workers who are 
citizens of the country. 
Article 7 of the Treaty which appears in the introductory Part I 
(entitled "Principles") provides that within its field of application 
"and without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein" 
"any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby be 
prohibited." The provisions in Part II, Title III, Chapter I 183 
are clearly "special provisions." The power of the Council, acting 
by a simple majority pursuant to Article 49, to take measures to 
give gradual effect to the free movement of workers is by the same 
token not impaired by the second paragraph of Article 7 under 
which the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may lay down 
rules in regard to the prohibition of any such discrimination as is 
mentioned in Article 7, paragraph I. 
Article 7 may, however, be of importance in connection with the 
rights of persons employed by public enterprises or enterprises to 
which any Member State grants "special or exclusive rights," for 
example, concessions. This is by virtue of Article 90, but although 
18
• See PART I, Section G of the text infra. 
1
"' Treaty arts. 48-51. 
340 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
this may conceivably be of some practical significance to American 
enterprises in Europe, it is not further considered here because, for 
the time being, that is as long as the Council has not exercised its 
rule-making power under Article 7, paragraph 2, this aspect of 
Article 90 is not operative. 
The provisions of Articles 48-5 I had been foreshadowed by Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention for European Economic Cooperation of 
April I6, I948, which applies to the (now) I8 Members of the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation and which is 
as follows: 
The Contracting Parties will make the fullest and most 
effective use of their available manpower. 
They will endeavor to provide full employment for their 
own people and they may have recourse to manpower avail-
able in the territory of any other Contracting Party. In the 
latter case they will, in mutual agreement, take the neces-
sary measures to facilitate the movement of workers and to 
ensure their establishment in conditions satisfactory from 
the economic and social point of view. Generally, the Con-
tracting Parties will cooperate in the progressive reduction 
of obstacles to the free movement of persons. 
Decisions of the O.E.E.C. can of course be taken only "by mutual 
agreement of all the members" (Article 14 of the Convention), 
and, in the absence of such decisions, the O.E.E.C. can implement 
the policy of Article 8 only through recommendations. One such 
recommendation 184 is based on Article I 6 and Article I 7 of the Re-
vised I.L.O. Migration for Employment Recommendation of 
1949.185 It provides that, after five years of residence and employ-
ment, foreign workers should be free to accept employment of their 
choosing. The Spaak Report 186 prefers this method of increasing 
freedom of movement to another scheme, also proposed by the 
O.E.E.C., according to which recruitment of foreign labor by any 
given employer could not be prohibited after the lapse of a maxi-
mum period (in principle one month), during which unsuccessful 
attempts have been made to fill the vacancy, by engaging labor avail-
able in the territory. The disadvantage of the latter system is that it 
may, in the opinion of the authors of the Spaak Report, result in 
something akin to a game of "musical chairs," that is, a situation in 
which a vacancy is filled by a workman who in accepting the vacant 
,.. Summarized in FIRST GEN'L REP. para. II3. 
185 See r I.L. ConE 1951, art. ISII, at II32· 
180 Spaak Report, pt. I, tit. III, ch. 3, at 90. 
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job has himself given up another and so on ad infinitum so that the 
occasion for the recruitment of foreign labor never arises. As against 
this, the O.E.E.C. proposal for a five-year maximum for any re-
strictions to be placed on choice of employment could, as the Spaak 
Report says, be the starting point for a more promising develop-
ment if the period were gradually reduced. A third possibility (also 
appearing in the Spaak Report, but not in the O.E.E.C. proposals) 
would be gradually to enlarge (by stages fixed in advance) the num-
ber of foreign workers to be admitted for employment, taking as 
the basis the mean of the numbers of foreign workers admitted dur-
ing the last three years, and enlarging it annually by at least one 
percent of the total labor force of the country, all of this to be 
coupled with escape clauses to protect particular industries in times 
of unemployment. 
None of these specific proposals have been written into the Treaty 
of Rome.187 Its relevant provisions are thus more general and vague 
than the O.E.E.C. proposals. The legal powers wielded by the in-
stitutions of the Community, however, are plainly very much greater 
than those of the organs of O.E.E.C. Thus, although the policies 
written into Article 8 of the O.E.E.C. Convention and those which 
are given expression in Article 48 et seq. of the Treaty are similar, 
the means available for their execution are very different. Within 
the framework of O.E.E.C. a free labor market can only be brought 
about by agreements between the Contracting Parties (although 
the organs of O.E.E.C. may, of course, be empowered to prepare 
and carry into effect such agreements). But under the Treaty a 
supranational body of law may be created which will take effect 
during the transitional period, and a supranational principle, which 
will take effect at the end of the transitional period, has been created 
by the Treaty itself. This emerges from Article 48 of the Treaty 
which must be regarded as one of its cornerstones and therefore 
deserves analysis in some detail. Four points seem to call for special 
comment. 
In the first place it should be noted that, with respect to the estab-
lishment of the common labor market, no four-year "stages" are 
envisaged. Article 48 (I) provides that "the free movement of 
workers shall be ensured within the Community not later than at 
the date of the expiry of the transitional period." According to 
Article 49, the "free movement of workers" is to be brought about 
"progressively," that is gradually, during the transitional period, 
m Treaty arts. 48, 49· 
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but the Treaty is silent concerning the rate or rhythm of progres-
sion. The Treaty does, however, indicate the steps which the organs 
of the Community are to take to make a free labor market pos-
sible (Articles 49-5 I), and it further indicates (Article 49) that 
these were to be initiated as soon as the Treaty came into force. 
The second noteworthy point is that, "at the end of the expiry of 
the transitional period," legal obstacles to freedom of movement 
(with certain exceptions) are automatically to disappear. The 
Treaty does not provide for decisions by any Community institution 
at that point, but its Article 48 contains substantive law which, if 
unamended, will come into force in the six countries at the end of 
the transitional period. Needless to say, this applies to legal ob-
stacles only, for example, to restrictions on immigration or on the 
employment of foreign workers. Other impediments to free migra-
tion, such as those caused by wage differentials, differences in social 
security expectations, 188 language difficulties, social mores, and na-
tional allegiances are either beyond the reach of legislation or dealt 
with in other provisions of the Treaty. 
Thirdly, however, this automatic implementation of the principle 
of a free labor market in the Community has been expressly limited 
so that it has no application with regard to "the non-European coun-
tries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands" (Articles 13 rand 135) and with 
regard to "Algeria and the French overseas departments" (Article 
227). The "non-European countries and territories" referred to 
in Article 131 are subject to the special provisions contained in 
Part IV of the Treaty (Articles IJI-136), and are listed in Annex 
IV of the Treaty. They consist of those territories of the French 
Community which are situated outside Europe (other than terri-
tories such as Algeria which are, for constitutional purposes, part of 
metropolitan France), of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-U rundi, 
of Italian Somali! and, and Nether lands New Guinea.189 The main 
188 This obstacle has been overcome in so far as the preservation of acquired ex-
pectations and the claim to equal treatment is concerned. See Treaty art. 51; Reg. 
N° 3, op. cit. supra note 17; Reg. N• 4, op. cit. supra note 94, and with regard to 
equality of treatment, especially art. 8 of Reg. N• 3· But this does not, of course, 
bring about an equalization of the substantive rights to benefit, such as that recom-
mended by the Council of Europe in the Interim Agreements drafted by it in 1953 
(1 European Handbook 226 et seq.), and referred to by the Commission in its First 
Gen'l Rep. para. 120. For the Council of Europe agre :ments: Europ. T.S. Nos. 12, 
13; Five European Conventions put out by the Directorate of Information of the 
Council of Europe; ROBERTSON, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ch. 8, at I3D-3I (1956). 
189 According to the Protocol relating to tl:e,Application of the Treaty to the Non-
European Parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is annexed to the Treaty, 
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body of the Treaty does not apply to these territories, but the Mem-
ber States have by Article 131 agreed to associate them with the 
Community. This is not the place to discuss the politically momen-
tous aspect of this differentiation with regard to the Common Mar-
ket in general, a differentiation which is regulated in Articles 13 1-
134, and for the first five years from the entry into force of the 
Treaty by the implementing Convention annexed to it (Article 
136). This Convention, although it deals with the "Right of Estab-
lishment" in the Overseas Territories (Article 8 of the Conven-
tion) and in Algeria and the French overseas departments (Article 
r6 of the Convention), that is with matters regulated for the Euro-
pean territories of the members in Articles 52 to 58 of the Treaty, 
has no provisions concerning freedom of movement for workers. 
This freedom is regulated in Article· r 35 of the Treaty which pro-
vides: 
Subject to the provisions relating to public health, public 
safety and public order, the freedom of movement in 
Member States of workers from the countries and terri-
tories, and in the countries and territories of workers from 
Member States shall be governed by subsequent conven-
tions which shall require the unanimous agreement of 
Member States. 
If no such conventions can be unanimously agreed on, there will be 
no freedom of movement from the overseas territories, or into or 
among them, either at the end of the transitional period or at any 
subsequent time. This provision in Article 135 does not, however, 
apply to Algeria or the French overseas departments. Neither, 
however, do Article 48 et seq. on free movement of workers. These 
are not among the Treaty provisions which, by Article 227 ( 2) of 
the Treaty, have been made to apply to Algeria and the French 
overseas departments. The conditions for the application of these 
and other Treaty provisions not applicable to those territories 
. . . shall be determined, not later than two years after 
the date of [the Treaty's] ... entry into force, by de-
cisions of the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote 
on a proposal of the Commission. 
the Netherlands may ratify the Treaty so as to include only the Kingdom in Europe 
and Netherlands New Guinea, thus excluding Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. 
The parties to the Treaty are however-according to a Declaration of Intention 
annexed to it-ready, at the request of the Netherlands, to open negotiations for 
the economic association of these territories with the Community. 
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All measures designed to ensure free migration of labor, then, must 
be confined to the European territories of the Member States, and 
no one can say how far such measures ever can or will be applied to 
any overseas territories. It is even more difficult to predict to what 
extent the free movement of labor which is to be guaranteed by the 
end of the transitional period in the Community will apply to the 
overseas territories. 
The principle of free movement and of the abolition of legal ob-
stacles to its exercise is further subject 190 -and this is the fourth 
point of importance-to a number of significant exceptions even 
where Europe is concerned. 
Restrictions on free immigration or emigration or upon the em-
ployment of foreigners for reasons of "public order, public safety 
or public health" (Article 48) can be maintained. It will be a some-
what delicate task for the Court of Justice to distinguish between 
limitations imposed for economic reasons and limitations prompted 
by reason of public order, safety, or health. One can think of any 
number of situations in which these motivations may overlap; for 
example, where housing or medical facilities are inadequate or 
where there are political or religious dissensions among groups of 
workers or disputes concerning trade union organization, or where 
potential immigrants are not sufficiently familiar with the safety or 
hygienic requirements imposed by the country of immigration and 
the like. The need of these exceptions to the principle of freedom 
of movement is nonetheless clear. This is just another illustration 
of the difficulties facing an economic community which is to be es-
tablished in an environment of cultural, political, and legal diversity. 
Another exception concerns "employment in public administra-
tion" (Article 48 (a) ) , which may also be difficult to interpret. The 
central and municipal government administrations of the Member 
Countries are clearly included, but is employment by public corpora-
tions? Does the exception in fact ri-Iean that the principle of free-
dom of migration is not to extend, for example, to the railway serv-
ices which in all European countries are public services? Or to public 
utilities? 
2. CHANGES DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 
Such questions are even now not entirely academic since pursuant 
to Article 49 Community institutions are to "lay down the measures 
necessary to effect progressively the free movement of workers as 
100 Spaak Report, supra note 186. 
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defined in the preceding Article." Indeed, the Commission has, ac-
cording to its Second Report,191 practically completed the prepara-
tory work which will enable it to draw up proposals for the applica-
tion of Articles 48 and 49, but before seeking an opinion from the 
Economic and Social Committee and approval of the Council, the 
Commission will submit a draft of its proposals to experts in the 
various countries. 
The measures to be taken are to be directed at a gradual achieve-
ment of certain legal changes enumerated and explicitly described in 
Article 48. The matters affected will be these: 
I) Discrimination based on nationality between workers of 
Member States is to be abolished as regards employment, remunera-
tion, and other working conditions (Article 48 ( 2)). Of these "em-
ployment" is perhaps the most important. It means not only that 
nationals of all Member States have equal rights to seek employ-
ment 191n and to accept it, without any need for the approval of any 
governmental authority (this point is specifically mentioned in Article 
43 ( 3) (a) ) but also that employment exchanges must not, in find-
ing employment for workers or workers for vacancies, make any 
distinction between their own nationals and those of other Member 
States. It further means that no discrimination must be agreed upon 
between trade unions and employers or employers' organizations, 
or be practiced by statutory works councils or by councils of shop 
stewards, whether such councils are based on statutes or collective 
agreements.m Industrial conciliators, mediators, and arbitrators are 
bound by the rule of non-discrimination whatever the basis of their 
authority. As soon as the principle of non-discrimination becomes a 
rule of law in the Member States (and this might happen-at any 
rate in some industries-by virtue of measures taken pursuant to 
Article 49 long before Article 48 gives automatic effect to the princi-
ple), individual employers will also be bound by it. An employer 
could, in accordance with the procedural rules prevailing in the coun-
try concerned, be prevented from practicing systematic discrimina-
tion in the hiring of labor, and he could certainly be compelled to 
reinstate an employee upon proof that the worker had been dis-
191 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 173· 
191
• Art. 48, para. 3, appears to be enumerative and not exhaustive, but the matter 
is not free from doubt. The principle established in para. 1 goes beyond the particular 
instances mentioned in para. 3· This means that workers will be free to enter any 
Member Country in order to seek work there, and not only to accept work already 
offered. This is a matter of great importance. An early clarification of this question 
of interpretation is desirable. 
193 See PART II of this Chapter. 
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missed because he was a national of a Member State other than that 
of the employer. Clearly "discrimination as regards employment" 
refers to "firing" as well as "hiring." It would therefore also be 
illegal for unions and employers or employers' associations to adopt 
by collective agreement any principle of "seniority" which would, in 
the event of dismissals, give preference to nationals of one Member 
State over those of another. \Vorks councils, arbitrators, and the 
like would be similarly restricted. 
2) Discrimination with regard to remuneration is less likely to 
occur, at any rate as a systematic measure. The word "remunera-
tion" 193 clearly covers not only wages and salaries of various kinds 
(time and piece rates, overtime rates and the like), but also "fringe 
benefits," and discrimination regarding fringe benefits, especially 
among salaried employees, may be more likely than wage discrimi-
nation. Discrimination between nationals of the Community states 
with regard to paid vacations, to pension schemes, or to bonuses is 
forbidden, and the same prohibition applies to other "working con-
ditions." 
3) Two matters of very great potential importance are not ex-
pressly referred to in Article 48-social security rights and trade 
union membership. 
Social security rights are not expressly covered by Article 51 be-
cause this provision, which is concerned with assimilation of qualifi-
cation periods and benefit payments, does not deal directly with the 
question of the equal treatment of workers employed in the same 
country. Any differences of treatment in this area would neverthe-
less clearly violate the spirit of Article 48, and provision against it 
is therefore within the powers vested in the Council under Article 
49· The question has in fact been settled by Article 8 of the Coun-
cil's Regulation No. J, concerning the Social Security of Migrant 
Workers. 194 It provides that all residents of one of the Member 
States to whom the Regulation applies are subject to the obliga-
tions and entitled to the rights established by the social security 
legislation of each Member State under the same conditions as the 
nationals of that State. 
Trade union membership raises a much more formidable prob-
lem. In this respect the experience of the American courts in relying 
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution may 
103 See the definition in art. 6 (r) (a) (i) of the I.L.O. Migration for Employment 
Convention (Revised), 1949, in 1 I. L. CODE 1951, art. 1499, at 1110. Article 6 also 
deals with trade union rights, social security, and kindred matters. 
'"'See Reg. N• 3, op. cit. supra note 17, art. 8. 
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perhaps be of some assistance. It may be arguable that the rule 
against non-discrimination makes it incumbent on unions not to re-
ject any applicant for membership for reasons condemned by law, 
but such a principle, however desirable, is obviously very difficult 
to enforce. As is true in a similar situation in the United States, 195 
the rule against non-discrimination can perhaps be more usefully 
applied to collective bargaining practices of unions than to their 
membership policies. Article 48 might, in other words, play a role 
comparable to that of American provisions which make the union 
the statutory bargaining representative of all members of the bar-
gaining unit and invalidate any agreement purporting to discrimi-
nate between members and non-members in so far as non-member-
ship is in fact the result of the non-members' nationality. It might, 
moreover, implicitly provide a check on expulsions from trade union 
membership which are in fact based on discriminatory policies. 
4) Freedom of movement implies not only the "right ... to 
accept offers of employment actually made" (Article 48 (3) (a)), 
but also the right to move about freely in order to do so, a right 
to stay in the country in which one has found employment, and-a 
point of great importance-a right to continue to live in the country 
of employment even after the loss of the actual job. All these mat-
ters are mentioned in Article 48 ( 3) (b), (c), and (d), but the last 
is subject to "implementing regulations laid down by the Commis-
sion." 196 The effectiveness of the entire scheme may well depend 
on these regulations. If a foreign worker has to face expulsion in 
the event of a loss of his employment, he is not in fact on a par 
with indigenous workers, and would moreover find himself in a 
state of dependence which is undesirable. On the other hand, in 
the event of protracted unemployment a repatriation of foreign 
workers may become an urgent economic necessity. The regulations 
to be issued by the Commission are clearly a matter of great impor-
tance. The Treaty is silent as regards the right of the worker's 
family to live in the country of his employment, 197 and silent as re-
gards his rights in relation to the allocation of housing accommoda-
tion, the schooling of his children, public assistance, and public 
190 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 ( 1944). 
100 When laying down tl::ese Regulations, the Commission " ... shall take due 
account, in so far as the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is concerned, of the par-
ticular demographic situation of that country." Treaty, Protocol Concerning the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, art 2. The number of foreign workers in Luxem-
bourg is proportionately very large: see First EXPOSE A. II, para. 24 ad finem. 
107 See arts. r6, 17 of the I.L.O. Migration for Employment Recommendation 
(Revised), 1949, in I l.L. CODE 1951, art. 1511 at II3Z. 
348 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
health services (other than those based on social security legisla-
tion). In this respect as in others the scheme of the common labor 
market is still fragmentary. 
3· METHODS OF GIVING EFFECT TO THESE CHANGES 
The powers vested in the Council by Article 49 for the purpose 
of gradually effecting the free movement of workers are far-reach-
ing. The Council has been placed under a duty to (it "shall") adopt 
measures by means of directives or regulations. Neither a unani-
mous decision nor a qualified majority vote is required so that the 
Council can in this case 198 create law applicable in each Member 
State by majority vote provided the measures it adopts are based 
on the required proposals of the Commission 199 and provided the 
Economic and Social Committee has been consulted. Whether, in 
fact, the Council is likely to act by means of regulations and 
whether the measures mentioned in Article 49 would not more ap-
propriately take the form of directives is a matter of opinion. The 
Commission in its Second Report leaves the matter open, speaking 
of a "legal instrument" which is in course of preparation.200 
Article 49 requires immediate steps to achieve the aims of Arti-
cle 48, and two methods of doing so are envisaged: ( 1) the re-
moval of certain restrictions on the employment of foreign nationals 
(Article 49 (b) and (c) ) , and ( 2) the improvement of employ-
ment opportunities by reforms in the employment exchange services 
(Articles 49 (a) and (d) ) . 
I) The Commission emphasized in its First Report 201 that its 
proposals would have to deal with three fundamental problems: 
access to work, freedom of movement, and the possibility of resid-
ing, and settling down in, the country of employment. It further 
stated that the progressive removal of restrictions "according to a 
plan" as required by Article 49 would have to take account of the 
experience of the Coal-Steel Community in applying Article 69 of 
the E.C.S.C. Treaty and also the decision of the O.E.E.C.202 It 
indicated more particularly that during a first phase the lapse of 
time between application for work permits and their grant or re-
fusal would have to be reduced to a minimum and grounds for their 
refusal restricted to reasons of public order and health. Renewal 
198 Treaty arts. 148 ( r), 189. 
199 I d. art. 149. 
200 
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 175. 
001 
FIRST GEN'L REP. para. III. 
"""See text preceding note 184 supra. 
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procedures would have to be improved by lengthening the duration 
of permits and liberalizing the grounds for extension, and reform 
and unification of procedures for acquiring permission to enter and 
remain in a country-which are at present extremely complex-
would also be needed. The Commission envisaged measures to im-
plement the Recommendation of the O.E.E.C. that foreign workers 
should have complete freedom of choice of employment after five 
years' residence and that this period should be gradually reduced.203 
This program, although "preliminary," is sufficiently ambitious to 
require very extensive preparations, and the Second Report of the 
Commission contains an account of the preparatory work done so 
far. A systematic comparative analysis of the legal position of for-
eign workers in th·e six countries has been completed,204 but not pub-
lished. It includes a study of the conditions of entry and resi-
dence for workers and their families as well as of labor permits, 
whether based on legislation or administrative practices or bilateral 
and multilateral treaties, as well as of methods of bringing together 
offers of work and persons seeking it. A draft of an "instrument" 
has also been prepared by the Commission which will have "limited 
objectives and will cover only a first stage," 205 affecting the entry 
of workers and their families, employment and residence, the right 
to remain in the territory entered, and the right of establishment 
there. The Commission will also initiate "a thorough and systematic 
study of the legal position of nationals of Member States who 
have established themselves in the territory of another Member 
State." 206 Finally, a committee is to be set up to assist the Commis-
sion and to propose practical measures by which freedom of move-
ment is to be created.207 
At the end of this first phase the need for labor permits, time 
limits restricting the free choice of jobs (Article 49 (c) ) and ex-
clusion from certain, or from all but certain, occupations (Article 
49 (d) ) should have disappeared-whether they were created by the 
law of any Member State or by existing treaties. 
2) A reform of the system of labor exchanges to promote free-
dom of movement can be brought about by instituting a common sys-
tem of such exchanges. This can be done either by close collaboration 
of the national labor administrations (Articles 49(a)) or (Article 
!lO:l FIRST GEN'L REP. paras. IIZ-q. 
""'SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 174· 
c"" !d. para. 175. 
"""!d. para. 177. 
207 I d. para. 175. 
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49 (d)) it can be effected by a supranational machinery designed to 
even out regional unemployment and regional excesses in the demand 
for labor over its supply. The Treaty describes the latter as the: 
appropriate machinery for connecting offers of employ-
ment and requests for employment, with a view to equili-
brating them in such a way as to avoid serious threats to 
the standard of living and employment in the various 
regions and industries. 
The reorganization of the labor exchanges is obviously a necessary 
preliminary for the establishment of a common labor market. 
The Commission hopes 208 to improve the. liaison between the em-
ployment services of the Member States, to promote direct contacts 
between employers and workers and to ensure that workers can 
make use of employment exchanges. It also hopes to create a coordi-
nating agency to study labor market developments, to cooperate 
with national employment services in helping employers to find 
workers in other Member Countries, to promote closer contacts 
between existing employment services and to suggest improvements. 
When the Assembly received the Report of the Commission which 
contains this program, it passed a resolution 209 strongly recom-
mending the creation of a European Employment Exchange with 
a view to coordinating the activities of the national employment 
exchanges. The "legal instrument" of which the Commission has 
prepared a draft does not go quite so far, but it provides for meas-
ures of cooperation between labor exchanges to bring together sup-
ply and demand and for the general coordination of their work 
under the aegis of the Commission. The Commission further aims 210 
at a gradual harmonization of the working methods of labor ex-
changes and at a regular exchange of information between them. 
4· EXCHANGE OF YOUNG WORKERS 
The best that measures to be taken by the Council can be expected 
to achieve is the removal of legal obstacles to the free fluctuation 
of supply and demand in labor markets. They cannot by themselves 
overcome the economic and ideological barriers which separate the 
..,. See FIRST GEN'L REP. para. r 14; SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 176; Bulletin, Feb. 
1959, pt. II, para. 49· 
209 Resolution sur Ies questions traitees dans Ie premier rapport general sur 
l'activite de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, pt. IV, paras. II and 12, 
[1959] }'L OFF. 168. 
210 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 176. 
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unemployed or under-employed worker and potential employers. 
The Treaty does, however, envisage during the transitional period 
action in several directions in addition to the progressive abolition 
of legal and administrative restrictions on employment. Besides 
measures (already taken) in the field of social security the Treaty 
envisages that "Member States shall, under a common program, 
encourage the exchange of young workers" (Article so). Unlike 
the social security measures, this program is not to be effected by 
supranational legislation, but by the Member States themselves. No 
organ of the Community has been assigned specific tasks in this re-
spect, except, of course, that the Commission, by virtue of Article 
I I 8, is to promote close cooperation among Member States in 
this as in other employment matters. 
The importance of such exchanges to the creation of "Europe" 
could be great, and it augurs well that the Commission proposes a 
first program making periods of apprenticeship abroad for young 
workers more feasible. 211 Bilateral and multilateral understandings 
to this effect already exist, but the Commission believes that an an-
nual program is needed so as to make foreign apprenticeships avail-
able to a substantial number of workers. 
G. THE EuROPEAN SociAL FuND 
"The European Social Fund is intended to be a cornerstone in 
the edifice of social security which is to be built up side by side with 
the measures of economic expansion in the Community." 212 The 
need for it arises, in the words of the Spaak Report, 213 from the 
"risks which accompany the changes" demanded by economic prog-
ress. The aim is to protect labor against these risks and to "reconcile 
the necessary mobility and the stability of employment," which must 
not be confused with a policy permitting workers to cling to their 
jobs. The authors of the Spaak Report, in proposing what they 
called an "adjustment fund" (fonds de rtf adaptation) were con-
vinced that this device, by protecting the worker against the conse-
quences of labor mobility, would promote mobility. They also 
thought that the fund should be used to assist workers who were 
undergoing re-training or changing their homes. The Treaty accord-
ingly defines the aim of the Fund as one of "promoting within the 
211 
FIRST GEN'L REP. para. II6. 
"'-'SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 170. 
213 Spaak Report, pt. I. tit. III, ch. 2, at 83. 
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Community employment facilities and the geographical and occu-
pational mobility of workers." 214 
A similar policy is embodied in the Treaty instituting the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community,215 but in a number of respects the 
structure and function of the European Economic Community are 
so different from those of the Coal-Steel Community that the ar-
rangements applicable to the latter have not been able to serve as 
a pattern. Under the E.C.S.C. Treaty this policy is carried out by 
the High Authority by means of funds raised through the Coal-
Steel Community's "taxing" power, but the Treaty of Rome confers 
no corresponding powers either on the Commission or on the Coun-
cil. The European Economic Community has no power to levy taxes, 
and for the time being 216 the revenues of the Community consist of 
the financial contributions of the Member States.217 These contri-
butions are not intended to cover expenses incurred in assisting 
Member States to implement Treaty policy. Therefore a special 
fund will be established to be known as the European Social Fund.218 
This is in accordance with the proposals of the Spaak Report,219 
but the Spaak Report also pointed out 220 that the system of re-
adjustment grants would have to differ from that administered by 
the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. in respects other than 
the source of the funds. Inevitably such a scheme, if applied to a 
general common market, has to be different from a scheme applied 
to two particular industries. It is, for example, quite impossible to 
require-as the Coal-Steel Community Treaty does 221-that the 
payment of grants to workers be justified by proof that the loss of 
employment resulted either from the introduction of technical proc-
esses or new equipment or from the operation of the Common 
Market-that is, from increased freedom of competition and move-
ment. Further, under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, grants pre-
suppose that the state to which a grant is made will itself make a 
214 Treaty art. 123. 
21
" Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 56. Convention 
containing the Transitional Provisions, sec. 23. See on this: Bebr, Labor and the Schu-
man Plan, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1010 ( 1954); HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 88 (1958). 
216 Treaty art. 201 envisages the possibility that eventually the Community may 
have its own revenue, e.g., from the common customs tariff. 
217 Treaty art. 200 ( r). 
218 !d. arts. u3-28. 
219 Spaak Report, supra note 213, at 84. 
229 !d. at 83. 
221 Compare E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 56 and E.C.S.C. Treaty, Convention contain-
ing the Transitional Provisions, pt. 3, ch. r, sec. 23, with Treaty art. 125. 
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grant over and above its normal payment of unemployment insurance 
benefits or assistance. 222 This rule, too, was regarded by the authors 
of the Spaak Report as not easily applicable to the European Eco-
nomic Community. They thought that the principle of re-adapta-
tion grants should gradually be integrated into the general systems 
of unemployment insurance or assistance, and that these systems 
might be harmonized in the process, which in turn would aid in 
rendering labor more mobile. They pointed to the American system 
of unemployment insurance to show how one could arrive at har-
mony of legislation without "federalizing" the administration of 
the scheme. 
Hence, neither the requirement of causal nexus between the opera-
tion of the Common Market and the dislocation of labor nor the 
requirement of special financial assistance by the state concerned 
have been incorporated in the Treaty. The basic function of the 
Fund 223 is to cover, at the request of a Member State, 50 percent 
of the expenses incurred by that state or by a body under public 
law 224 
. for the purpose of: 
(a) ensuring productive re-employment of workers by 
means of: 
-occupational re-training, 
-resettlement allowances; and 
(b) granting aids for the benefit of workers whose 
employment is temporarily reduced or suspended as a re-
sult of the conversion of their enterprise to other produc-
tions, in order that they may maintain the same wage level 
pending their full re-employment. 
The fund is fed by financial contributions of the Member States 
according to a special scale laid down in Article 200, paragraph 2. 
This special scale differs substantially from the general scale of 
contributions. This, too, is in accordance with the Spaak Report 
proposals, 225 which are to the effect that contributions to the Fund 
""""'See for these provisions of the E.C.S.C. Treaty and their operation in practice: 
HAAS, op. cit. supra note 215, at 92 et. seq. Since the above was written, the text of 
E.E.C. Treaty art. 56 has been amended so as to enable the High Authority to grant 
assistance in the event of dislocation due to fundamental changes in marketing conditions 
( 1960). Section 23 of the Convention on Transitional Provisions expired on Feb. 9, 
1960. 
223 Treaty art. 125 ( r). 
224 For the meaning of this term in this context see p. 356 infra. 
2!l5 Spaak Report, supra note 213, at 84. 
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should be proportionate to the total of wages and statutory or 
agreed social insurance contributions, that is, to total (direct and 
indirect) labor costs (except in sectors covered by the Coal-Steel 
re-adaptation scheme). The differentiation between the proportion-
ate distribution of the general contributions to the Community and 
those to the Social Fund is important. It means that the highly in-
dustrialized countries contribute proportionately more than the 
potential sources of labor emigration. Germany and France pay 32 
percent each of the expenses of the Social Fund, but only 28 percent 
of those of the Community in general, Belgium pays 8.8 percent of 
the expenses of the Social Fund, as against 7·9 percent of general 
expenses. Italy, however, contributes only 20 percent of the Fund 
compared with 28 percent of the general expenses. 
The Fund is established by Article I 2 3 of the Treaty "in order to 
improve opportunities of employment of workers in the Common 
Market and thus contribute to raising the standard of living." This 
is entirely in accordance with the general principle underlying the 
proposals of the Spaak Report. The Report-rejecting the view 
that the Fund should intervene only where unemployment could be 
shown to be the result of the Common Market itself-indicated 
that the Community was interested in progressive change in the 
industrial structure, in the rationalization of undertakings, and in 
better employment of the labor force; it was interested in all of 
these because they will increase productivity and improve standards 
of living. Such aims justify the Community in bearing part of the 
cost of protecting labor against the risks which accompany such 
changes. The drafters of the Treaty wholly accepted this general 
principle, and, although they did not adopt many of the detailed 
proposals of the Spaak Report,226 the general rule that the Com-
munity would bear 50 percent of these costs (as the Report sug-
gested) has been adopted, but adopted as a rule not of prospective 
but of retrospective participation. The Spaak Report indicated 227 
that the distributive trades and professional and other services 
should be brought within the orbit of the Social Fund only from 
the moment and to the extent to which they would come within the 
Common Market, but no such limitation has been written into the 
Treaty. On the other hand, only wage-earners and not small inde-
pendent craftsmen or peasants may benefit from the fund, whereas 
the authors of the Spaak Report took the view that the latter might 
c.,• Not, e.g., the proposal to use the Fund towards assisting enterprises in "stagger-
ing" closures: Spaak Report, supra note 213, at 85. 
=/d. at 87. 
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY 3 55 
be made eligible for Fund aid if they were also eligible for re-adapta-
tion assistance provided by Member States. 
The Fund will be administered by the Commission which will be 
assisted by a Committee presided over by a Member of the Com-
mission and composed of government, trade union, and employers' 
association representatives.228 The Committee has not yet been 
formed. 229 The activities of the Fund will be circumscribed by regu-
lations to be issued by the Council (by qualified majority vote) on a 
proposal of the Commission, and after the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Assembly have been consulted.230 The Com-
mission submitted its proposal to the Council on July I, 1959, and 
shortly thereafter draft regulations were sent by the Council to the 
Economic and Social Committee and to the Assembly in order to 
obtain their views.231 The Fund can and will begin to operate as 
soon as that Committee and the Assembly have been consulted and 
the Council has made its decision.232 The Assembly has already ex-
pressed the opinion that the Commission should be given the widest 
possible scope of action and that the Fund at its disposal should be 
sufficiently large for the creation of opportunities for employment 
and for the improvement of the free circulation of manpower.233 
The Assembly also expressed the view that, in administering the 
Fund, the Commission should cooperate with the European In-
vestment Bank and with the High Authority so as to prevent unem-
ployment, for example, in regions in which coal mines have to be 
closed down on a large scale. In accordance with a desire expressed 
by the Assembly, the principles underlying the draft Regulations 
were discussed in its Social Affairs Committee,234 and a statement on 
the subject was also made to the Economic and Social Committee. 
In preparing its draft, the Commission ascertained from the Mem-
ber Governments 235 what action had been taken and what expenses 
had been incurred by them or by public bodies under their jurisdic-
tion in I 9 58 for purposes which would qualify for assistance by 
223 Treaty art. I2.J.. 
229 Its jurisdiction and procedure will be regulated by the Third Part of the 
Regulations to be passed under art. 127: see SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 171; Bulletin, 
Sept. 1959, pt. III, para. 41. 
=Treaty art. 127. 
231 Bulletin, Sept. 1959, pt. III, para. 40. 
=Bulletin, Feb. 1959, pt. III, para. 49· 
233 This opinion was expressed in a European Assembly Resolution after receipt 
by the Assembly of that part of the Commission's First Report dealing with social 
questions. Resolution, op. cit. supra note 209, pt. II, para. 6, at 167-68. 
234 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 172. 
285 FIRST GEN'L REP. para. IIS· 
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the Fund. The draft consists of three parts, one which defines the 
scope of activity of the Fund and the conditions under which its 
assistance can be claimed, a second which lays down the procedure 
for obtaining a grant, and a third which deals with the advisory com-
mittee.236 Experts in the ministries of labor and finance in each of 
the Member States have been consulted, and contact had been made 
with employer and union representatives.237 In preparing its draft, 
the Commission obviously faced a difficult problem of definition 
since the relevant concepts-for example, "unemployed worker" 
or "occupational re-training"-vary from country to country and 
had to be precisely determined for the purposes of the Fund.238 
The functions of the Council should be distinguished: it has to 
issue the regulations, but it must also adopt the budget of the Social 
Fund. The provisions fixing the conditions on which assistance can 
be granted and the categories of enterprises whose displaced work-
ers are to benefit must be adopted by a qualified majority vote,239 
so that any two members, neither of which is Luxembourg, have the 
power of veto. The weighing of the votes for the adoption of the 
budget relating to the Social Fund is however differently regu-
lated 240 by reason no doubt of the difference in rates of contribution. 
Here a majority of at least 67 out of I oo votes is required, which 
gives the veto power to any two members either of which is Germany 
or France and neither of which is Luxembourg, while Germany and 
France together with any other member except Luxembourg can 
carry a favorable vote. 
"Within the framework of the rules" laid down by the Council 
the Fund can in accordance with Article I 2 5 make certain grants. 
These grants are never made to private firms or to individual 
workers, but always to a Member State or to a "body under public 
law." The quoted words presumably refer to public corporations-
the Belgian Office National de Placement et du Chomage, the 
German Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosen-
versicherung, the Italian Istituto N azionale della Previdenza 
Sociale, the Luxembourg Office National du Travail, or the Nether-
lands Algemeen Werkloosheidsfonds.241 (There is no system of un-
280 The draft has not yet been published at the time of writing, but for a detailed 
description, see: Bulletin, Sept. 1959, pt. III, paras. 4o-41. 
231 Bulletin, May I 959, pt. III, para. 32. 
238 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 172. 
239 Treaty art. q8, which requires 12 out of 17 votes. 
"'
0 Treaty art. 203, para. 5· 
241 All these are public corporations whose activities fall within the purposes of 
the Fund. 
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employment insurance in France.) The state or public body can, 
however, never recover more than 50 percent of the expenses in-
curred. Within these limits there are three kinds of grants: 
I) Occupational re-training grants. These can only be made 
towards expenses incurred for re-training workers who cannot find 
employment except in a new occupation. It is not a grant for re-
training in general, but only assistance towards overcoming the 
consequences of unemployment. Moreover-and in this respect the 
structure of the system inaugurated by the Treaty differs materially 
from that proposed in the Spaak Report-the grant is retrospective, 
that is, it cannot be made until the re-trained workers have been 
productively employed for at least six months in the new occupation. 
The Fund is not, therefore, to participate in re-training experiments, 
but only to reimburse part of the expenses of successful re-training. 
This retrospective character of grants made it possible to dispense 
with a number of additional "controls" proposed in the Spaak 
Report, for example, that grants could only be made where under-
takings or plants were totally or partially closed down or where 
partial shut-downs or dismissals affected at least IO percent of the 
workers of an enterprise. The fact that the grant is retrospective, 
following a change of occupation, guarantees that the resources of 
the Fund will be spent on cases originating in structural economic 
changes. Though the methods of the Treaty differ from those 
recommended in the Spaak Report, their object is, of course, the 
same-to promote occupational mobility. 
2) Resettlement allowances. Here the object is to promote geo-
graphical mobility. The assistance granted is conditional upon the 
unemployed workers having been obliged to change their residence 
within the Community. This may prove to be important in those 
cases in which effective freedom of migration depends on financial 
assistance, and this aspect of the Social Fund is thus clearly a corol-
lary to the provisions in Article 48 et seq. concerning freedom of 
movement from one country to another within the Community. 
The power to make grants is not, however, restricted to such cases, 
but extends to changes of residence within any one Community 
country. Thus the Fund could participate, for example, in the ex-
penses of the re-settlement of Italian workers in France or in Bel-
gium, but it could also do so if workers from one part were to be 
re-settled in another part of Italy. Here, too, the grant is retro-
spective since it can only be given in respect of workers who have 
been "in productive employment for a period of at least six months 
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in their new place of residence." What was said above about the 
relation between the proposals of the Spaak Report and the Treaty 
with regard to occupational re-training grants applies mutatis mu-
tandis to the resettlement grants as well. 
3) Aids for the benefit of workers temporarily displaced as a 
result of the conversion of their enterprise to other production. 
Workers will be benefited who have not lost their employment 
permanently, but who have suffered temporary wage cuts or sus-
pensions or whose work weeks have been reduced-in the words 
of the Treaty "whose employment is temporarily reduced or wholly 
or partly suspended." The object of the grant is to assist in main-
taining wage levels pending full re-employment, the Fund paying 
half the lost wages if the government or public corporation con-
cerned pays the other half. In this case no grant can be given except 
on proof that the suspension of employment was the result "of the 
conversion of the enterprise to other production," but-as the 
Spaak Report has suggested-it is not necessary to show that the 
conversion was in turn the result of the operation of the Common 
Market. 
The conditions of this type of grant are particularly stringent in 
other respects, too. Not only is the grant retrospective in the sense 
that the grant cannot be made before the workers concerned have 
again been fully employed in the same enterprise (not necessarily in 
the same plant) for at least six months, but the conversion plan for 
the particular enterprise, including a plan setting out the financing 
of the re-conversion, must have been drawn up by the enterprise in 
advance, the government concerned must have submitted it to the 
Commission and the Commission must have given its approval. This 
is in accordance with the Spaak Report proposals. But the proposal 
in the Report of a special system of grants to assist in staggering the 
closing-down of undertakings in order to prevent sudden mass un-
employment has not been incorporated in the Treaty, although 
there is, of course, nothing in it to prevent the Commission from 
giving especially favorable consideration to such cases provided 
they are within the reach of Treaty provisions. In this respect as in 
others much will depend on the Regulations to be issued by the 
Council. 
As especially emphasized in the Spaak Report,242 this system of 
grants imposes no obligation on states should they find it difficult to 
finance increased unemployment benefits, but it is intended to give 
each Member State a powerful financial incentive to make financial 
"'" Spaak Report, supra note 213, at 86. 
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provision for various kinds of re-adaptation grants. The American 
scheme of financial incentives, which is part of the United States 
system of unemployment insurance law,243 has doubtless to some 
extent served as a model. The Commission hopes 244 that, "through 
its retrospective financial activities the Fund will serve as a power-
ful corrective helping those states and bodies under public law 
which have taken positive action in connection with re-employment 
to prevent the workers in certain economic sectors or certain areas 
from being harmed by the structural changes which are inevitable, 
and which can even be considered desirable." 
But, as the Commission also says in its Second Report, the Fund 
may achieve a great deal more. By fostering occupational re-training 
(and also re-settlement) it may help to make freedom of movement 
a reality and thereby aid in "the attainment and continued existence 
of a high level of employment." 
This plan for grants has been devised for the transitional period. 
At its end various procedures may be adopted 245 to terminate part 
of the assistance functions of the Fund, and also to entrust it with 
new tasks. These, however, must be within its general mandate 
which is to promote employment facilities and the geographical 
and occupational mobility of workers in order to improve employ-
ment opportunities and thus to contribute to the raising of living 
standards. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
In many ways one of the most important activities of the Com-
munity is likely to consist in the collection of social and economic 
facts and the explanation of social and economic trends. Experience 
has already shown the great value of the work of the Commission in 
this respect, as could have been expected from the precedents set by 
the International Labor Office and the High Authority. In conclud-
ing this analysis of the Treaty provisions on labor and social policy 
special emphasis can therefore appropriately be placed on Article 
I 22, which requires the Commission in its annual report to the As-
sembly 246 to include a special chapter on the social situation within 
the Community. The first two of these Exposes, on the social situa-
tion at the beginning of I 9 58 and on its development from early 
1958 to March 1959, are mines of information. For the future the 
Commission is particularly anxious to promote comparative studies 
213 I d. at 84. 
244 SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 170. 
246 Treaty art. 126. 
248 I d. art. 156. 
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of the structure of wages,247 and of-and this may prove very im-
portant-the costs of labor in the six countries.248 The preparation 
of this latter study is being undertaken jointly by the Directorate-
General of Social Affairs and the Joint Statistical Service, in con-
junction with the competent department of the High Authority. A 
joint conference of these bodies was held in November I 9 58 249 to 
which the heads of the Statistical Departments of the Member Gov-
ernments were also invited. If and when this study reaches fruition, 
it may yield the most valuable information to those interested in 
investing in the industry of any of the six countries. 
The Assembly also may invite the Commission to draw up re-
ports on special problems concerning the social situation, presuma-
bly on such matters as safety measures, minimum wage laws, meth-
ods of wage payment and the like. A broad interpretation will 
probably be placed on the words "social situation" so as to make 
them cover not only such questions as employment, wages, social 
security, and housing conditions but also education and health serv-
ices, all of which are closely connected with labor and with social 
security. The existing Exposes show a welcome tendency to deal with 
such things as superannuation schemes, private housing schemes, 
private insurance against illness and funeral expenses and other 
"special services." 250 The work of the Commission may thus open 
up the possibility of providing the factual information required for 
a unified and enlightened social policy in Europe. 
It is obvious-and the Commission and its officials appear to be 
very much aware of the fact-that the success of these inquiries 
depends to no small extent on the cooperation of the governments 
concerned and on that of the representatives of labor and manage-
ment. During the summer of 1959 a major question of policy in this 
connection was raised in the Assembly.251 Did the Commission con-
sider the cooperation of governments, labor, and management so 
important that it would refrain from an inquiry unless it had ob-
tained the approval of all of them or at any rate of the latter two? 
Did not the Commission consider that it had a measure of autonomy 
in selecting topics for inquiry? To this searching question (which 
goes to the essence of the relation between the Community and its 
members) the Commission, as might have been expected, gave a 
.. 
7 FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 108. 
24
' SEC. GEN'L REP. para. 188. 
249 Bulletin, Sept.-Dec. 1958, pt. III, para. 16. 
"""First ExPosf ch. D.! II (h) ; Second EXPOSE paras. 128-41. 
201 Question ecrite 11'" 28, para. 7, [1959] ]'L OFF. 850. 
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highly diplomatic answer. It said 252 that it was free to deal with 
all questions connected with the application of the Treaty, within 
the framework of its own organization and within the limits of its 
budget. Yet the Commission considered the closest collaboration 
with governments and the two sides of industry as valuable in it-
self and as absolutely necessary for the performance of its own ob-
ligations and for the achievement of the objects of the Treaty. Is 
it an exaggeration to say that the pattern of the relation between 
governments and representatives of labor and management, which 
has become an essential feature of western democracy, is beginning 
to find its counterpart at an international level? 
Despite the limitation of the labor and social provisions of the 
Treaty to the European territories of the Member States,253 the in-
vestigative functions of the Commission may extend to the overseas 
areas. On January I 5, I 9 59, the Assembly passed a Resolution 254 
inviting the Commission to study carefully the social conditions of 
the overseas peoples and as soon as possible to report its findings. 
The services of the Commission in conjunction with government 
experts have now drafted a working plan for this purpose.255 The 
significance of this matter for the Overseas Development Fund 
needs no emphasis. 256 
The Treaty's provisions on labor and on social policy create a 
network of policies and promises rather than a set of legal princi-
ples which can be immediately translated into practice. The effect 
on labor law in the Six is, therefore, for the present not likely to be 
conspicuous. The trend towards harmonization of the various legal 
systems is unmistakeable, but it is anyone's guess how far it will go. 
For a long time to come those interested in the labor conditions and 
relations of the Six will, therefore, have to consult national legal 
sources. 
II. A SKETCH MAP OF LABOR LAWS IN THE SIX 
Despite the great diversity of the systems of labor legislation in 
force in the Six they share a number of common features of basic 
importance. To Continental lawyers, employers, or trade unionists 
262 I d. at 852. 
263 Treaty arts. 131-36. 
••• Resolution sur les problemes concernant !'association des pays et territoires 
d'outre-mer, para. 3, [1959] ]'L OFF. 170. 
255 Bulletin, May 1959, pt. III, para. 49· 
256 Treaty, Implementing Convention relating to the Association with the Com-
munity of the Overseas Countries and Territories, arts. 1-7. 
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these basic characteristics are matters of course, but they are un-
familiar to many Americans. Even though they are unfamiliar to an 
American lawyer, however, his European colleague may fail to 
draw his attention to them simply because he recognizes no need for 
doing so. An attempt will therefore be made in the following pages 
to explain five fundamental characteristics of Western European 
labor law and with regard to each of them to indicate what the laws 
of the Six have in common and in what respects they differ. It goes 
without saying that this can be no more than an introductory survey. 
The five matters which have been singled out for discussion are: 
(a) the role of legislation in shaping labor-management relations 
and defining the rights and obligations arising from employer-
employee relationships; (b) the method and legal significance of 
collective bargaining; (c) councils or committees at plant or enter-
prise level which represent the interests of the employees or are 
entitled to be consulted concerning, or to cooperate in resolving, 
questions of management; (d) the settlement of conflicts, collective 
and individual, including the structure of labor courts; and (e) the 
restrictions imposed by law or collective agreements on the power 
of the employer to terminate the contract of employment. These 
five matters are likely to be relevant to the routine work of anyone 
engaged in business on the Continent, or in advising businessmen 
in the Community. 
A. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION 257 
The simple fact is that legislation in that part of the European 
Continent with which we are concerned is of greater importance in 
regulating labor relations than it is in the United States or in Great 
Britain. There is, to be sure, an important and voluminous body of 
labor legislation in the United States, but its principal role is to 
ensure that the collective bargaining process can work and can 
produce the substantive rules which are to govern labor-manage-
ment relations. On the Continent, however, the bulk of legislation is 
257 See for information on the content of this section: E. C. S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, 
ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES SOURCES DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL DANS LES PAYS DE LA COM-
MUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER (1957). This is the first of a 
series of monographs published by the High Authority of the E.C.S.C., and written 
by a group of six experts. In this volume the part on Germany is by Prof. G. Boldt, 
the one on Belgium by Prof. P. Horion, the one on France by Prof. P. Durand, the 
one on Italy by Prof. L. Mengoni, the one on Luxembourg by President A. Kayser, 
and the one on the Netherlands by the late Prof. A. N. Molenaar. Prof. Molenaar 
also wrote the general introductory summary. 
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designed to regulate these relations directly. A great many things 
which in the English-speaking countries are left either to collective 
bargaining or custom are subject to more or less detailed statutory 
regulation. Such statutory regulation is frequently (but not always) 
mandatory, that is, it cannot be avoided, at any rate not to the detri-
ment of the employee, either by contract of employment or by col-
lective agreement. In some cases collective agreements can do what 
the individual contract cannot do, that is, vary in either direction the 
terms of employment provided for by statute.258 In other cases the 
statute provides no more than an optional norm which can be dis-
placed by the contract of employment between the individual em-
ployer and worker. As a general rule, however, statutory provisions 
on labor are mandatory, and-a point which an American observer 
may find difficult to grasp at the outset-even in countries with a 
very highly developed and efficient collective bargaining system 
(such as Belgium or Germany) important aspects of the labor-
management relation are not subject to collective bargaining since 
they are regulated by mandatory legislation. In Belgium "there 
are no collective agreements which deal with the terms of notice: 
this question is the object of very detailed statutory provisions." 259 
A similar observation could be made about Germany. The decisive 
bearing of legislation on the discharge of employees (so unfamiliar 
in America) will have to be constantly borne in mind by anyone in-
terested in labor relations in any of the Six. 
To some extent, but with great variations in the six countries, 
the constitutions themselves contain principles of law which have 
a direct bearing on the relation between management and labor. 
This is true of France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg, but not of 
Belgium, and only to a very limited extent of the Netherlands. In 
some cases the constitution contains positive law. For example, one 
of the provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal German Repub-
lic on "fundamental rights" 260 declares that any agreement which 
aims at restricting or impairing the freedom of organization of any 
person is null and void, with the result that "yellow-dog" contracts 
as well as closed-shop agreements are illegal and invalid, and with 
the further result that an employer cannot discharge any employee 
258 E.g., with regard to working hours in Germany and with regard to terms of 
notice in the Netherlands. 
258 Horion, National Report for Belgium on Contents of Collective Agreements 8, 
znd International Congress on Labor Law (Geneva, 1957). 
200 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 9, para. 3· 
3 64 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
by reason of his membership or non-membership in a, or in any 
particular, trade union.261 The act of discharge would be invalid and 
the obligation to pay wages would continue. 
Another equally important example of the direct effect of con-
stitutional norms on the labor relationship is that of Article 40 of 
the Italian Constitution of December 27, 1947,262 according to 
which "the right to strike is exercised within the framework of 
the laws by which it is regulated." The highest Italian court and 
the prevailing opinion among learned writers consider this as a 
norm of positive law, and not merely as a legislative program, and 
the highest court has held that, as a result of this provision, con-
tracts of employment are not terminated but merely suspended by 
a strike and the strikers have an automatic right of reinstatement. 
This direct effect of constitutional provisions on labor-management 
relations may in itself be familiar to American lawyers, but it may 
come as a surprise that such an effect has also been ascribed to 
seemingly programmatic pronouncements such as those contained in 
the Preamble to the French Constitution of 1946, which has been 
expressly incorporated in and confirmed by the Constitution of 1958. 
Freedom to organize, is, for example, guaranteed by the Preamble 
to the Constitution which also provides that "no one may be injuri-
ously affected in his work or in his employment by reason of his 
origin, his opinion or his belief." 263 Moreover, the highest French 
court has drawn from the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946 
precisely the same conclusions, in regard to the right to strike, which 
the highest court of Italy came to on the basis of a similar clause 
in the body of the I tali an Constitution. 264 
On the other hand, it is very common to find in Continental con-
stitutions provisions which are not intended to be applied as rules 
binding the individual and the courts, but as programs addressed to 
the legislature, either in the form of general ethical, social, or eco-
nomic maxims or in the form of specific mandates to legislate on a 
particular matter. The Italian Constitution contains provisions of 
this kind with reference to hours of work, to the effect of collective 
261 NIKISCH, ARBEITSRECHT 574 ( 1955); SPYROPOULOS, LA LIBERTE SYNDICALE 199-200 
( 1956). 
262 MAZZONI, MANU ALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO 142 ( 1958); Mengoni in E. C. S.C. 
HIGH AUTHORITY, LA STABIL!TE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES PAYS MEMBRES DE LA 
C.E.C.A. 251 (1958). 
263 Preambule de Ia Constitution du 27 octobre 1946: "Nul ne peut etre lese, dans son 
travail ou son emp/oi, en raison de ses origines, de ses opinions ou de ses croyances." 
2
"' 3 DURAND (with the concurrence of Vitu), TRAITE DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL paras. 
26, 252, 292 ( 1956) [hereinafter cited as 3 DURAND]. 
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agreements, to workers' councils and other matters.265 The Constitu-
tion of theN etherlands 266 supplied the programmatic foundation for 
the Dutch law of 1950 concerning the Economic and Social Council, 
which exercises important consultative functions, and concerning 
the various kinds of Industrial Councils comprised in each case 
of labor and management representatives, which are intended to 
exercise consultative, and also to some extent regulatory, functions 
for particular industries. The Constitution of Luxembourg was 
amended in 1948 in order to guarantee to each citizen the right to 
work, and to enjoin the legislature to provide for social security, 
for the protection of the health of all workers and of their hours of 
rest and for guarantees of the freedom to organize. All of this is 
nothing more than a program for legislation, except that the courts 
have held that the concluding words concerning freedom of organi-
zation confer an immediate right to strike.267 
These examples should suffice to emphasize the fact that Euro-
pean constitutions can be very misleading. One must in each case 
look at the decisions of the courts and at the opinions of learned 
writers in order to determine the extent to which a given provision 
of a constitution creates rights and obligations of labor and manage-
ment, and to what extent it merely holds out promises of future 
legislation. This is especially important if one's view is colored by 
American constitutional law since American and European canons 
of interpretation differ greatly. On the Continent it is the object of 
a constitution not only to define the limits of legislation but, to some 
extent, to provide a blue-print for it-that is, to say what the legis-
lature should do and not only what it may not do. Whether the legis-
lature will accept the assigned tasks is generally determined by politi-
cal considerations (as is vividly illustrated by the debates concern-
ing the implementation of Article 39 of the Italian Constitution) .268 
The courts can do nothing to enforce such constitutional mandates 
unless they decide that they embody norms of positive law, and 
whether they will do so or not cannot be predicted. Where courts 
are unfavorably disposed towards policies embodied in constitu-
tional provisions, they are unlikely to see in such provisions more 
"""Italian Constitution, art. 36 (3), art. 39, art. 46. See Mazzoni, op. cit. supra 
note 262. 
266 Molenaar, Les Sources du Droit du Travail aux Pays-Bas, in E.C.S.C. HIGH 
AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 257, at 161, 166. 
267 Kayser, Les Sources du Droit du Travail dans Le Grand-Duche de Lux-
embourg, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AuTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 257, at 152. 
266 See Mazzoni, II Diritto dei Rapporti Col/ettivi di Lavoro in Italia, in I RAP-
PORT! CoLLETTIVI DI LAVORO 45 1 90 (1959). 
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than legislative programs. This fact explains to some extent court 
decisions in Germany between 1919 and 1933, and these decisions 
in turn explain why so many of the constitutional provisions of the 
Bonn Basic Law are expressly formulated as positive norms. On 
the other hand, the important clauses on labor law and social policy 
contained in the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic and 
now incorporated in that of the Fifth were written into the Pream-
ble rather than the body of the Constitution in order to make it 
impossible for the then competent "constitutional committee" to 
scrutinize legislation with regard to its compatibility with these 
provlSlons. 
In France and in the three Benelux countries, it should be added, 
judges have no power to declare a law unconstitutional, and in Ger-
many and in Italy this power is reserved to a "constitutional court" 
to which all litigation must be submitted in the event of an allega-
tion of unconstitutionality. Under the Constitution of the Fifth 
French Republic the Constitutional Council can be asked to deter-
mine on the constitutionality of legislation prior to its promulgation, 
but the right to submit ordinary legislation to the Council is reserved 
to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the presi-
dents of the two houses of Parliament.209 
The question of the distribution, in matters concerning labor re-
lations, of legislative powers between a federal parliament and the 
parliaments of members of a federation arises only in Germany.270 
Labor law and social insurance belong to the sphere of "concurrent 
legislative jurisdiction" of the Federal Republic and its states 
(Lander). This means that as soon as the Federal Republic has ex-
ercised its legislative jurisdiction (as, in fact, it has in most fields of 
labor and social security) the field is "pre-empted" and the Lander 
can no longer legislate. Labor and social security problems clearly re-
quire uniform solutions, and the federal government is therefore ex-
pected to enact legislation in these areas.271 Nonetheless some areas 
remain-industrial arbitration is one-where some laws of the Lan-
der are still in force. Anyone concerned with German labor legisla-
tion must keep an eye not only on the legislation of the Federal Re-
public but also on that of the states, as well as on some still existing 
""'For the foregoing: E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 257, passim; 
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;AISE art. 6I (I958). 
270 Except with regard to the Italian "regions." This matter is not further pursued 
here. 
271 See Boldt, Les Sources du Droit du Travail en Allemagne, in E.C.S.C. HIGH 
AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 257, at 5I-62; arts. 72, 74, No. I2 of the Basic Law of 
the Federal German Republic. 
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remnants of legislation of the Inter-Allied Control Council and of 
the transitional legislative bodies which preceded the formation of 
the Federal Republic. A vast amount of consolidation and simplifi-
cation of legislation has been achieved in the last few years, but 
there are still vestiges of the chaos which prevailed during the years 
following the collapse of the Nazi State. 
The status accorded to treaties by constitutions is important to 
an understanding of labor law in the Six not only because of the 
need for analyzing the relation between the Treaty of Rome and the 
municipal laws of the Member States, but more importantly in 
order to have a clear understanding of the status in municipal law of 
conventions of the International Labor Organization which have 
been ratified by the Member States. Nothing in the laws of the Six 
corresponds to the provisions of the United States Constitution con-
cerning the treaty-making power or stating that treaties form part 
of the "supreme law of the land." The provisions of a treaty do not 
acquire the force of law so as to impose obligations or to confer 
rights upon any individual unless the treaty has been ratified or ap-
proved by an act of the legislature. In some of the Member States 
ratified international agreements are said to prevail over ordinary 
legislation. This principle was expressed in the Constitution of the 
Fourth French Republic, 272 but according to the present Constitu-
tion 273 the principle applies only if the other contracting parties 
fully apply the treaties or agreements concerned.274 In the case of 
I.L.O. conventions the obligation of the governments concerned to 
place the matter before their legislative organs "for the enactment 
of legislation or other action" is based on the Constitution of the 
I.L.O. itsel£.275 
All the six countries have, at one stage of the development of 
their legislation, enacted a civil code. The extent to which the pro-
visions of those codes are now of importance in regard to the law 
governing labor relations depends largely on the date at which the 
particular code was enacted. The French and Belgian Civil Codes 
were enacted at a time when industry was in its infancy and when 
legislation was still dominated by the economic principles of laissez-
faire. They have almost completely lost their importance in prac-
"" CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE art. 28 ( 1946). 
"
73 CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE art. 55 ( 1958). 
274 The complexity of the matter emerges from the fact that in Belgium treaties 
have no stronger legal force than statutes, but in Luxembourg they have. See Horion, 
Les Sources du Droit du Travail en Belgique, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AuTHORITY, op. cit. 
supra note 257, at 8o; Kayser, supra note 267, at 152. 
075 1946 I.L.O. CoNST. art. 19 (5) (b). 
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tice: their special provisions concerning the contract of employment 
were, in France, either repealed or incorporated in the Labor Code 
(Code du Travail) .276 In Belgium the Code was superseded by 
later legislation, notably the statutes of I900 and I922, amended in 
1954 and I955, regulating the contract of employment of manual 
and of non-manual employees, but no labor code has ever been 
enacted in Belgium. In Luxembourg the Civil Code, to which much 
special legislation has been added, continues to apply to manual 
workers, but as regards non-manual workers it has been superseded 
by legislation first enacted in I 9 I 9 and then considerably amended 
in I937· In the Netherlands the Civil Code would have suffered 
the fate of the French and Belgian Codes had it not been, as it were, 
rejuvenated by the law on the contract of employment of I 907, 
which (differing from legislation enacted elsewhere) took the form 
of a comprehensive amendment of the Code itself. Italy got an 
entirely new Civil Code in I 942, and, consequently, the provisions 
of the Civil Code (Articles 2096-2 I 29) are of greater importance 
in Italy than in any other of the six countries. In Germany the 
amended provisions of the Civil Code of I 896 are still of impor-
tance, but they are supplemented and partly superseded by special 
rules contained (with regard to industrial workers and employees) 
in the Industrial Code ( Gewerbe-Ordnung) originally of I 8 69 and 
often amended, in the Commercial Code (with regard to clerical 
workers) and in many special enactments.277 The Industrial Code 
comprises the bulk of the protective rules on labor in factories. 
It goes without saying that labor legislation in all countries is volu-
minous. Legislation concerning health, safety, and welfare of work-
ers in factories, mines, and offices, and in the various branches of 
transport, concerning hours of work and the employment of women, 
children, and young persons, concerning the payment, and to some 
extent the amount, of wages, concerning collective bargaining, trade 
unions, labor disputes and their settlement, labor courts, labor in-
spection and employment exchanges, and many other matters be-
sides, has been passed in all six countries. Everywhere there is a vast 
and unwieldy mass of statutes and statutory regulations which only 
specialists can hope to master. French law, however, differs in one 
respect from legislation in the other Community countries. In France 
an attempt has been made to consolidate the existing labor legis-
276 See text infra at footnote 278. 
277 For this information and for further details, see E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, 
op. cit. supra note 257, passim. 
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lation in what is misleadingly called a "labor code" (Code du Tra-
vail), originally enacted (in installments) between 19 ro and 
1927 278 and more or less kept up to date by means of amendments. 
Although the work is (and presumably always will be) incomplete, 
the volume of the "non-codified" texts being many times that of the 
Code, the consolidation has made it a little less difficult to find one's 
way through French legislation than through that of the other 
nations. In Germany a private venture, the looseleaf publication of 
labor legislation by H. C. Nipperdey,279 performs up to a point a 
similar service. 
As was said above, legislation plays a greater role in the regula-
tion of labor relations on the Continent of Europe than it does either 
in the United States or in Britain, but the extent to which this is 
true differs greatly in the six countries of the Common Market. 
With some exaggeration one may say that the role of legislation in 
determining the rights and obligations of employers and employees 
in a given country is inversely proportional to the quality of its col-
lective bargaining machinery. The stronger the latter, the less need 
there is for invoking the aid of the legislature, and the strength and 
quality of collective bargaining in turn depend very much on the 
structure of the trade union movement. The political and other diffi-
culties which beset the French trade unions 280 and in particular their 
disunity should be kept in mind when trying to understand the role 
played by labor legislation in France. Legislation is more important 
than collective bargaining as a source of the mutual rights and ob-
ligations of employers and employees in France, much more than 
in Germany, Belgium, or the Netherlands, and certainly no less 
so than in Italy. Thus in Belgium 281 collective bargaining functions 
well, largely, though not exclusively, through standing bilateral 
committees known as commissions paritaires. Consequently, if 
one compares the situation with that half a century ago, "state in-
tervention emerges today as very much less important: this is a 
fruit of trade unionism." 282 
The increasing importance of collective bargaining is exemplified 
by the shift in methods of shortening hours of work in Belgium. 
178 For its history and structure: 1 DURAND & }AUSSAUD, TRAITE DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL 
para. 98, at 117-120 (1947) [hereinafter cited as I DuRAND]. 
179 NIPPERDEY, ARBEITSRECHT 5th ed. ( 1958). 
280 See LORWIN, THE FRENCH LABOR MOVEMENT (1954), esp. at 145· 
•on The structure of Belgian industrial relations in some ways resembles that in 
Britain. See text at note 310 infra. 
280 Lagasse, National Belgian Report on Individual Labour Relations 7, 2nd In· 
ternational Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958). 
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"Fifty years ago one thought only in terms of legislative interven-
tion or intervention of the executive (for example, the law of De-
cember 3 I, I 909 concerning working hours in mines). In I 92 I, 
the law established the general principles of the eight-hour day and 
of the 48-hour week, but appealed to collective bargaining (at in-
dustry or plant level) to introduce divergent schemes (that is, 
schemes more favorable to the workers). In 1936, when the ques-
tion of reducing the working week to 40 hours arose, Parliament 
was content to invite the bilateral committees to take the initiative 
in this direction. More recently, in 1955 and 1956, when the trade 
unions started a movement for the five-day week, no proposal for 
legislation was laid before the Chambers (of Parliament) : reform 
was carried into effect exclusively by agreements with the employers' 
associations, first at the inter-industrial, then at the industrial, and 
finally at the plant level." 2Ra 
This should be contrasted with the development in France. The 
40-hour week was introduced by statute in 1936, and the system 
of overtime pay was again changed by legislation in I946. Col-
lective bargaining has made much progress since the enactment of 
the law of 1950,284 but a very large proportion of all collective 
agreements in France continue to be agreements about wages only, 
leaving all such matters as working hours and overtime pay, holi-
days and holiday remuneration, or the employer's obligation to 
compensate the employee in the event of dismissal, to regulation by 
statute. Two of the most distinguished French authorities on labor 
law have, indeed, attributed the slowness of the growth of collective 
bargaining to the impoverishing effect which the rapid development 
of labor legislation has had on the content of collective agree-
ments.285 One may wonder, however, whether the tendency to in-
voke the aid of the legislature (so markedly different from the ten-
dency in Belgium) was not itself partly a result of the weakness of 
the collective bargaining machinery caused both by the structure of 
the French economy and by the split among the trade unions. 
Despite the complete destruction of the German trade unions by 
the Nazi government and the cessation of all collective bargaining 
between 1933 and 1945, collective agreements are in many respects 
of far greater importance in Western Germany today as sources of 
Z"3 Ibid. 
""'Law of Feu. II, 1950, [1950] ].0. 1688, the basis of collective bargaining in 
France today. 
285 RoUAST & DURAND, PRECIS DE LEGISLATION INDUSTRIELLE para. 196, at Z53 (4th ed. 
1951). See also Lorwin, op. cit. supra note z8o, at 134. 
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rights and obligations than statutes. The rapid and spectacular re-
vival of collective bargaining in the Federal Republic since 1945 280 
is partly due to the unity of the German trade union movement 
which distinguishes it so dramatically from the French. It would be 
wrong to attribute this unity exclusively to the virtual absence of 
Communist influence in the West German trade unions, but that 
this is a contributing factor cannot be doubted. In any event the 
regulation of the details of the employment relationship by col-
lective agreement has become the rule to such an extent in Germany 
that legislative intervention affecting the contract of employment 
has, in this century, been comparatively inconspicuous.287 The "stat-
ute law concerning the contract of employment . . . is still essen-
tially that of the codifications of the end of the 19th century, that is, 
in particular of the civil code and the commercial code. This self-
restraint on the part of the legislature was only possible because 
the collective parties had taken the development of labor law in 
this area out of its hands." 288 The great exception to this general 
statement is that of the law of Kundigungsschutz which protects 
the employee in the event of dismissal and fulfills to some extent 
the function of the American collective agreements on seniority.289 
This is a significant example of a matter which, in Germany and in 
France, is governed by statutes 290 but which Americans do not see 
as a subject of legislation. 
Italian labor law is still in a state of transition, and it is more 
difficult to gauge the relative importance of legislation and collec-
tive bargaining in shaping labor relations in Italy than it is in the 
other five countries. Fascist legislation has disappeared, 291 but the 
promise-held out by Article 39 of the Constitution of 1947-of 
legislation to define the legal status and effect of collective agree-
ments has not yet been fulfilled. A provisional and transitional sta-
tute of 1959 has, however, empowered the Government for the 
period of one year to issue decrees fixing legally binding minimum 
288 Kerr, Collective Bargaining in Postwar Germany, in CoNTEMPORARY CoLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES (Sturmthal ed. 1957). See also Second EXPOSE para. 68. 
287 This observation does not, of course, apply to matters such as protection of health, 
safety, and welfare, or to the organization of the works' council system, to be discussed 
infra. 
288 Dietz, National German Report on Collective Labour Relations, submitted to the 
2nd International Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958) . 
... See PART II, Section E, Subsection 3 infra. 
200 The matter is discussed below in section E. As will be seen, what has been said 
here about France and Germany cannot be applied to all the six countries. In Italy 
collective bargaining is today more important in this context than legislation. 
m Law Decree of Nov. 23, 1944, No. 369, [1943-44] Lex. Legislazione Italiana 521. 
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wages and other conditions of employment. These are to correspond 
in substance to collective terms agreed upon prior to the coming 
into force of the statute.292 The constitutionality of this statute will 
remain doubtful until the Constitutional Court has spoken. 
At the moment of writing no one can predict which of the many 
definitive legislative projects under discussion in Italy will be trans-
lated into law.293 It is noteworthy that, despite the absence of legis-
lation on collective bargaining and despite the complicated and volu-
minous legal controversies which surround the status of the trade 
unions and of their agreements with employers and employer as-
sociations, collective bargaining has had a considerable develop-
ment since the end of the second World War.294 One of the most 
remarkable features of this development is the formulation-
chiefly by two "inter-industrial agreements" of October 18 and 
April 21, 1950-of certain principles of procedure to be observed, 
and concerning indemnities to be paid, in the event of individual 
discharges or discharges caused by reduction of personneJ.295 These 
agreements, which have been sustained by the courts, amplify the 
relevant provision of Article 2120 of the Code of 1942 and embody 
what is probably the closest parallel to the American conception of 
"seniority" agreements to be found in Europe today. Nevertheless, 
in spite of the survival or revival of collective bargaining in Italy, 
the over-all picture seems to resemble that of France. "State legis-
lation certainly constitutes the most abundant source of provisions 
with regard to the regulation of labor relations, and one can even 
observe an unmistakable tendency on the part of the legislature to 
reserve to its own jurisdiction an increasingly important range of 
topics which are thus withdrawn from that of the autonomous or-
ganizations in industry. With regard to certain topics the Constitu-
tion itself provides that they will be regulated by legislation, for 
example, working hours, the weekly period of rest, and annual vaca-
tions (Article 36); legal status in industry and working conditions 
of women and children (Article 37) ; restrictions on the right to 
strike (Article 40); and the participation of workers in the man-
"""See for the situation apart from the statute of 1959, Mazzoni, National Italian 
Report on Collective Labour Relations, 2nd International Congress on Social Legisla-
tion (Brussels, 1958). The statute of 1959 is further discussed below . 
..., On the bill submitted by Signor Rubinacci in 1951, the most widely discussed of 
these attempts to solve the problem, see Mazzoni, supra note 268, at 99· 
2"' Sanseverino, Collective Bargaining in Italy, in CONTEMPORARY CoLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES 210 (Sturmthal ed. 1957). However, compared with the 
development in Germany, that in Italy is modest. Second EXPOSE para. 73· 
295 Mengoni, supra note 262, at 278; see also Mazzoni, supra note 268, at 109, where 
the relevant cases are cited. 
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agement of undertakings (Article 46) . On the other hand, one topic, 
and, of all things, that which concerns wages, appears, on principle 
at any rate, to have been withdrawn by the Constitution from legis-
lative intervention and to have been reserved to collective agree-
ments." 296 The legal status of collective bargaining in Italy more 
nearly resembles that of collective bargaining in Britain and in the 
United States than that of the other Member States, but its signifi-
cance, compared with legislation, cannot-or, perhaps, cannot yet 
-be compared with that of its counterparts in the English-speaking 
countries. 
It is only in the Netherlands of all the Community countries that 
wages and conditions of employment are subject to the control of 
a governmental institution, the Council of Mediators.297 Neverthe-
less-or perhaps because of the stimulus which the Council has de-
liberately given to collective bargaining since 1945-the number of 
agreements and the number of workers subject to agreements has 
risen spectacularly.298 TheN etherlands is one of the European coun-
tries in which collective bargaining flourishes. The significance of 
legislation in shaping the employment relation is nevertheless great, 
greater probably than in Belgium or in Germany, both because the 
law concerning the contract of employment of 1907 (which 
amended the Civil Code of 183 8) was a comprehensive measure 
of 70 articles, and because an important law concerning the termi-
nation of contracts of employment was enacted on December q, 
1953.299 As in France and in Germany provision has been made by 
statute not only for the periods of notice to be given by the employer 
to the employee prior to the termination of the contract but also 
for compulsory payment by the employer of a special compensation 
in the event of an unfair use of the right to give notice.300 Although 
the Council of Mediators has in some cases made supplementary 
provision for the regulation of the termination of contracts of em-
ployment, this important statute of I 9 53 remains the principal 
source of law and is therefore decisive, inter alia, in that area which 
corresponds to the American regulation of "seniority" rights. 
200 Mengoni, Les Sources du droit du travail en ltalie, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, 
op. cit. supra note 237, at 122. 
297 See on this Levenbach, Collective Bargaining and Government Wage Regulation 
in the Netherlands, 16 MoDERN LAw REVIEW 453 (1953). 
298 Pels, The Development of Collective Employment Agreements in the Netherlands, 
in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES 98 (Sturmthal ed. 1957). 
299 See de Gaay Fortman, National Netherlands Report on Individual Labour Rela-
tions, 2nd International Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958). 
800 PART II, Section E infra. 
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In Luxembourg there is a very marked difference between the 
position of manual and non-manual workers. The position of the 
latter is controlled by a fairly up-to-date codifying enactment, but 
there is no corresponding statutory regulation for manual workers. 
It is perhaps a fair generalization to say, therefore, that the im-
portance of collective bargaining overshadows legislation in deter-
mining the relation of manual workers to their employers.301 
This very brief survey should suffice to convince the reader that 
any analysis of the mutual rights and obligations of employers and 
employees in the Six must take legislation as well as collective bar-
gaining into account. The I.L.O. has long since recognized that 
standards established by it can be adopted, and obligations to in-
troduce such standards can be implemented, by either method.302 By 
the same token "harmonization" pursuant to the Treaty will lead 
nowhere unless bargaining practice as well as legislation is taken into 
account. In France paid holidays are regulated by statute, in Ger-
many mainly by collective bargaining, and in the Netherlands regu-
lation of paid holidays is in a state of transition from one to the 
other. From the point of view of harmonization, what matters, of 
course, is the substance of the mutual obligations, not their source. 
B. THE METHOD AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 303 
\Vhere bargaining methods and the legal effect of collective agree-
ments are concerned, European ideas and practices differ from those 
"'"See Kayser, supra note 267, at 151. The law concerning salaried employees dates 
from 1937. 
302 Preface to I INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CODE 1951 at Jxxvi (1951). 
:JO:l General Reference is made to the following works: 
a) COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS (Galenson ed. 1952). 
b) CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES ( Sturmtha) ed. 
1957). 
c) STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, GEWERKSCHAFTEN UND FRAGEN DES KOLLEKTIVEN 
ARBEITSRECHTS ( 1957 ). 
d) E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES SOURCES DU DROIT DU 
TRAVAIL DANS LES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE 
L'ACIER (1957). 
e) Kahn-Freund, Collective Labour Relations, Report prepared for the 2nd Inter-
national Congress on Social Legislation, Brussels, 1958 (published in English 
in RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E COMPARATO DEL LAVORO, Vol. 3, pp. 353-
409 (196o)). 
f) Among the national treatises, the third volume of Durand's TRAIT!l DE DROIT 
DU TRAVAIL (1956) is of special importance. 
g) Much the best comparative treatise on the matters discussed under this sub-
heading is Spyropoulos's "Le Droit des Conventions Collectives de Travail dans 
les Pays de Ia Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de I'Acier," 16 TRAVAUX 
ET RECHERCHES DE L'INSTITUT DU DROIT CoMPARE DE L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS ( 1959). 
The present writer expresses his special indebtedness to this excellent mono-
graph. 
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in the United States, and there are some important differences 
among the Six as well. 
I. BARGAINING BY EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS 
Without any doubt the most important difference between col-
lective bargaining all over Europe (on the Continent as well as in 
Britain) and in the United States is the prevalence of bargaining 
in Europe by employers' associations. Collective bargaining by 
individual employers is not unknown and indeed it is inevitable 
where-as is true of railways all over Europe, of coal mining in 
France and partially of coal mining in the Netherlands, and of the 
postal, telephone, and telegraph services everywhere-the bargain-
ing employer is either the state or a public corporation administer-
ing an industry as a public enterprise. Even in such cases, however, 
the bargaining unit on the employer's side is likely to be the enter-
prise and not the plant. It is, in American terms, "company-wide" 
and not "plant-wide" bargaining. 
The usual bargaining partner of a trade union or unions is, how-
ever, an employers' association or a number of such associations. 
This does not necessarily mean that bargaining is nation-wide. In 
France district bargaining is very common, whereas, for example, 
in Germany "industry-wide" or "nation-wide" bargaining prevails, 
as it does in Italy and the Benelux countries. 
Plant-wide bargaining is, not without reason, viewed with a cer-
tain amount of suspicion, especially in France.304 Hence French 
law, according to what is probably the correct solution of "one of 
the greatest riddles" in the law of collective bargaining, seeks to 
counteract the danger that, "within the framework of a plant, 
agreements might be concluded between an employer and a union 
which is too accommodating." 305 Although the matter is not free 
from doubt, it appears that under French law only that organization 
which is "most representative" (a highly technical term explained 
below), and therefore sure to be independent, can enter into collec-
tive agreements which cover only one plant or several enumerated 
plants. Moreover, in the absence of a national, regional, or local 
agreement such an ''accord d' hablissement" or plant agreement can 
only deal with wages, and in the presence of a national, regional, 
or local agreement it can modify its terms only in favor of the em-
ployees. The details of the highly technical distinction between 
304 See the reference to the debates in the National Assembly preceding the passing 
of the law of Feb. nth, 1950, in 3 DuRAND para. 181. 
806 3 DURAND para. 241. 
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((accords" and ((conventions" need not be further discussed here. 306 
The reason or reasons why collective bargaining in Europe has 
in this respect developed along lines so different from those which 
its development has followed in America cannot be explored either. 
They must be sought in the history of industrial relations and in 
general economic and political trends. Clearly, however,-whether 
this be a cause or an effect of bargaining by employers' associations 
or both-collective bargaining in Europe has a very important func-
tion in determining relationships between enterprises or manage-
ment units as well as those between labor and management. It helps 
to regulate competition and to prevent certain kinds of undercutting. 
Moreover, it is quite impossible to understand the law relating to 
collective agreements without realizing that, in principle, there are 
two kinds of firms from the point of view of collective bargaining, 
those who have and those who have not joined the appropriate em-
ployers' associations. The distinction among workers between or-
ganized and unorganized labor has its counterpart, therefore, 
among employers-that between federated and non-federated firms. 
Once an agreement has been concluded by an employers' association, 
its members are very likely to be interested in the "extension" of 
its terms to non-federated employers. Such an extension is not nor-
mally effected by collective bargaining, however, since non-federated 
firms will frequently be those unwilling to bargain with unions. Only 
the law can effect such extensions and this is one of the reasons, but 
not the only one, why the law has played such a prominent role in 
the evolution of collective bargaining in the Six. In five of the six 
countries there exist, in one form or another, procedures to extend, 
by administrative act, the effect of collective agreements to "non-
federated" employers, and in the sixth country, that is, in Italy, 
similar legislation was-in substance though not in form-provi-
sionally introduced in I959.307 
From the point of view of an American firm wishing to operate 
in one of the six countries this point is important. The American em-
ployer cannot, in the countries of the Community, remain outside 
the nexus of collective bargaining if he is inclined to do so, any more 
than he can in the United States. To some extent the "extension," 
and similar, provisions of European legislation fulfill a function like 
that of American laws which compel employers to bargain in good 
faith. The non-federated employer must contemplate at least the 
300 !d. para. 242. 
807 It is, however, controversial whether this provisional statute is constitutional in 
view of Art. 39 of the Constitution. 
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possibility of being placed under a legal obligation to observe the 
terms of an agreement on which he had no influence. In view of the 
legal requirements to be fulfilled as a condition for an "extension" or 
similar order,308 the likelihood of this happening may be less in some 
cases than in others, but the possibility is always there, and its 
practical corollary is the advisability of joining an employers' as-
sociation. 
Collective bargaining is, then, on the whole, more centralized in 
Europe than in America. This is reflected in the structure of the 
trade unions. By and large, the powers of the "local" or "branch" 
union compared with those of the district or national organs are 
smaller in Europe than in America. Even in France, where a strong 
tradition of decentralization inside the unions grew out of the or-
ganizational and ideological traditions of the labor movement,309 
the real power rests with the central union institutions. It would be 
very misleading to compare the functions of an American "local" 
with those of its European counterpart, and the causes of the dif-
ference can only partly be found in the size of the United States as 
contrasted with that of any of the Six. The process of centralization 
does not stop at "industry-wide" bargaining. For example in Ger-
many, in Italy, and in Belgium confederations of trade unions (that 
is, the equivalents of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.) enter into compacts on vital 
questions with central associations of employers' federations. In 
Luxembourg, the smallest of the Six, this phenomenon is particu-
larly marked. 
2. CONTRACTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARGAINING 
Another aspect of collective bargaining in the Six which might 
strike an American as unfamiliar is the existence of two types of 
bargaining machinery, which-for want of a better word-might 
be called "contractual" and "institutional." In two of the six coun-
tries, Germany and Italy, bargaining machinery is purely "contrac-
tual" (as it mainly is in the United States). The bargaining partners, 
normally organizations on both sides, occasionally a single employer 
on one side and a union or unions on the other, meet, discuss, and, 
if all goes well, arrive at a contract. At the opposite extreme is Bel-
gium, where collective bargaining is highly developed, but in a form 
more reminiscent of the British than of the American type. Begin-
308 I.e., an order extending the legal effect of a collective agreement to non-federated 
employers and making it a "common rule." See below. This applies to France, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and, in substance, also to Belgium. 
309 See LORWIN, op. cit. supra note 28o, pt. I. 
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ning shortly after the end of the first World War, the two sides of 
industry have there set up-and for a long time they were entirely 
outside the law-bilateral committees (commissions paritaires) 
consisting of equal numbers of employers and employees, that is, 
employers' association and trade union representatives in equal 
numbers. These committees fixed wages and other conditions of em-
ployment by unanimous decisions and sought to settle industrial 
conflicts, in very much the same way as British "joint industrial 
councils" and similar bodies do.310 They were (and are) generally 
established on an industry-wide basis, although sometimes their 
scope is national and sometimes district-wide. Originally they had 
no official status whatever, but were simply collective bargaining 
organs established by the joint action of the unions affiliated to cer-
tain top organizations and of the employers' organizations. In 
I 94 5, after the Liberation, they were given legal status.311 Each of 
them now has an impartial president and vice-president (usually 
civil servants), a secretarial staff and the like, appointed by the Min-
ister of Labor, but only the management and labor representatives 
can vote. They usually meet at the offices of the Ministry. The whole 
of Belgian economic life is now covered by the more than 100 exist-
ing committees, some of which deal only with manual workers, 
whereas others deal with salaried employees, and still others with 
both. The resolutions (accords) adopted by a committee ( neces-
sarily unanimously) can be given a legally binding effect by royal 
decree. This possibility is certainly important, but the overwhelming 
majority of these "resolutions" are never made legally binding, anJ 
are neither contracts nor enforceable norms, but, like British col-
lective agreements, no more than social compacts. Collective bar-
gaining outside the committees is not insignificant, prevailing for 
example in the textile industry around Verviers and in the cement 
industry, but the overwhelming majority of all collective agreements 
are today resolutions of the permanent bilateral committees. 
The collective bargaining system of Luxembourg resembles that 
of Belgium. In Luxembourg there is only one bilateral committee 
(commission paritaire) established by a Decree of r 94 5 312 as part of 
310 See for the commissions paritaires: Horion, supra note 259, Van Goethem, National 
Report for Belgium, 2nd International Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958); 
STEINMANN-GoLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 303, at 94 et seq. 
811 Law Decree determining the status of Commissions Paritaires of June 9th, 1945, 
[1945] Moniteur Beige 4337· 
312 Decree of the Grand Duchess of Oct. 6, 1945, arts. 1-5, [ 1945] Pasin. Lux. 540. 
Much of the information in this paragraph (and elsewhere in this chapter) concerning 
Luxembourg is derived from a series of answers to a questionnaire of the Institute of 
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theN ational Conciliation Office. As in Belgium, most but not all col-
lective agreements are concluded in the form of resolutions of this 
committee, which consists of three employer and three union rep-
resentatives but, unlike the Belgian bilateral committees, the Lux-
embourg committee consists of representatives of the top organiza-
tions and not of the individual unions, a type of bargaining which 
can, of course, only exist in a very small country-at any rate as the 
normal type of bargaining. Again, whereas in Belgium some of the 
committees deal with salaried employees, there has so far been vir-
tually no collective bargaining for salaried employees in Luxem-
bourg, their conditions of employment being largely governed by a 
comprehensive statute.313 There is a very appreciable difference be-
tween the legal effect of collective agreements in Belgium and in 
Luxembourg, the law of Luxembourg being in this respect much 
more akin to French than to Belgian law. 
Generally speaking, the French type of collective bargaining is 
"contractual" rather than "institutional." Nevertheless, a very 
strong "institutional" element has been introduced by legislation.314 
Joint committees (commissions mixtes) are, and in some cases have 
to be, 315 summoned by the Minister of Labor ad hoc, that is, for the 
sole purpose of concluding a collective agreement capable of being 
"extended" by the Minister to non-federated employers, and thus 
of being made a "common rule" of industry. Only the "most repre-
sentative organizations"-that is, in practice, on the employers' 
side, the National Council of French Management 316 (the French 
National Association of Manufacturers) and, on the employees' 
side, the C.G.T.,317 the Force Ouvriere (F.O.), and the C.F.T.C.318 
(the three leading French top organizations )-are represented on 
these committees, which are presided over by a representative of the 
Minister, who does not vote. Some of these committees operate on a 
national and others on a regional or local basis. 
Unlike the Belgian and Luxembourg bilateral committees, the 
joint committees are not, then, normal bargaining bodies, but oper-
Comparative Law at the University of Paris. The author expresses his gratitude to 
M. G. van Verwecke, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labor, and to M. F. Ewen 
of the same Ministry for having put this and other material at his disposal. 
813 Law of Oct. zrst, 1919, substantially amended by Law of June 7, 1937, [1937] 
Pasin. Lux. II9. 
310 CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 3If, introduced by the Law of Feb. IIth, 1950, 
[1950] J.O. 1688 (Fr.). 
310 See the detailed analysis in 3 DURAND, para. 219. 
316 Conseil N a tiona! du Patronat Franc;ais. 
317 Confederation Generale du Travail. 
318 Confederation Franc;aise des Travailleurs Chretiens. 
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ate only in those exceptional (but also exceptionally important) 
situations in which "the most representative organizations" are 
called upon to agree to terms and conditions which the Minister can 
then convert into a "law for the trade." In addition, French law 319 
provides for a purely consultative body, made up of representatives 
of both sides of industry and of other interests, the Higher Com-
mittee on Collective Agreements (Commission Superieure des Con-
ventions Collectives) which is called upon to advise the Minister of 
Labor in the event that management and labor cannot agree and 
also in the event of an application to "extend" the terms of an agree-
ment to outsiders. Its most important function is in connection with 
the fixing of the statutory over-all minimum wage. 
In the Netherlands the pattern of collective bargaining is largely 
determined by the existence and the powers of the Council of Me-
diators, which, being a body of impartial outsiders appointed by the 
government, cannot be compared with the representative commit-
tees of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, quite apart from the fun-
damental difference in functions and in jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the 
Foundation of Labor, in which labor and management cooperate 
and which is completely independent of the government, gives to 
collective bargaining-seen from a social rather than a legal point 
of view-the imprint of the "institutional" pattern. The Founda-
tion has only consultative functions but the Council of Mediators 
neither approves nor disapproves of an agreement without consult-
ing it, and normally, when the Foundation recommends approval, 
the Council will approve.320 
3· UNION STRUCTURES AND IDEOLOGIES 321 
An American looking at the European scene is likely to find much 
that is unfamiliar not only in trade union structures but also in trade 
union ideologies, and he will soon realize that these ideological dif-
ferences have had their effect on collective bargaining methods and 
on the substance of collective bargaining. In the first place he cannot 
fail to notice the continuing strength of working class solidarity. 
Each union is, and sees itself as, not only an organization for the 
defense of the interests of its members but also a part of the 
working class movement. In the second place, however, Western 
European trade unionism is linked with political programmes and 
319 ConE ou TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 3 xv. 
320 Pels, supra note 298, at II9; see also Levenbach, supra note 297· 
321 No more than a few suggestions are given here. Reference is made to the literature 
quoted in note 303 supra. 
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ideas and with religious persuasions-although this differs greatly 
from country to country. In the Netherlands there are unions with 
Socialist, Communist, Protestant, and Catholic leanings; in France 
there are three types of unions whose tendencies are, broadly speak-
ing, Communist, Socialist, and Christian; whereas in Germany, as 
a result of the dire experience of the Nazi system, the division 
among "free" (that is, Socialist), "Christian" and "Liberal" ( na-
tionalist) unions was eliminated in I 94 5 when the present "united" 
trade union movement came into being. This dual phenomenon-
working class solidarity and the political-religious affiliation of trade 
unions-has meant that "splits" between unions and jurisdictional 
disputes are not normally the result of purely "organizational" 
rivalries, but rather of conflicts concerning lines of demarcation, 
for example, between two craft unions which cannot come to terms 
concerning the allocation of certain work processes or between un-
ions of different political persuasion. Working class solidarity cer-
tainly does not mean trade union unity, since the ideological differ-
ences remain, but it does mean that, vis-a-vis the employer or the 
employers' association, the various unions, however divided among 
themselves, can form a united front. Joint collective bargaining by 
trade unions of different political and religious persuasions is com-
mon and, where industrial unionism is not fully developed, unions 
with the same political or religious persuasion but organizing dif-
ferent types of workers or employees, may, and often do, appear 
as joint bargaining partners. This is one of the principal reasons why 
the American observer will look in vain for anything corresponding 
to the procedures for the determination of the "statutory bargain-
ing representative" with which he is familiar. There is no need for 
determining the union which may bargain since many unions may 
bargain together. 
Moreover, the structure and the ideology of the European trade 
union movements leave little room for a counterpart of the Ameri-
can "union security agreement." Trade unions everywhere aim at 
I oo percent trade union organization in the industries in which they 
operate, and everywhere they may, if the law allows them to do so, 
go to the point of obtaining the agreement of an employer or em-
ployers not to hire anyone who is not a member of a trade union or 
perhaps of a trade union of a particular political persuasion or one 
affiliated to a particular federation of unions, although even these 
types of agreements appear to be rare in Europe. But the American 
variety of union security agreement, tending to reserve employment 
3 8 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
to members of the contracting union, though perhaps not unknown in 
Europe, is certainly not frequent. In France all discriminations in 
hiring and firing based on membership or non-membership in a 
union have been made illegal by statute,322 and to some extent the 
same applies in Belgium under a law of 1921.323 In Germany the 
courts have held closed-shop agreements to be illegal as against 
public policy.324 In the Netherlands a closed-shop agreement of what 
above has been called the American variety has been declared void 
by statute 325 (as it has been, of course, in the United States), but a 
dosed-shop agreement excluding non-union labor without seeking 
to reserve employment to members of a particular union 326 is valid, 
although it cannot be "extended" so as to bind non-federated em-
ployers. But agreements of this kind appear to be of no great signi-
ficance in community countries with the exception of France. The 
exception is explained by the conflict between the Communist 
C.G.T., the Socialist F.O. and the Catholic C.F.T.C. The recent 
French statute of 1956 was an attempt to give some protection to 
the smaller groups vis-a-vis the C.G.T. 
Within this very broad framework the differences among the 
union movements in the Six are very great, and what separates them 
is as important for an understanding of the law as what they have 
in common. The contrast between the situation in France and in 
Western Germany illustrates the point. In France the trade union 
movement has been split along political lines for many years, and 
of all its various schisms that of 1947 was the most important. The 
decisive events of I 94 7 themselves were closely connected with the 
international political situation (the opening of the rift between 
East and West), and the French trade unions have in many respects 
remained at the mercy of political upheavals. The policy of the 
C.G.T. has in the past been all too obviously subservient to that of 
the Communist party, and the general revulsion against Commu-
nism all over Europe which the events in Hungary in 1956 created 
3
"' Law of April 27, 1956, [1956] ].0. 4080 (Fr.). This made it unlawful for an 
employer to take any account of the union membership of his employees or to exercise 
any pressure in the direction of joining or not joining an organization. The "check-off" 
is also illegal. 
"""Law of May 2-J., 1921, [1921] Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux de Belgique 956; 
see Van Goethem, supra note 310, at 8 . 
... Judgment of Apr. 6, 1922, 104 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 
328 (Ger.) . 
... Law of Dec. 24, 1927, art. I, para. 3, [1927] Staatsblad van bet Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden [hereinafter cited as Stb.] No. 415. 
326 Law of May 25, 1937, art. 2, [1937] Stb. No. Sot (Neth.). 
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led to widespread resignations from the C.G.T. The inherent weak-
ness of the French trade unions stems not only from their disunity 
but also from the low percentage of workers organized, which is only 
partly to be accounted for by disunity. It is estimated that of some-
thing like 20 million persons gainfully employed only two million 
are members of trade unions-approximately one million of the 
C.G.T., 4oo,ooo of the C.F.T.C. and about 3oo,ooo of the F.O. 
unions (the latter being to a very large extent civil servants and 
white collar workers) . 327 
In Western Germany trade unions were compelled in r 94 5 to 
start their organization "from scratch." They were not burdened 
with the damnosa hereditas of the inter-war tradition from which 
they were separated by the gulf of twelve years of suppression. Be-
fore Hitler, the German unions, too, had been split on ideological 
lines, and the "free" (socialist) unions always occupied a position 
of overwhelming strength. In 1945, however, the unions rallied 
behind a drive for "unity," with the result that, at any rate as far 
as manual workers are concerned, there are today no ideological 
schisms in the German trade unions. Sixteen "unified unions" (Ein-
heits-Gewerkschaften) are combined in one top organization, the 
D.G.B.,328 the total number of D.G.B. union members being esti-
mated at well over six million.329 German union structure and "offi-
cial" German trade union ideology exhibit an impressive but perhaps 
slightly deceptive simplicity. 
In France and in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, the principle 
of industrial union organization clearly prevails over that of craft 
unionism. This is a tendency inherent in the development of mod-
ern industry. In France craft unionism survives at a few not very 
significant points-in Germany it seems to be dead, as far as manual 
workers are concerned. The result of this development towards in-
dustrial unionism is of course most important from the legal point 
of view because it minimizes the risk of demarcation disputes, and 
the difficult problems connected with the simultaneous a·pplication of 
several agreements in one enterprise. Industrial unionism makes for 
large and powerful unions: the German metal workers union (I. G. 
327 These figures are given by Prof. G. Friedel of the University of Nancy in his 
National Report for France on Collective Labour Relations, made to the znd Interna-
tional Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958}, at 3· 
823 D. G.B. stands for "Deutscher Gewerkschafts-Bund." 
329 For this, and other statements on German trade unions and employer's association: 
2 HUECK & NIPPERDEY, LEHRBUCH DES ARBEITSRECHTS 128 (6th ed. 1955-57). 
384 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
M etall) has over 1.6 million members, and the union organizing 
transport workers and workers employed by municipal authorities 
well over 8oo,ooo.330 
Nevertheless, there is in one respect an important difference be-
tween the principles of union organization in Germany and in 
France. In France the non-manual workers (civil servants, teachers, 
white collar workers) belong to unions affiliated with the same top 
organizations with which manual worker unions are affiliated. In 
Germany, however, whereas about one million white collar workers 
and civil servants belong to industrial unions affiliated with the 
D.G.B., others belong to separate unions affiliated with separate, 
comparatively small, top organizations such as the D.A.G. the 
D.B.B.331 and a few very much smaller ones. This deviation from 
the principle of industrial unionism is closely connected with the 
German tradition of a separate status for non-manual workers, a 
tradition reflected in social insurance law.332 It does not, however, 
involve a conflict between the various organizations concerned. In 
fact, for collective bargaining and other purposes the D.G.B. and 
the D.A.G. cooperate, a cooperation to which both were formally 
committed by a solemn resolution adopted by both in 1953. The 
number of organized workers and civil servants in 1956 totalled 
more than seven million of the 18.6 millions employed. 
In Italy, as in Germany, trade unions had to be rebuilt following 
a period of totalitarian dictatorship, and, as in Germany, an at-
tempt was made to overcome the ideological rifts of the past and 
to erect a structure of unified organizations.333 But, for a number of 
reasons connected with the past history of Italian trade unionism, 
with the economic structure of the country, and with the resulting 
influence of Communism, the attempt, which was successful in Ger-
many, proved abortive in Italy. The present situation in Italy is 
reminiscent of that in France-there are three principal groups of 
trade unions of which one, the C.G.I.L. ( Confederazione Generate 
880 See 2 HUECK & NIPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 329, and the very informative sur-
vey by Kerr, supra note 286, esp. at 176. Special reference should also be made to Taft, 
"Germany," in Comparative Labor Movements 243 (Galenson ed. 1952), but its sta-
tistical material is slightly out of date having been published in 1952. This is, for an 
American reader, the best introduction to the history and background of the German 
situation. 
331 D.A.G. stands for "Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft," D.B.B. for "Deutscher 
Beamten Bund." 
332 Separate organization for old age and survivors pensions. See PART III infra. 
333 For Italy, see LA PALOMBARA, THE ITALIAN LABOR MOVEMENT, PROBLEMS AND PROS-
PECTS (1957); Adams, Italy, in COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS 410 (Galenson ed. 
19 52) ; Sanseverino, supra note 294· 
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ltaliana del Lavoro) is regarded as being under Communist in-
fluence, one, the C.I.S.L. ( Confederazione ltaliana Sindacati dei 
Lavoratori) is generally considered to be politically close to the 
Christian Democrats, and one, the U .I.L. ( U nione I taliana del 
Lavoro) is said to favor the Socialist and Republican Parties. Re-
liable information concerning the strength of these groups is ap-
parently unobtainable, 334 but it is clear that the C.G.I.L. is far 
stronger than either of the others, and that the C.I.S.L. is stronger 
than the U.I.L. Broadly speaking, the unions affiliated to these 
groups are industrial unions, called federations. In short, there is 
a close factual resemblance between the French and Italian unions, 
despite important differences in their legal situation. Collective bar-
gaining is generally on a national basis. 
The situation in Belgium differs fundamentally from that in 
France and in Italy. It also differs from that in Germany since Bel-
gian trade unions have not succeeded in unifying the two large politi-
cally-orientated groups, the General Federation of Labor in Bel-
gium ( F idiration Ginirale du Travail en Belgique) (which in some 
respects cooperates with the Socialist Party) and the Catholic Con-
federation of Christian Unions ( Confidiration des Syndicats Chri-
tiens). Trade unions affiliated to the former group were thought to 
have some 681,000 members in 1955, and those in the latter group 
some 625,000 members in 1953. Both groups cooperate closely in 
collective bargaining and also as political pressure groups. 335 In 
addition there are in certain occupations and localities unions af-
filiated with the General Central Office of Liberal Unions ( Cen-
trale Ginirale des Syndicats Libiraux) said in I 9 52 to number 
about 90,000 members. These are the three groups of unions which 
are represented in the bilateral committees (commissions pari-
taires), but the latter two are not on all of them. The Communists 
appear to be quite insignificant, and are not represented at all on the 
bilateral committees. The employers' associations represented on 
these committees are affiliated to the Federation of Belgian Indus-
tries (Federation des Industries Belges). The very high standard 
of development of collective bargaining is demonstrated not only 
by the organization of the bilateral committees, but also by the 
significant agreements on particular topics reached by the top union 
organizations, especially the agreement concerning shop steward 
334 See LA PALOMBARA, op. cit. supra note 333, at 106; Adams, supra note 333, at 447, 
states that accurate statistics are unobtainable. 
"""Figures and other statements from Steinmann-Goldschmidt, op. cit. supra note 
303, at 85. 
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organization-that is, the representation of the unions at plant or 
enterprise level-concluded in I 94 7. In F ranee and in Western 
Germany such representation is regulated by statute (consultative, 
as distinguished from representative organization in the individual 
undertakings being regulated by statute in Belgium as well) .336 The 
over-all picture of collective bargaining in Belgium is one of centrali-
zation, coupled with a minimum of legal intervention or enforce-
ment. In such a scheme of things there is little room for craft unions 
or for agreements between unions and individual firms. 
A comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands reveals 
great contrasts but also striking similarities. The Dutch trade un-
ions, like their Belgian counterparts, are split on ideological lines, 
with the difference, however, that the divisions are much more com-
plicated. The largest group is the Netherlands Federation of Trade 
Unions (N.V.V.) which is loosely linked with the Labor Party, and 
which (in ideology but not in proportional significance) corresponds 
to the Force Ouvriere in France. Others are the Catholic Workers' 
Movement, and the (Protestant) Christian National Federation 
of Trade Unions in the Netherlands. "Each of these trade union 
organizations comprises, for instance, trade unions of workers in 
the metal industry, the building industry, food establishments, trans-
port undertakings, miscellaneous branches of industry, as well as 
unions of government servants, office staff, and the like." 337 What 
is more, there are three groups of employers' associations, one non-
denominational, one Catholic and one Protestant. The strength of 
denominational feeling, which may reflect the dramatic history of 
the Netherlands, appears to have very little impact on the social 
realities of collective bargaining. The three groups of trade unions 
and the three groups of employers' associations customarily engage 
in joint collective bargaining, and such other groups, for example, 
Communist groups, as exist are not significant. To this extent the 
picture presented by the Netherlands is not too different from that 
of Belgium. "Nationwide" bargaining between associations is usual 
in both countries, the coverage of central regulation of wages and 
other conditions of employment is broad in each country and both 
the Dutch and Belgian wage regulation systems operate efficiently. 
Here, however, the similarities end. The second World War and 
its aftermath-which included the separation of Indonesia from 
"""See PART II, Section C infra. 
"'"Pels, supra note 298, at 105. 
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the Netherlands-made it necessary in the Netherlands-as it ap-
parently still is-to counteract inflationary tendencies by govern-
mental control of wages and conditions of employment. The Nether-
lands is the only country in the Community to impose a system of 
maximum wages. Collective agreements require the approval of a 
board of experts, the Council of Mediators appointed by the govern-
ment. This Council can itself issue regulations, and the number of 
persons affected by these regulations is apparently larger than that 
of persons within the scope of collective agreements. 338 The im-
portance of the distinction between collective agreements and cen-
tral regulation can, however, easily be exaggerated. The Council 
of Mediators acts in close cooperation with the Foundation of 
Labor, a central organization comprising both the trade union and 
the employers' top organizations, and it appears that, far from 
suppressing collective bargaining, state regulation of wages and 
conditions since 1945 has helped to stimulate it in the Netherlands. 
The difference between the situation in the Netherlands and that 
obtaining in the other five Member Countries may be more one of 
legal form than of social substance. The fact remains that, within 
the Community, Belgium (together with Italy) today represents 
the minimum, and the Netherlands the maximum of legal regula-
tion of collective bargaining. 339 
Luxembourg has a very highly developed system of collective 
bargaining on an industry-wide basis. In 1956 four-fifths of all 
industrial workers (including mining) were covered by collective 
agreements. An official memorandum of March 1957 states that 
all agreements have been concluded in accordance with a general 
pattern; they cover not only wages and hours, the making and un-
making of the contract of employment, holidays and vacations, as 
well as family allowances and bonuses, but also the settlement of 
differences by a bi-partite commission at the enterprise level. In the 
event of failure of settlement the matter must be taken before the 
"National Conciliation Office." 340 The memorandum adds that 
838 I d. at 103. 
889 The Expose on the Social Situation attached to the Commission's Second Report 
shows that, compared with the other members of the Community (except Luxembourg) 
the Netherlands has had remarkably few strikes in the recent past. Only 7,214 work-
ing days were lost in 1957, and 37,241 in 1958. The Commission attributes this partly 
to the "spirit prevailing in the (Netherlands) Economic and Social Council in which 
employers, workers and the general interest are represented," and partly "to the fact 
that the Council of Mediators has the power to impose, in case of conflict, compulsory 
regulations." (Second ExPOSE para. 77). 
340 
Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, art. 9, [1945] Pasin. Lux. 540. 
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"since the conclusion of these collective agreements and the estab-
lishment of the National Conciliation Office, strikes have practically 
ceased to exist in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg." 341 
The collective agreements cover manual workers in both the pri-
vate and public sectors of the economy, whereas the working condi-
tions of clerical, technical, and administrative employees are regu-
lated by a rather elaborate statute.342 It is a unique feature of 
collective bargaining in Luxembourg that it is, generally speaking, a 
function not of the unions but of the top organizations. There are, 
as in Belgium, two principal confederations of unions, and collective 
bargaining is entrusted to a committee which they have jointly 
formed. 
4· LAW OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN GENERAL-
FREEDOM OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AND ITS RESTRICTIONS 
The legal aspects of collective bargaining and of collective agree-
ments in the Six are complex, and only some of the problems thought 
to be of special importance for readers of this book can be touched 
on here. The topics of principal significance are freedom of contract 
with regard to collective agreements, the effect of the agreement as 
a contract, its effect as a compulsory norm, its extension to outsiders, 
its enforcement through administrative and similar measures, and 
the publicity which by law must be given to collective agreements. 
The legislative treatment of collective agreements is profoundly 
different in France, Germany, and the Netherlands on one hand 
and Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg on the other. In France, Ger-
many, and the Nether lands systematic and comprehensive legisla-
tion has been passed to regulate the conclusion and the effect of 
collective agreements, whereas such legislation as exists in the re-
maining three countries is unsystematic and fragmentary. The rele-
vant legislation is: 
-in France, the Law of Feb. I I, 1950, which has considerably 
amended the Labor Code (Code du Travail) ; 
-in Germany, the Law Concerning Collective Agreements 
( Tarifvertrags-Gesetz) of April 9, 1949, originally applicable in 
the American and British Zones of Occupation only, and extended 
to the entire Federal Republic by the Law of April 23, 1953; 
-in the Netherlands, the Law on Collective Agreements of De-
sn The Commission notes in para. 75 of the Second EXPOSE that Luxembourg had no 
strikes in 1957 or 1958 • 
... See note 313 supra. 
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY 389 
cember 24, I927, the Law of May 25, I937, concerning the bind-
ing force of collective agreements, and the Emergency Decree of 
October 5, I 94 5, on labor relations. 
In Belgium the relevant legislative texts are the Decree of June 
9, I945, concerning bilateral committees, and certain provisions in 
the Law concerning contracts of employment, consolidated by the 
Decree of July I955· What legislation there is in Luxembourg is 
contained in the Decree of October 6, I 94 5, concerning the N a-
tional Conciliation Office. Article 39 of the Italian Constitution of 
I 94 7 provides that legislation should be passed to give legal effect 
to collective agreements, but no such legislation has yet been passed, 
nor can it be expected in the near future. A provisional statute has 
been approved by both Houses of the Italian Parliament, however, 
and this law of I959 regulates in a fragmentary way the effect of 
collective agreements. There is, however, considerable doubt 
whether it is constitutional. 
In five of the six countries freedom of contract prevails in rela-
tion to collective bargaining in the sense that, in so far as a collec-
tive agreement has legal effect as a contract or as a compulsory norm 
binding on individual employers and employees, it derives this effect 
from the act of contracting as such and no consent or approval of 
any governmental authority is required. In the Netherlands, how-
ever, the so-called "Extraordinary Decree" of October 5, I 94 5, 
provides that no collective agreement is valid without the con-
sent of the Council of Mediators whose task it is to protect the 
economy against potential inflationary effects of the bargaining 
process, a function which may remind Americans of that of the 
former War Labor Board in the United States. The Council is in 
close contact with labor and management, and its powers do not 
seem to be regarded as a serious encroachment on the freedom of 
industry, no strong agitation for its abolition being apparent. 
In a different sense, however, freedom of collective bargaining 
is much more seriously "hedged in" in the Six than in either the 
United States or in Great Britain. Mandatory legislation is of im-
portance in the Six (though not of the same importance every-
where), and there is a general rule that any provision of a collective 
agreement which runs counter to mandatory legislation is null and 
void. Where, as, for example, in Germany, France, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands,343 the election or appointment and the func-
tions of shop stewards are regulated by statute, collective agree-
"'
3 See PART II, Section C infra. 
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ments at variance with the statute are void, so that even by agree-
ment between unions and employers or their associations the powers 
and duties of shop stewards cannot be restricted, though they may 
perhaps be enlarged. Similarly, where, as in Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and to some extent in Luxembourg, the law fixes 
periods of notice which the employer and the employee must ob-
serve when terminating the contract of employment, collective 
agreements concerning terms of notice are valid only to the extent 
to which the relevant statutes expressly provide that their provi-
sions may be abrogated in this way (as is the case, within certain 
limits, in the Netherlands).344 A similar observation could be made 
about the regulation by statute of the employer's obligation to con-
tinue wage or salary payments in the event of the employee's sick-
ness. Where such payments are concerned as well as with regard to 
the regulation of working hours,345 German law provides examples 
of mandatory statutory provisions of which the effect can be ren-
dered inapplicable by collective agreement but not by an individual 
contract of employment. This is also true of the Belgian law with 
regard to working hours.346 It is as if in America a statute, such as 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, could be derogated from by collec-
tive agreement but not otherwise. 
The two most significant restrictions on the freedom of collective 
bargaining imposed by legislation are, however, those which con-
cern freedom of organization and minimum wage standards. In all 
of the Member States any collective agreement which seeks to re-
strict the employee's freedom to join a union would be null and void. 
In France, under the Law of April 27, 1956, in Germany by virtue 
of the relevant provision of the Bonn Basic Law and of general 
principles, and to some extent in Belgium and in the Nether lands 
this means that union security agreements are void, and, although 
this is not so clear, the same result, based on general principles, is 
likely to be reached in Italy.347 
Far more important, however, is the limitation which minimum 
wage legislation imposes on freedom of collective bargaining. The 
French National Guaranteed Minimum Wage (Salaire Minimum 
""See on all this: PART II, Section E infra. 
340 BiiRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [hereinafter cited as BGB] para. 616; Decree on 
Working Hours of April 30, 1938, para. 7, [1938] Reichsgesetzblatt [hereinafter cited 
as RGBl.] I, 448 (Ger.) . 
... Law of June 14, I9ZI, arts. z, 5, 7, [I9ZI] x Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux 
de Belgique roz8. 
841 See note 322-26 supra, and for Italy: MAZZONI, MANU ALE Dl DIRJTTO DEL LAVORO 
92 (1958). 
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National lnterprofessionnel Garanti-S.JI.f.I.G.) 348 is comparable 
to the American Federal Minimum Wage under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in that it constitutes a "floor" for all wages and 
makes it impossible, either by individual contract or by collective 
agreement, to undercut in any way the specified minimum. A similar 
system exists in Luxembourg under two Decrees of I 944 and 
1956,349 but no comparable institution exists now in any of the 
other four Common Market countries. In its economic and social 
functions, however, the French National Minimum Wage Act dif-
fers considerably from the scheme inaugurated by the American 
Fair Labor Standards Act. The French National Minimum Wage 
is not (as is the corresponding Luxembourg minimum wage) fixed 
as a rigid absolute figure. It is constantly kept under review, and, 
through a complicated system of computation, linked with the cost 
of living index. It moves up if the monthly average expenditure of 
an average family in Paris (as ascertained by the National Institute 
of Statistics) rises by more than five percent, although it can never 
by the operation of this sliding scale be altered more than once in 
any four-month period. This system was introduced by an amend-
ment of the Labor Code in 1952, and whereas all sliding scales in 
collective agreements were forbidden by the Order of January 7, 
1959,350 as part of the program of the De Gaulle government to 
stabilize prices and the currency, the automatic sliding scale ap-
plicable to the statutory minimum wage was expressly preserved. 
Nor is the cost-of-living sliding scale the only method of keeping 
the statutory minimum wage flexible. Under the Law of 1950,351 
by which free collective bargaining for wages was re-introduced in 
France, after being suppressed since the outbreak of the second 
World War, a method was provided for and is still used by which 
the minimum can be changed by government decree on the basis of 
a recommendation made by the Higher Committee on Collective 
Agreements. This recommendation does not, however, bind the gov-
ernment. The minimum is fixed for the Paris region, and reduced 
for other regions in which the cost of living is lower. Since all these 
318 See on this: Sturmthal, Collective Bargaining in France, in CoNTEMPORARY CoL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES 151 (Sturmthal ed. 1957) j LORWIN1 op. cit. 
supra note 28o, at 219; 2 DuRAJ:'D Paras. 338 et seq., and more up to date: BRUN & GAL-
LAND, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 449 (1958). 
319 Decree of Dec. 30th, 1944, and Decree of Dec. 31st, 1956, [1957] Pasin. Lux 485. 
300 See on this Second EXPOSE, para. 49, and for the most recent developments of the 
National Minimum Wage, paras. 47-51 in general. 
861 CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31x, introduced by the Law of Feb. n, 1950, 
[1950] ].0. 1688 (Fr.). 
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minima are fixed on an hourly basis, they immediately affect the 
system of overtime pay to which reference has already been made. 
Although in practice the wages paid in industry exceed the national 
minimum, the National Minimum Wage doubtless plays a far 
greater role in the economic and social life of France than does the 
federal minimum wage in the United States. The French system is 
(through the interaction of a number of statutes with conflicting 
tendencies) extraordinarily complex, and only a very superficial idea 
of its operation can be gleaned from the above remarks. In collec-
tive bargaining the National Minimum Wage operates, as one au-
thor puts it, as a "minimum of minima." 
The term "minimum wage legislation" is (somewhat mislead-
ingly) also used for a different type of statutory wage regulation of 
which the British law is today the principal example.352 This "selec-
tive" system, under which there is no national over-all minimum, but 
minima can be fixed for particular industries in which collective bar-
gaining does not function satisfactorily, was introduced (for wages 
and other conditions of employment) in the West German Federal 
Republic by a law of 1952.353 It is not, however, of great importance 
in practice. Similar legislation exists in Belgium, France, and the 
Netherlands 354 for homeworkers, and, in a different form in Italy, 
for homeworkers and also for caretakers and similar personnel.355 
The Italian provisional statute of I 9 59 356 to which reference was 
made above restricts the freedom of contract of the parties in the 
sense that, once the government has regulated the wages or other 
conditions of employment of a given category of workers on the 
basis of an existing agreement-and the agreement is only the pat-
tern on which the government moulds its decree-any subsequent 
collective agreement applicable to the same workers is invalid in so 
far as it purports to derogate from the governmental decree to their 
detriment. 
More important even than these restrictions on the parties' free-
dom of contract (with the exception of this temporary Italian law 
352 Agricultural Wages Act, I948, II & I2 Geo. 6, c. 47; Wages Councils Act, I959, 
7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 69; Kahn-Freund, Minimum Wage Legislation in Great Britain, 97 
u. PA. L. REV. 778 (I949). 
"""Law on Fixing Minimum Conditions of Employment, Jan. II, I952, [I952] Bundes-
gesetzblatt [hereinafter cited as BGBI.] I, I7 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). See also Dietz, supra 
note 288, at 8 . 
... On Belgium, France, and the Netherlands: STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra 
note 303, at 78, 99, I I7. 
"""Law No. 23 of Feb. 4, I958, [I958] I Lex, Legislazione Italiana 5o6; Law No. 
264 of Mar. I3, I958 [I958] I Lex, Legislazione Italiana II35· 
358 Law of July 14, 1959, No. 74I, Norme transitorie per garantire minimi di tratta-
mento economico e normativo ai lavatori, [Sept. 18, I959] Gazzetta Ufliciale (No. 225). 
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of 1959 if constitutional) is the power of the Dutch Council of 
Mediators to fix wages and other conditions of employment by col-
lective regulations. These are absolutely binding, that is, they do 
not permit any variation in favor of the employers or of the em-
ployed. But since in the Netherlands collective agreements require 
the approval of the Council of Mediators and since, on the other 
hand, the Council does not decide either on the issue of collective 
regulations or on the approval of agreements until it has consulted 
with both sides of industry and especially with the Foundation of 
Labor on which they are both represented, there would not, from a 
practical point of view, appear to be any appreciable difference be-
tween the two types of collective determination of the conditions of 
employment. 3" 7 
5· THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AS A CONTRACT 
It is today generally recognized on the Continent that a collective 
agreement has a dual legal function: to create obligations between 
those who have concluded it, that is, between the organizations on 
both sides, or between the union or unions and an individual em-
ployer, and also to establish a code for the individual employers and 
employees in the industry. It is customary to refer to these two as-
pects of a collective agreement as its contractual and normative ef-
fect. Perhaps it is unnecessary to point out that, whether or not 
these or similar terms are actually used in the United States, in sub-
stance collective bargaining has this same dual function there as 
everywhere, and it may be sufficient to refer to the two decisions of 
the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lin-
coln Mills of Alabama 358 on the one hand, and in 1.1. Case Co. v. 
N.L.R.B. 359 on the other, to illustrate the point. 
The question whether a collective agreement is a contract is, as 
the American experience has shown, of very great practical impor-
tance indeed. More than that, given an affirmative answer to the 
question, a second question arises concerning the obligations im-
plied by the contract. There is no unanimous agreement concerning 
answers to either of these questions in the Six. In France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 360 a collective agreement can 
clearly be enforced as a contract between those who have concluded 
857 See Pels, supra note 298, passim. 
858 353 U.S. 448 (I957). 
859 32I U.S. 332 (I944). 
300 France: 3 DURAND paras. 209 et seq.; Germany: HUECK & NIPPERDEY, TARIFVER-
TRAGSGESETZ art. I, notes 57-n I ( I95I) ; Luxembourg: Bill on Collective Agreements 
of Nov. I6, I955 1 art. 8, which is deemed to codify the present law; Netherlands: Leven-
394 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
it. In Belgium, however, the question whether a collective agree-
ment operates as a contract between the organizations which have 
concluded it appears to be a question of fact to be decided in accord-
ance with the intentions of the parties,361 and this applies to agree-
ments which take the form of a resolution of a bilateral committee 
and to others. Where an agreement operates as a contract, each 
party is under the usual duty to "keep the peace," to see to it that 
its members carry out the terms of the agreement, and each is liable 
for damages in the event of breach.362 Moreover, there is nothing 
to prevent the parties from creating by express provision additional 
obligations, a matter of special importance in view of the contrac-
tual and non-statutory basis of the appointment and operation of 
shop stewards.363 
In this respect as in others the situation in Italy 364 is complicated 
by the fact that the Fascist so-called "syndicates" were abolished 
by a law of November 23, 1944, but the same law provided that the 
collective and individual relations would continue, subject to subse-
quent modification, to be governed by the terms of the existing col-
lective agreements, awards and the like. Article 39 of the Constitu-
tion of I 94 7 provides for legislation under which registered unions 
and employers' associations would make agreements having the 
force of law erga omnes, but such legislation has not yet been passed. 
In the meantime the old collective terms continue to apply (in so 
far as they have not been modified) and new-so-called "post-cor-
porative"-agreements have been concluded by the organizations 
set up since the fall of the Fascist regime. There are thus at the mo-
ment two kinds of collective terms-those which survive from the 
Fascist era under the law of 1944, and those which have since been 
agreed upon. The former have survived the parties who made them, 
and, although they continue to operate as norms binding individual 
employers and employees, they cannot have any contractual effect 
because the parties to the contracts from which they arose were sup-
pressed. The "post-corporative" agreements on the other hand have 
contractually binding effect on the organizations which are parties 
to them. 
bach, Netherlands National Report on Collective Agreements 8, znd International 
Congress on Labor Law (Geneva, 1957). 
861 Horion, supra note 274, at 76. 
862 STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 303, at 101. 
363 Horion, supra note 259, at 6 . 
... Mazzoni, II Diritto dei Rapporti Collettivi di La<Voro in Italia, in I Rapporti Col-
letti<Vi di La<Voro 45 (1959). 
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The importance of this-and particularly to the reader of this 
book-is that, generally speaking, the right to resort to hostile ac-
tion in labor-management relations, the "freedom to strike" and the 
"freedom to lockout" is to a very large extent restricted by the law 
of collective bargaining. There is no such thing on the Continent as 
a concept of "unfair labor practices," nor is there an administrative 
agency comparable to the American National Labor Relations 
Board. The borderline between that which is permissible and that 
which is forbidden in collective labor management relations is in 
some degree drawn by what corresponds to the law of tort and to 
the criminal law, but much more importantly by the "peace obliga-
tion" which, even if unexpressed, is deemed to be implied in a col-
lective agreement. The legal principles governing this "peace obliga-
tion" have been mainly developed in Germany, and subsequently in 
France. With important exceptions, the obligation is deemed to be 
"relative." This means that both sides implicitly undertake not to 
resort, during the term of the agreement, to hostile action in an at-
tempt to alter terms of the agreement. The organizations on both 
sides are "bound to do nothing which might jeopardize the loyal 
performance of the agreement." 365 These words are contained in 
the French Labor Code but they summarize the essence of the 
"peace obligation" everywhere. It follows that there is nothing to 
prevent the parties from resorting to or supporting a strike or lock-
out for purposes unconnected with the agreement, for example, to 
obtain an advantage in connection with matters not regulated by 
it, or to enforce the agreement, or in response to a breach by the 
other party, or for political or purely economic reasons.366 The par-
ties may, however, by an express clause in the agreement extend the 
peace obligation making it "absolute." In regard to agreements 
capable of "extension," the "peace obligation" has been made ab-
solute by French,367 but not by German, law. The German Courts 
have, however, gone very far in their definition of what acts con-
stitute a breach of the peace obligation, as is illustrated by a recent 
decision of the Federal Labor Court 368 to the effect that arrange-
3611 CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31q. inserted by the law of Feb. II, 1950, 
[1950] ].0. r688 (Fr.). ("Tenus de ne rien faire qui soit de nature a en compromettre 
l' execution loyale.") 
300 3 DURAND 594· For Germany: HUECK & NIPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 360, notes 74 
et seq. to para. I of the 1949 law. 
""'CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31g(r) No. 8j see 3 DURAND 595· 
308 Judgment of Oct. 31, 1958, 6 Entscheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgerichts [herein-
after cited as BArbG] 321 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), a case arising from the Schleswig-
Hol.tein metalworkers' strike which began on Oct. 24, 1956 and ended on Feb. 14, 1957· 
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ments for a trade union poll concerning a possible strike is a breach 
of a collective agreement. Both judgments for damages and injunc-
tions or their equivalent may follow in the event of a breach. 
Both parties to a collective agreement (as a rule the organiza-
tions on both sides) are further under an obligation to draw their 
members' attention to its provisions and to the need for implement-
ing them, and Dutch law expressly creates such a duty.369 In Ger-
many and in the Netherlands 370 the parties must go even further to 
ensure loyal performance of the agreement. They are bound to 
make use of such powers to this end as the by-laws or rules of the 
organization put at their disposal, including if necessary, the power 
to expel members. French law does not go nearly so far. 371 
In addition the parties are, of course, bound to fulfil such special 
provisions in the agreement as impose obligations with regard, for 
example, to the establishment of organs of conciliation or arbitra-
tion, agencies to administer agreed vacation schemes, social welfare 
schemes and the like. 
This contractual function of collective agreements is enforced 
through actions for injunctions, including mandatory injunctions 
(or their equivalent), and for damages-the threat of which is a 
formidable weapon. Such actions belong in France to the jurisdic-
tion of the ordinary courts, and in Germany to that of the labor 
courts.372 In Germany, only the parties to the agreement (normally 
the organizations) can be parties to such actions, except that as a 
result of the third party beneficiary doctrine embodied in the Ger-
man Civil Code,373 a member of one organization may sue the or-
ganization which is the other party to the agreement. This is of 
little practical importance, however. In France 374 and in theN ether-
lands,375 however, the members of the organizations are subject to a 
similar liability. 
6. THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AS A LEGALLY 
ENFORCEABLE CODE 
The "normative function" of a collective agreement means, in 
the first place, that in the absence of an express agreement to the 
360 Netherlands: Law of Dec. 24, 1927, art. 4, [1927] Stb. No. 415. 
370 This is the so-called "Einwirkungs-Pflicht": see HuECK & NrPPERDEY, op. cit. supra 
note 360, notes 62 et seq. For the Netherlands: Law of Dec. 24, 1927, [1927] Stb. No. 415. 
371 3 DURAND 597· 
""'See PART II, Section D infra. 
378 BGB para. 328. 
37
' CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31r. See 3 DURAND 601. 
375 Law of Dec. 24, 1927, art. 9, [1927] Stb. No. 415 (Neth.). 
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contrary between the individual employer and the individual em-
ployee, their mutual rights and obligations are governed by the 
relevant collective agreement. This rule is expressly stated only in 
two Belgian laws-that of I954 in regard to manual workers and 
that of I 9 55 in regard to salaried employees 376-and it applies 
whether or not the employer or employee is a member of the organi-
zation or union which is a party to the collective agreement. This 
is, however, doubtless the law in all six countries. In French this is 
often called the "automatic effect" of the agreement. 
In Germany, 377 F ranee, 378 and the Netherlands 379 express legis-
lation provides that this effect is not only "automatic" but also 
"compulsory." In France this principle applies to the relations be-
tween an employer who is a party to the collective agreement or 
member of an organization which is a party and all his employees, 
irrespective of their union membership. In Germany and in the 
Netherlands it applies only if the employee is a member of a con-
tracting organization, but in the Netherlands 380 the employer may 
be liable to damages or to an injunction on the complaint of a trade 
union party to the agreement if he does not, in relation to un-
organized workers, fulfil the terms of the collective agreement. 
The effect of this legislation is that any agreement between an 
individual employer and individual employee which is at variance 
with the collective agreement is ineffective and replaced by the cor-
responding terms of the collective agreement, unless it is expressly 
permitted by the collective agreement or more favorable to the 
worker than the terms of the latter. In Belgium this applies only to 
such resolutions of bilateral committees as have been declared le-
gally binding by royal decree-and these represent a minority of 
existing agreements.381 In Luxembourg, on the other hand, it is 
370 Horion, supra note 259, at 10; Van Goethem, supra note 310, at 2. The relevant 
clause which is contained in both statutes says that if no decision of a commissioll 
Paritaire which has been made binding by Royal Decree applies, and if the parties to 
the contract of employment have failed to deal with a matter, the terms laid down in 
collective agreements or non-binding decisions of commissio11s paritaires apply as 
implied terms of the contract of employment. Similarly the Dutch law of Dec. 24, 
1927, art. 13, [1927] Stb. No. 415. 
377 Law of April 9, 1949, para. 4, [1949] Gesetzblatt der Verwaltung des Vereinigten 
Wirtschaftsgebietes [hereinafter cited as WiGBI.] 55 (Ger.), extended to the entire 
territory of the Federal Republic by Law of April 23, 1953, [1953] Bundesgesetzblatt, I, 
156. The parties to the contract of employment cannot waive their rights arising here-
from, except with the consent of the parties to the collective agreement. 
'
78 CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31e. 
'
7"Law of Dec. 24, 1927, art. 12, [1927] Stb. No. 415 (Neth.). 
'""I d. art. 14. 
'
81 See Horion, supra note 259; STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 303, 
at 103. 
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thought that this principle, although incorporated expressly only in 
a draft bill, is nevertheless part of the existing law.382 The situa-
tion in Italy is less clear than that in the other five countries, since 
Italian law is still in transition, but the courts appear generally to 
assume that such a compulsory effect attaches both to the surviving 
agreements of the Fascist era and to the "post-corporative agree-
ments" which have since been concluded.383 
It may not be obvious to an American observer at first sight why 
there should be a differentiation between members and non-members 
of a union, but it must be remembered that the American concept of 
a "statutory bargaining representative" is alien to European law. 
In Europe, however strongly it may be union policy to induce or com-
pel employers to apply the terms of collective agreements to non-
organized as well as to organized labor, the union "represents" no 
one except its members. Moreover, union policy with regard to the 
treatment of non-organized labor is far from uniform, and the de-
sire to prevent undercutting by outsiders still conflicts with the de-
sire to restrict the privilege of the "union wage" as an inducement 
to joining the union. 
7. THE EXTENSION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Whatever may be the policy of a given legal system with regard 
to the compulsory effect of collective agreements on contracts be-
tween organized employers and unorganized employees, the prob-
lem of the position of unorganized employers remains. This is the 
problem of "extending" the collective agreement so as to make it 
a "common rule" of the trade irrespective of the membership of 
the employer in a contracting organization. With certain important 
variations the German Law of I949/I953,384 the French Law of 
I950,385 the Dutch Law of I937 as modified by the Decree of I945,386 
the Belgian Decree of I945,387 and the Luxembourg Decree of the 
same year 388 all provide for such extension procedure. 
In Germany, where this procedure was first introduced in I 9 I 8, 
the extension order is made by the Minister of Labor after consulta-
tion with a committee consisting of representatives of the top organi-
.., Art. 8 of the Bill of 1955. 
883 Mazzoni, supra note 364, at uS . 
... Law of April 9, 1949, para. 5, [1949] WiGBI. 55 (Ger.), extended by Law of 
April 23, 1953, [1953] B.G. Bl. I, 156. 
885 CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. art. 31j. 
888 Law of May 25, 1937, art. 2, [1937] Stb. No. Sox; Extraordinary Decree of Oct. 5, 
1945, art. 15, [1945] Stb. No. F 214 (Neth.). 
881 Decree of June 9, 1945, arts. 12 and 13, [1945] Moniteur Beige 4337· 
888 Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, art. 22, [1945] Pasin. Lux. 540. 
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zations on both sides, upon application by one or more of the parties 
to the collective agreement. It is i condition of extension that those 
employers who are either themselves parties to the agreement or 
members of organizations which are parties employ at least 50 per-
cent of the employees coming within the terms of the agreement. The 
extension also must appear to the Minister to be required by the 
public interest. 
In France extension orders were first introduced in 193 6: under 
the present law they are made by the Minister of Labor and Social 
Security but only if the Higher Committee on Collective Agree-
ments makes a positive recommendation to this effect. The condi-
tions which must be fulfilled in France to enable the Minister to make 
an extension order differ from those in Germany. Only agreements 
made by the "most representative organizations" within the frame-
work of a "joint committee" summoned for this purpose can be so 
extended: the criterion is not, as in Germany, the factual significance 
of the agreement, but the character of the parties, the degree to 
which they are "representative" (their representativite) .389 This 
depends on a number of factors listed in the statute, including their 
membership, the total amount of dues, their independence, their 
experience and length of standing, and their patriotic attitude under 
the German occupation. Agreements which are to be extended may 
have been concluded on a national or on a regional basis. If they are 
national agreements, they must comply with very stringent and de-
tailed provisions as to their compulsory content. They must, for 
example, guarantee freedom of organization and opinion and regu-
late not only wages (providing for equal pay for men and women), 
but conditions of "hiring and firing," terms of notice, the functions 
of shop stewards, vacations with pay, conciliation proceedings, ap-
prenticeship and so forth. They may also deal with many other mat-
ters.390 In the Netherlands the power to make extension orders was, 
under the Law of 1937 by which they were introduced, vested in the 
Minister of Social Affairs, but it was transferred by the Emergency 
Decree of 1945 to the Council of Mediators. The extension order 
presupposes an application by the "industrial council" 391 or by one 
or more of the parties to the agreement, and it can only be made 
with regard to agreements which cover the majority of those to 
whom they apply. 
389 This is defined in CODE DU TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 31(f). See 3 DuRAND 628. 
399 CODE DU TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 31 (g). 
891 Law of May 25, 1937, art. 3, [1937] Stb, No. Sox. "Industrial council" is a body 
on which both sides of industry are represented. 
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The corresponding orders which can be made under the laws of 
Belgium and of Luxembourg have a different character. In Belgium 
only resolutions of bilateral committees come within the relevant 
provisions,392 and the order is made by royal decree upon applica-
tion either of the bilateral committee which has passed the resolu-
tion or of one of the organizations. Its effect is to give the resolu-
tion obligatory force, to convert it into a "law of the trade" which 
cannot be avoided by contract. In Germany, France, and theN ether-
lands a collective agreement cannot be avoided by individual con-
tracts, at any rate to the detriment of the employee, between or-
ganized employers and organized workers. In France this is also 
true where organized employers and unorganized workers are con-
cerned, and it is true in all three countries whether or not it has been 
"extended," the "extension" merely binding unorganized employers 
to the same extent that organized employers are in any event bound. 
On the other hand a Belgian royal decree is necessary to make the 
agreement compulsory for organized as well as unorganized em-
ployers: it transforms an optional into a compulsory norm for all 
those concerned. 
In Luxembourg 393 the situation is in fact similar to, though in 
law different from, that in Belgium. Only agreements concluded 
before or confirmed by the National Conciliation Office, normally 
that is, agreements made within the bilateral committee, can be 
declared to be "generally binding." This is done by the government 
on the basis of a unanimous application of the bilateral committee 
and on a recommendation of the organizations on both sides, which 
in turn may consult their members. An organization which has con-
sulted its members cannot recommend the making of an order un-
less two thirds of the members concerned have voted in favor. On 
the other hand, no organization can refuse to recommend the mak-
ing of the order unless it has consulted its members and the majority 
have voted against the order. The effect of this is in Luxembourg, 
as it is in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, to extend to "out-
siders" the compulsory effect which, even without the order, the 
agreement has on "insiders." Legally it differs, therefore, from 
the corresponding royal decree in Belgium. 
Article 39 of the Italian Constitution of 1947, which envisages 
a system enabling unions and employers' organizations to register, 
and, when registered, to conclude agreements with binding force 
392 See note 387 supra. 
393 Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, art. 22, [ 1945] Pasin. Lux. 540. 
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throughout the trade, that is, constituting a "common rule," has 
not yet been implemented by legislation. It is useless to analyze here 
the numerous draft bills which have been produced. No one knows 
which, if any, of them will ever become law, and when. 
Meanwhile, in the face of a lively discussion of the extraordi-
narily complex constitutional situation, Parliament has passed a 
temporary statute which seeks to circumvent the constitutional is-
sue-whether successfully or not remains to be seen. According to 
this statute the Government can issue orders with legally binding 
force, in order to secure to workers of a given catagory minimum 
standards which cannot be bargained away ( minimi inderogabili 
di trattamento economico e normativo). These "minimum wages 
and conditions orders" must in substance be in accordance with the 
relevant collective agreements which have been deposited in the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Only agreements made prior 
to the coming into force of the statute (summer, 1959) are taken 
into account, and no orders can be made more than one year after 
its coming into force. The object of the statute, is, of course, to pro-
duce the effect of an order making collective agreements into "com-
mon rules" without violating Article 39 of the Constitution which 
reserves this universally binding effect to agreements made by unions 
registered under a procedure which has not yet been introduced. 
Hence the provision that the terms of the order have to "conform" 
to existing agreements, but that the orders do not incorporate them 
or extend them. 
The effect of an extension or similar order is everywhere that no 
one concerned can avoid the collective agreement by contract to the 
detriment of the worker (in the Netherlands any derogation from 
the terms of the agreement either to his advantage or detriment is 
prohibited). 
8. SANCTIONS AND PUBLICITY 
The sanctions which protect the standards established by collec-
tive agreements are not civil sanctions only. In France it is a criminal 
offense for an employer to pay wages lower than those provided for 
in an extension order,394 and labor inspectors are under a duty to 
see that the relevant provisions are observed.395 Much the same 
applies to violations of resolutions of Belgian bilateral committees 
which have been declared binding by royal decree. These are also en-
""' CooE ou TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 31zb. 
395 I d. arts 31Y and 31zc. 
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forced by inspectors. 396 In the Netherlands 397 and Luxembourg 398 
any violation of a collective agreement by an employer is an offense, 
and in Luxembourg this applies also to an employee. German law 
has no penal sanctions, but the civil sanctions, including injunctions, 
of German law 399 are available to enforce provisions such as those 
concerning limitations on the number of apprentices and generally 
concerning the making rather than the content of the contract of 
employment, which in other countries cannot be directly enforced. 
The new Italian law also provides for penal sanctions and for en-
forcement by inspectors.400 
In France 401 and Germany 402 the employer must exhibit in the 
plant the wording of relevant collective agreements, and in the 
other countries this is often required by the agreement itself. In 
Germany all collective agreements are entered in a Register kept 
in the Ministry of Labor where they can be inspected.403 In France 
they are deposited in the local labor court ( conseil des prud'-
hommes) or failing this, the general local court.404 
C. EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE PLANT AND 
IN THE UNDERTAKING 405 
Statutory employee representation at workshop or enterprise 
level is alien to American thinking and experience. Nevertheless any 
American, whether businessman, lawyer, or trade unionist, who has 
anything to do with labor-management relations in any of the Six 
will be inevitably and almost immediately concerned with questions 
of employee representation as day-to-day problems. 
Two things should be mentioned at the outset. In the first place, 
there are two distinct, though often related, 406 social objectives 
which the institutions to be discussed are intended to serve: one is 
396 Decree of June 9, 1945, arts. 14-16, (1945] Moniteur Beige 4337. 
897 Extraordinary Decree of Oct. 5, 1945, arts. 17, 21, [1945] Stb. No. F 214 ( Neth.). 
396 Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, art. 26, (1945] Pasin. Lux. 540. 
390 HUECK & NIPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 360, notes 40 et seq. to para. 4 of the 
Law of I949· 
.,. Discussed pp. 401 supra. 
""CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 3JU; see also id. art. 312 as to the public 
display of the extension decree . 
..,. Law of April 9, 1949, para. 7, [1949] WiGBI. 55 (Ger.). 
'""'I d. para. 6. 
""CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31d. The general local court is the "justice de 
paix." The agreement does not take effect until one day after having been so deposited . 
..,. In addition to the books listed in note 303 supra, see in particular E.C.S.C. HIGH 
AUTHORITY, LA REPRESENTATION DES TRAVAILLEURS SUR LE PLAN DE L1ENTREPRISE DANS LE 
DROIT DES PAYS MEMBRES DE LA C.E.C.A. (1959). 
'""E.g., in the case of threatened closures or changes in production liable to lead to 
reduction of personnel, see Law of Oct. n, 1952, para. 72, [1952] BGBI. I, 681 (Ger. 
Fed. Rep.). 
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the representation of the employees' interest at plant level, the other 
is joint consultation on, and, in some cases (notably in Germany) 407 
joint administration of, the affairs of the enterprise by employer 
and employees. In the second place, although the union or unions 
may in fact and even in law have a strong influence on the formation 
and operation of these organs of representation and consultation, 
they are independent from the unions. It is necessary to emphasize 
this because the representative function which they exercise closely 
resembles that of shop stewards in English-speaking countries, but 
unlike shop stewards they do not generally speak for the unions; 
they are representatives of the employees of the plant or enterprise, 
irrespective of whether those employees belong to a particular or to 
any union. To this there is one exception: De!Cgations syndicates du 
personnel, or shop stewards are elected in Belgium pursuant to col-
lective agreements and represent the unions at plant level, function-
ing along side the statutory works councils (or conseils d' entre-
prise). 
The legal basis on which this representative and consultative 
machinery rests may be either legislation or collective agreements. 
It is entirely statutory in France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands; it is (for the time being) entirely a matter of agree-
ment in Italy; and it is a mixture of both in Belgium. 
The French legislation is contained in the following enactments: 
Order on Works Councils (comites d' entreprises) of Feb-
ruary 22, I945, as amended by a law of May I6, I946; 
Law of April I 6, I 946, on Employees' Representatives 
(de!Cgues du personnel); 
Decree of August I, I 94 7, on Health and Safety Com-
mittees (Comites d'Hygiene et de Securite). 
The principal German enactments are: 
Law of October I I, I 9 52, concerning the Constitution of 
the Plant ( Betriebs-J7 erfassungs-Gesetz) ; 
Law of October 8, I95I, concerning Protection of Em-
ployees in Case of Dismissal (Kiindigungs-Schutz-
Gesetz); 
Law concerning Co-Determination by the Employees in 
the Undertakings of the Mining and Iron-and-Steel-Pro-
ducing Industries of May 2 I, I 9 5 I ; 
Law Supplementary thereto of July 8, I956. 
'
07 In the mining, iron and steel industries under the Co-determination Law, May zi, 
1951, [1951] BGBI. I, 347 and the Supplementary Law, Aug. 7, 1956, [1956] BGBI. I, 
707 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
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In Luxembourg older legislation has been largely superseded by: 
Decree of October 30, I 958, concerning the Institution 
of Workers' Representation in Industrial, Commercial 
and Craftsman's Undertakings; and 
Decree of November 2 I, I9 59, regulating elections 
thereto. 
Still in force are : 
Law of June 7, I937, concerning the contract of Em-
ployment of Salaried Employees, and 
Decree of May I I, I938, on the Institution of Salaried 
Employees' Representations. 
In the Netherlands the relevant statute is: 
Law on Works Councils (Onderneemingsraden) of May 
4. I950. 
In Belgium the principles are found partly in statutes and decrees 
and partly in collective agreements which, without having the force 
of law, operate in fact as regulatory provisions: 
Law of September 20, I948, concerning the Organization 
of the Economy (Portant !'Organisation de!' Economie), 
Section IV (Works Councils) ; 
Decree of October 6, I958, concerning Works' Councils; 
National Collective Agreement (Accord National) of 
July I 6, I9 58, relating thereto; 
National Collective Agreement relating to the General 
Principles governing the Organization of Shop Stewards 
(Accord National relatif aux principes generaux du s tatut 
des delegations syndic ales du personnel des entreprises) 
of June I6-I7, I947; 
Law of July I7, I957, concerning committees dealing with 
safety, health, and amenities at the place of work. (This 
is only the principal of several enactments on these comites 
de securite, d'hygiene, et d'embellissement des lieux de 
travail). 
In Italy the works committees ( commissioni interne) have been 
established on the basis of the "interconfederal" national agreement 
(between the top organizations) of May 8, I953· There is a special 
agreement concerning salaried employees, dated October 23, I950. 
In all Continental countries a distinction is made between the 
plant or workshop ( hablissement, Betrieb) and the undertaking or 
enterprise ( entreprise, Unternehmen), the first being a technical or 
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organizational unit, the second commercial or financial. This dis-
tinction is relevant because, where, as in the case of most large un-
dertakings, one company or other undertaking operates a number 
of plants, it stands to reason that the "representative" function of 
employees' representatives is most naturally exercised at plant level, 
and much if not all of their "consultative" function at enterprise 
level. This leads to a certain complexity of organization. In Ger-
many, which has much the most elaborate scheme of employee rep-
resentation in Europe, the representative function is exercised by 
works councils which are elected for each plant. These works coun-
cils have the task of representing the employees' interests in relation 
to the employer. For example, they make (within the framework 
of the existing collective agreements) "plant agreements" with him 
concerning matters such as the beginning and end of the daily hours 
and intervals, the time and place of wage payments, vacation 
schemes, apprenticeship, administration of welfare schemes and in-
stitutions, discipline, piece rates, principles and methods of remu-
neration, and health and safety measures. 408 They must try to induce 
the employer to remedy grievances of the employees, and to see to 
it that statutes, orders, collective agreements and the like, which are 
designed to serve the interests of employees, are applied in the 
plant. 409 Finally, they exercise such statutory functions as the work-
ers' representatives have in connection with the hiring and discharge 
of employees.410 All this takes place within the plant, and, although 
the law provides that where an undertaking consists of two or more 
plants a "joint works council" can be formed, that council does not 
supersede the individual works councils nor are they subordinated 
to it.411 Its jurisdiction is restricted to such necessarily exceptional 
cases as concern more than one plant. 
On the other hand, and generally speaking, the organs of joint 
consultation operate at the enterprise level. If the total number of 
employees in one undertaking (that is, the aggregate number of 
employees in all plants belonging to the undertaking) exceeds I oo, 
a joint consultative committee will be formed for that undertaking, 
known as a Wirtschafts-Ausschuss 412 consisting of an equal num-
ber of employee and employer representatives which meets once a 
month. It is the employer's duty-within the limits of the required 
"""Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. 11, 1952, paras. 1 and 56 If., [1952] BGBI. 
I, 681 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
""'I d. para. 54· 
""I d. paras. 6o If. 
411 I d. paras. 46 If . 
• ,. I d. paras. 67-69. 
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secrecy-to keep this committee informed about the affairs of the 
firm ("the economic development of the undertaking"), including 
methods of production, production programs, the volume of pro-
duction and sales, and other matters "which intimately concern the 
interests of the employees of the undertaking." This has to be done 
in the light of such documentary material as in the employer's dis-
cretion is needed to explain his statement, and the employer must 
explain to the joint consultative committee the annual balance sheet 
and profit and loss account. Four times a year the employer, together 
with the joint consultative committee and the works council in each 
plant, gives an oral or written account of the development of the 
undertaking which is addressed to the employees in their entirety.413 
On similar lines, and again at the enterprise rather than the plant 
level, it is the policy of the law to associate the employees with the 
larger undertakings by providing that one third of the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat) of all those corporations (normally the larger 
ones) which are by law required to have such a board, must consist 
of elected representatives of the employees.414 All this is under the 
general law, and it amounts to very much less than the special sys-
tem of "co-determination" or "joint management" which under the 
statute of May 21, 1951, applies to the mining and iron-and-steel-
producing industries. In these industries (and by virtue of the sup-
plementary law of 1956 also in the holding companies of those 
industries) membership of supervisory boards consists half of em-
ployees and half of shareholder representatives under an impartial 
chairman. One member of the board of directors (the Vorstand) is 
a "labor director" appointed, normally in consultation with the 
trade unions, by the supervisory board. In the operating companies, 
he may not be appointed if the employee members of the super-
visory board vote against him. 
This is the barest outline of what is meant by "co-determination" 
(Mitbestimmung), an institution which does not appear to have any 
parallel in other European countries (and to which, for example, 
British trade unions are, on the whole, strenuously opposed). "]oint 
consultation" on the other hand (which in practice means very much 
less since the powers of the supervisory board vis-a-vis the board of 
directors in an ordinary German company vary greatly and are mal-
'"'See for all this: ld. paras. 67 and 6g. 
"'I d. paras. 76 and 77· See Conard, Chapter VIII, where he discusses the difficulties 
of translating such terms as /J u/sichtsrat. The term which he adopts, "supervisory 
board," is hereinafter used. The Aufsichtsrat either makes the policy or (if the 
J7 or stand does so) does nothing at all. It does not "supervise." 
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leable) is a very general phenomenon in Europe. German law has 
arrived at a compromise between these two principles by confining 
"co-determination" to the mining and heavy industries, that is, 
broadly speaking, to those which come within the jurisdiction of the 
Coal-Steel Community. The reasons for this compromise are purely 
historical: they are of course connected with the very special place 
which the German coal, iron, and steel industries have occupied in 
the political destinies of Germany and indeed of Europe. 
Both joint consultation and co-determination aim at a closer as-
sociation of the employees with the undertaking as an economic 
unit. Where the special interests of the employees are concerned, 
the relevant unit is the plant, even where the law restricts the man-
agerial power of the employer. This is indicated by those provis-
ions of German law 415 which confer a right of co-determination on 
the works councils of all plants with normally more than 20 em-
ployees who are entitled to vote for the council. This right can be 
exercised when management is planning changes which may have a 
detrimental effect on the workers, such as cutting down, closure, or 
transfer of a plant or any essential part thereof, its amalgamation 
with another plant (whether or not in the same undertaking) or 
fundamental changes in production or equipment (unless clearly 
caused by the needs of the market) , or fundamentally new working 
methods (unless clearly the result of, or the means towards, technical 
progress). In all such cases the works council (not the joint con-
sultation committee) must be asked for its consent, and, failing 
agreement between employer and works council, a mediation pro-
cedure may be set in motion before an impartial tri-partite body the 
chairman of which will, if necessary, be nominated by the President 
of the competent Court of Appeal. This body has no compulsory 
power; but if the employer resorts without adequate reason to meas-
ures at variance with an agreement arrived at with the works coun-
cil or with a recommendation made by the tri-partite body, he must 
compensate any employee discharged as a result of these measures 
being put into effect. 
Emphasis has been placed here on the difference between those 
provisions which operate at plant level and those which operate at 
the level of the undertaking because the latter do not apply to for-
eign companies, that is, according to the principles of the conflict 
of laws generally accepted in Continental countries, to such cor-
u• Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. II, 1952, paras. 72-75, [1952] BGBI. I, 681 
(Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
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porations as have their central management and control (siege 
social effectif, P erwaltungssitz) abroad. Those operating at plant 
level, apply to all plants within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
country from which the relevant legislation emanates, irrespective 
of the nationality or domicile of the company, for example, irre-
spective of whether the plant belongs to an American corporation 
or to its local subsidiary. 
The separation of representative and consultative functions is 
known in the six countries,416 though the corresponding distinction 
between organs operating at plant and at enterprise level has no-
where been developed as fully as in Germany. In France there exist 
side by side the works councils (comites d' en/reprises) and the em-
ployees' representatives (detegues du personnel). The consultative 
function is exclusively reserved to the former, and the representative 
function is divided between them, so, however, that in any undertak-
ing which comprises more than one plant with 50 employees, a 
separate plant committee ( comite d' hablissement) is set up which 
takes over the representative functions of the works counciJ.417 None 
of these representative functions amount to a right of co-determina-
tion, except with regard to the discharge of members of the repre-
sentative organs themselves (which requires the consent of the 
works council or, alternatively, of a factory inspector) 418 and with 
regard to the administration of welfare arrangements.419 Except 
where collective agreements provide for more extensive powers, 
the functions of the French representative and consultative organs 
are otherwise purely advisory. The employer himself is a member 
of the works council (which is not the case in Germany) . In under-
takings which have the form of stock companies (socihes 
anonymes) the works council is entitled to obtain the balance sheet, 
the profit and loss account, and the auditor's report, and to employ, 
at the expense of the undertaking, the services of an independent 
accountant. The works council also sends two delegates to the 
administrative board of the stock company, but they have no right to 
vote. These provisions do not apply to foreign corporations.420 
The situation in Belgium resembles that in France inasmuch as 
in Belgium, too, works councils ( conseils d' entre prise) and em-
.,. See Boldt, Rapport de Synthese, in E.C.S.C. HrGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 
405, ch. II, sec. V, at 2o-22. 
m Durand, La Representation des Tra'Vailleurs sur le plan de l'entreprise en droit 
fran(ais, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, esp. at 211. 
418 Jd. at 218. 
419 Id. at 236. 
""'I d. at 212. 
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ployees' representatives (deligations syndicales du personnel) exist 
side by side. There is an important distinction, however, in that the 
basis of the latter is an agreement and is not statutory, and that, 
to a larger extent than in France, the functions even of the statutory 
works councils are determined by collective agreements (notably 
by the decisions of the bilateral committees) as well as by the statute 
itself. 421 
The collective agreements (decisions of the bilateral committees) 
which created employees' representatives do not belong to those 
which have been given legal force by royal decree.422 The Belgian 
"employees' representatives" thus resemble British shop stewards 
in that they exist praeter legem. The consultative function is re-
served to the works councils which so far have been established 
only in undertakings with more than I so employees,423 a figure which 
was substituted for the previous figure of 200 by a royal decree of 
October, 1958.424 The employer is a member of the works coun-
cils. Detailed information about the development of the undertak-
ing must be furnished at regular intervals, and in undertakings car-
ried on in corporate form this includes furnishing balance sheets, 
profit and loss accounts, auditors' reports and the like.425 There 
is no provision for employee representation in the organs of the 
stock company, as there is in Germany and in France. Clearly the 
consultative functions can be usefully exercised only at the enter-
prise level, and the name of the works councils ( conseils d' entre-
prise) appears to indicate that they are intended to operate at that 
level. Nevertheless, there is in Belgium a certain amount of doubt 
on this point,426 which is understandable since the works councils 
combine with their consultative functions purely social tasks ap-
propriate to the plant rather than to the undertaking, for example, 
those dealing with the fixing of annual vacations, the management 
of welfare institutions, agreement on works rules, and above all, 
the task of ensuring that safety and other protective social legisla-
tion is observed.427 On the other hand, it is the employees' repre-
sentatives and not the employee members of the works councils who 
421 Law of Sept. 20, 1948, art. 15, [1948] Pasinomie Beige 663. See Horion, La Repre-
sentation des Tra<vailleurs sur le plan de l'entreprise en droit Beige, in E.C.S.C. HIGH 
AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 155· 
422 Horion, supra note 421, at 174. 
'
23 I d. at 149. 
""'See Second Exrosil para. 129. 
""'Horion, supra note 421, at 158 et seq. 
426 !d. at 150. 
wLaw of Sept. 20, 1948, art. 15(d), [1948] Pasinomie Beige 663. See Horion, supra 
note 421, at 157. 
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are the spokesmen of the employees in the event of grievances, but 
they must take care not to usurp the functions of the works 
councils. 428 
One would expect the employees' representatives to be elected 
at plant level, but the General Agreement of I 94 7 speaks in terms 
of undertakings. It should be emphasized, however, that this Agree-
ment does not operate automatically, but by virtue of its incorpora-
tion in decisions of bilateral committees for particular industries.429 
Incorporation on a large scale has, in fact, been effected and much 
detailed regulation is to be found in these individual decisions pur-
suant to which sub-committees can be formed for individual plants 
(as has happened, for example, in the coal mining industry) .430 
In Luxembourg the situation is very much simpler than in Bel-
gium. Existing legislation does not provide for any consultation 
between management and labor representatives on purely economic 
or commercial matters. There are no "works councils" but only 
separate "workmen's delegations" (de ligations ouvrieres) and 
"salaried employees' delegations" (delegations d' employes), of 
which the employer is not, of course, a member. Their tasks 431 are 
generally to defend the rights of the workers, to advise on works 
rules to be adopted by the employer and to see that they are applied, 
to transmit grievances to the employer, to try to settle difficulties, to 
participate in the management of welfare institutions, to promote 
the employment of disabled persons, to cooperate in the organiza-
tion of apprenticeships for manual workers, and to assist in the 
prevention of accidents and occupational diseases. Although it is 
expressly said only with regard to salaried employees, it is clearly 
also a function of these delegations to transmit communications of 
employer to the workers. Unlike their German counterparts, the 
delegations have no right to intervene in the case of dismissals, but 
if an employer wishes to dismiss a manual worker without notice he 
must inform the delegation of his reasons, and notice must be given 
to them of any intended discharge of large numbers of workers, for 
example, by reason of contraction of business.432 All these are ob-
viously functions which can be fully exercised only at plant level. 
428 Horion, supra note 421, at ISS, 183. 
429 I d. at 174. 
""'Id. at 177. 
"
11 Law of June 7, 1937, art. 25, [1937] Pasin. Lux. 119; Decree of Oct. 30, I9S8, art. 
3, (19s8] Pasin. Lux. S64; Kayser, La Representation des Travail/curs sur le plan de 
l'entreprise en droit Luxembourgeois, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 
405, at 307. 
'""Decree of Oct. 30, 19s8, art. 20, [I9S8] Pasin. Lux. s64. 
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The law provides 433 that where an undertaking consists of several 
plants, there will be a separate manual workers' and a separate sala-
ried employees' delegation for each plant, but that (in forms which 
differ for manual workers and for salaried employees) there can 
be central committees for the entire undertaking as well. Manual 
workers can have separate representation for each workshop in-
side a plant provided it contains at least 50 workers, but this appears 
to be rarely applied.434 The entire legislation does not apply to un-
dertakings with less than fifteen employees.435 
The Netherlands legislation on employee representation is of 
comparatively recent origin, and is still being gradually intro-
duced.436 It is far less elaborate than that now in force in France and 
Belgium, to say nothing of Germany. According to the relevant law 
of 1950 each employer who employs at least 25 employees entitled 
to vote (that is, who are over 2 I years old and have been employed 
in the undertaking for more than one year) must set up a council 
( onderneemings-raad). By the beginning of I 9 59 councils had, how-
ever, been established in only about one-fifth of the s,ooo undertak-
ings to which the statute is applicable. It was expected that within the 
foreseeable future this would increase to one-fourth.437 In some in-
dustries (for example, textiles and banking) the figure is much 
higher, and in the metallurgical industries, although only 2 5 per-
cent of the undertakings had councils by the middle of I958, these 
employed 74 percent of all metallurgical workers.438 These councils 
are designed to further understanding between labor and manage-
ment; their tasks are purely deliberative and advisory; and they 
have no power of co-determination (not even in purely social ques-
tions). Their functions 439 are to transmit grievances to the em-
ployer, to consider matters such as vacation rosters, shift work 
schemes, and intervals (in so far as they have not been fixed by col-
lective agreement), to see that the agreed conditions of employment 
are observed as well as the protective provisions of statutes, and to 
433 Law of June 7, 1937, art. 24, [1937] Pasin. Lux. 119; Decree of Oct. 30, 1958, art. 
85, [1958] Pasin. Lux. 564. Kayser, supra note 431, at 302 states that the workers' 
representation is concentrated in the plant, that of the salaried employees in the enter-
prise . 
.,,. Decree of Oct. 30, 1958, art. 4, [1958] Pasin. Lux. 564. 
"'"Law of June 7, 1937, art. 24, [1937] Pasin. Lux. 119; Decree of Oct. 30, 1958, art. 
1, [19'8] Pasin. Lux. 564 . 
.. ,. Molenaar, La Representation des Travailleurs sur le plan de l' entre prise en droit 
Neer/andais, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 331. 
031 FORTAN!ER & YERAART, ARBEITSRECHT 142 ( 1959 ). 
488 Molenaar, supra note 436. 
439 Law of May 4, 1950, art. 6, para. 2, [1950] Stb. K174 (Neth.) ; Molenaar, supra 
note 436, at 329. 
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inspect safety installations, canteens and the like, and also to sug-
gest technical and other improvements. Like the French works coun-
cils (comites d' entreprises) they have one function which is more 
than deliberative-to participate in the management of welfare 
arrangements. Moreover, the employer, who is a member and chair-
man of the council, is under a duty to furnish the necessary infor-
mation, to keep the council informed about the commercial situa-
tion of the undertaking, and to consult it before issuing works rules. 
Although the relevant legislation is not explicit on the point, these 
councils are apparently on principle designed to operate at the level 
of the undertaking, but one provision seems to make it possible to 
create a special council for each plant.440 The councils are part of 
the general organization of the Dutch economy provided for by the 
legislation of 1950, under which undertakings are grouped both 
vertically and horizontally, and organized by law to further their 
mutual interests. Each "horizontal" group has a committee, con-
sisting of equal numbers of employer and employee representatives, 
which supervises the establishment and operation of the works coun-
cils, the idea being that an employer should be induced to create 
these councils by persuasion and not by penal sanctions.441 
The structure and functions of the existing Italian system of em-
ployee representation, like those of the corresponding institutions in 
Germany, can only be understood against the background of the 
complex political and social history of the country. Although Arti-
cle 46 of the Constitution of 194 7 provides for legislation dealing 
with the cooperation of employer and employees in the management 
of enterprises, no such law has been enacted. Of the far-reaching at-
tempts to achieve participation of workers in management which 
have from time to time played a dominant role in the political his-
tory of Italy in this century, only a few vestiges remain-such as 
the councils of management of the Olivetti works at Ivrea and else-
where,442 and certain experimental agreements between the Con-
federation of Christian Trade Unions and a number of employers 
establishing mixed committees to consider the raising of produc-
tivity.443 Such general arrangements as exist serve mainly social and 
not economic purposes, that is, the enforcement of collective agree-
ments and protective legislation, the ventilation and settlement of 
440 Molenaar, supra note 436, at 326. 
'''/d. at 322. 
442 Mengoni, La Representation des Travailleurs sur le plan de !'en/reprise en droit 
/ta/ien, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 268. 
448 /d. at 270. 
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grievances, the formulation of works rules in cooperation with the 
employer, the regulation of vacation rosters, methods of wage 
payments, working hours and shift work, the management of wel-
fare schemes, and, in certain very narrowly defined limits, the set-
tlement of conflicts arising from dismissals and lay-offs.444 These are 
the matters with which the works committees ( commissioni interne) 
are principally concerned. They are clearly subjects to be dealt with 
at the plant level, and so are technical or organizational improve-
ments suggested by workers and their transmission to the em-
ployer.445 The relevant provision in the Collective Agreement of 
1953 has to be interpreted as envisaging a committee for each plant, 
branch, or office which is "autonomous," that is, which has some in-
dependence as a technical and organizational unit. This Agreement 
(and its amendments) apply to industry only, and only to those un-
dertakings which are members of the General Confederation of In-
dustry-to which most larger and medium-sized enterprises in fact 
belong. Those which do not belong nevertheless observe the Agree-
ment.446 A separate Agreement of October 23, 1950, applies to 
purely commercial undertakings. 447 In industry, committees are pro-
vided for plants with more than 40 employees; for those with fewer 
than 40 and more than five there is an individual "delegate." 448 
It must be clear to an American observer that the great impor-
tance of these representative institutions in the Six results partly 
from the fact that collective bargaining takes place at industry and 
not at plant level. This makes it necessary to have "on-the-spot" 
representative organs which can fit the provisions of the general col-
lective agreement to the needs of the individual plants. 
This relationship between collective bargaining and representa-
tion at plant level has important practical consequences. These com-
mittees and councils are legally not organs of the unions (with the 
possible exception of the Belgian employees' delegates). This legal 
independence from the unions exists even where, as in France, the 
unions have a limited power to demand their "recall." 449 Whatever 
their legal position, however, workers' representatives are bound in 
fact often to be very closely connected with the unions. 
The German statute 450 expresses a principle which is inherent in 
'"'I d. at 284. 
""Id. at 280. 
""Id. at 272. 
mId. at 271. 
446 I d. at 274. 
••• Durand, supra note 417, at 215. 
,.., Law of Oct. II, 1952, para. 49, [1952] BGBI. I, 681 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
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the legislation of all the six countries where it states that the em-
ployer and the works council are to collaborate "within the frame-
work of the existing collective agreements and in cooperation with 
the trade unions and employers' associations represented in the 
plant." Collective agreements have priority over any agreements 
the works council may make with the employer. The law of "plant 
agreements" (Betriebsvereinbarungen) is particularly developed 
in Germany and very complicated. On some topics such agreements 
must, on others they may, be made, and an elaborate arbitration 
mechanism is provided in case of failure of agreement.451 But plant 
agreements must always be subordinate to collective agreements to 
which unions are a party, and in this connection it is useful to em-
phasize the difference between, on the one hand, an agreement be-
tween a works council (or other representative organ at plant level) 
and the employer, and on the other hand a collective agreement for 
a single plant (accord d' hablissement). In Germany the distinction 
is relevant among other reasons because, in the event of disagree-
ment between management and works council about the compulsory 
plant agreement (concerning the beginning and end of the working 
day, intervals, vacation rosters, apprenticeship, administration of 
welfare schemes confined to plant or enterprise, discipline, piece 
rates, time and place of wage payments, principles and new methods 
of wage payments) arbitration is compulsory,452 whereas arbitra-
tion between trade unions and employers and their associations is 
entirely voluntary. In Germany, as well as in Belgium, Italy, and the 
Netherlands, the representatives at enterprise or plant level have 
expressly been given the task of watching over the enforcement of 
collective agreements and of the provisions of protective legisla-
tion.453 Moreover, the works rules or reglement interieur must 
either, as in Germany and in Belgium,454 be agreed to by the em-
ployer and the works council or other representation, or, as in 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, be issued after 
consultation between these parties.455 
All the representative bodies here referred to-with the excep-
451 I d. paras. so, 56, 57· 
4152 I d. para. s6. 
458 E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 109, 182, 281, 329. 
454 Germany: Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. n, 1952, para. 56, [1952] BGBI. 
I, 681; Belgium: Law of Sept. 20, 1948, art. 15(d), [1948] Pasinomie Beige 663. 
'"' E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 230, 283, 307; Molenaar, 
Rapport Recapitulatif sur les sources du droit du travail, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, 
ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES SOURCES DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL DANS LES PAYS DE LA C.E.C.A. 42 
(1957)· 
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tion of the Belgian employees' representatives-are elected by the 
employees in the plant or enterprise, and in Germany and Italy, as 
also in Belgium in the larger undertakings, manual workers and 
salaried employees vote for separate lists. 456 In F ranee there is a 
separate list for certain supervisory and higher technical person-
nel.457 Clearly, whether the law says so or not, the competing lists 
of candidates are frequently those put up by rival trade unions, but 
the desire, for example, of the French trade unions, to exercise a 
right of "direct appointment" has not been realized. 
Members of the representative bodies will frequently be the most 
active trade unionists in the enterprise. Hence the great importance 
of the provisions which, in order to protect them from being vic-
timized by the employer, restrict his right to dismiss any of them ex-
cept for misconduct or with the consent of the works council or of 
the workers' delegation itself, or of some outside body. In Ger-
many 458 the employer cannot dismiss any member of a works coun-
cil except if he is entitled to dismiss the member without notice by 
reason of his misconduct or on any other ground which, according 
to the provisions of the Industrial Code, the Commercial Code, or 
the Civil Code enables the employer to discharge a worker without 
giving notice.459 Moreover, a member of a works council can be dis-
missed in the event of closure of a plant or of a division of a plant 
if it is impossible to transfer the works council member to another 
division. The employer may not take action in any form which hin-
ders the members of the works council in the exercise of their func-
tions or affects them to their advantage or to their detriment.460 
To some extent the purpose and effect of these provisions and of 
similar provisions in others of the Six are comparable to those of 
American statutes directed at certain kinds of unfair labor practices. 
In France 461 the contract of employment of a works council member 
cannot be terminated by the employer without the consent of the 
council or, in the alternative, that of the labor inspector, and simi-
larly no employees' representative can be discharged except under 
... E. C. S.C. HIGH AuTHORITY, op. cit. suPra note 405, at 104, 153, 274· Luxembourg is 
the only member of the Community to have not only separate lists but also separate 
"workmen's" and "salaried employees" delegations. 
"'
7 Durand, supra note 417, at 216 . 
... Law on Protection in the Event of Dismissals (Kuendigungs-Schutzgesetz), Aug. 
10, 1951, para. 13, [1951] BGBI. I, 499 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
"'"See PART II, Section E infra. 
""'Law of Oct. II, 1952, para. 53, [1952] BGBI. I, 681 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
'
61 Ordonnance of Feb. 22, 1945, art. 22, [1945] J.O. 954 (Fr.). For details, see 
Durand, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES MEM-
BRES PAYS DE LA C.E.C.A. 214 (1958). 
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those conditions. The protection in France against discrimination 
by the employer of members of councils, of employees' representa-
tives, of candidates for one of these offices and of former office 
holders was strengthened by a recent Decree of January 7, I 9 5 9.462 
Belgian law 463 is similar to German law, except that the employer 
cannot dismiss a member of, or candidate for office in, a works coun-
cil in cases other than those justifying instantaneous dismissal, un-
less there are "economic or technical" grounds for the termination 
of the contract, recognized in advance as such by the bilateral com-
mittee. The employees' representatives are, in fact, also protected 
by the collective agreements. 
In Luxembourg 464 no member of a workmen's delegation can be 
dismissed except for reasons justifying instantaneous dismissal or 
with the consent of the delegation itself. In Italy 465 the members of 
the "internal committees" are protected against discharge by a series 
of complicated provisions in the Collective Agreement of 1953. 
Normally the employer requires the consent of the relevant trade 
union, and if this is withheld, as frequently happens, the matter is 
settled by an arbitration tribunal which declares the discharge to be 
void if it is found to be due to the representative activities of the 
employee. In the Netherlands 466 such protection as exists would 
appear to depend on the autonomous rules which the works coun-
cils themselves have power to adopt. 
In all the six countries countervailing obligations are imposed on 
the members of works councils and on employees' representatives. 
These duties are mainly of two kinds: they must not interfere with 
the powers of management to any larger extent than the law pro-
vides, and they are under strict duties of secrecy with regard to such 
technical or commercial information as they obtain in their official 
capacity. 
This is only a bird's-eye view of workers' representation in the 
six countries, since the details of the law are complicated and could 
not be discussed. In order to understand fully the social significance 
462 See Second EXPOSE, para. 53· The protection was, on the Belgian pattern, extended 
to candidates and former members. 
463 Law of Sept. 20, 1948, art. 21, [1948] Pasinomie Beige 663; Horion, in E.C.S.C. 
HIGH AUTHORITY, LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES MEMBRES PAYS DE LA 
C.E.C.A. I67 (1958). 
4 
.. Decree of Oct. 30, 1958, art. 22, para. 4, [1958] Pasin. Lux 564. 
465 Collective Agreement of May 8, 1953, art. 14, in I CONTRATTI CONFEDERALI DI 
LAVORO NELL'INDUSTRIA ITALIAN A ( 1955); Mengoni, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, 
LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES MEMBRES PAYS DE LA C.E.C.A. 277-78 (1958). 
486 Molenaar, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT 
DES MEMBRES PAYS DE LA C.E.C.A. 307 (1958). 
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of these institutions and also of collective bargaining it is necessary 
to glance at the settlement of conflicts in the six countries. 
D. SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS 407 
One of the outstanding legal characteristics of labor relations on 
the Continent when compared with those in the United States is, as 
has been suggested, the importance of the role of legislation in 
creating rights and obligations of employers and employees. A simi-
lar observation can be made about the judicial function of the state 
and about litigation. Litigation in the courts between individual em-
ployers and employees on matters such as wages and the legality of 
dismissals is a common occurrence, and in many cases the courts de-
termine the meaning of terms of collective agreements where such 
terms have been incorporated in individual contracts of employment. 
Litigation in the courts takes the place which, in broad areas of 
American industry, is occupied by grievance arbitration. Arbitration 
itself is very important in at least some Continental countries but, 
generally speaking, it is arbitration between unions and employers' 
associations concerning collective terms to be adopted for the future. 
To appreciate the significance of litigation one should bear in 
mind a number of facts which are not obvious. In the first place, it 
is customary on the Continent to draw a sharp distinction between 
"collective conflicts" and "individual conflicts," a distinction which 
also exists, of course, in America and in Britain but is not nearly as 
important there as, say, in Germany or in France. The distinction is 
very clearly defined in a recent article by Professor Paul Durand of 
the University of Paris: 
Fundamentally, the collective industrial dispute differs 
from the individual dispute in two respects. It presupposes 
in the first place the intervention of a group, which may 
be either a legally recognized group (such as a trade 
union) or simply a de facto group consisting of an unor-
ganized majority of employees. But this first feature does 
not suffice of itself, for in that case the distinction between 
individual disputes and collective disputes would depend 
exclusively on the initiative of the group. A second condi-
tion is required: the existence of a collective interest. The 
dispute will be a collective one if it involves a question of 
467 In addition to the books listed in note 303 supra, see GRUNEBAUM-BALLIN & PETIT, 
Les Conf/its Collectifs du travail et leur reglement dans le monde contemporain, 9 
TRAVAUX ET RECHERCHES DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT CoMPARE DE L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS 
(1954). 
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principle, the settlement of which affects the legal status 
of the different members of the group. It will also have 
this character if a common interest is at stake, e.g., free· 
dom of opinion, trade union freedom, representation of 
the staff in the enterprise, or recourse to strike action, even 
though the settlement of the dispute may affect the legal 
status of only one employee. The dismissal of an employee 
on the ground of his membership of a trade union can give 
rise to a collective dispute, because the attack on the "right 
to organize" endangers a prerogative of workers as a 
whole.468 
The mere fact that in a case of allegedly unlawful or abusive dis-
missal, for example, the trade union takes up the cudgels on behalf 
of one of its members and that a union official negotiates with the 
employer and, if necessary, acts for the member in court, does not 
make the dispute a "collective conflict." The distinction is especially 
important in countries such as France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, 
where special courts deal with individual disputes, whereas collec· 
tive disputes, in so far as they can go before any courts at all, are 
dealt with by the ordinary courts. Many of those cases which in 
the United States concern, for example, seniority issues in grievance 
arbitration proceedings would, by French or German lawyers, be 
characterized as individual disputes, although the employee may be 
represented by his union. The distinction is vital in view of the pro-
cedural differences which are involved. 
The second point which one should bear in mind when consider-
ing the significance of litigation is that, by and large, it is very much 
simpler and cheaper than in America, and that people resort to the 
courts with little hesitation. This is true quite generally, but es-
pecially in labor matters in those countries among the Six-France, 
Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg-in which special labor courts 
exist. These labor courts are tribunals provided by the state for the 
adjudication of conflicts between employers and employees in pro-
ceedings which are speedy and inexpensive and in which the tribunal 
makes special efforts to induce the parties to arrive at an amicable 
settlement. Such tribunals have existed on the Continent for over 
I so years, having been first introduced by Napoleon. No attempt 
will be made to describe in any detail the composition and function-
ing of these labor courts. In France, Belgium, and Luxembourg they 
are called conseils des prud' hommes and they are organized in France 
'""Durand, Conciliation and Mediation in Collective Industrial Disputes, 10 INTER-
NATIONAL SoCIAL SCIENCE BULLETIN (UNESCO) 545-46 (1958). 
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pursuant to Book IV of the Labor Code,409 in Belgium pursuant to 
a law of 1926,470 and in Luxembourg to a Decree of 1938.471 In 
Western Germany they are called Arbeits gerichte and governed by 
a law of 1953 472 which, like the legislation in France and Belgium, 
has taken the place of older statutes. 
There are important differences between the various types of 
labor courts. Thus in Germany, but not in France or in Belgium, the 
whole country is covered by a network of these courts. In Germany 
each court when sitting consists of a chairman who is a lawyer and 
normally a judge 473 and one employer and one employee representa-
tive taken from panels nominated by the organizations on both 
sides.474 In France and in Belgium the court consists of an equal num-
ber of employees and employers,475 and the chair is taken alter-
natively by a member of the employer and by a member of the em-
ployee group.476 They are elected-one of the few examples of 
elected judges in Europe.477 In Germany and in France they have 
jurisdiction over both manual workers and salaried employees, but, 
whereas in Germany jurisdiction extends to all contracts of employ-
ment irrespective of the amount of the salary, excluding completely 
that of the ordinary courts the conseils des prud'hommes in France 
have exclusive jurisdiction only over contracts of employment of 
the less highly paid employees. In the case of employees at the higher 
levels, their jurisdiction is concurrent with that of ordinary courtsY~ 
The right of appeal is restricted in both countries to cases involving 
more than a minimum amount. 479 In France the appeal is heard by 
469 For discussions of the law, see: 2 DURAND paras. 502-30; BRUN & GALLAND, 
DROIT DU TRAVAIL pt. I, paras. 96-n2, at 126-46 (I958). 
470 Loi organique des conseils de Prud'hommes, July 9, I926, [I926] I Recueil des 
Lois et Arretes Royaux de Belgique I4I4i amended by Law of Mar. I8, 1950, [1950] I 
Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux de Belgique 634. 
471 Decree of Dec. 3I, I938, [I938) Pasin. Lux. 571. 
472 Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, I953, [I953] BGBI. I, 1267 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); for 
a detailed commentary: DIETZ & NIKISCH, ARBEITSGERICHTSGESETZ (I954). 
mLaw on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, I953, para. I8(3), [I953] BGBI. I, I267 (Ger. 
Fed. Rep.). The labor courts are organized by the Ministries of Labor of the Lander 
which cooperate with the Ministries of Justice. Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, 
para. 14, id. 
474 I d. paras. zo-23. 
475 See notes 469 and 470 supra. France: CoDE DU TRAVAIL, bk. IV, Art. 6. In Belgium 
there is also an "assesseur juridique" who votes in certain cases: Art. 26 of the law 
quoted in Note 470. 
476 CODE DU TRAVAIL, bk. IV, art. IO. 
477 CoDE DU TRAVAIL, bk. IV, arts. 7, 22-35· This applies also to Belgium. 
408 Contrast Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, I953, para. 2, [I953] BGBI. I, 1267 (Ger. 
Fed. Rep.) with CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. IV, art. 8o, (Fr.). 
m France: CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. IV, arts. 80 et seq. (for details: BRUN. & GALLAND, 
op. cit. supra note 469, at I44 et seq.). Germany: Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, 
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the ordinary courts,480 but in Germany there is a Labor Court of 
Appeal and, in the last resort, a Federal Labor Court.481 The juris-
diction of the German labor courts is in some respects wider than 
that of the conseils des prud'hommes.482 
No such tribunals exist at the moment in Italy, although there are 
some special provisions to be applied by the ordinary courts when 
dealing with labor matters.483 Nor do they exist in the Netherlands, 
although a similar function is exercised by a Dutch administrative 
tribunal, the ontslagcommissie or "discharge committee" consisting 
of one employer, one employee, and two officials, which must decide 
whether the official consent required in the case of each discharge of 
an employee, otherwise than for urgent reasons or by agreement, 
should be given or withheld.484 
The frequency of litigation in most of the six countries is partly 
explained by the existence and accessibility in most of them of in-
expensive and expert tribunals. The parallel between their social 
function and that of grievance arbitration in America is also sug-
gested by the fact that in many cases the employee, who is normally 
the plaintiff, will be assisted or represented by an official of his un-
ion, while the employer's case will often be presented by an official 
of his employers' association. But the courts are, of course, open to 
the unorganized on both sides as well as to organization mem-
bers. 
One would expect the interpretation of collective agreements to 
be a principal activity of these labor courts, and this is true, es-
pecially in Germany. The terms of collective agreements become 
terms of the relevant contracts of employment and a dispute con-
para. 64, [1953] BGBI. I, at 1267 (for details: DIETZ & NIKISCH, op. cit. supra note 472, 
at 458 et seq.). 
'"'Contrast Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, para. 64, [1953] BGBI. I, at 1267 
(Ger. Fed. Rep.) with CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. IV, art. 83 (Fr.). In Belgium there is a 
labor appeal court ( conseil des prud'hommes d'appel). 
'
81 Appeal from the Labor Courts of Appeal (in exceptional cases from the Labor 
Courts directly) to the Federal Labor Court in Kassel only on points of law. Law on 
Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, paras. 72, 76, [1953] BGBI. I, 1267. For the special pro-
cedure concerning matters arising from the creation, operation, etc. of works' councils, 
see paras. 8o-wo of the Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, id. 
""'Especially because it comprises disputes arising between parties to collective 
agreements as such, and also certain disputes between employees and certain delictual 
claims: Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, para. 2(1) Nos. I and 3, [1953] BGBI. I, 
1267 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
'
83 Aranguren, La Disciplina Collettiva delle Controversie di Lavoro, in I RAPPORT! 
COLLEITIVI DI LAVORO 175 (1959). 
'"'This arises under the Extraordinary Decree of 1945 under which the contract 
of employment cannot be terminated either by the employer or by the employee without 
the consent of the Labor Office. See FoRTANIER & VERAART, op. cit. suPra note 437, at 58. 
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cerning the meaning of any of these terms may arise between the 
individual employer and employee and thus come before the court. 
Disputes may, however, also arise between the parties to a collective 
agreement, that is, between a union and an employer or employers' 
association, or-in France-between an organization on either side 
and an organization member on the other. Such disputes are heard 
by ordinary courts in all Member States except Germany where the 
jurisdiction of the Labor Courts, sitting with two representative 
members of each side, extends to collective disputes on existing 
rights. 485 
All that has been said so far refers exclusively to disputes about 
existing rights, including collective disputes concerning the inter-
pretation of collective agreements or concerning, for example, such 
matters as an alleged breach of a collective agreement by a trade 
union in calling a strike or by an employers' association in failing to 
use all available means to induce its members to observe the terms of 
the agreement. As in the United States, but perhaps with even 
greater emphasis, a distinction is made everywhere on the Continent 
between disputes over existing rights (con flits d' ordre juridique, 
Rechts-Streitigkeiten) and disputes over future rights, that is, "con-
flicts of interest" ( conflits d' ordre iconomique, I nteressenstreitig-
keiten). Examples of disputes over future rights are disputes about 
demands for wage increases or other matters concerned with the 
making of new, or the modification of existing, collective agree-
ments. The need for keeping this distinction clearly in mind in at-
tempting to understand the conciliation, fact-finding, and arbitra-
tion in the various European countries is especially great in view of 
the ambiguity of the word "arbitration." "Arbitration" covers both 
types of conflict, and, indeed is used indiscriminately in the United 
States to designate totally different proceedings-grievance "arbi-
tration" on the one hand, and "voluntary arbitration and compul-
sory arbitration as procedures for the settlement of labor contro-
versies arising in the course of collective negotiation" 486 on the 
other. 
Although the distinction is made in all the six countries, it has a 
different practical significance in Germany, where labor courts deal 
with all conflicts of right even if they are of a collective char-
acter,487 than it does elsewhere. In France, Belgium, and Luxem-
485Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, paras. 2(1) No. I, 16(2), [1953] BGBI. I, 
1267 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
480 HANDLER & HAYS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 323 (3rd ed. 1959). 
'" See note 48 5 supra. 
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bourg 488 purely interpretive conflicts, that is, disputes about the 
meaning of collective terms and their application which arise be-
tween the parties to the agreement, do not go to the courts at all, but 
in France suits for injunctions or claims for damages by reason of 
breaches of a collective contract (for example, in the event of a 
strike) go to the ordinary courts.489 In the Nether lands 490 and also 
in Italy 491-although this is not absolutely clear in view of the un-
certain state of the law-collective disputes as well as individual 
disputes of a legal character belong to the jurisdiction of the ordi-
nary courts, there being neither a statutory system of arbitration nor 
a system of special labor courts. 
The three methods of dispute settlement which have been de-
veloped in the United States and in Britain-conciliation, fact-find-
ing (inquiry) and arbitration-are represented in the Six. Although 
they differ very much from country to country, certain tendencies 
are clearly discernible everywhere. 
One is the preference for settlement machinery created by col-
lective bargaining to that created by statute: In Italy there were 
at the time this was written no statutory conciliation or arbitration 
schemes, but, partly by ordinary collective agreements and partly by 
agreements between top organizations ( accordi interconfederali), 
schemes for conciliation and arbitration of disputes have been de-
veloped by the two sides of industry themselves.492 In Germany 
there are provisions for arbitration, and to an extent also for con-
ciliation, in the Control Council Law of 1946 493 which is still in 
force, and in a number of statutes of the individual states (Lan-
der) .494 More significant, however, is the Model Arbitration Agree-
ment adopted by the top organizations in 19 54,495 which has been 
incorporated in collective agreements in a number of industries. In 
488 France & Belgium: Durand, suPra note 468, at 547; Luxembourg: Decree of Oct. 
6, 1945, art. 27, [1945] Pasin. Lux. 540. As regards France, see however: 3 DURAND 
para. 2I 5, at 607. 
489 France: 3 DuRAND para. 216, at 6o8-1o. In Belgium the question does not seem 
to have arisen (Horion, supra note 259, at 14) but if it arose, the ordinary courts 
would presumably have jurisdiction. This would also appear to be the case in Luxem-
bourg. For Belgium, see 2 GEYSEN, DROIT SoCIAL no. 1069, at 258 ( 1953). 
400 STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, GEWERKSCHAFTEN UND FRAGEN DES KOLLEKT!VEN ARBEITS-
RECHTS 123 ( 1957) ; Levenbach, supra note 360, at u-12. 
491 See Aranguren, supra note 483. 
492 Aranguren, supra note 483, at 245. 
493 Control Council Law No. 35 of Aug. zo, 1946, [1946] No. 10 Official Gazette of 
the Control Council for Germany 174. 
494 See NIPPERDEY, ARBEITSRECHT 5th ed. nos. 521, 524. (Baden, Rhineland-Palatinate) 
(1958). 
406 Printed in 7 RECHT DER ARBEIT 383 (1954). 
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the metal industry, which is the most important of all, it has now, 
however, been terminated by the union as a result of a decision of 
the Federal Labor Court of October 1958 in which the Court in-
terpreted the Agreement in a manner to which the unions took ex-
ception. 
In the Netherlands the functions exercised elsewhere by concilia-
tion and arbitration arrangements are to a large extent fulfilled by 
the Council of Mediators. The Council is, as already pointed out, 
a statutory institution, but it cooperates so closely with the organi-
zations on both sides as they are combined in the Foundation of 
Labor that it is hard to say whether its social function (as dis-
tinguished from its legal structure) more nearly resembles that of 
an autonomous or a statutory institution. The Council has com-
pletely pushed the conciliation machinery established by a law of 
1923 into the background, but arbitration based on collective agree-
ments continues to be important.496 
In Belgium the effective machinery for the settlement of disputes 
is that of the bilateral committees. A law of 1948 has even entrusted 
to them the implementation of certain emergency measures. Older 
legislation on conciliation by government officials, passed in 1926 
and amended in 1929 and 1932, has lost its· importance, but the con-
ciliation powers of labor inspectors and other similar officials, based 
on legislation of 194 5, are still exercised. 497 In Luxembourg the 
existing compulsory conciliation and voluntary arbitration scheme 
is based on the Decree of I 94 5 498 and is given effect by the National 
Conciliation Office. Inside the Office, however, settlement is handled 
by a bilateral committee so that despite the statutory framework, 
settlement is not by governmental organs but by cooperation of 
labor and management. Preference for autonomous as compared 
with governmental action in conflict settlement has, in sum, become 
a developing principle of "European" scope. 
Nor is this statement invalidated by the structure of the French 
system, despite first appearances. The law of 1950 499 provides for 
compulsory conciliation and voluntary arbitration, but this has been 
largely a failure. On the other hand it is generally agreed that con-
496 Law of May 4, 1923, [1923] Stb. No. 182 (Neth.); Law of Apr. 7, 1933, [1933] 
Stb. No. 160 (Neth.) (see Fournier, Pays-Bas, in GRUNEBAUM-BALLIN & PETIT, op. cit. 
supra note 467, at 237) j STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op, cit. supra note 490, at 124j 
Levenbach, ·supra note 360, at II • 
.., Seeuws & Fournier, Belgique, in GRUNEBAUM-BALLIN & PETIT, op. cit. supra note 
467, at 48-50 j STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 490, at 103-o5. 
498 Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, [1945] Pasin. Lux 540 • 
... Law of Feb. u, 1950, arts. s, 9, 10, [1950] J.O. 1688 (Fr.). 
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ciliation procedures based on collective bargaining were much more 
successful. This may, it is true, be partly due to the fact that the 
courts stigmatized strikes in violation of an agreed conciliation 
procedure as illegal but did not enforce statutory provisions con-
cerning compulsory conciliation in the same way. Nonetheless it 
appears also to indicate the greater vitality of agreed procedures.500 
Moreover, the great reform of French settlement procedure in-
augurated in 1957 501 with the introduction of proceedings modelled 
on American "fact-finding" machinery was the result of previous 
experience with similar arrangements under collective agreements. 502 
Another important aspect of settlement procedures which seems 
to have developed in the countries of the Community is a general 
aversion to compulsory proceedings. Even where conciliation, fact-
finding (inquiry) or arbitration is carried out by statutory organs, it 
is generally voluntary. With the minor exception of compulsory 
arbitration of certain disputes concerning "plant agreements" be-
tween employers and works councils in Germany and, much more 
conspicuously, of the powers of the Councils of Mediators in the 
Netherlands, the recommendations of conciliators, reports of in-
vestigators, and awards of industrial arbitrators in the Six have no 
compulsory effect except where they have been accepted by both 
sides either in advance or after the fact. In at least two of the Mem-
ber Countries, in France and in Germany, compulsory arbitration 
was a decisive feature of labor law for several years between the 
Wars (to say nothing of Fascist Italy and its Magistratura di 
Lavoro). It has been abandoned because of its adverse effect on col-
lective bargaining. 
On the other hand, in some countries, and especially France, pro-
ceedings are "compulsory"-at least according to the letter of the 
law-in the sense that the authority seeking a settlement may in-
tervene on the application of either side without the consent of the 
other and the latter is under a legal duty to participate in the pro-
ceedings. In this sense conciliation has been compulsory in France 
since the decisive statute of r 9 50, as it is in Luxembourg. Because 
they lacked sanctions, these provisions of the French statute proved 
quite ineffective, and they have now been replaced by the very much 
more elaborate and effective provisions of the Law of July 1957· 
This law is of great practical importance and of special interest to 
600 BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note 469, at 936-40. 
501 Law of July z6, 1957, [1957] J.O. 7459 (Fr.), discussed in detail by Durand, supra 
note 468. 
002 BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note 469, at 943· 
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
Americans because its model was the "fact-finding" provisions of 
American federallegislation. 503 In its social function, if not its legal 
structure, it is perhaps the nearest European equivalent of the obli-
gation to bargain in good faith with which American lawyers are 
familiar. Under the Law of July 1957 conciliation has remained 
compulsory, but this fact has quite a different significance under 
this new statute. All collective agreements must provide for the 
conciliation of disputes arising between the parties, whereas hitherto 
this was only required in those agreements which were to be "ex-
tended." 504 Furthermore, within one month after a dispute has 
arisen, the matter must be taken before either an agreed conciliation 
committee, or in the absence of agreement before the competent 
regional, or before the national conciliation committee, consisting of 
an equal number (a maximum of three) of delegates from the "most 
representative" organizations on either side and up to three rep-
resentatives of the public authorities under the chairmanship of the 
Minister of Labor or a Divisional Labor lnspector. 505 The pro-
ceedings can be initiated ex officio by the Minister of Labor, the 
prefect, or the directors of the Labor Inspection Service,506 but the 
authorities are somewhat reluctant to make use of this power. 
Normally, therefore, the proceedings will be set in motion by either 
side to the dispute, but regardless of how they originate, a party 
who has been summoned to appear before an agreed or statutory 
conciliation committee and fails to do so can be fined. This means 
that the party must appear in person and, if a corporate body, must 
be represented by someone in a managerial position who is em-
powered to negotiate and conclude an agreement. 
This is a large measure of "compulsion," but under the new law 
of 1957, as under the old one of 1950, a strike or lockout in de-
fiance of the compulsory conciliation provisions is not for that reason 
alone illegal. On the other hand, it is illegal if it violated a concilia-
tion agreement, which may mean inter alia that participation in the 
strike constitutes "serious misconduct" (faute lour de) which under 
the relevant provision of the statute of 1950,507 enables the em-
ployer to terminate the contracts of employment with the strikers. 
""'Durand, supra note 468. 
604 !d. at 552. 
"""/d. at 562. 
606 /d. at 579-81. 
607 Law of Feb. 11, 1950, art. 4, [1950] J.O. 1688 (Fr.) : "La greve ne rompt pas le 
contrat de travail, sauf faute lourde imputable au salarie. ("A strike does not termi-
nate the contract of employment, in the absence of serious misconduct on the part of 
the employee.") 
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If the conciliation procedure is successful, the resulting "conciliation 
agreement" is the equivalent of a collective agreement. 508 If it fails, 
"mediation," that is, "fact-finding" proceedings, can be set in mo-
tion either by the chairman of the conciliation committee before 
which the proceedings have taken place or by the Minister of Labor. 
They are not, however, available where the dispute is about existing 
rights.509 These fact-finding proceedings on the American model 
constitute the great innovation of 1957 in French law and may pro-
vide a pattern for similar legislation elsewhere in Europe. The 
difference between the powers of the mediator, who is appointed 
from a panel of names maintained by the Ministry of Labor, and 
those of a conciliator is that the mediator, in addition to making a 
further attempt at conciliation, formulates a recommendation based 
on a systematic analysis of the facts.510 This recommendation is not 
only submitted to the parties but published, the idea being to mobil-
ize public opinion in favor of a settlement of the dispute. According 
to the most competent French authors,511 the British experience in 
dispute settlement has been repeated in France-the sanction of 
public opinion proving far more effective in settling conflicts than 
compulsory arbitration and the threat of legal penalties or damages. 
In fact, one gains the impression that arbitration plays a very minor 
role in France. The French law of 1957 is much the most interesting 
recent development within the countries of the Community in the 
general field of the law governing dispute settlement. 
The German statutory arbitration schemes of the Control Coun-
cil Law of r 946 and of the still surviving Lander legislation, are, 
as has been pointed out, less important than those based on the Top-
Organization Agreement of 1954 and its Model Arbitration Code. 
The significance of what was said above about the "contractual" 
function of collective agreements and the so-called "peace obliga-
tion" here becomes apparent. Once an obligation to refrain, until the 
termination of the agreed arbitration proceedings, from "hostile 
action" ( Kampfmassnahmen) has been written into a collective 
agreement, both sides are under stringent and legally enforceable 
obligations. Judgments awarding possibly heavy damages and the 
008 I d. art. 16. 
009 Durand, supra note 468, at 578, emphasizes the contrast in this respect between 
art. 15 of the French Law of 1957 and the American attitude which does not exclude 
from "fact-finding" proceedings questions "turning on the interpretation or violation 
of a legal provision." 
510 Durand, supra note 468, at 584-86. 
511 /d. at 594; BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit, supra note 469, at 947-48. 
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
equivalent of injunctions threaten an employers' organization, an 
individual employer, or a union refusing to participate in arbitra-
tion proceedings, or one who initiates or (as the Federal Labor 
Court has now held) 512 even prepares a lockout or strike. How 
long this very serious restriction of the freedom to strike will be 
tolerated by the German trade unions is difficult to guess. The con-
trast between the strength of the legal sanctions in Germany and the 
French tendency under the new law of 1957 to rely chiefly on the 
influence of public opinion is clear, but it should not be overlooked 
that the German sanctions operate only where arbitration is based 
on a collective agreement. Another feature which distinguishes the 
German from the French (and also from the Luxembourg) 513 sys-
tem of promoting industrial peace is the absence in Germany of a 
clear distinction between the functions of conciliation and arbitra-
tion-arbitration agencies are expected to perform the function of 
conciliators as well. 514 
This merger of conciliation and arbitration functions is also char-
acteristic of Belgium, the bilateral committees exercising both func-
tions. Labor inspectors, on the ·other hand, act only as conciliators 
and, if their efforts fail, they submit the case to the competent bi-
lateral committee,515 which may and often does act in such cases 
through a conciliation sub-committee. Like the French "mediation" 
of conflicts this Belgian procedure cannot be used to settle disputes 
concerning existing rights. The parties may, of course, agree to ac-
cept the recommendation of the sub-committee. If they do not, the 
settlement recommendation may be incorporated in minutes which 
are deposited at the Ministry of Labor. The Belgian procedure is 
singularly free from elements of compulsion and, unlike that in 
France, does not even compel the parties to participate in the pro-
ceedings. Belgian industry is, however, strongly organized on both 
sides and the autonomous forces of industry presumably exercise a 
strong pressure in favor of settlements. In a decree of March 
1946 516 the Belgian legislator made a highly original and interest-
ing contribution to these efforts. This decree provides that, if an 
employer does not avail himself of the existing arrangements for 
610 Judgment of Oct. 31, 1958, 6 BArbG 321 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
610 Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, arts. 9, 18, [1945] Pasin. Lux 540. 
""See, e.g., the Baden Arbitration Law, Oct. 19, 1949, Para. 5 [1950] Gesetz-und 
Verordnungsblatt 6o (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
6
"' See STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 490, at 104. 
"
16 Seeuws & Fournier, supra note 497, at 49; STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra 
note 490, at 105. 
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a settlement, the strikers can be treated as involuntarily unemployed 
for the purposes of unemployment insurance which in effect means 
that a recalcitrant employer is threatened with a government-
financed strike. By the same token workers can be deprived of un-
employment benefit for six months if settlement fails through their 
fault or through that of the union of which they are members. 
In the Nether lands the functions of conciliation and, in so far 
as this term can be used at all, of arbitration are mainly concen-
trated in the Council of Mediators to which frequent reference has 
already been made. 
In Italy, in addition to conciliation effected pursuant to collective 
agreements and to agreements between top organizations, concilia-
tion functions are exercised informally-but apparently on a large 
scale-by the Ministry of Labor and its offices in the provinces, the 
labor administration having been re-constituted after the war by a 
decree of 1948. Like so much else which has been said about Italy, 
this situation may sooner or later be changed by legislation.517 
E. PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES IN THE 
EvENT oF DisMISSAL 
No American lawyer familiar with seniority arrangements in the 
United States needs any special reminder of the profound impor-
tance of security of tenure in contemporary industry. This idea has 
taken deep roots all over Europe. The job is the basis of the work-
er's livelihood, and the law cannot allow him to be deprived of it 
unfairly and without just compensation any more than it can tolerate 
the arbitrary expropriation of the property of a farmer or of a 
businessman. The least that can be done for the worker is to ensure 
that he is given due notice, just as it should be incumbent on him to 
give due notice to the employer before quitting his job. 
Generally speaking the idea of the arbitrary right to "hire and 
fire" has, all over Europe, given way to what the French call the 
principle of "stability of employment" or job security. The subject 
has recently been analyzed, and the legislations of the Six have been 
compared, in a volume published by the High Authority of the Coal-
Steel Community 518 to which the present writer is much indebted 
and to which reference is made for further details. 
017 STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 490, at 141. 
""'LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES PAYS MEMBRES DE LA C.E.C.A. (1958), 
being volume two of the publications on labor law under the auspices of the High 
Authority of the E.C.S.C. 
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I. PERIODS OF NOTICE 
In Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, and, with regard to 
salaried employees, in Italy and in Luxembourg, periods of notice 
are fixed by statute. In France (one recently introduced exception 
apart), and, with regard to manual workers, in Italy and Luxem-
bourg, they are fixed by collective agreement, and failing this, by 
usage. There is no general doctrine as there is in English law to the 
effect that "reasonable" notice must be given, nor have the courts a 
power to fix the time of notice, except in Belgium with regard to the 
most highly paid salaried employees and in the absence of a con-
tract.519 
According to German law 520 the period of notice is two weeks for 
industrial manual workers, but this may be extended or shortened 
by agreement, including a collective agreement, provided that the 
periods to be observed by the employer and by the worker are identi-
cal. For clerical 521 as well as technical 522 salaried employees the 
period of notice is six weeks, and notice can only be given so as to 
terminate the contract at the end of a quarter, that is, on March 
31, June 30, and so forth. This, too, can be altered by contract, pro-
vided that the period of notice is not less than one month and that 
the contract can by its terms only be terminated at the end of a 
month, for example, on January 31, February 28, or March 31. 
Special provisions relate to apprentices,523 and particular indus-
tries 524 and where neither the provisions of the Industrial Code nor 
those of the Commercial Code apply (for example, in the profes-
sions), the general provisions of the Civil Code supply a subsidiary 
rule.525 Special provisions also apply to the most highly paid em-
ployees.526 Salaried employees are in all undertakings employing 
more than two people (not including apprentices) entitled to at 
least three months' notice terminating the contract at the end of a 
quarter, if they have been employed in the enterprise for at least 
five years 527 (but only years after the employee's 2 sth birthday are 
taken into account). After eight years' employment the period of 
519 See Horion, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AuTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 127. 
520 GEWERBEORDNUNG [hereinafter cited as GEw0] para. 122 (Ger.). 
521 HANDELSGESETZBUCH [hereinafter cited as HGB] para. 67 (Ger.). 
522 GEwO para. 133a. 
523 E.g., GEwO para. 127h. 
""'Boldt, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 73-74. 
525 BGB paras. 62o-25. 
626 E.g., GEwO para. 133ab; HGB para. 68. 
527 Law on the Period of Notice for Salaried Employees, July 9, 1926, [1926] Reichs-
gesetzblatt I, 399 (Ger.). 
430 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
notice is four months; after I o years, five; and after I 2 years, six 
months. These seniority provisions do not, however, affect the per-
iod of notice to which the employer is entitled. 
In Belgium as in Germany the periods of notice for salaried em-
ployees differ from those for manual workers. Manual workers 528 
are entitled to two weeks' and must give one week's notice, the period 
to begin running on the Monday after the day the notice is given, but 
these periods are doubled for those who have been employed in the 
enterprise without interruption for I o years, and quadrupled for 
those who have been employed for 20 years. Individual contracts can 
only reduce the period to be observed by the worker or extend that to 
be observed by the employer, except in the case of workers employed 
for less than six months, in which case special provisions apply. Spe-
cial provisions also apply in the building industry. If orders for his 
product are lacking the employer may introduce a shortened work-
ing week after giving seven days' notice, but there are special rules 
for certain branches of the textile industry. Salaried employees 529 
who earn less than I 2o,ooo francs a year must be given three 
months' notice which begins to run from the beginning of the month 
following that in which the notice is given. The period increases by 
three months for each five-year period commenced, but not neces-
sarily completed, by the employee after the first five years in the 
same enterprise. These periods cannot be reduced by contract, but 
the notice to be given to employees earning more than I 2o,ooo francs 
a year is fixed by contract, and in default of a contract, by the court. 
The court cannot, however, fix a shorter period of notice than that to 
be given to the less highly paid employees. Contracts of employment 
for a fixed period of less than three months concluded with the 
intent of evading the statutes concerning notice are by the courts 
considered as contracts for an indefinite period. In Belgium, as else-
where in Europe, "chain contracts" for fixed periods designed to 
evade periods of notice are frowned upon by the courts. The em-
ployee's required period of notice to the employer is half that of the 
employer, but this can, within limits, be changed by contract. Special 
provisions protect the employee under notice who has found another 
job. 
628 See arts. 19-19 ter and 28 quater of the Law of Mar. 10, 1900, [1900] Recueil des 
Lois et Arretes Royaux de Belgique 76, as amended by the Law of Mar. 4, 1954, [1954] 
Moniteur Beige 1770, and Decrees issued thereunder. Also see Horion, supra note 519, 
at 113-15. 
629 Law of Aug. 7, 1922, arts. 14-16, [ 1922] Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux de 
Belgique 864, as amended by the Law of Mar. n, 1954, [1954] Moniteur Beige 2078; 
See Horion, supra note 519, at 125-28. 
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In the Netherlands 530 the period of notice is in principle identical 
with the pay period, for example, one week for workers paid 
weekly, one month for employees paid by the month. This rule 
applies both to notices given by the employer and by the employee, 
subject to a contractual agreement derogating from it. Such an 
agreement must be in writing, may not enable the employer to dis-
charge the employee on shorter notice than that required of the 
employee, and may not be longer than six months. These periods of 
notice are extended in the case of all employees who, after having 
reached full age, have served the same enterprise for a full year. For 
them the period of notice to be given by the employer is at least one 
week for each year of service up to a maximum of 13 weeks, and 
that to be given by the worker at least one week for each two years 
of service up to a maximum of six weeks. This can only be abrogated 
by collective agreement and within certain defined limits. 
In Luxembourg 531 salaried employees can only be dismissed by 
notice in writing, the period of notice beginning to run at the mid-
dle or the end of a calendar month. The period may not be less than 
two months for employees who have been in the employer's service 
less than five years, four months for those in service for five or more 
but less than ten years, and six months for those who have been in 
the service of the same employer for ten or more years. Periods 
of notice required of the employee are one half of these. There are 
no statutory provisions for manual workers, notice depending on 
usage and in practice mainly on collective agreements which nor-
mally provide for up to two weeks' notice irrespective of duration 
of service. 
Until very recently no periods of notice were fixed by statute in 
France. The Labor Code 532 merely says that these periods have to 
be in accordance with usage or collective agreements, by which usage 
can be abrogated, and that any term of a contract of employment 
or works rule ( reglemcnt intirieur) purporting to reduce the period 
of notice as established by usage or collective agreement is void. 
Under a statute of I 9 58 533 any manual, clerical or other employee 
who has served the same employer for at least six months without 
000 Law on Contracts of Employment, July 13, 1907, [1907] Stb. No. 193, amended by 
the Law on Discharges, Dec. 17, 1953, [1953] Stb. No. 619 {Neth.); Molenaar, in 
E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 306; FORTANIER & VERAART, op. cit. 
supra note 437, at 41-55. 
631 See Kayser, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 287. 
632 CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 23. 
633 Law of Feb. 19, 1958, [1958] J.O. 1858 (Fr.); Durand, in E.C.S.C. HIGH Au-
THORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 227. 
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interruption is entitled to at least one month's notice, but the notice 
he has to give is not affected by the statute. In practice notice periods 
are invariably extended and not curtailed by collective agreements, 
which may take into account the place of the employee in the hier-
archy of the undertaking and his seniority. This is true even in in-
dustries such as the building industry where workers were entitled 
to no notice at all according to usage. Contractual agreements 
purporting to fix periods of notice which are too long may be void 
as an infringement of freedom of work.534 Under the statute of 
I 9 58 the employer must give notice by registered letter and must 
obtain a receipt.535 
The Italian Civil Code refers to usage and collective agreements 
with regard to the notice to be given to manual workers,536 but 
salaried employees are entitled to statutory periods of notice which 
apply in the absence of usage or collective agreements more favor-
able to the employee. These statutory periods range from I 5 days to 
four months in accordance with seniority. 
In the event of a violation by the employer of statutory provisions 
concerning notice some laws provide that the contract continues and 
wages are due to the end of the period of notice; others that the 
contract is terminated by the notice but that the employer is liable 
to pay damages for breach of contract. 537 
2. GROUNDS FOR INSTANTANEOUS DISMISSAL 
In all the six countries the employer has a right of instantaneous 
dismissal, irrespective of any provisions or rules on notice, or special 
protective provisions normally safeguarding the employee, if a 
situation has arisen in which he cannot be expected to keep the em-
ployee in his employment. Similarly, a right to quit instantaneously 
is given to the employee where he cannot be expected to remain 
longer. This basic idea is shared by the six legal systems, but there 
are great variations in detail. 
In France 538 there are no general statutory provisions, but the 
courts permit the employer to dismiss the employee on the spot if 
63
' Durand, supra note 533, at zxo-n. 
"
35 !d. at 227. 
086 CoDICE CIVILE art. 2II8 (Italy); Mengoni, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. 
supra note srS, at 242. 
637 This matter is highly complex and cannot be discussed here. Reference is made 
to Boldt, supra note 524, at 43 et seq. and to the discussions of the various legal sys-
tems in that volume. 
"""Law of Feb. n, 1950, art. 4, [1950] ].0. 1688 (Fr.); Durand, supra note 533, at 
203, 2II-I2. 
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he has been guilty of a faute gra7.:e, that is, a breach of duty such as 
breach of discipline, absenteeism, unauthorized work for another 
firm, and the like, the seriousness of the offense always being weighed 
against other factors such as seniority. Participation in a strike as 
such is no cause for dismissal and leaves the contract suspended but 
intact. In the case of some employees, for example, war pensioners, 
the employer must according to statute be able to prove very serious 
misconduct ( une faute tres grave). Special principles apply to con-
tracts on approval. 
In Germany 539 instantaneous dismissal is regulated by statute. 
Manual workers who have a right to a term of notice of two weeks 
or less-the normal case-can be dismissed on the spot only for 
certain specific reasons enumerated in the statute such as theft, at-
tacking or insulting the employer or his representative, or "persist-
ent refusal to fulfil their obligations" ( beharrliche A rbeits-P er-
weigerung). Persistent refusal to fulfil obligations may include 
participation in a strike. The worker may quit without notice forcer-
tain specific reasons, such as assaults and insults, non-payment of 
wages, and the like. Other employees, including commercial and 
salaried technical employees, can be discharged and can quit "for 
important reasons," a phrase which recurs in German legislation. It 
is interpreted as envisaging facts, whether or not caused by the 
fault of either side, so grave as to make it impossible to expect either 
side to continue the relationship. This does not include every breach 
of contract, but only serious breaches, and it certainly does not in-
clude a lack of orders for the product or a need for reducing per-
sonnel. The courts are very exacting in their interpretation of this 
phrase. 
In Belgium manual workers can be dismissed and can quit instan-
taneously for serious reasons 540 (juste motif), which in practice 
are much the same as the "important reasons" of German law. Bel-
gian statutes list certain situations to exemplify what such serious 
reasons are. Much the same applies to salaried employees, except 
that in the case of an instantaneous dismissal the employer must, 
within three days, let the employee know by registered letter the 
precise facts on which the dismissal is based. The law is similar in 
1539 GEWO paras. 123, 124, 124a, 133b-133d; HGB paras. 7o-72; BGB para. 626; 
Boldt, supra note 524, at 75-77. 
uo Law of Mar. 10, 1900, arts. 16, 20, 21, [1900] Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux 
de Belgique 76, as amended by the Law of Mar. 4, 1954, [1954] Moniteur Beige 1770; 
Law of Aug. 7, 1922, arts. 18, 20, 21, [1922] Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux de Bel-
gique 864, as amended by the Law of Mar. n, 1954, [1954] Moniteur Beige 2078; 
Horion, supra note 519, at uo-22, 135-36. 
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Luxembourg, except that the dismissal or the termination of the 
contract bya manual or clerical worker must be based on a grave 
default by the other party to the employment contract.541 In the 
Netherlands 542 either side can terminate the contract for "urgent 
reasons" and can obtain a judgment for the termination of the con-
tract for "important reasons." "Urgent reasons" in the Netherlands 
means much the same as faute grave in France, or "important rea-
sons" in Germany. A strike does not automatically terminate the 
contract, but is generally an "urgent reason" for the employer to 
discharge the strikers.543 In Italy 544 either side can terminate a con-
tract made for an indefinite time, if the other side has committed a 
grave breach of contract. 
3· SOCIALLY UNJUSTIFIED DISMISSALS 
The principle of "job security" requires that an employee should 
be either indemnified or reinstated if the employer abused his right 
of discharge and acted in a way which is socially unjustified. This 
principle has been given effect, especially in French, German, and 
Dutch legislation, and it is not completely absent, though much at-
tenuated, in the laws of Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In all 
these situations it is assumed that the employer has given the requi-
site notice. If he has not, he will in France,545 and may in Ger-
many,546 be liable to pay a double indemnity: for the period of notice 
and for abuse of right. Except in the Netherlands, 547 the principles 
here under discussion do not apply where the employee terminates 
the contract. 
In France 548 the employer must compensate but need not re-
instate, the employee if the discharge constitutes an abusive dismis-
sal (rupture abusive). In the course of the many years since this 
principle was first introduced, the courts have gradually enlarged 
its scope until it now means that the employer must compensate the 
employee if he has dismissed him in circumstances in which a reason-
able employer would not have done so. According to the case law, 
however, the employee bears the burden of proof. 
6
" Kayser, supra note 53 r, at 289, 294· 
042 FORTANIER & VERAART, op. cit. supra note 437, at 56-57. 
643 Molenaar, supra note 530, at 302. 
"" ComcE CIVILE art. 2119 (Italy) ; Mengoni, supra note 536, at 243-44. 
"'"Durand, supra note 53 3, at 224. 
646 Law on Protection in the event of Dismissals, Aug. ro, 1951, para. rr, [1951] 
BGBI. I, 499 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), Normally there will be only one indemnity . 
.,
7 Molenaar, suPra note 530, at 308. 
"'"CoDE DU TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 23; Durand, supra note 533, at 22o-24. 
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French law has adopted this means of attempting to do what 
the United States tries to achieve by counteracting "unfair labor 
practices" on the one hand, and by giving effect to seniority princi-
ples on the other. Some of the cases in which the employer has had to 
pay indemnity were, for example, plainly cases of discrimination; 
others were cases of personal hardship of the employee. Apart from 
the protection by statute of more senior employees against abusive 
dismissal, there are also special arrangements under collective agree-
ments to protect older employees. 
The German principle 549 of Kiindigungs-Schutz or protection 
against "socially unjustified dismissals" goes much further. It enables 
all except managerial employees, who are more than 20 years old 
and have had more than six months' uninterrupted employment in 
a plant normally employing more than five employees, to ask the 
labor court within three weeks of their discharge to declare the 
discharge socially unjustified and therefore invalid. It is socially un-
justified if it is not required by reasons connected with the person or 
conduct of the employee or by urgent needs of the enterprise. All 
this the employer has to prove, but even if he establishes the urgent 
needs of the enterprise, it is open to the employee to prove that, in 
selecting the employees to be discharged, the employer took insuf-
ficient account of social factors, for example, of seniority. The em-
ployer may then show that the discharge of a particular employee 
was technically or economically necessary. If the labor court finds 
that the complaint is justified, it declares that the contract was not 
terminated by the discharge. Except in certain cases, it must at the 
same time at the request of either side (which is frequently made) 
terminate the contract of employment as of a date it considers ap-
propriate and fix the compensation (up to one year's wages) which 
the employer must pay to the employee. 
Before invoking the jurisdiction of the labor court, the employee 
may put the matter before the works council. If the council thinks 
the complaint is justified, it should attempt a settlement with the 
employer. Moreover, the works council must be consulted before 
each discharge 550 and, although a violation of this obligation does 
not render the discharge void, it will probably make it socially un-
justifiable in the eyes of the labor court. Whether the powers of the 
049 Law on Protection in the Event of Dismissals, Aug. 10, 1951, paras. 1-3, 7-8, 12, 
21, [1951] BGBI. I, 499 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
550 Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. II, 1952, para. 66(1), [1952] BGBI. I, 681 
(Ger. Fed. Rep.). This applies only in plants with more than 20 employees. 
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works council can be enlarged by collective agreement is a moot 
point much debated by German lawyers. 551 
In the Netherlands protection against manifestly unreasonable 
termination of the contract by either employer or employee was in-
troduced in I954.552 A discharge is manifestly unreasonable if no 
reason is given, the stated reason for it is a pretext, or the reasons 
for it are false, or if, in view of the difficulties of finding another 
job, the hardship inflicted upon the employee by the termination of 
the contract outweighs the employer's interest in terminating it, or 
if the employee is discharged for complying with his military obliga-
tions, or if, except for serious reasons, the employer in discharging 
the employee has contravened a regulation or usage concerning 
seniority. The termination of the contract by the employee is mani-
festly unreasonable if he has no reasons or his reasons are a pretext 
or false, or if the consequences of the employee's quitting the job 
are so serious from the employer's point of view as to outweigh the 
employee's interest in giving up his job. The judge fixes the com-
pensation payable by the party whose action is manifestly unrea-
sonable, but he may also order him to resume the employment re-
lationship. The Netherlands is one of the few countries where what 
corresponds to the penalties for contempt of court by reason of non-
compliance with a decree of specific performance can be used to en-
force a contract of employment. The importance of this legislation 
of I954 is, however, overshadowed by the need for obtaining the 
consent of the Regional Employment Exchange prior to the termi-
nation of a contract of employment. 
No legislation corresponding to that concerning abusive dismis-
sal in France, or socially unjustified dismissal in Germany, or mani-
festly unreasonable termination of the contract in the Netherlands 
exists in the three other countries of the Community. In Belgium 553 
an employer who gives the proper notice is liable to indemnify the 
employee only if there is a real "abuse of right," for example, if he 
has been dismissed for demanding payments due to him or if an 
innocent employee has been accused of theft. The works councils 
have nothing to do with individual dismissals but must cooperate in 
1>51 See DIETZ, BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ, MIT WAHLORDNUNG n. 12 to para. 66, at 
5II (znd ed. 1955); Boldt, supra note 524, at 78. 
552 This was introduced by the Law on Discharge, Dec. 17, 1953, [1953] Stb. No. 619, 
which amended the Law on Contracts of Employment, July 13, 1907, [1907] Stb. No. 
193 (Neth.). See Molenaar, supra note 530, at 308-10; FoRTANIER & VERAART, op. cit. 
supra note 437, at 6o-6x . 
... Horion, supra note 519, at u8, 166. 
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defining general rules to govern engagements and dismissals in the 
plant. In Luxembourg 554 collective agreements prohibit dismissals 
by reason of union membership or activities, and special indemnities 
are payable under statute to salaried employees dismissed after long 
service. They amount to two months' salary after I 5 years, four 
months after 20 years, and six months after 2 5 years. In the event 
of a discharge without notice the works councils must be informed of 
the grounds of dismissal. 
In Italy 555 there are some rare cases in which, according to the 
general principles of the law of contract, the dismissal may be void 
by reason of illegality or immorality, but this is of little practical 
importance. Apart from some special statutory provisions for cer-
tain branches of the economy, what is of interest is the restriction 
which the law imposes on the power of the employer to dismiss an 
employee during sickness, or a female employee during pregnancy 
and during the first few weeks after confinement. During a lawful 
strike the strikers, whose contracts of employment are suspended, 
may not be discharged.556 More important even than this are anum-
ber of statutory provisions imposing upon the employer an obliga-
tion to pay "seniority compensation," except in the event of a serious 
breach of contract by the employee or in cases in which he volun-
tarily quits his job.557 Of principal interest and importance, however, 
are the three "ipter-industrial" collective agreements of October 
I 9 5o and May I 9 53 of which the one in force since October I 8, 
I950, is here relevant.558 According to this agreement any employee 
who has been discharged can lodge a protest with his union, and 
if the union does not arrive at a settlement with the employer, the 
matter is sent to arbitration. If the arbitration board judges the em-
ployee's complaint to be justified, it can impose on the employer an 
obligation either to re-engage the worker or to pay an indemnity. 
This applies only in undertakings with more than 35 workers. The 
"works committees" which used to play an important role in dis-
charge procedures under previous collective agreements are no 
longer concerned with them. 
GM Kayser, supra note 531, at 292--93; Decree on Workers' Delegations, Oct. 30, 1958, 
art. 20(1), [1958] Pasin. Lux. 564. See also Law of June 7, 1937, art. 22(4), [1937] 
Pasin. Lux. 119. 
655 Mengoni, supra note 536, at 236-38. 
006 I d. at 245-51. 
'"''I d. at 253-55. 
""
8 Aranguren, supra note 483, at 245-72; Mengoni, supra note 536, at 274-'76. 
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4· DISMISSALS SUBJECT TO CONSENT 
In a number of important situations the employer must have the 
consent or authorization of some authority, whatever his motive 
for discharging the employee. He is often spared the necessity of ob-
taining such consent or authorization, however, if the employee 
was guilty of a serious breach of discipline or the employer for some 
other reason would have been entitled to dismiss the employee on 
the spot. 
In the Nether lands 559 neither the employer nor the employee can 
terminate the contract of employment without the authorization of 
the Director of the Regional Employment Office. This does not 
apply where the contract of employment is terminated not by uni-
lateral notice but by mutual consent or where either side has an 
"urgent reason" for putting an immediate end to the contract. The 
need for authorization by the Director of the Regional Employment 
Office arises from one of the provisions of the Extraordinary De-
cree on Labor Relations of 1945 560 designed to counteract infla-
tionary tendencies by regulating the labor market. If either side 
purports to terminate the contract by notice without having obtained 
this authorization, he committs an offense and is liable to imprison-
ment up to six months or to a fine up to 1o,ooo florins. Moreover, 
the contract continues, the employer is liable to pay wages and the 
employee to work, and these obligations can be enforced by court 
order. Here, then, the validity of the termination of the contract 
depends on the decision of an administrative authority. In fact, how-
ever, the procedure is more "judicial" than at first appears. The 
Regional Employment Office consults the organizations on both 
sides and the Labor Inspector. In the more important cases the 
matter is submitted to a "discharge committee" which hears the 
parties and tries to bring about an understanding-successfully, 
it is said, in about 40 percent of the cases. If unsuccessful, the dis-
charge committee sends a recommendation to the Employment Of-
fice on which the latter acts. This recommendation is, so we are 
told, usually made unanimously. 
The authorities, including the "discharge committees," apply pub-
lished directives issued by the Labor Department. The policies 
it pursues are intended to ensure a distribution of labor designed to 
559 Molenaar, supra note 530, at 300; FoRTANIER & VERAART, op. cit. supra note 437, 
at 58-59. 
"""Extraordinary Decree on Labor Relations, Oct. 5, 1945, art. 6, (1945] Stb. No. 
F 214 (Neth.). 
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guarantee the ~1aximum of production and to promote peaceful 
labor relations. Moreover, the "discharge committees," which deal 
with some so,ooo cases a year, consider the interests of both sides, 
including matters such as seniority, the employee's age, and whether 
it is more or less hopeful to attempt to restore the relationship be-
tween the parties. Hence the matters taken into account in this pro-
cedure coincide to some extent with those to be taken into account 
by a court when asked to decide whether the termination of the con-
tract is "manifestly unreasonable." This parallelism of judicial and 
administrative procedures is criticized by Dutch writers.561 
A French Order of I 94 5, also requires the employer to obtain the 
consent of the employment office 562 to hiring and discharges in in-
dustrial and commercial undertakings. Except in industry and com-
merce no consent is required, but in some cases the employment 
office must be notified. In industry and commerce such consent is re-
quired even where the discharge, or termination of the contract by 
the employee, is based on faute grave of the other party. In such 
cases, however, the office must make its decision in three days, 
whereas normally it has a week to do so. If no answer is given within 
the required period, consent is deemed to have been given. If con-
sent is refused, reasons must be given, and against the decision 
there lies an appeal to a higher administrative authority (Directeur 
Departmental du Travail) who hears a consultative committee in 
which both sides of industry are represented. An infringement of 
the provisions of this legislation is a criminal offense, but in radical 
contrast to the Nether lands, infringement in France has no effect on 
the validity of the contract or of its termination by notice. Another 
difference from the Dutch law consists in the exclusively economic 
(labor market) nature of the policies to be taken into account by the 
authorities who are not concerned with the social situation at all. 
Nevertheless, the employer commits an offense if he discharges an 
employee without the necessary authorization, whether he does so 
for economic reasons, for example, because he must reduce his 
personnel-or for other reasons, for example, because of a breach 
of discipline on the part of the employee. These rules have been 
developed by the somewhat complicated case law of the highest 
French courts. 
No legislation of this kind exists in the other four countries, ex-
cept in the case of lay-offs of large numbers of employees. In all 
561 Molenaar, supra note 530, at 311. 
562
2 DURAND 187-98; E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 2I2-I4j 
BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note 469, at 595-600. 
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countries 563 the employer must notify the employment office of each 
case of a discharge or other vacancy, and in Belgium this includes 
a notification of the grounds on which the employee was dismissed. 
The office may make inquiries, and by negotiating with the employer 
sometimes produces a settlement where discharge was unjustified. 
In Germany, Italy, France, and Luxembourg special provisions 
regulate "mass dismissals"; these provisions are partly contained in 
statutes and partly in collective agreements. No such legislation 
exists in Belgium or in the Nether lands. 564 In the Dutch Extraordi-
nary Decree of 1945 there is, however, a provision which prohibits 
the employer from reducing working hours to less than 48 per week, 
except in certain situations defined in the Decree. If he reduces the 
hours below 48, he nevertheless remains liable to pay the wages 
due for 48 hours of work. 
The most elaborate provisions protecting the labor market 
against the consequences of sudden mass dismissals have been en-
acted in Germany.565 With exceptions they apply to each plant em-
ploying more than 20 employees and are directed at discharges of 
five or more in plants with less than so employees, of IO percent or 
more than 2S employees in plants with at least so but fewer than 
soo employees, and of at least so employees in larger plants, not 
counting managerial staff and not counting instantaneous dismissals 
which are not affected by this legislation. The employer must first 
notify the works council and consult with it on ways of avoiding 
hardship. Next, he must notify the labor exchange in writing, and 
submit a statement of the views expressed by the works council. The 
contracts of employment terminate no earlier than one month after 
this notification, unless the Regional Labor Office decides otherwise. 
On the other hand, the Regional Labor Office may extend the period 
as much as another month, and may also permit the employer to 
shorten working hours during the period. The decisions of the 
Regional Labor Office are made by a committee on which both sides 
of industry are represented and which is presided over by the presi-
dent of the Regional Labor Office or his deputy. The purpose of 
these provisions is to "stagger" mass dismissals; the purpose of 
other provisions seeking to ensure that the works' council is con-
sulted and that no measures of this kind are taken without its con-
603 Boldt, supra note 524, at 39-40. 
664 Horion, supra note 519, at 166; Molenaar, supra note 530 at 306. 
666 Law of Aug. 10, 1951, paras. 15-18, 20, [1951] BGBI. 'I, 499 (Ger. Fed. Rep.): 
Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. II, 1952, paras. 66(2), 72-75, [1952] BGBI. I, 
681 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 
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sent is social rather than economic-that is, to protect the individual 
and not the labor market. The ultimate sanction for violation of 
the latter provisions may be the imposition on the employer of a 
duty to compensate employees who lose their jobs. 
In Italy corresponding measures have been introduced by collec-
tive bargaining rather than legislation. 566 A statutory provision was, 
however, enacted in I949 567 which provides that the employer may 
engage labor only through the employment exchange and that a 
discharged employee has, for a year after his discharge, a prior right 
to be considered for re-engagement by his former employer. The 
inter-industrial collective agreement of April 2 I, I 9 so (in force 
since October of that year) provides that an employer who wishes 
to reduce the number of his employees because of a contraction of 
business or because of a change in production methods must notify 
the regional organizations (union and employers' associations) and 
the discharges are suspended for the two weeks following this noti-
fication. Within these two weeks negotiations take place to regulate 
the order of discharges, taking into account the economic interests 
of the enterprise on the one hand and such matters as seniority and 
family status of the employees on the other. If no settlement is ar-
rived at, the employer may nevertheless, in accordance with the 
provisions of the agreement mentioned above, be liable to pay in-
demnities to the individual employees if he ignores the social con-
siderations which it is incumbent upon him to observe. The essential 
features of the procedure applicable to mass dismissals are the need 
for notification and the postponement of their effectiveness. Special 
rules apply to small undertakings. If an employer starts to re-engage 
labor after a mass dismissal, he is bound by the rule: "last out-
first in." 
In France the order of discharges in the event of mass dismissals 
is determined by collective agreement (and an agreement capable 
of "extension" must contain such provisions) 568 or by a works rule 
( reglement interieur) which, in the absence of a relevant collective 
agreement, must be issued by the employer,569 and must take ac-
count of seniority and family status. In practice much has been done 
to regulate these matters by collective bargaining, including agree-
ments which provide for compensation.570 
""" Mengoni, supra note 536, at 278-79. 
"
67 I d. at 251-52. 
•••conE ou TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31{g) (3). 
569 Ordinance of May 24, 1945, art. 10, [1945] J.O. 2970 {Fr.). 
570 Durand, supra note 533, at 217. 
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In Luxembourg 571 the employer must notify the National Labor 
Office if he wishes to discharge more than 10 employees at a time 
and the discharges do not take effect until the end of the fourth week 
after this notification, a period which can be reduced, or extended 
up to six weeks by the Minister of Labor. Those discharged have a 
prior right to be re-hired-that is, a right to damages if they are 
not re-hired in preference to hiring others. The employer must, un-
der statute,572 notify the workmen's delegations, and, under collec-
tive agreements, the organizations on both sides, in the event of in-
tended mass dismissals. 
Certain categories of employees enjoy special protection in all 
the six countries. Most important among these are the members, 
and candidates for membership, of works councils and similar 
bodies, as has been indicated. Other provisions protect disabled per-
sons, women during pregnancy or during the first few weeks after a 
confinement, sick employees and the like. 573 
APPENDIX 
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS : A SKELETON SURVEY 
574 
A. BELGIUM 
I. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Comprises all employees. Contribution conditions (minima of 
contribution periods) must be fulfilled. Duration (exceptions apart) 
unlimited. Rate varies with age, sex, family status, the occupation 
of the wife, and the classification of the place of residence from the 
point of view of the cost of living. Special payments in case of short 
time work and of short time interruption of work. Financing: Con-
tribution of 2 percent of wages and (up to 6o,ooo francs per year) 
rmKayser, supra note 531, at 287, 294-95; Law on National Labor Office, June 30, 
1945, art. 12(2), [1945] Pasin. Lux. 310. 
""'Decree on Worker's Delegations, Oct. 30, 1958, art. 20(2), [1958] Pasin. Lux. 564. 
573 For details of these measures, see Coal-Steel Community publication cited in note 
518 supra. 
574 This skeleton survey is largely based on the two volumes of monographs on the 
systems of social security applicable to the employees in the Coal and Steel Industries 
in the Community and in Great Britain, published by the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. 
From the very large literature on the subject the two short works by Rouast & Durand, 
SEcURITE SociALE ( 1958), and by Caesar, SoZIALVERSICHERUNG in Schaeffer's GRUN-
DRISS No. 40 ( 1958) may be useful to readers of this book in view of their succinctness, 
They are also up to date, 
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of salaries, half paid by employer, half by employee. State supple-
ment. Organization: National Institute for Labor Exchanges and 
Unemployment Benefit (Office National du Placement et du Cho-
mage.) 
2. SICKNESS, DISABILITY, AND MATERNITY BENEFITS 
Covering all manual workers and salaried employees and mem-
bers of family. Contribution conditions to be fulfilled. For insured 
and family: medical (including hospital, pharmaceutical, dental, 
maternity) service. For insured only: cash benefit, 6o percent of 
wages up to six months, then disability benefit of varying amounts 
without time limit. Maternity grant of 200 francs, and for insured 
women 6o percent of lost wages six weeks before and six weeks after 
confinement. Contributions: For manual workers 7 percent of wages, 
3·5 percent paid by employer, 3·5 percent by worker; for salaried 
employees 6 percent, 2.75 percent paid by employee, 3.25 percent 
by employer, but not beyond 6o,ooo francs per year. National Un-
ions of recognized Local and Regional Insurance Funds, and Auxil-
iary Insurance Fund coordinated by National Insurance Fund (Sick-
ness, Disability). 
3· FAMILY ALLOWANCES 
Covering all employees. Payment either I 2.50 francs per day for 
the first and second child, 17.20 for third, 2 1 for fourth and 2 7. So 
francs for fifth and further children, or in monthly total amounts of 
3 I 5 for first and for second, 430 for third, 52 5 for fourth child, 
69 5 for fifth and further children, with special rates if father sick, 
or victim of accident, or if child an orphan. Payments continue until 
child at end of school age or he reaches age 2 I in case of further 
education. Maternity grant: I 8oo francs for first birth, 900 for 
second and each subsequent birth. Special payment of four francs 
per day for first and two francs for each subsequent child (or 100 
and 50 francs respectively per month) if mother not gainfully em-
ployed. Local and mutual funds coordinated in National Fund for 
Family Allowances. Contribution: Employer pays 7·5 percent of 
wages. Considerable state supplement. 
4· OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS' PENSIONS 
Completely reformed in I 9 55. Separately organized for manual 
workers (National Fund for Retirement and Survivors' Pensions-
Caisse N ationale des Pensions de Retraite et de Survie) and for sala-
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ried employees (Various Funds). Contribution for manual work-
ers 8.5 percent of which 4.25 percent paid by employer and 4.25 
percent by employee; for salaried employees I 0.2 5 percent of which 
6 percent paid by employer, 4.25 by employee. Considerable state 
supplement. All employees covered. Old age pension for men from 
age 65, women age 6o, provided they have retired from work. Un-
der system inaugurated in I955, which is being gradually introduced, 
amount of pension equal to 7 5 percent (in certain cases 6o percent) 
of ~5 (in case of women ~0 ) of the aggregate of the remuneration 
received by the beneficiary during the years taken into account. 
This adapted to purchasing power (retail price index). Also wid-
ow's benefit. 
5· ACCIDENTS 
No system of social insurance, but absolute liability imposed on 
employers, as in U.S. workmen's compensation law, for accidents in 
course of employment including way to and from work and for pre-
scribed industrial diseases, excluding civil liability. Covers all em-
ployees. Insurance against accident liability optional, but only pos-
sible with licensed insurance companies (of which there are 7 5) or 
one of the I 6 licensed mutual insurance societies. In fact 99 percent 
of employers insured (state guarantee fund in case of insolvency of 
non-insured employers). Insurance against liability for occupational 
diseases in fact compulsory with Fonds de Prevoyance to which 
contributions payable. Insured employer exonerated, insurer directly 
liable to victim. Benefits: medical services including hospital, phar-
maceuticals, and orthopedic care. Pension amounting in some cases 
to IOO percent, in others to 90 or So percent of last annual wage, 
maximum I 20,000 francs. In case of fatal accidents or disease, fu-
neral grant and pensions for widows, orphans and other relatives. 
Premiums payable by employers according to risk, e.g.) in iron and 
steel industry, average 4·5 percent of wages, plus payment to cover 
occupational diseases fixed by decree, varying between I 5 and about 
20 francs per worker per year. 
B. FRANCE 
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
a. Organization 
(a) Local, Regional, and National Social Security Funds linked 
in National Federation of Social Security Organizations, dealing 
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with all branches of insurance except old age and survivors' pen-
sions. (b) Regional Old Age Pensions Funds. (c) Local Family Al-
lowances Funds, linked in National Union of Family Allowances 
Funds. 
b. Financing 
For all branches of social security except industrial accidents and 
diseases and family allowances, global contribution of I 6 percent of 
wages (up to 66o,ooo francs per year) of which I o percent paid by 
the employer, 6 percent by the employee; for family allowances, 
I 6. 7 5 percent of wages, paid by employer; for accidents and dis-
eases, variable rates in accordance with degree of industrial risk. 
c. Coverage 
All employees without ceiling, provided they have fulfilled con-
tribution conditions. 
2. UNEMPLOYMENT 
No statutory unemployment insurance, but unemployment assist-
ance paid by municipal authorities, and, since January, 1959, a 
scheme of unemployment insurance agreed between unions and em-
ployers' associations which may be declared binding on all employers 
and employees. Contribution: I percent of wages, o.8 percent paid 
by employer, 0.2 percent by employee. Payment up to nine (in 
certain cases I 2) months of 3 5 percent of last relevant wages, a 
maximum of 80-90 percent which is constituted of payments out 
of agreed insurance plus public unemployment assistance. 
3· SICKNESS, MATERNITY, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE 
Medical services including hospital, maternity, pharmaceutical, 
dental. For insured, wife, children and certain other family mem-
bers in the household. No time limit as long as insured remains in 
insurance. Expenses other than most maternity expenses not com-
pletely covered; maximum of So percent of doctor's and other 
charges covered, and in the majority of cases a lower percentage. 
Sickness benefit in cash up to three (in certain cases up to four) 
years; on principle one half of "basic wage," in case of three chil-
dren, two thirds, reduced in case of hospitalization. Payable to 
women six weeks before, eight after confinement. In case of disabil-
ity, i.e., reduction of working capacity by at least two thirds, full 
medical expenses and pension of (depending on nature of cas·e) 30, 
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40 or up to So percent of average of last IO years wages to age 6o 
when old age pension begins. 
4· FAMILY ALLOWANCES 
Covers entire working population and those who for acknowl-
edged reasons refrain from working. Basic allowance for each fam-
ily with at least two children under I6 (if apprenticed, I7, or if 
studying or incapacitated, 20) 22 percent of basic wage plus 33 per-
cent for each further child, plus certain additional payments to make 
up for former tax advantages. Basic salary fixed regionally in ac-
cordance with cost of living. Paid monthly. Where only one member 
of family gainfully employed (e.g., husband) further payment 
ranging in accordance with number and age of child or children, 
from S to so percent of basic wage. (This payable also where only 
one child, in some cases where no child in the family.) Prenatal al-
lowances for pregnant women, and maternity grants (twice basic 
salary for second, and four-thirds basic salary for each additional, 
birth). Also other benefits such as rent subsidies and removal sub-
sidies. 
S. OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS' PENSIONS 
Present system inaugurated in I94S 1 but transitional systems con-
tinue for older pensioners. Under definitive system entitlement from 
age 6o for all those having insurance record of at least IS years and 
from age 6s for those having record of more than five and less 
than IS years. Percentage of basic wage (meaning here average 
of last IO years) up to 66o,ooo francs per year, with allowances 
for devaluation of the franc. The percentage varies according to 
contribution record from 20 to 40, plus increments for spouse, chil-
dren etc. If contribution record less than IS years but more than s 
years, calculation in terms of percentage of contributions paid 
(rente as distinguished from pension). Special and supplementary 
allowances have to be paid on large scale by government. Also death 
(funeral) grant, and widows' and widowers', but no other survi-
vors' pensions. 
6. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND DISEASES 
Financed from employers' contributions varying according to 
size and nature of enterprise. Covering all employees with regard 
to accidents arising either out, or in the course, of employment 
(par le fait ou a I' occasion du travail) or with regard to one of the 
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diseases "recognized," i.e., prescribed as occupational diseases for 
the occupation of the particular employee. Benefits in kind: medi-
cal (as in case of health insurance) and rehabilitation services. In 
case of temporary incapacity, payment of so percent of basic wage 
for first 28 days, subsequently two thirds. Basic wage calculated on 
basis of last monthly earnings. In case of permanent incapacity per-
manent pension varying with degree of disablement, age, etc. In 
case of fatal accident or disease: costs of funeral, widows', orphans' 
and other special survivors' pensions. The civil liability of the em-
ployer is excluded, but not that of third parties. 
C. GERMANY 
I. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Comprises generally speaking all employees except the most 
highly paid salaried employees. Amount: regressive percentage of 
wages during last 13 weeks before loss of job ( 90 percent for lowest, 
S S percent for highest point of wage scale). Duration varies in ac-
cordance with contribution record. Minimum: 78 days, maximum 
468 days. Besides: payment of wage supplement in case of short 
work week (up to S 2 weeks) . Where no insurance, unemployment 
assistance with means test. Organization: Federal Institute for 
Labor Exchanges and Unemployment Insurance. Contributions: 
two percent of wages up to a maximum of I7S DM a week (7SO 
D M a month), borne So percent by the two parties to the contract 
of employment. 
2. SICKNESS BENEFIT (INCLUDING MATERNITY BENEFIT 
AND DEATH GRANT) 
Borne by local, regional and other sickness funds, comprising 
manual workers and salaried employees up to income 7,920 DM 
per year, granting insured and family medical and maternity serv-
ices (including hospital) and cash benefit, in principle so percent 
of basic wage plus increments. Contributions vary among sickness 
funds; average 6.1 percent. Borne so percent each by employer and 
employee, except lowest wage earners, where employer pays all. 
3· FAMILY ALLOWANCES 
40 DM for the third and each further child per month up to the 
age of 18 or, in case of full-time education, 2S. Organization: Fam-
ily Compensation Funds attached to Employers' Mutual Insurance 
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Institutes (Berufsgenossenschaften). Paid for employee!! by em-
ployer. Contributions vary between Mutual Institutes (estimated in 
1957 at average 1.1 percent of wages). 
4· PENSIONS (RENTENVERSICHERUNG) 
Completely reformed in 1957. Covering old age pension (from 
age 6 5), survivors' pension (widows', orphans'), disability (i.e., 
employability reduced by half or more) and unemployability. Cover-
ing all employees (and others). Organization: For manual workers 
(exceptions apart) : State (Land) Insurance Institutes; for salaried 
employees: Federal Insurance Institute. Principal benefits: (a) re-
habilitation, re-training, etc., (b) pensions varying with the average 
wages or salaries received during the 3 years preceding the first 
payment of pension, and with the number of years of contribution 
payments, plus certain increments. Percentages of various types of 
pensions different. Contribution 14 percent of wages of which em-
ployer and employee pay one half each (only of wages and salaries 
up to 9,6oo DM). 
5. ACCIDENT INSURANCE 
That is, insurance against accidents in the course of employment 
and occupational diseases covering, among others, all employees. 
Includes accidents on way to and from work. Only such diseases as 
prescribed by order recognized as occupational. Organization: Em-
ployers Mutual Insurance Institutes (Berufsgenossenschaften): 
compulsory and statutory. Benefits: medical treatment (all stages, 
hospital, etc.), rehabilitation, occupational therapy, assistance in 
finding employment, pension up to two thirds of last annual wages, 
varying with degree of disablement, death grant, widows' and or-
phans' benefit in case of fatal accident or diseases. Mutual Insur-
ance Institutes supervise safety measures in industry. Employer and 
his agents civilly liable for damages only if convicted by criminal 
court for intentionally causing accident (broader liability in case 
of road accidents), but liable to Mutual Insurance Institute (also 
to sickness fund, etc.) to refund moneys disbursed on proof of in-
tention or negligence. Contributions paid to Mutual Insurance In-
stitutes by employers alone, varying for each employer in accordance 
with rate of wages paid, number of employees and the "risk cate-
gory" to which the plant belongs, i.e., the magnitude of the accident 
risk and risk of diseases. There may be incremental payments in 
case of bad accident record, and reductions in case of good accident 
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record. The average was, in I 9 55, calculated at I percent of wages 
or salaries. 
D. ITALY 
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
a. Organization 
Three principal organizations (at national, provincial, local 
levels): National Institute for Social Security (/stituto Nazionale 
della Previdenza Sociale: l.N.P.S.) :unemployment insurance, fam-
ily allowances, old age, disability and survivors' insurance, tuber-
culosis insurance. National Institute of Health Insurance (/stituto 
N azionale Assicurazione M alattie: /.N.A.M.) : sickness and ma-
ternity benefit. National Institute for Insurance against Industrial 
Accidents (/stituto Nazionale Assicurazione lnfortuni sul Lavoro: 
J.N.A .I.L.) : industrial accidents and occupational diseases. Some 
minor organizations, e.g., National Unit for Insurance of, and As-
sistance to, Orphans of Italian Workers (Ente Nazionale per la 
Previdenza e l' A ssis tenza agli Orfani dei Lavoratori l taliani, 
E.N.A.O.L.J.). Also the Social Housing Programme: /.N.A.-
C.A.S.A. 
b. Financing 
Two kinds of contributions: absolute and percentage. Unemploy-
ment, old age, disability, survivors' and tuberculosis insurance: ab-
solute contributions ( contributi base) paid by employer from 8 lire 
in case of wages up to 2,500 per week to 53 lire in case of wages of 
more than 27,700 per week, and percentage contributions (contri-
buti integrativi) I4.70 percent of wages, of which 3.05 percent 
borne by employee, rest by employer. Health, maternity, orphans' 
insurance: no absolute contributions, 6.93 percent of wages paid 
by employer, o. I 5 percent (for health insurance) by employee. 
Accident insurance: contribution approximately 3.70 percent paid by 
employer. Social Housing program: I. I 5 percent paid by employer, 
0.57 percent paid by employee. Family allowances and supplement 
for workers working shortened week: 33·9 percent of wages up to 
ceiling of 900 lire per day for men, 7 so for women, paid by em-
ployer. (The percentage is only seemingly high, in view of the very 
low ceiling.) State subsidies to various branches of insurance. 
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c. Coverage 
All employees. 
2. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Total unemployment: If contribution conditions fulfilled, basic 
benefit proportionate to contributions paid during last year, plus 
supplement of 200 lire per day and certain family increments, e.g., 
children, spouse, etc. Maximum I So days per year. If contribution 
conditions not fulfilled-only for localities and occupations pre-
scribed by Minister of Labor, and subject to willingness to undergo 
re-training etc.-220 lire per day plus increments for 90 (in excep-
tional cases I So) days per year. Partial unemployment: for cer-
tain industries in case of reduction of hours below 40 per week two 
thirds of the wages which would have been payable for the 25th to 
40th hour per week (no time limit), and, in case of temporary lay-
off, normally up to one month (extension up to I 3 weeks) two-thirds 
of I 6 hours' wages per week. In addition: unemployment assistance 
in case of need. Re-training of unemployed under Ministry of Labor. 
J. SICKNESS, MATERNITY, AND FUNERAL BENEFITS 
Contribution conditions must be fulfilled. Comprises services of 
general practitioner, hospital, pharmaceutical and (within a financial 
limit) dental services for insured and family, subject to a time limit 
of (exceptions apart) I So days per calendar year. Sickness benefits 
for up to ISO days amounting to so percent of average wage of last 
month or quarter, reduced if insured hospitalized. Special rule for 
tuberculosis: no time limit, cash benefit payable only during sana-
torium treatment and for up to one year after, and fixed in absolute 
figures (with family increments), irrespective of wages earned. Ma-
ternity: medical, etc. services plus So percent of wages for three 
months prior to expected confinement and eight weeks after confine-
ment. Funeral benefit in certain cases. 
4· FAMILY ALLOWANCES 
Payable to all employees while employed, or if sick up to I So 
days (in some cases three months) amounting (in industry and 
trade) to 4,342 lire per month with respect to each child up to I 4 
(or IS and in some cases 2 I, if living in the house and not gainfully 
employed) (in some cases this covers brothers, sisters, grandchi 1-
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dren), J,OI6lire per month with respect to wife, unless in receipt of 
certain minimum income, or to husband, if incapable of self support, 
and I ,430 lire per month for each parent or other ascendant rela-
tive above a certain age and dependent on recipient of family allow-
ance. 
5· DISABILITY, OLD AGE, AND SURVIVORS' BENEFITS 
Disability benefits, provided contribution conditions fulfilled, for 
persons whose earning capacity reduced by at least one third, of 
unlimited duration: full medical service and cash benefit depending 
on contributions paid in the past, plus increment for children, mini-
mum 6o,ooo lire per year if beneficiary over, and 42,000 lire per 
year if under, 6 5. Reduced if beneficiary employed, in receipt of 
sanatorium treatment, or in receipt of industrial accident etc. bene-
fits. Old age pension for men from age 6o, women age 55, provided 
contribution conditions fulfilled, amount depending on contribu-
tions, with increments for children under I 8 and subject to same 
minima as disability pension. Reduction of pension in case of gain-
ful employment or treatment in sanatorium. Survivors' pension for 
benefit of widow or widower amounting to 50 percent of pension of 
deceased, for benefit of full orphan (in certain cases 20 in others 30 
percent of pension of deceased), and (exceptionally) for benefit 
of parent. In certain cases no survivors pension payable, payment of 
lump sum to survivors on death of insured. Orphans' benefit con-
sisting in educational and medical services for orphans administered 
by National Unit for Insurance of and Assistance to Orphans of 
Italian Workers, financed by employers' contributions and subsidies 
from various public funds. 
6. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND DISEASES 
Contributions payable by employers in accordance with risk of 
industry, varying from 2 to 7.6 percent of wages, average 3·7 per-
C:ent but payment of contribution not condition of benefit. Only un-
dertakings covered which use certain kinds of machinery (including 
those driven by steam, electricity, internal combustion) or belong 
to defined branches of activity (e.g., building, transport, and many 
others), in fact comprising major part of industry. Diseases only 
covered insofar as prescribed as occupational for particular occupa-
tions. Industrial accident defined as violent event in the course of 
employment leading to physical or mental injury, fatal or otherwise. 
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Way to and from work not generally included. Medical services in-
cluding orthopedic and rehabilitation. In case of temporary disabil-
ity compensation of five-ninths of average daily wage during two 
weeks preceding accident or onset of disease until cure, or com-
mencement of pension as below. In case of permanent incapacity, 
total or partial (i.e., at least IO percent disablement in case of ac-
cidents, 20 percent in case of disease), pension amounting to percent-
age (SS-IOO percent) of the last annual wage of beneficiary within 
a minimum of I35 ,ooo and a maximum of JOO,ooo lire, plus family 
increments and attendance supplement. Survivors' benefits for 
widow or widower, or, in certain cases, orphan children, or parents. 
Funeral benefits of varying amounts. 
E. LUXEMBOURG 
I. GENERAL 
One of the principal characteristics of the social security system: 
coexistence of two separate schemes of insurance, one for manual 
workers and one for salaried employees. These two schemes exist 
side by side in (I) health, maternity and funeral insurance, and 
( 2) disability, old age and survivors' pensions. The schemes of 
family allowances, industrial accident insurance and unemployment 
benefits are common for both categories. 
2. ORGANIZATION 
a. Health, Maternity, Funeral Insurance 
For manual workers: three regional sickness funds ( Caisses Re-
gionales de M aladie) acting through I 5 local offices and (in the 
iron and steel industry) seven plant-level private sickness funds 
(Caisse de Maladie d'Entreprises), linked in Union of Sickness 
Funds. For salaried employees: One statutory Sickness Fund for 
Employees, and three employer-owned sickness funds (in the iron 
and steel industry). · 
b. Old Age, Disability, Survivors' Pensions 
For manual workers: Old Age and Disability Insurance Board 
( Etablissement d' Assurance contre la Pieillesse et l' I nvalidite), 
part of the Social Insurance Office (Office des Assurances Sociales) 
which, for some purposes, acts through the Regional Sickness Funds 
(above). For salaried employees: Pensions Fund for Private Em-
ployees (Caisse de Pension des Employes Prives). 
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c. Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases 
Accident Insurance Society (Association d' Assurance contre les 
Accidents), part of the Social Insurance Office (above). 
d. Family Allowances 
Family Allowances Fund (Caisse de Compensation pour A !loca-
tions F amiliales) managed by the Old Age and Disability Insurance 
Board (above), and partly acting through the Regional Sickness 
Funds. 
e. Unemployment Compensation 
(There is no system of unemployment insurance proper) : N a-
tional Employment Office (Office National du Travail), acting for 
some purposes through its three local agencies, through the Re-
gional Sickness Funds, and through the municipalities. 
3· UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
No insurance. Financed 7 5 percent by state, 25 percent by munici-
palities. Covers all employees (manual and salaried), certain cate-
gories (e.g., seasonal workers, commercial travelers, agricultural 
workers) excepted, from age I 6 to 6 5, provided unemployment in-
voluntary, unemployed ready to accept work and employed for 200 
days during last I 2 months. No means test. For 26 weeks (in I 2 
months )-less in cases of foreign nationals-6o percent of normal 
wage or salary which is the basis for calculation of health insurance 
contributions, ceiling: 220 francs per day. Income from occasional 
work deducted, also other income above 25 percent of compensa-
tion. In certain cases also compensation for shortened working week. 
In addition re-training and other similar services. 
4· HEALTH, MATERNITY, FUNERAL INSURANCE 
Covers all manual workers and salaried employees, irrespective 
of wage or salary (and certain others). Financed out of contribu-
tions fixed by individual sickness funds, maximum (in case of man-
ual workers) 6. 7 5 percent, in fact 6 percent in case of Regional 
Funds, 5·4 percent in case of Plant Funds. Ceiling in case of manual 
workers 220 francs per day. Two thirds of contributions borne by 
employee, one third by employer. State supplement to administra-
tive expenses. Contribution conditions must be fulfilled. Medical 
services for insured and certain members of his family ( wife1 chil-
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dren in the house up to I 8 and in certain cases beyond, and other 
persons), including hospital, dental services, maternity care, and 
pharmaceuticals, with participation of insured in cost (in case of 
manual worker not beyond 25 percent). Time limit for hospital 
service. Funeral paid. Sickness benefits payable to insured or if in 
hospital, etc., to members of his family, normally 26 weeks, some-
times extended. Minimum so percent of wage or salary, can be 
increased by individual sickness fund up to 7 5 percent. Average 
66% percent. Payment to family in case of hospitalization at lower 
rates. At end of sickness benefit period disability pension may begin. 
Maternity benefit: cash payments six weeks before and six weeks 
after confinement, up to I 2 weeks for nursing mothers. 
5· FAMILY ALLOWANCES 
Covering all employees, financed by employers at varying rates 
of contribution, amounting in industry to 4·5 percent of wages (no 
ceiling). State supplement. Maternity grant 5 ,ooo francs for first 
birth, J,Ooo francs for subsequent confinements. For each child up 
to I 8 (beyond in case of incapacity) 444 francs per month and more 
for fifth and further children. Adapted to cost of living index. 
6. OLD AGE, DISABILITY, SURVIVORS' PENSIONS 
Covering all manual workers and, under separate legislation, 
generally speaking all salaried employees, irrespective of wage or 
salary. Financed by contributions of 5 percent of wages from em-
ployers and 5 percent of wages from employees plus state supple-
ment and supplement from municipalities. No ceiling for manual 
workers but ceiling of I 59,600 francs per year for salaried em-
ployees. If contribution conditions fulfilled, on reduction of earning 
power through sickness etc. by two thirds in case of manual workers, 
and on permanent inability to exercise usual or equivalent occupation 
in case of salaried empoyees ( invalidite) or, in case of manual 
workers on reaching age 6 5 (in certain cases 62, 6o or 58) and in 
cases of male salaried employees on reaching age 6 5 (in certain cases 
6o) and female salaried employees age 55, pension between mini-
mum and maximum depending on contribution record, plus family 
increments. Treatment for certain diseases and support of family 
during treatment. Survivors' pension for widow, orphans, in cer-
tain cases other relatives. Payment of funeral. 
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7· INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND DISEASES 
Covering all manual workers and salaried employees earning up 
to 90,000 francs per year. Financed by contributions (percentage 
of aggregate of wages and salaries in enterprise or plant in accord-
ance with category of risk to which it belongs, and fixed periodically, 
subject, in case of salaried employees, to salary ceiling of 90,000 
francs per year) paid by employers, plus state supplement. Indus-
trial accident defined (as in France) as accident arising either out 
of, or in the course of, employment. List of recognized occupational 
diseases. Industrial accident includes way to and from work. Bene-
fits: full medical treatment, payment of three-fourths of wages or 
salary for first I 3 weeks as long as victim is incapable of work, be-
yond this a pension of So percent of wage or salary in case of Ioo 
percent disablement, and correspondingly lower in case of partial 
disablement, plus family increments, funeral cost, survivors' pen-
sions. Other services in kind including rehabilitation. Civil action 
for damages excluded (as in Germany) except where employer 
convicted for causing accident intentionally. 
F. NETHERLANDS 
I. GENERAL: ORGANIZATION 
a. Health and Maternity Insurance: Medical Benefits 
The local (or regional) General Sickness Funds (Algemene Zie-
kenfondsen) organized on a mutual basis, or by employers or by in-
surance companies, etc., linked in a (national) Council of Sickness 
Funds which has a number of regulatory and other powers. Sick-
ness funds must be licensed by Minister of Social Affairs and Public 
Health. 
b. Health and Maternity Insurance: Cash Benefits, 
Family Allowances, Unemployment Insurance 
Twenty-six "joint industrial associations" ( Bedrijfsverenigingen) 
combining employer and employee representative and licensed by 
the Minister. Employers compelled to be members. Fifteen of them 
operate through a "Joint Office of Management." Central financial 
organ for family allowances: Family Allowances Compensation 
Fund. For unemployment insurance: General Unemployment Fund 
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c. Disability, Old Age, Survivors' Pensions, Industrial 
Accidents, and Occupational Diseases 
(Cash benefit) Social Insurance Bank (a public institution: So-
ciale Verzekeringsbank) acting through the 22 regional Labor 
Councils (Raden van Arbeid) each of which consists of three em-
ployer and three worker representatives and a full time chairman 
appointed by the Minister. 
d. Coordinating and Supervising Organ: Council 
of Social Insurance 
Responsible to Minister. (Note: calculation ceiling for all con-
tributions and all benefits: 19 florins per day.) 
2. UNEMPLOYl\IENT INSURANCE 
Covers all employees below age 6 5 not earning more than 6,900 
florins per year. Two kinds of benefit: Short unemployment ("sus-
pension") benefit for a minimum of 48 days (or more if rules of 
particular Joint Industrial Association so provide), and unemploy-
ment benefits proper for at least 7 8 days following upon the short 
unemployment benefit. Contribution conditions must be fulfilled. 
Amount: 6o percent to So percent of last wage (depending on age, 
sex, family status) up to I 9 florins per day. Financing: Short un-
employment benefit: equal contributions of employers and em-
ployees varying from industry to industry in accordance with risk 
(between 2 percent and 5.8 percent of wages payable by either side). 
Unemployment benefit proper: 1.2 percent of wages of which 0.4 
percent paid by employer, 0.4 percent by employee, 0.4 percent by 
state. Calculation ceiling 19 florins per day. In addition unemploy-
ment assistance financed by state, paid by municipalities. 
J. HEALTH AND MATERNITY INSURANCE 
Sharp distinction between medical services and cash benefits. 
Covers, generally speaking, all employees earning up to 6,900 florins 
per year. Medical services also cover unemployed, pensioners etc., 
and cover the spouse, children up to 16 (in certain cases 2 7), and 
(if living in the same household) certain other relatives of the in-
sured. Financing: Medical Services: 4· 2 percent of wages (up to 
19 florins per day) of which half paid by employer, half by em-
ployee. Cash benefit: contribution varying from industry to industry 
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between 2 percent and 4 percent of wages up to I 9 florins per day, of 
which one half but no more than I percent paid by employee, rest by 
employer. Medical services comprise those of general practitioner 
and specialist, and dental, hospital, sanatorium, midwifery services, 
and pharmaceuticals, etc. Sickness fund enters into standard con-
tract with medical and other practitioners (generally speaking no 
full time employment by sickness fund), who are entitled to enter 
into such contract. Claimant must be registered with a sickness fund. 
No further contribution conditions. Hospital up to 70 days, but 
90 percent of those insured have full coverage for small payment 
to sickness fund. Cash benefit: So percent of wage (up to I 9 
florins per day) and one-third of this(payable to family) if insured 
in hospital, for up to 52 weeks (in case of tuberculosis in some cases 
for three years). Maternity grant of 55 florins and maternity allow-
ance of I oo percent of wage or salary (up to I 9 florins per day) 
for six weeks before and six weeks after confinement. 
4· FAMILY ALLOWANCES 
Covering all employed persons and others, with respect to each 
child under I6 (in cases of incapacity or full time education up 
to 27) on ascending scale, 58 cents per day for first, 6 5 cents 
per day for second and third, 9 I cents per day for fourth and fifth 
and I 02 cents per day for sixth and further children. Financed by 
employer contribution of 5 percent of wage or salary up to I9 
florins per day. Special supplement of IO cents per child per day for 
employees earning less than I 6 florins per day. 
5. OLD AGE, DISABILITY, SURVIVORS' PENSIONS 
Distinguish between the general old age insurance for the entire 
population (employed or not) in force since I 9 57, and the special 
old age, disability, and survivors' insurance for employees. 
General insurance covering all persons resident or employed in 
the Netherlands between ages I 5 and 64, irrespective of income or 
nationality. Financing: Contribution of (until I962) 6.7 5 percent 
of total income, up to 7,450 florins annually, payable by insured and 
in case of employees deducted from wage or salary by employer and 
paid over by him. Right to pension from age 65: 972 florins an-
nually for single person, I, 5 84 florins for married couple. Condi-
tion: Payment of contribution for so years, but, generally speaking, 
all those over I 5 on January I, I 9 57, deemed, subject to certain con-
ditions, to have paid 50 years' contributions. Under final system 2 
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percent deducted for each year of non-payment. Amount of pension 
variable (adapted to wage index). 
Special (additional) insurance of all employees over I4 earning 
up to s,6oo florins per year, or having previously earned less, reach-
ing s ,6oo florins but no more than 6,900 florins (persons earning 
more can join voluntarily and pay their own contribution), no one 
over 3S can enter insurance for the first time. Financing: weekly 
contribution from 25 to 6o cents, payable by employer, amount 
depending on age and sex of employee, 6o cents for man, 50 
cents for woman over 21. Contribution condition: payment of 
I so contributions for disability pension. Benefits: old age pension 
from age 6 s, pension in case of disability (i.e., reduction of normal 
earning capacity by two-thirds or more whether permanent or, if 
exceeding six months, temporary) amounts varying with number of 
contributions paid plus certain family increments. In case of disa-
bility also special medical services. Widows' and orphans' pensions 
depending on amount of contributions paid. 
6. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND DISEASES 
(Special legislation applicable to seamen, agriculture, etc. not con-
sidered.) Normally (see above) through Social Insurance Bank, 
but employer may be authorized to insure through private insurance 
company or as self-insurer. Financing: contribution paid by em-
ployer in accordance with the "risk category" (there are 93) to 
which his plant belongs, percentage of wages up to I 9 florins per 
day. Covers all employees against risk arising from (fatal or non-
fatal) industrial accident, i.e., sudden event caused by external 
force and resulting in impairment of physical or mental integrity, 
in the course of employment, including during way to or from work, 
or from one of the prescribed industrial diseases. Benefits: medical, 
surgical, etc., treatment and re-training. In case of reduction of 
working capacity by at least so percent up to 42 days So percent of 
wages (up to I9 florins per day) (or one third of this if in hospital 
and without family). In case of total incapacity to work (after 42 
days) for I 2 months So percent of wages (up to I 9 florins per day) 
and after that 70 percent. In case of partial incapacity proportionate 
reduction, further reduction in certain cases of hospitalization, but 
up to Ioo percent in case a permanent attendant is needed. Fatal 
cases: funeral benefit and survivors' pensions for widow ( 30 per-
cent), orphans up to age I 6 (Is or 20 percent), in certain cases 
widower and certain relatives, aggregate to be no more than 6o per-
cent of wage (up to I 9 florins per day). 
Chapter VII 
New Legal Remedies of Enterprises: A Survey 
Eric Stein and Peter Hay* 
The Community system is conceived of as "a government of laws" 
rather than "a government of men." The Community Court of Jus-
tice is directed "to ensure observance of law and justice . . . in 
the interpretation and application" of the Treaty. Any other system 
would run counter to the basic principles underlying the democratic 
institutions of the six Member States and would be incompatible 
with their constitutions. A necessary component of this system is an 
adequate armory of legal remedies available to persons whose rights 
are unlawfully abridged by authorities administering the system. 
Economic rights and interests of persons-individuals and enter-
prises-engaged in economic activities in the Community may be 
affected in varying degrees by the acts of the Community institu-
tions as well as by the acts of national authorities acting pursuant 
to the Treaty or to a Community act. This applies to economic 
rights and interests of natural persons whether or not they are 
nationals of a Member State, as well as to legal persons whether or 
not they are organized under the laws of a Member State or of a 
non-member country if such persons are partly or wholly engaged 
in economic activities within the Community. Thus, for example, 
an American citizen doing business in the Community, a branch of 
an American company or a subsidiary of an American parent may 
be affected by these acts.1 The principal purpose of this chapter is 
*B.A., J.D., University of Michigan; Board of Editors, Michigan Law Review, 
1957-58; Research Assistant, University of Michigan, 1958-59; University of Michigan 
Foreign Law Fellow, Universities of Gottingen and Heidelberg, Germany, 1959-60; 
Instructor of Law, University of Michigan, 196o-61. 
[The authors are greatly indebted to Professor Paul Reuter of the Paris Law Faculty 
and to Mr. Michel Gaudet, Director of the Legal Services of the European Com-
munities, for their detailed and most helpful comments on this chapter.] 
1 Art. 196 of the Euratom Treaty defines the term "person" as used in that Treaty as 
"any natural person wholly or partly engaged in the territories of Member States 
in activities" falling within the scope of the Treaty and the term "enterprise" as 
"any enterprise or institution wholly or partly engaged in activities under the same 
conditions, whatever may be its public or private legal status." Art. 8o of the Coal-
Steel Treaty provides that the term "enterprise" as used in that Treaty "refers to any 
enterprise engaged in production in the field of coal and steel" within the Community 
territory; "and in addition, with regard to Articles 6 5 and 66 as well as information 
required for their application and appeals based upon them, to any enterprise or 
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to outline the legal remedies available to enterprises against these 
acts in the Community Court of Justice. Only brief reference is 
made to remedies available in national courts. A study of national 
remedies would entail an analysis of the procedural systems in the 
six Member States, a task which is entirely beyond the scope of this 
volume. Brief attention is given to legal remedies in suits based on 
contracts to which the Community is a party and on tortious acts 
imputed to the Community, as well as to the related conflict of laws 
problems. Finally, the salient features of the procedure before the 
Community Court and the Court's sources of law will be considered.2 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS OF THE COMMUNITY 
A. FORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTS 
In the areas of their responsibility, the Council of Ministers and 
the Commission adopt measures 3 which will be referred to here, 
for want of a better term, as administrative acts. This term must not 
obscure the fact that in form, content, and effect some of these acts 
may resemble national legislation more than national administrative 
measures. The effect of the administrative acts depends on whether 
they take the form of regulations, directives, decisions, recom-
mendations, or opinions. Of these, regulations resemble American 
federal statutes in that they establish general rules applicable di-
rectly and without national implementing legislation in the Mem-
ber States. Directives, on the other hand, are binding orders which 
may be addressed only to Member States; they bind the Member 
States as to the prescribed result but leave to each Member State 
the choice of the means and legal form of implementation of the 
order.4 Decisions are individual rather than general acts and differ 
from directives in that they may be addressed to an enterprise, as 
well as to a Member State, and are binding in all respects. 5 Recom-
organization regularly engaged in distribution other than sale to domestic consumers 
or to craft industries-." The E.E.C. Treaty contains no similar definitions. It would 
appear logical that the E.E.C. Treaty, like the two other Treaties, should be inter-
preted as applicable on the basis of the principle of territoriality. For the status of 
aliens in the Community countries generally see 57• CoNGRES DES NOTAIRES DE FRANCE, 
LE STATUT DE L'ETRANGER ET LE MARCHE COMMUN (1959). 
• The composition and jurisdiction of the Court was outlined in "The New Institu-
tions," Chapter II supra. 
3 Art. 189. 
• E.g., art. 69 provides for the implementation, by directives issued by the Council, 
of the provisions of art. 67 concerning the abolition of restrictions on the free move-
ment of capital. 
5 E.g., art. 79 (4) empowers the Commission to issue decisions to remove discrimina-
tion practiced by carriers. 
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mendations and opinions, finally, do not bind their addressees but 
constitute advice to Member States or enterprises in those instances 
in which the institutions have no power or do not choose to act with 
a binding effect.6 Recommendations and opinions are, nevertheless, 
of importance because of the expertise of the Community institu~ 
tions 7 and of the possible measures which may be taken if a recom~ 
mendation or an opinion is disregarded.8 
B. ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS 
AGAINST ENTERPRISES 
I. IMPOSITION OF PENAL TIES 
Failure to abide by a binding administrative act (regulation or 
decision) subjects an enterprise to the enforcement procedure. Nor~ 
mally, such an administrative act will be enforced by fining the de~ 
linquent enterprise.9 The E.E.C. Treaty does not expressly author~ 
ize enforcement by other means.10 
The Coal-Steel Community Treaty under which a number of fines 
have been imposed specifically authorizes the High Authority to 
impose penalties upon enterprises in a considerable number of in-
stances; it envisages either a single fine 11 or a series of daily fines 
for each day of continuing violation.12 The E.E.C. Treaty expressly 
requires penalties in one instance only: the Council must institute 
fines to ensure observance of the antitrust provisions.13 In addition, 
• Art. 189 last para. The characterization of recommendations as "advice" points 
up an interesting difference between them and the recommendations issued by politi-
cal international organizations where recommendations are issued in lieu of decisions 
and carry undeniable political weight. Nagel, Einige rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen 
zu den Empfehlungen der 1' ereinten N ationen, des Europarates und des Nordirchen 
Rates, 1958 lNTERNATIONALES RECHT UND DIPLOMATIE 223 at 234-235 (No. 3). 
7 Examples are the recommendations concerning liberalization of capital beyond 
the degree provided for by the Treaty (art. 71) and such technical problems as 
special transport charges for frontier traffic (art. 81). 
8 E.g., art. 91 (1) under which the Commission may authorize a Member State 
injured by dumping to take "protective measures" against "the originator" of dump-
ing who had disregarded the Commission's earlier recommendation to end the dumping. 
• For the special enforcement procedures of the antitrust provisions pending regula-
tion by the Council see Chapter X infra. 
10 The E. C. S.C. Treaty did provide for one such instance in art. 66 ( 5) under which 
illegal concentrations could be dissolved by forced sales and other measures. 
11 Ordnungsstrafe; compare E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 66 ( 6). 
"'This latter fine parallels the German concept of Zwangsgeld. E.C.S.C. Treaty 
art. 65 (5). 
13 "Geldbussen und Zwangsgelder," "amendes et ... astreintes," art. 87 (2a). The 
Treaty does, however, provide for other "measures" to assure compliance with Com-
munity policy apart from fines. Thus, art. 91 ( 1) provides that the Commission may 
authorize Member States to take "protective measures" when parties guilty of dump-
ing practices do not heed the Commission's recommendations. 
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however, the Treaty contains a general provision to the effect that 
the regulations adopted by the Council "may confer" on the Com-
munity Court "full jurisdiction in respect of penalties 14 provided 
for in such regulations." 15 Consequently, it would seem that the 
Council in any regulation may provide for penalties against enter-
prises and determine the respective roles of the Commission and 
of the Community Court in the imposition of penalties. Three pat-
terns seem possible. 
1) The Treaty requires the Commission to "exercise the com-
petence conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of 
the rules laid down by the latter." 16 Thus the Council may authorize 
the Commission to impose penalties on enterprises violating a Coun-
cil regulation. In accordance with the general procedure discussed 
below, the enterprise concerned may appeal the Commission decision 
to the Community Court which may either sustain or annul the pen-
altyP 
2) The Council may provide in its regulation that in hearing an 
appeal from a Commission decision imposing a penalty the Court 
exercises "full jurisdiction." 18 In that case the power of the Court 
will be substantially broader than its general power of review on 
appeal against administrative acts: the Court will act as a trial court 
and consider such factors as the seriousness of the violation, recidi-
vism, and the economic circumstances of the defendant. Moreover 
the Court will not be limited to confirming or annuling the penalty 
but will also be able to modify it.19 
""Zwangsmassnahmen," "sanctions." It should be noted that these terms are not 
limited to fines. 
16 Art. 172. Whether the Council may establish penalties and give the Court "full 
jurisdiction" with regard to them for violation of the antitrust provisions only ( cf. 
art. 87, 2a) or whether it may establish penalties for all its regulations and give the 
Court "full jurisdiction" with respect thereto, depends on how art. 172 is interpreted. 
The language of art. 172 admits of an extensive interpretation which appears pre-
ferable in order to render the Council's regulations effective. The meaning of "full 
jurisdiction" will be discussed later. 
18 Art. ISS· 
17 Art. 173. See Part II, Section A, Subsections 3-4, infra. 
18 Art. 172. 
19 Daig, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der 
Europiiischen Atomgemeinschaft, 44 ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 132, at 184-186 
(19s8) (hereinafter cited as Daig, ARCH. D. o. R.). Cf. E.C.S.C. Court competence of 
review under art. 36 and 66 (4) of the E.C.S.C. Treaty. See also case 8-56 [19s8] 
Journal Officiel de Ia Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de l'Acier 5, at 9· 
According to Daig, Die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der Europ'iischen Gemein-
schaft fiir Kohle und Stahl in den Jahren I956 und I957, 13 ]URISTENZEITUNG 204, 
at 207 (I9S8), this conceptual difference in the scope of review by the Court was 
modeled after French administrative law, which distinguishes between recours pour 
exces de pouvoir (appeal against administrative acts with ordinary scope of review) 
and recours de pleine juridiction ("full jurisdiction"). 
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3) The Council may determine that the penalties for infraction 
of its regulation should be imposed by the Court itself exercising 
"full jurisdiction" within the meaning described above. If this al-
ternative is adopted, the Commission presumably would act as 
prosecutor before the Court.20 
A further question arises, whether the Commission has an in-
dependent power to institute penalties for the violation of its own 
regulations or of Council regulations, without being authorized to 
do so by the Council.21 The Treaty contains no express provision 
- granting the Commission such power; it does accord the Commis-
sion a power "to ensure the application of the provisions of the 
Treaty and of the provisions enacted by the institutions of the 
Community in pursuance thereof" as well as "a power of decision 
of its own" but only "under the conditions laid down in this 
Treaty." 22 The Commission, composed of appointed and inde-
pendent administrators, is conceived of predominantly as an "exec-
utive" and not a "law-making" institution. It is, therefore, doubtful 
whether the Treaty could and should be interpreted so extensively as 
to accord the "executive" an implied independent power to prescribe 
penalties. 
The Council and, in case of disagreement, the Community Court 
will provide authoritative answers to these problems of Treaty in-
terpretation. But it may be safely concluded that the Council has 
the power to prescribe penalties for violation of any of its regula-
tions and to authorize either the Commission or the Court to impose 
such penalties. 
It has been suggested that in the antitrust field at any rate the 
Community Court exercising "full jurisdiction," rather than the 
Commission, should have the original authority to impose penalties 
because the Court's procedures more effectively safeguard rights of 
the affected enterprises.23 Under certain circumstances an enterprise 
""Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. 185. 
21 The conferral of such broad discretionary law-making powers, which are ordinar-
ily within the competence of the legislator, on the executive may also create difficulties 
with regard to the constitutionality of such acts under the constitutions of the Member 
States. This question has already been raised with regard to a regulation issued by 
the Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community. See Everling, Die ersten 
Rechtsetzungsakte der Organe der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 14 BETRIEBS-BERATER 
52 (1959) No. z, and Meibom, Die Rechtsetzung durch die Organe der Europiiischen 
Gemeinschaften, 14 BETRIEBS-BERATER 127 (1959) No. 4· 
The E.E.C. Council Regulations Nos. 3 and 4 concerning the social security of 
migrant workers, [1958] Journal Officiel 561, 597, have been said to raise questions of 
constitutionality in France. 
""Art. 155 para. 3· 
23 Nebolsine et a!., The "Right of Defense" in the Control of Restrictive Practices 
under the European Community Treaties, 8 AM. J. CaMP. L. 433 at 461 (1959). 
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may prefer, however, to "accept" a penalty imposed by the Com-
mission rather than to face the publicity of a public proceeding be-
fore the Court, particularly since the Commission may be more 
indulgent than the Court. 
2. COLLECTION OF MONETARY OBLIGATIONS 
Only those administrative acts which create monetary obligations 
are enforceable against an enterprise in the territories of the Mem-
ber States under an express provision of the E.E.C. Treaty. These 
acts include Council or Commission decisions creating monetary ob-
ligations or imposing fines for the violation of administrative acts.24 
These decisions as well as money judgments of the Community 
Court are enforceable in the Member States.25 Domestic authorities 
in the Member State where execution takes place are authorized by 
the Treaty only to require verification of the authenticity of the docu-
ment containing the decision or judgment. Once the document is 
verified they must grant execution in accordance with their own rules 
of civil procedure.26 Thus, the enforcement of judgments of the 
Community Court is quite different and substantially easier than the 
enforcement of foreign judgments. National courts cannot examine 
whether the Community Court had jurisdiction, whether, on the 
merits, the Community law was correctly applied, or whether the 
enforcement would-be contrary to the "public policy" of the forum. 27 
A collateral attack on Community acts or judgments therefore is 
not possible in the course of the enforcement procedure. Only the 
Community Court may suspend execution. 
"'Under the E.C.S.C. Treaty pecuniary obligations other than fines were imposed 
upon enterprises for instance by decisions setting forth the contributions to be made 
by enterprises to the compensation scheme for scrap. See E.C.S.C., SEVENTH GENERAL 
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 88-94 ( 1959), 
25 Arts. 192 and 187 . 
.. For a discussion of the applicable national law, see OsTERHELD, DIE VoLLSTRECKUNG 
VON ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER E.G.K.S. IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 7o-84 
( 1954). 
27 This procedure can be explained by the fact that the Community Court is not 
regarded as a "foreign court" in· the Member States. See MATHIJSEN, LE DROIT DE LA 
CoMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 97 (1958). The requirement 
of verification of the authenticity can thus not even be assimilated to an exequatur pro-
ceeding. See Dumon and Rigaux, La Cour de Justice des Communautes Europeennes 
et /es juridictions des Etats membres, 19 ANNALES DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES 
7, at 21 ( 1959). For the competence of German courts to go behind an ordinary 
foreign judgment, see Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) § 328; it might also be said that 
German courts would not be able to go behind a Community judgment even absent 
the express provision of art. 192 of the Treaty, on the ground that the Community 
Court is not a "foreign" court but a supranational court for purposes of ZPO § 328. 
Cf. in a different context, OsTERHELD, op. cit. supra note 26, at 73, n. 258. 
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II. LEGAL REDRESS OF ENTERPRISES AGAINST 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACfS 
A. SUIT FOR ANNULMENT IN THE COMMUNITY 
COURT OF JUSTICE 
The composition of the Court and its diversified jurisdiction have 
been described in general terms in the chapter dealing with the in-
stitutions of the Community. The experience with the Coal-Steel 
Community Treaty has shown that from the viewpoint of an en-
terprise the most important aspect of the jurisdiction of the Court 
is its power to review and annul administrative acts rendered by 
the institutions. This will no doubt also be the case under the E.E.C. 
Treaty; one must keep in mind, however, that since the E.E.C. 
Treaty contains fewer rules directly applicable to enterprises, there 
will be fewer occasions for enterprises to appeal to the Court in 
the earlier stages of the Community at any rate and pending the 
issuance of regulations by the Community institutions. 
I. THE ENTERPRISE AS PARTY BEFORE 
THE COMMUNITY COURT 
The question of who may bring an appeal before the Court has 
been of importance in the Coal-Steel Community, since there the 
right to appeal is limited to coal and steel producers, while certain 
distributors and buyers of coal and steel are able to sue in special 
circumstances only.28 A much disputed question was the extent to 
which "outsiders," such as industrial users of coal and steel or labor 
groups, would have access to the Court. In one case the Court re-
fused to consider an appeal from an association of coal consumers.29 
This problem does not exist under the E.E.C. Treaty. The right 
to appeal under the E.E.C. Treaty is granted under specified cir-
28 E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 33 and 65-66 in connection with art. So and art. 63(2) (b). 
See joint cases 7-54 and 9-54, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes [here-
inafter cited as Sammlung], Vol. II, 53 and case 2-56, Sammlung, Vol. Ill, 9, at 36. 
29 Joint cases 8-54 and 10-54, Sammlung, Vol. II, 155 at 184. STEINDORFF, DIE 
NICHTIGKEITSKLAGE IM RECHT DER EuROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT FVR KOHLE UND STAHL 
so-52, 127-129 ( 1952), who pleads for an application by analogy of the exceptions of 
arts. 65 and 63 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty to all "outsiders" who are affected; MucH, DIE 
AMTSHAFTUNG IM RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT Fi.iR KoHLE UND STAHL 93 
(1952), however, believes that outsiders have no enforceable claim for damages 
against the Community arising out of the latter's administrative acts. See Schiile, 
Grenzen der Klagebefugnis vor dem Gerichtshof der Montanunion, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FVR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 227 (1955-56). Steindorff, 
Montanfremde Unternehmen in der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl, 
8 }URISTENZEITUNG 718 (1953). 
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cumstances to "any natural or legal person," 30 obviously because 
the Community may affect almost any person or any type of enter-
prise within its jurisdiction.31 This right does not depend on any 
specific legal status, nationality, or type of activity of the plaintiff 
enterprise. Thus the Court will be open to American citizens or com-
panies organized in the United States or to foreign companies con-
trolled by American capital if the rights or interests of such citizens 
or companies are affected in a manner specified in the Treaty. 
There is reason to assume that the Court will interpret liberally 
the provisions governing access to the Court. This expectation is sup-
ported by the clause of the Treaty, referred to above in the introduc-
tion to this chapter, which is called the "Magna Carta" of the Court; 
it charges the Court with the duty of ensuring "observance of law 
and justice in the interpretation and application of" the Treaty. 32 
This expectation is also encouraged by the constitutional require-
ment of broad access to legal remedies inherent in any democratic 
system of government under law.33 
2. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS SUBJECT TO APPEAL 
Since the object of legal redress is the protection of rights, an en-
terprise may appeal against regulations and decisions but not against 
recommendations or opinions which are not binding and therefore 
in law cannot affect rights.84 
J. GROUNDS OF APPEAL AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS 
If, for example, an enterprise applies for exemption from the 
antitrust provisions and the application is denied, on what grounds 
can an appeal be taken to Court? 35 The Treaty provides four 
grounds of appeal.36 
I) The first ground is "incompetence" which consists of an ac-
30 Art. 173. 
31 Cf. Pinay, La Cour de Justice des Communauth Europeennes, 1959 REVUE nu 
MARCHE CoMMUN 138, at 143 (No. 12). 
32 Art. 164; Daig, ARCH. D. 5. R. supra note 19, at I5D--I54· 
32 The concept of "Rechtsstaatlichkeit." E.g., German Grundgesetz art. 19; cf. also 
in a different context Everling, supra note 21, at 55, 58 and Meibom, id. at 131. 
34 See note 68 infra concerning appeals against non-binding acts which are, in fact 
"disguised decisions." Daig, Die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der Europiiischen 
Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl in den Jaltren I956-I957, 13 ]URISTENZEITUNG 
204-205 (1958). 
35 It is assumed here that in regulations to be issued under art. 87 the Council will 
charge the Commission with the task to pass upon such application in the first instance. 
•• Art. I73· 
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tion by a Community institution "outside the defined limits of [its] 
legal power" 37 and may perhaps be analogized to the concept of 
ultra vires.38 
2) The second ground for appeal is the violation of a substantial 
procedural requirement, such as the failure to adopt the adminis-
trative act by the requisite number of votes, the failure to comply 
with requirements of publication or consultation with other bodies 
(such as the Economic and Social Committee), or the failure to 
give sufficient reasons for the act.39 These requirements are based 
on express provisions of the Treaty. However, this ground of appeal 
may possibly be available not only in case of a violation of a pro-
cedural requirement set forth in the Treaty (i.e., "statutory require-
ment"), but also in case of a violation of a procedural requirement 
to which the administrative act is "inherently [subject] from its 
nature," 40 a concept which has its American analogy in the notions 
of "due process" and "fair play." 41 It may well be that should the 
competent institution refuse an application for exemption from the 
antitrust provisions without according an opportunity to the appli-
cant enterprise to present evidence, the decision will be subject to 
annulment because of a defect in form even though the Treaty and 
all applicable regulations are silent on the point.42 
3) The third ground, violatio':l of the Treaty, serves to contest 
the administrative act because of an incorrect interpretation of the 
Treaty or "of any legal provision relating to its application," such 
37 VALENTINE, THE CoURT OF }USTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, 
71 (1954). 
38 For instance the plaintiff argued the High Authority's incompetence in the E.C.S.C. 
case 8-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 197, at 228, 307-314, but the Court rejected this alleged 
ground. 
•• In E.C.S.C. case 6-54 plaintiff charged that the High Authority's decision was 
not based on sufficient reasons as required by arts. 5 and 15 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty. 
The Court held that the reasons given were sufficient. Sammlung, Vol. I, 213, at 232-
233; a similar allegation in E.C.S.C. case 2-56 was rejected by the Court on the 
ground that the High Authority was not bound to meet all possible arguments in its 
reasons, but needed only state the factual and legal considerations on which it bases 
its decision. Sammlung, Vol. III, 9, at 37-38. Finally, in the more recent E.C.S.C. 
case 9-56 the Court held that the recital of reasons in two short paragraphs did not 
constitute compliance with the requirement to give reasons; having found, inter alia, 
that the lack of sufficient reasons constituted a major violation of procedure, the 
Court annulled the High Authority's decision. Sammlung, Vol. IV, 9, at 28-31. The 
requirement to give reasons for regulations, directives and decisions is contained in 
E.E.C. Treaty art. 190. 
'
0 VALENTINE, op. cit. supra note 37, at 72. 
41 Cf. Administrative Procedure Act 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958); F.C.C. v. Pots-
ville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, at 143 (1939). 
•• Cf. Nebolsine, 8 AM. ]. CoMP. L. supra note 23, at 462. 
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as a regulation, or because of a complete absence of facts to support 
the act.43 Violation of the Treaty has been argued extensively in 
many cases involving the Coal-Steel Treaty and the Court has de-
veloped a sizable body of law.44 
4) Finally an administrative act may be attacked for detourne-
ment de pouvoir, best translated as "misapplication of power," 
which results whenever an organ has exercized its power to achieve 
an end not envisioned in the grant of power. Although alleged in 
several Coal-Steel cases,45 thus far the Court has not relied on it as 
a basis for annulment.46 
These grounds for appeal are modeled on those of French admin-
istrative law in which they are known collectively as appeals for 
exces de pouvoir/1 that is, appeals to prevent governmental agencies 
from exceeding their powers. They show considerable similarity to 
the administrative law of the other Member States 48 and even of 
England and the United States. Belgian and Luxembourgian admin-
istrative laws in this area are almost exactly like the French.49 The 
43 Cf. the excellent analysis by Steindorlf, op. cit. supra note 29, at r3o-13I, with 
regard to the E.C.S.C. as well as his comparative analysis of French law, id. at 55-76. 
See also case 6-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, 213, at 235-236. 
44 In case 2-56, Sammlung, Vol. III, 9, at 38 the Court had to decide whether the 
High Authority's reference to the general principles of E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 4 in 
applying and interpreting the anti-cartel provisions of the Treaty constituted a viola-
tion of the Treaty. The Court held that the High Authority did not violate the Treaty 
by interpreting the specific prohibition against discrimination of art. 65 in conformity 
with the general principles of art. 4· Id. at 44, 45· Any other interpretation would 
have led the Court to the untenable proposition that some parts of the Treaty are 
contrary to other parts of the Treaty. Daig, Die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der 
Europiiischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl in den Jahren I956 und I957, 13 
]URISTI!NZI!ITUNG 238 at 239· On the other hand, the Court annulled the High Author-
ity's decision concerning price publication because it was based on an incorrect inter-
pretation of E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 6o (case 1-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, at 23-33); the 
Court also annulled the decision involved in case 9-56, Sammlung, Vol. IV, 9, at 
32-33, inter alia, because the High Authority had violated arts. 5 and 47 of the 
E.C.S.C. Treaty by not publishing certain information and data as it was required 
to publish. For ·a discussion of cases 1-54 and 2-56 see Stein, The Court of Justice of 
the European Coal atzd Steel Community: I95¢-I957, 51 AM. J. INT'L. L. 821, at 821-
824 and 828-829 ( 1957) and Stein, The EuroPean Coal and Steel Community: The 
Beginning of its Judicial Process, 55 CoL. L. REV. 985 (1955). 
""'E.g., cases r-54, 6-54, 8-55, 9-55. See Stein, articles cited in note 44 supra. 
'"See text at notes 54-56 infra for discussion of case 9-56 and 10-56, Sammlung, 
Vol. IV, 9, at 34-47 and 51, at 73-85 where plaintiff charging detournement de pouvoir 
prevailed. 
07 STI!INDORFF, op. cit. supra note 29, at 53-83 and literature cited there. 
48 With regard to the E.E.C. Treaty see Erliiuterungen der Bundesregierung zum 
I' ertrag zur Griindung der Europiiisc!zen JVirtschaftsgemeinschaft, HANDBUCH FUR 
EUROPAISCHI! WIRTSCHAFT I/Teil A/3o at 77, where it is said that the grounds of 
appeal of art. 173 are the same as in German constitutional and administrative law. 
Cf. Daig, ARCH. o.o.R. supra note 19, at 173-174· 
49 WIGNY, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 371-375 (1953). Lievens, The Cotzsei/ d'Etat in 
Belgium, 7 AM. ]. COMP. L. 572, at 586, 587 (1958). 
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Italian law provides for similar grounds of appeal with the differ-
ence that detournement or sviamento di potere, is not an independent 
ground for appeal but may be asserted only in support of one of the 
other grounds of appeal-for example, violation of law-which 
are collectively known as eccesso di pot ere. 50 Detournement is an 
independent ground for appeal under Dutch law together with the 
other three grounds included in the E.E.C. Treaty.51 German law, 
finally, recognizes as grounds for appeal the administrator's incom-
petence to act, the violation of statutory procedural requirements, 
and violation of law, 52 as well as misapplication of power which is 
understood in very much the same way a:s the French detournement 
de pouvoir.53 In those cases under the Coal-Steel Treaty where the 
ground of detournement was pressed the Court tended to employ 
the French definition of the term. In one case the plaintiff attacked a 
decision of the High Authority establishing a subsidiary organ on 
the ground of detournement de pouvoir. The Court upheld the plain-
tiff and annulled the decision primarily because of an unlawful dele-
gation of power.54 The Court intimated that the Treaty had been 
violated since "the guarantee of the balance of power" among the 
institutions had been upset by the unlawful delegation of power by 
the Authority to the new organ. 55 The Court did not inquire whether 
or not there was a detournement but having found an irregularity 
proceeded to decree the annulment.56 
Detournement de pouvoir has also served the Court as a basis 
for broadening the right of appeal of enterprises under the Coal-
Steel Community Treaty. 
Grounds for appeal similar to those of the E.E.C. Treaty are 
found in common law countries. Although review of administrative 
50 MATHIJSEN, LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 
119 (1958). 
51 /d. at 120. 
•• I FORSTHOFF, LEHRBUCH DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS 2II-215, 218, 225 (7. Auflage 
1958). 
53 Lagrange in the conclusions in case 3-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, 131, at 177, 178; but 
see Laun, Bemerkungen zum freien Ermesscn. und zum detournement de pouvoir im 
staatlichen und im J'o/kerrecht, in: MENSCH UND STAAT IN RECHT UND GESCHICHTE, 
FESTSCHRIFT FUR HERBERT KRAUS 128, at 147, 148 (1954). 
54 Case 9-56 and 10-56, Sammlung, Vol. IV, 9, at 34-47. 
55 Case 9-56, id., at 44· As Prof. Reuter, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 142 
(1958-1959), points out, this case is especially interesting since the issue of a subsidiary 
organ brings to mind the famous case of Montpeurt of French administrative law 
(C.E. 31 July 1942, [1942] Sirey, Jur. III, 37) and the Advisory Opinion of the l.C.J. 
on the Effect of awards of compensation made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, 
Advisory Opinion of July I]tlz, I954: I.C.J. Reports I954, p. 47· 
56 Cf. Rivero, Le probleme de /'influence des droits internes sur Ia Cour de Justice 
de Ia C.E.C.A., (1958) ANNUAIRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 295, at 304-305. 
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acts in England is now usually provided for in the statutes establish-
ing administrative agencies-and in terms which often differ sub-
stantially from one statute to the next-some general observations 
can perhaps be made. English law of judicial review revolves around 
the question of whether the administrative agency has "exceeded its 
jurisdiction." 57 Exceeding jurisdiction includes exceeding its powers 
(ultra vires), procedural defects, that is, failure to observe manda-
tory procedural requirements or rules of "natural justice" (due 
process), and "error of law on the face of the record," that is, viola-
tion of law. 58 "Abuse of discretion," finally, includes the increasingly 
important element of "improper purpose" which seems to be simi-
lar to detournement de pouvoir in Community law. As is true of 
Community administrative law, English law grants no right of ap-
peal when the agency can show that it pursued in good faith a proper 
as well as an improper purpose.59 In the United States where judicial 
review of federal administrative acts is treated as are appeals from 
lower courts,60 judicial review of administrative acts may be ob-
tained on the grounds of ultra vires, violation of law, disregard of 
the requirements of procedural due process, and abuse of discre-
tion.61 "Improper purpose" does not seem to offer a ground for 
review. However, because of the relatively broad scope of review 
asserted by American courts, adoption of an act for an "improper 
purpose" perhaps might be challenged as an abuse of discretion.62 
4· SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF APPEAL OF ENTERPRISES 
a. Direct Appeal Against Binding Acts 
An enterprise may appeal against a decision addressed to it. In 
addition, it may appeal against a decision which, although in the 
form of a general regulation or a decision addressed u to another 
person," is "of direct and specific concern" to it. 63 Thus if an in-
57 GRIFFITH AND STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 212-229 (2d ed. 1957). 
58 I d. at 212, 215, 218. 
59 Cases I-54 and 2-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, 7, at 34 and 79, at III; case 8-55, 
Sammlung, Vol. II, I97, at 314-319; cf. Westminster Corp. v. L.N.W. Ry., [1905] 
A. C. 426; Municipal Council of Sydney v. Campbell, [I925] A.C. 338. 
60 SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW I09 (I950). 
61 I d. at II3; cf. also STEINDORFF, op. cit. supra note 29, at 90 and 95-96. Adminis-
trative Procedure Act§ 9(e), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958) . 
.. The "Hoover Commission" recommended that the scope of review should be 
broadened to permit the courts to reverse for "unwarranted exercise" of discretion. 
This was intended to permit review where it was alleged that agency action was 
taken for an improper purpose. Report on Legal Services and Procedures of U.S. 
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1953-1955) 
215-217. 
83 Art. 173, para. 2. Cf. the French text: " ... les decisions qui, bien que prises 
so us l' apparence d'un reglement ou d'une d6cision addressee a une autre personne, 
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stitution issues what purports to be a regulation, but which in fact 
affects a single enterprise only, an appeal would lie. Again, an en-
terprise should be able to appeal a decision addressed to its com-
petitors authorizing a cartel agreement among them if a similar 
authorization has previously been denied to it, but there may be 
some question whether the language of the Treaty permits such ap-
peal. If such appeal does not lie, the only recourse remaining to the 
enterprise would be to re-submit its application for an authorization 
to the Commission with a view to appealing a second denial to the 
Court. Thus defined the right of appeal is narrower than that 
granted under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty.64 
The language of the E.E.C. Treaty seems to exclude an appeal 
against regulations except where they affect a single enterprise. Nor 
does it allow an appeal against a decision or a directive addressed 
to aM ember State which will cause the latter to take administrative 
or legislative action against an enterprise. If an enterprise has no 
way in national courts to restrain its national government from 
complying with an illegal Community directive and if it is barred 
from an appeal to the Community Court, it will be without any 
remedy. As is true of American courts which refuse to review ad-
ministrative action where the plaintiff is "anyone who asserts no 
more than his interest as a member of the public" 65 (absent a "case 
or controversy"), the Treaty understandably seeks to exclude ap-
peals based on insubstantial and remote interests. A problem might 
arise, however, of reconciling the requirement contained, for in-
stance, in the German constitution that legal redress must be avail-
able against every administrative act 66 with the necessity of avoid-
ing abuse of the judicial process. The Court may in due course de-
fine "direct and specific concern" of enterprises claiming the right of 
appeal. It is difficult to foresee whether the Court will be able to 
elevate the concept of "direct and specific concern" to a general test 
by which it would measure the right of appeal in those cases where 
Ia concernant directement et individuellement." The German text: " ... Entschei-
dungen ... , die, obwohl sie als Ferordnung oder als eine an cine andere Person 
gerichtete Entscheidung ergangen sind, sie unmittelbar und individuell betreffen." 
[Emphasis added.] 
64 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 33 grants enterprises a right of appeal not only against 
decisions addressed to them and against "general decisions" (i.e., decisions pur-
porting to contain general rules roughly comparable to regulations under the E.E.C. 
Treaty) which are "concealed decisions" but also against "recommendations" (com-
parable to directives under the E.E.C. Treaty) and "general decisions" in which a 
detournement de pouvoir was committed against the enterprise. 
65 ScHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW WoRLD 191 
(1954); cj. GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTs 20'f-242 
( 1954). 
66 German Grundgesetz art. 19 (4). 
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such right is claimed by an enterprise but is not expressly accorded 
in the Treaty. From the viewpoint of an enterprise it would cer-
tainly be more desirable to permit it to appeal whenever its interests 
were directly affected than to limit arbitrarily the right of appeal 
to appeals against specified administrative acts.67 
b. Collateral Attack Against Regulations 
An appeal must be brought within two months from the date of 
the publication of the regulation in the official journal of the Com-
munities or from communication of the directive or decision to the 
addressee or, absent such communication, from the day the ad-
dressee obtained knowledge of the act. Since regulations are in the 
nature of general laws, it may be impossible to determine within 
two months whether an enterprise is "affected" in the sense that per-
mits it to appeal. For this reason the Treaty provides that when-
ever a regulation becomes the subject of a dispute in any legal pro-
ceeding, any party may question its validity on any ground on which 
the regulation could have been attacked directly, regardless of the 
lapse of time since its publication.68 It may well be that this broad 
right of "indirect appeal" will be used as a substitute for direct ap-
peals against regulations which enterprises may not be permitted to 
bring. Despite the specific Treaty language an effort might also be 
made to make "indirect appeals" available not only against regula-
tions but against other acts as well in order to create legal protection 
against acts which cannot be attacked directly. 69 
The Court is not given the power to annul an indirectly contested 
61 An attempt to arrive at a general test of "interest" was made under the E.C.S.C. 
Treaty for the purpose of resolving the difficult question of whether a given adminis-
trative act was "individual" or "general" in character and thus did or did not entitle 
enterprises to appeal. Such a test has been urged repeatedly by writers, (Rivero, supra 
note 56, No. 14 at 302; Steindorff, Die EuroPiiischen Gemeinschaften in der Rechtspre-
chung, 8 ARCHlY DES VoLKERRECHTS 50, at 66 (1959); Court Advocate Romer in cases 
7-54 and 9-54, Sammlung, Vol. II, 105, at III and IZD-127. Court Advocate Lagrange 
in case 8-55, id., 231, at 248 and in case 15-57, id., Vol. IV, 205, at zn), and in at 
least one case the E.C.S.C. Court seemed to have accepted this test (case 7-54 and 9-
54, Sammlung, Vol. II, 53, at 84). Cf. also Belgium, Conseil d'Etat, 8 juin 1951, 5-6 
Recueil de Jurisprudence du Droit Administratif 281; Lievens, AM. ]. CoMP. L. supra 
note 49, at 585; LAUBADERE, TRAITE ELiiMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF Nos. 635-643, 
623, 626 and 629; FoRSTHOFF, op. cit. supra note 52, at 501. 
""Art. 184. The E.C.S.C. Treaty recognizes such an indirect appeal against general 
decisions in appeals against fines only. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 36 par. 3· Cf. case 9-56, 
Sammlung, Vol. IV, 9, at 25-28. 
66 Daig (ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 177) seems to favor extending availability 
of the indirect appeal beyond the language of art. 184, which limits it to regulations, 
to all other acts of the Community organs, where the time limitation for the bringing 
of a direct appeal has run. He argues that the indirect appeal is designed to broaden 
the available legal protection rather than merely provide for special situations. 
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regulation. It is merely authorized to hold it "inapplicable." It has 
been argued, however, that the result will be essentially the same 
because Community institutions as well as national courts are bound 
to comply with the legal interpretations rendered by the Court.'0 
c. Appeal Against Decisions "Disguised" as 
Recommendations or Opinions 
A recommendation or opinion, although not binding and not ap-
pealable, may in effect reflect a policy which the Community institu-
tion has adopted and will enforce by means of binding administra-
tive acts, for example, if the recommendation or opinion is not 
heeded. For purposes of legal certainty and commercial security, an 
enterprise may therefore desire a determination of the legality of 
the position taken by the institution in the recommendation or opin-
IOn. 
Several situations of this kind seem possible. For example, the 
Commission might address a recommendation to an enterprise to 
desist from what it considers dumping practices. The enterprise 
knows that if it disobeys the Commission may authorize "the Mem-
ber State injured" to take "protective measures" defined by the 
Commission.71 Or, the Community institution for reasons of its 
own might choose to recommend action in the antitrust field which 
it has the authority to make obligatory by a binding appealable de-
CISIOn. 
In several cases arising under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty 
it was argued that the Court could not consider an appeal because 
the contested act of the Community institution was not binding. The 
Court has held, however, that acts will be considered binding and 
thus appealable ("disguised decisions") if they contain provisions 
which can be applied. In other words, where the High Authority 
had made abundantly clear in administrative acts what position it 
would take, should stated conditions later obtain, those acts were 
considered appealable. In several cases the Court, following this 
reasoning, has found acts appealable. On the other hand it refused 
to entertain an appeal against an "opinion" in which the High Au-
thority took a negative view of certain investment plans of a steel 
70 It is argued further that the Court may also adjudicate which parts of the regu-
lation are to remain in force, a competence which the Treaty confers on the Court 
expressly only in the case of annulment of regulations on direct appeal. Ibid. 
71 Art. 91 ( 1). It could possibly be argued on the basis of the general Treaty frame-
work that the Commission may address a recommendation to a Member State only 
rather than to an enterprise. 
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producer. The Court did so despite the fact that the "opinion" had 
grave economic consequences for the enterprise concerned and was 
thought by some to contain a clearly implied threat of sanctions. In 
this case the Court stressed the fact that the "opinion" did not im-
pose any legal obligations on the enterprise.72 It is interesting to 
compare this latter approach with the recent judgment of a U.S. 
District Court. It held a "report" by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission reviewable because of its "immediate and practical impact" 
on the enterprise concerned.73 
The E.E.C. Treaty provides expressly that only "acts other than 
recommendations or opinions" are subject to judicial review. 74 How-
ever, this provision was hardly intended to exclude appeals against 
such recommendations and opinions which are in fact "disguised 
decisions," since decisions remain decisions regardless of the form 
in which they are issued. 75 
A different situation may arise where the Commission renders an 
unfavorable opinion with regard to a project which forms the basis 
for an application by an enterprise for a loan from the European 
Investment Bank. In such event the Board of Directors may grant 
a loan by a unanimous vote only which means that the opinion may 
prejudice the applicant in a very real sense. 76 This case may be dis-
tinguished on the ground that a grant of a loan is a privilege rather 
than a right or legally protected interest. Thus an enterprise would 
not have a legal remedy against an unfavorable opinion of the Com-
mission even if in fact the opinion was the cause of the denial of the 
application by the Board of Directors of the Bank. Nor would the 
enterprise have recourse to the Court against the negative decision 
of the Board of Directors.77 
72 Case 8-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 197, at 224 and conclusions of Advocate General 
Lagrange id. 231, at 245; case 9-55, id. 331, at 363; joint cases 7-56 and 3-57 to 7-57, 
Sammlung, Vol. III, 83, at II5-II6; joint cases 1-57 and 14-57, id., 213, at 234-235. 
See a comment by Jerusalem, Die Rechtslage der Unternehmen in der Montanunion, II 
NEUE }URISTISCHE WocHENSCHRIFT 410 ( 1958); MATHIJSEN, op. cit. supra note so, at 
6o-62. Cf. Bebr, The Development of a Community Law by the Court of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN. L. REV. 845, at 869 ( 1958) on extensive interpre-
tation of what is an appealable "individual decision" under the E.C.S.C. Treaty. 
73 Garden City Floral v. United States, (D. C. Mont.) 143 F. Supp. 609, at 6u 
(1956) relying on Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, at 43-44 (1956), 
involving a determination of "agricultural commodities" within the meaning of 
§ 203 (b) (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 
"E.E.C. art. 173. Cf. E.C.S.C. art. 33· For a definition of "recommendations" in the 
E.C.S.C. Treaty see art. 14. 
75 See note 72 supra, particularly cases 8-55 and 9-55. 
7"Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank art. 2r (6). 
77 The conclusions of the Board of Directors may only be contested by Member States 
or the Commission and only on the ground of infringement of specified procedural re-
quirements. Art. r8o(c). 
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d. "Unclassified" Acts 
Closely connected with the last problem is the question of the 
appealability of Community acts "other than recommendations or 
opinions" which do not fit the categories of "regulation," "direc-
tive," or "decision." Although in many cases it may be possible to 
draw analogies to these categories, it may be difficult to do so in 
some. In numerous cases the Treaty provides that the Council or 
Commission is to "authorize," "approve," "decide," "provide," 
"lay down rules" or "adopt measures" without specifying the form 
of the administrative act. 78 Again, the Treaty authorizes the Coun-
cil to conclude international agreements on behalf of the Commu-
nity without specifying the form of the act by which the Council 
gives final approval to such agreements. 79 
The problem is twofold: Is the Community free to choose any 
form where the Treaty does not specify the type of act and, sec-
ondly, how does this affect an enterprise's right of appeal? The 
choice of the form of an act was discussed earlier in the chapter on 
"The New Institutions." With respect to the enterprise's right to 
appeal against such "unclassified acts," it will be recalled that the 
right is given in general terms with regard to ''acts other than 
recommendations or opinions." The use of such a broad term with-
out a defined meaning should be a sufficient basis to allow appeals 
against those acts of the Council or the Commission which do not 
fit the above categories but require judicial control because of their 
legal impact on the enterprise. 
5· THE SUIT FOR INACTION 
Since the Treaty requires the Community to exercise certain 
powers, a provision had to be included whereby the Council and the 
Commission may be compelled to act when they fail to exercise their 
powers. This type of suit is familiar to the common lawyer in the 
form of a mandamus proceeding whereby an official may be com-
pelled to perform a statutory duty or to exercise a discretionary 
18 Everling, BETRIEBS-BERATER supra note 21, at 52, footnotes 18, 19. Art. 51 provides 
that the Council shall "adopt ... measures" in the field of social security for mi-
grant workers. The Council enacted two regulations on the basis of this article: Regu-
lations Nos. 3 and 4, [1958] Journal Olliciel 561, 597· 
79 Art. 228 and art. 238. Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 167, recognizes the 
possibility of an appeal against such acts of approval under art. 173 but doubts whether 
this was intended. It seems that appealability of such acts of approval merely depends on 
whether they can be assimilated to other binding Community acts and appealed on 
the same conditions. 
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power but not to exercise such power in any particular manner. 80 In 
the E.E.C. the legal means for compelling such action is the suit for 
inaction. Its scope is wider than that of a similar suit under the 
Coal-Steel Community Treaty.81 
In order to institute such an action the enterprise must allege 
that the Community institution has failed to address a decision to 
it ("an act other than a recommendation or an opinion") and that 
the inaction is in violation of the Treaty. Thus after the Council 
has issued the regulations implementing the antitrust provisions as 
envisaged in the Treaty, an enterprise, relying on the regulations, 
would be able to sue if the Commission should fail to act on its ap-
plication for exemption from the antitrust provisions.82 Two ob-
servations must be made in this context. First, the language of the 
Treaty is specific enough to exclude a suit by the enterprise for a 
failure of the institution to address a decision to another enterprise 
or to a Member State, or to issue a directive or a regulation. Such 
a suit is reserved to the Member States only. Secondly, of the four 
grounds enumerated above on which appeal can be taken against an 
administrative act, "violation of the Treaty" seems to be the only 
ground on which a suit for inaction may be instituted. 
Yet there are cases where choice by the Commission of a recom-
mendation (or opinion) rather than a decision would not of itself 
constitute a violation of the Treaty. In making this choice, the Com-
mission may nevertheless be guided by improper motives. Thus, 
while an enterprise may not be able to sue for annulment of the 
opinion (since it is a non-binding act), it is arguable that it should 
be able to bring what would amount to a suit for inaction (for fail-
80 GRIFFITH AND STREET, op. cit. supra note 57, at 233-236; cf. Wade, The Courts 
and the Administrati'Ve Process, 63 LAW Q. REv. 164 at 170 (1947); Reg. v. Belfast 
Corp., 1954 N.I. Rep. 122 at 125-126. American cases are collected in GELLHORN AND 
BYsE, op. cit. supra note 65, at 379-424. Two recent New York cases are fairly repre-
sentative of the American position. In Berger v. Dumper, 160 N.Y.S. 2d. 530 (1957), 
and in Corrigan v. Jansen, 173 N.Y.S. 2d. 894 (1958), the applications for mandamus 
were dismissed because the defendants had neither failed to act in violation of a duty 
imposed by law nor had made an "arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious" use of their 
discretionary power. Corrigan case at 897. 
81 Art. 175. The E.C.S.C. Treaty regards the suit for inaction merely as a particular 
aspect of the suit for annulment. It is likened to an appeal for the annulment of an 
"implied negative decision." E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 35· Daig, JuRISTENZEITUNG supra 
note 34, 204 at 206-207. The E.E.C. Treaty provides for two separate actions, As a 
result, the scope of the suit for inaction under that Treaty cannot be determined by 
analogies to the suit for annulment. Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 178. See also 
the appeal lodged recently by the Chambre Syndicale de Ia Siderurgie Fran~aise in 
[1959] Journal Officiel 683. 
""It is assumed for the purpose of this illustration that in the regulations which the 
Council is required to issue under art. 87 the Commission will be charged with the task 
of passing upon such applications. 
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ure to issue a decision) by urging that the choice of the opinion con-
stituted a detournement de pouvoir. Such a right could be justified 
on the ground that only incomplete legal protection would be af-
forded if the Community institutions could refuse to issue appeal-
able acts for demonstrably improper motives with immunity from 
judicial control.83 
No remedy is available to an enterprise in the Community Court 
against a Member State which has failed to act in violation of its 
Treaty obligation. Only other Member States and the Commission 
are given the right to sue before the Community Court for a de-
termination that a Member State has failed to fulfill its obligation 
under the Treaty; the enterprise concerned would therefore have 
to induce a government or the Commission to institute action on its 
behal£.84 Nor, as shown above, can the enterprise bring suit for in-
action in the Community Court against the Commission for failing 
to sue the Member State. To the extent that a remedy exists at all, it 
would have to be sought through national procedures. 
6. RELIEF IN A SUIT FOR INACTION AND 
APPEAL FOR ANNULMENT 
The purpose of the suit for inaction is to establish the duty of the 
institution to act. The Court therefore may determine the existence 
and timing of the duty to act but the contents of the required act 
must be left to the institution itself. Thus, in the example used ear-
lier, the Court may find that the institutions must act on the applica-
tion for authorization of a cartel agreement; the institution is left 
free, however, to grant or deny the application. 
The same principle applies in appeals for annulment. The Court 
may only annul the contested Community act, but it may not sub-
stitute its own judgment as to the kind of act required; the institu-
tion concerned has the duty to substitute an appropriate act for the 
annulled one. 
In practice, of course, the judgment of the Court in a suit for in-
action or on appeal will frequently indicate at least by implication 
the elements of the act which the defendant institution will be re-
quired to issue "for the implementation of the judgment." 85 
83 See Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 179. The Court will have to rule on the 
scope of the suit for inaction in joint cases 24-58 and 34-58 now pending before it. 
84 Arts. 170 and r69. Judgments rendered against Member States are not enforceable. 
These types of suits are known as Feststellungsklagen in German law since they do 
not carry any sanction. 
85 Arts. 176 para. r, 174, 175 para. r. 
4 78 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
Claims for damages against the Community arising from the act 
annulled by the Court are not affected by the judgment of annulment 
but may be pressed against the Community in a separate action.86 
7· THE SCOPE OF REVIEW BY THE COURT 
The Coal-Steel Community Treaty provides that the Court may 
not review "the High Authority's evaluation of the situation, based 
on economic facts and circumstances," which led to the adminis-
trative act, unless detournement de pouvoir or clear misinterpreta-
tion of the Treaty law is alleged. Only in such circumstances was 
the Court authorized to examine, for instance, whether the decision 
of the High Authority to fix maximum coal prices was warranted 
economicallyY An express limitation of this type was not included 
in the E.E.C. Treaty which is, indeed, wholly silent on the point. 
The question thus arises whether the Court-for instance in re-
viewing a decision denying an application for exemption from the 
cartel provisions-is free to inquire whether the institution has 
evaluated correctly the economic circumstances and conditions, or 
whether it must accept the economic conclusions of the institution 
and is limited to a review of the legality of the decision. The lack 
of an express authorization such as was included in the Coal-Steel 
Treaty might be interpreted as barring the Court from any review 
of the economic conclusions; or, at the least, it might be taken to 
indicate that the power of the Court to review conclusions is limited. 
On the other hand, it appears fairly clear that the absence of an 
express provision should not be interpreted as depriving the Court 
of any and all power to review economic conclusions. The Court 
must be free-as it is under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty-to 
review such conclusions where the subjective motivation of the ad-
ministrator is an issue determinative of the legality of this act, that 
is, when the administrative act is attacked by an allegation of de-
tournement de pouvoir. At least in that case the Court must be able 
to inquire into the conclusions if it is to determine whether the ad-
ministrator has applied his power to an improper end.88 In those 
86 Arts. 176 para. 2 and 215. 
87 E.C.S.C. art. 33 par. 1. Case 6-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, 213, at 235-236. See Matthies, 
Zur Nachpriifungsbe/ugnis des Gerichtshofs der Montanunion, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR 
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND Vi:iLKERRECHT 427, at 443-450 (1955/56). 
88 See Daig, ARCH. D. i:i. R. supra note 19, at 175. Contra Bebr, The Development of a 
Community Law by the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN. 
L. REV. 845, at 858, n. So (1958), who regards art. 172 as the only instance where the 
Court may be given an unlimited right of review. It has been suggested that the Court 
should be given "full jurisdiction" to review the facts in cases where an application 
for exemption from antitrust provisions was denied. Nebolsine, 8 AM. ]. COMP. L. 433 
supra note 23, at 461. · 
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instances, of course, where the Court exercises "full jurisdiction," its 
right with respect to the review of facts and economic conclusions is 
in no way limited. 
In this context, English and American parallels are of interest. 
In English courts, as in the Community Court, the scope of review 
extends merely to testing the legality of administrative acts. As a 
result, an administrative decision unsupported by any facts what-
soever may not be quashed on that ground; however, a total lack of 
facts may provide sufficient basis for quashing on other grounds 
such as "error of law on the face of the record," "bad faith," or "un-
reasonableness." 89 In the same situation the Community Court 
could annul an administrative act for violation of the Treaty or 
perhaps also for detournement de pouvoir. 
The scope of judicial review in the United States is substantially 
wider than in England or in the Community.90 On the basis of the 
Administrative Procedure Act the United States Supreme Court 
has held in several recent cases that while the findings of an adminis-
trative agency are entitled to respect, "they must nevertheless be set 
aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes 
the. . . . [agency's J decision from being justified by a fair esti-
mate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed 
judgment on matters within its special competence or both." 91 A 
review of this breadth could be undertaken by the Community Court 
apparently only upon a showing of detournement de pouvoir. 
B. REDRESS IN NATIONAL COURTS 
I. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATION ON NATIONAL COURTS 
An enterprise may not seek the annulment of a Community act 
in national courts. The Treaty vests exclusive jurisdiction in the 
Community Court to review the validity of and strike down the ad-
ministrative acts of the Community institutions. It bars any asser-
tion of similar jurisdiction by national courts. On the other hand, 
national courts are not deprived of their jurisdiction over cases 
89 GRIFFITH AND STREET, op. cit. supra note 57, at 224-225; cf. R. v. Furnished Houses 
Rent Tribunal for Paddington and St. Marylebone, Ex parte Kendal Hotels, Ltd., 
( 1947) I All E.R. 448, 450. Cf. Re The London County Council Order 1938, ( 1945) 
2 All E.R. 484. 
90 SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 6o, at 109. 
91 Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, at 490 (1951); this test was 
followed in N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, at n2 (1956), and in 
F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, at 40o-4oi (1958) where it was said that 
the Court of Appeals is required to make a "fair assessment" of the record. Also Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,§ 9(a) and (c), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). Cf. Cooper, Ad-
ministrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.}. 945 (1958). 
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which may involve the application of the Treaty or of a Community 
act. But under Article I77 the Community Court has exclusive juris-
diction to render a final and binding interpretation of the Treaty 
and the acts of the Community institutions. 
Thus, if any question concerning the interpretation of the Treaty 
or of an act of the Community institution or of the validity of such 
act arises in national judicial proceedings, the national court may, 
"if it considers that its judgment depends on a preliminary decision 
on this question, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling 
thereon." But when such question arises before a national court from 
whose judgment there is no further appeal, such court is bound 
to refer it to the Community Court which renders a binding decision 
on the point.92 Any move by an enterprise to attack a Community 
act collaterally in the course of a proceeding before a national court 
would therefore be ultimately determined under the Community 
law by the Community Court. This pivotal arrangement is designed 
to preserve the integrity of the Community system in relation to 
Member States. It is designed to assure the uniform interpretation 
of the Treaty and of the Community acts which is necessary for the 
development of a uniform "quasi-federal" law.93 It recalls the 
American concept of federal jurisdiction over "federal questions" 
arising in state courts. 
Two factors may limit the efficacy of this provision. Article I 77 
leaves to the national court the decision whether the law suit before 
it can or cannot be adjudicated without reference to the Treaty or 
to a Community act. The Article does not provide for a procedure 
akin to the American writ of certiorari whereby a party to the pro-
ceeding could seek a determination by the Community Court. Conse-
quently, while paying lip-service to the principle of Article I 77, a 
German court of last resort was able to determine that the Treaty's 
antitrust article did not apply to the case before it and that it 
was therefore not bound to refer the case to the Community Court.94 
02 Art. 177. 
03 Cf. Morelli, La Cour de Justice des Communauth Europiennes en tant que juge 
interne, 19 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UNO ViiLKERRECHT 
(MAKAROV-FESTGABE) 269, at 271 (1958). 
04 In its judgment of October :n, 1958, the Court of Appeals ( Oberlandesgericht) 
Dusseldorf held that the issue of the Treaty interpretation was only incidental to 
the main question and would not influence the decision in any way. It therefore refused 
to submit the question to the Community Court. Docket No. 2 W 47/58, reported in 
1958 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 493 (No. 24), and 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 
IIIO (No. 31, Nov. ro, 1958); Steindorff, AcHiv DES ViiLKERRECHTS, supra note 67, at 
son. 3· Cf. also the decision of the Court of Zutphen (Netherlands) reported and com-
mented on (by Steindorff) in 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 931-933 (No. 26, Sept. zo, 1958). 
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While a national court has undoubtedly the power to dispose of a 
case exclusively on what U.S. federal law would call "state law 
grounds," 95 its freedom to decide the case without reference to the 
Community Court ends when it begins to interpret the Treaty law.9G 
In the instant case, the German court interpreted the Treaty in 
order to hold it inapplicable and thus failed to give effect to the man-
date of Article 177. It is arguable that a procedure of certiorari 
must be introduced in order to avoid such incorrect decisions. Al-
though the parties do not possess the right to have the "Community 
law question" reviewed, the Commission could sue the Member 
State of the national court for violation of the Treaty thus helping 
the Court preserve its power over the uniform development of 
Community law. 
Again, the Community Court passing upon the conformity of a 
national law with the Treaty very likely will consider itself bound 
by the interpretation of that law as laid down by the national courts 
concerned-another factor lim,iting the scope of review of the Com-
munity Court somewhat as compared with a right of review of a 
court of last resort in a unitary state.97 It will be recalled that the 
United States Supreme Court, in passing upon the conformity of a 
state law with federal law or the federal Constitution, insists as a 
rule on affording the state court concerned an opportunity to inter-
pret the state law. 
2. SUIT FOR UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMUNITY 
ACTS OR OF NATIONAL ACTS ISSUED 
PURSUANT TO THE TREATY 
The question to be considered here is whether an enterprise has, 
as an alternative to a suit for annulment in the Community Court, 
the choice of attacking the Community act in national courts on the 
ground that the act (or for that matter the Treaty itself) is con-
trary to the national constitution. A somewhat different, but analo-
gous, problem is whether an enterprise may attllck as unconstitutional 
05 Cf. Fox Films Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, ex. rei. Patterson Att'y Gen., 357 U.S. 
449 (1958); Minnesota v. National Tea Co. et al., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). 
""Article 177 speaks of questions of "interpretation of Treaty." Article 219 dealing 
with disputes settlement refers to disputes concerning "interpretations and application" 
of the Treaty. Could it be argued that where the Treaty rule is so clear as not to re-
quire any interpretation reference to the Community Court is not required when such 
rule is applied in a national proceeding? But cf. 177(b) which deals with "The validity 
and interpretation" (emphasis added). 
97 Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at ISS· 
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in national courts an act issued pursuant to the Treaty by a national 
authority. 
The question is of little interest in France, where treaties have 
constitutional dignity and cannot be reviewed by the courts,98 in 
the Nether lands and Luxembourg, where the question was resolved 
by constitutional amendments and where courts are also precluded 
from a review for unconstitutionality,99 or in Belgium, where the 
Constitution is little more than an aggregate of "maxims of politi-
c_al morality" which impose no restrictions on parliamentary author-
ity.100 In Germany and Italy, however, constitutionality may be 
raised by an individual or an enterprise by means of a special judicial 
procedure. 
An act issued by German authorities pursuant to the E.E.C. 
Treaty could be subject to an attack before the Federal Constitu-
tional Court by reference from a German court on the ground that 
the German federal statute ratifying the Treaty is contrary to the 
Federal Constitution, but it is unlikely that such an attack would 
succeed.101 A successful recourse to the Constitutional Court is even 
•• Bebr, The Relation of the European Coal and Steel Community Law to the Law 
of the Member States: A Peculiar Legal Symbiosis, 58 CoL. L.R. 767, at 778 (1958). 
FRANCE, CoNSTITUTION OF 1958, art. 55· Title VII of the Constitution of 1958 provides 
for a Constitutional Council which may be asked to pass on the constitutionality of 
laws before their enactment. The same applies to statutes ratifying treaties. CoNSTITU-
TION art. 54· The Council must pass on the constitutionality in cases of special measures 
taken during national emergencies (art. 16), certain decree laws (art. 37), and cer-
tain organic laws (art. 46). See also, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et 
d'lnformation, French Affairs, No. 82, March 1959· In no case is a control a posteriori 
by the Constitutional Council envisioned. The existing system, noted in the main text, 
whereby questions of treaty interpretation and constitutionality are not passed upon 
by ordinary courts, but for reasons of "ordre public" are referred to the executive 
branch, does not seem to have been disturbed by the new Constitution. 
99 For the Netherlands and Luxembourg: Bebr, id., at 776-777, n. 43-44, 49-54· 
100 Lievens, AM. ]. COMP. L. supra note 49, at 572. 
101 An act issued by German authorities pursuant to the E.E.C. Treaty could 
conceivably be attacked on the basis of Art. 100 Bonner Grundgesetz (Basic Law). 
This article provides: "If a court considers unconstitutional a law, the validity of 
which is relevant to its decision, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall 
be obtained from the Federal Constitutional Court if the matter concerns a violation 
of the Basic Law." (Translation of the Basic Law by the Legal Staff of the Allied 
High Commission, Bonn, 1955). According to this provision, only a court before which 
a proceeding is pending, may refer the question of constitutionality of a Statute (not 
of an administrative act or order) to the Federal Constitutional Court. But in a pend-
ing case it could be argued that the basis of the attacked act; a statute, is invalid. 
Referring to Articles 20, 24 (I), 59 ( 2) and 79 ( 3) of the Grundgesetz an enter-
prise could claim that the statute ratifying the E.E.C. Treaty in effect amended the 
Grundgesetz (because of the far-re-aching impact of the Treaty) and thus should 
have been (but was not) adopted by the larger majority required for constitutional 
amendments. In the alternative, the enterprise could argue that the changes in the 
structure of the Federal Republic brought about by the Treaty are absolutely pre-
cluded by Art. 20 of the Basic Law and could not be effected even by a constitutional 
amendment (e.g., transfer of power to bodies which are not subject to adequate parlia-
mentary control). 
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less likely if the attack on the ground of unconstitutionality is di-
rected against a Community act. 10~ In the first place, decisions of the 
Constitutional Court indicate that acts emanating from "German 
public authority" only are within its jurisdiction 103 and Community 
acts are not likely to be considered as emanating from such a 
source.104 In the second place, even if the Constitutional Court 
should take jurisdiction, the complainant would have to show that 
one of its basic rights (for instance freedom of expression, free 
choice of profession, property right) has not only been restricted 
but destroyed "in essence" by the Community act.105 Thirdly, ap-
peals based on unconstitutionality can be brought before the Con-
stitutional Court only after all other remedies have been ex-
hausted.106 This would seem to require the complainant to seek 
annulment of the Community act in the Community Court on Treaty 
grounds (at least where a plausible argument may be made that any 
such ground exists) before he may contest the act for unconstitu-
tionality in the German court. The Community Court will, of course, 
not consider any allegation of unconstitutionality based on German 
law.107 If the Community Court refuses annulment and the plaintiff 
does finally appeal to the Constitutional Court, Article 177 of the 
Treaty, which requires the national court to refer to the Commu-
nity Court any question concerning the validity of a Community 
act, might conceivably be held to come into play. Thus the Com-
102 The complaint would be in the form of a f7 erfassungsbeschwerde. 
103 
I Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts IO No. 7: " ... Offentliche 
Gewalt im Sinne des § 90 Abs. I Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz ist nur deutsche 
iiffentliche Gewalt. Besatzungsrecht und Massnahmen, die deutsche Behiirden auf 
Anweisung der Besatzungsmiichte treffen, unterliegen der Verfassungsbeschwerde 
ebensowenig wie Massnahmen ausliindischer iiffentlicher Gewalt." LECHNER, BuN-
DESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ 258 (I954); GEIGER, GESETZ UBER DAS BUNDESVER-
FASSUNGSGERICHT 277 (I952). 
104 The Federal Republic transferred its public functions (H oheitsfunktionen) to the 
Community as a "supranational" organization. Mosler, Die Wen dung zum suprana-
tionalen Gedanken im Schumanp/an, 3 RECHT, STAAT, WIRTSCHAFT 245-259 at 256 
(I95I); Schlochauer, Der iibernationale Charakter der Europaischen Gemeinschaft 
fiir K ohle und Stahl, 6 }URISTENZEITUNG 289-290 at 290 ( I95 I). 
105 Art. 19(2) Bonner Grundgesetz (Basic Law). 
106 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz § 90. 
107 Case I-58 as yet unpublished. It would seem that the Community Court, as a 
practical matter, would, under the circumstances of the case suggested in the main 
text, attempt a Treaty interpretation which would be compatible with the national 
constitution. However, in one case Court Advocate Romer argued that art. I9 of the 
German Constitution was not controlling for the Community Court. Case I8-57, Samm-
lung, Vol. III, 247 at 266. In this context the interesting question arises to what extent 
the Court's competence under art. I77, par. I, (a) and (b), to "interpret" the Treaty 
and to pass on the "validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions," when such 
questions are referred to it by national courts, encompasses the authority to render a 
restrictive interpretation for the purpose of avoiding unconstitutionality under national 
law. 
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munity Court might have two chances to give the Community act 
an interpretation compatible with the national constitution before 
the case could be decided by the German court. At any rate, the like-
lihood of success of an appeal against a Community act to the Con-
stitutional Court is minimal. 
Requirements of a constitutional test in the new Italian Consti-
tutional Court are less stringent. Review of any law or any act hav-
ing the force of law-for instance, a statute ratifying an inter-
national agreement-may be sought in the Constitutional Court 
upon certification of the question from any court ( autorita giurisdi-
zionale) .108 While the constitutional question may not be raised in a 
recours populaire but only within an actual adversary proceeding, 109 
there is no requirement that all other remedies be exhausted before 
the Constitutional Court may consider the question. The Commu-
nity Court would consider the question if it is referred to it perhaps 
by the Italian Constitutional Court itself as the national court of 
last resort.110 
III. REDRESS UNDER NATIONAL LAW FOR VIOLATION 
OF THE TREATY OR OF A COMMUNITY ACT BY 
GOVERNMENTS OR OTHER ENTERPRISES 
A. REDRESS FOR VIOLATION BY 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
If a Member State fails to enact a measure required by the 
Treaty or by a Community act or issues a measure contrary to the 
108 Law No. 87 of March 11, 1953, art. 23, [1953] I Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e 
dei Decreti della Repubblica Ita Iiana 298, 304. See generally, Cassandro, The Consti-
tutional Court of Italy, 8 AM. J. CoMP. LAW 1-14 (1959). 
"'"Thomas, Italien: Der neue Verfassungsgerichtshof, 17 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUSLAN-
DISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND Vi:iLKERRECHT 327, at 336, n. 52 (1956-1957); Farelli 
and Chan, Italy's Constitutional Court: Procedural Aspects, 6 AM. J. CoMP. L. 314, 
at 318 (1957). 
110 As indicated- initially in this section, the French Constitution of 1958 accords to 
treaties a position superior to statutes. Any treaty as domestic law cannot be changed 
by subsequent legislation but enjoys a position similar to the Constitution itself. In 
turn, the E.E.C. Treaty (which enjoys such constitutional standing in France) provides 
for regulations to be issued by Community institutions. These regulations-because 
of the position of the Treaty upon which they are based-partake of the position of 
the Treaty, i.e. cannot be modified by French legislation. It has therefore been said 
that the French Constitution consists of the Constitution of 1958 and the E.E.C. Treaty. 
In contrast, acts of the Community institutions enjoy a position of superiority only over 
previous national legislation in those Member States where the Treaty's position is 
the same as that of an ordinary statute. Thus, regulations issued by the institutions 
in the proper exercise of their Treaty powers would supersede a previous national law. 
REUTER, CoURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 171 (1958-1959). 
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Treaty or a Community act, does an enterprise which suffers damage 
from such violation have a remedy in a national court or before an 
administrative agency against the government? For instance, if 
during the transitional period a French exporter to Germany can 
show that he had to pay higher customs duties to German authorities 
because the German Government had failed to reduce its tariff as 
required by the Treaty, does he have a remedy in Germany? 
The Treaty became national law of the Member States by virtue 
of ratifying acts of their national parliaments. The existence of a 
national remedy depends in the first place on whether the relevant 
Treaty provision imposes an obligation which is completely and 
clearly enough defined to be directly enforceable; and, secondly, on 
whether or not the provision was designed to give rights to individ-
uals and enterprises which are enforceable by an appeal to national 
remedies. This is a matter of Treaty interpretation.111 Beyond that 
national law will determine the nature of the remedy. An analysis of 
this latter question would require a detailed inquiry into national 
laws not contemplated here. 
An attempt may be made to classify the Treaty provisions, divid-
ing them into those which were and those which were not intended 
to modify national law directly upon ratification. The former re-
quire no implementing action subsequent to ratification whereas the 
latter do.112 
Some provisions merely embody declarations of economic and 
social policy and are not intended to create independent legal ob-
ligations.113 Other provisions, imposing broad obligations on Mem-
ber States 114 or even obligations defined in fairly specific terms, re-
quire implementing action by the Member States, in the form of 
national legislative or administrative acts, or by the Community 
institutions; and these provisions cannot be interpreted as modify-
ing national laws directly. The obligation to reduce internal tariffs 
by stages during the transitional period, 115 falls into this category 
since it requires periodic implementing action by Member States. 
This is apparent not only from the language of the Treaty,116 but 
m Cf. SPENGLER, DIE WEITBEWERBSREGELN DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEIN-
SCHAFT I6 ( I957) · 
ru On ratification in national parliaments see E.C.S.C., Assembil!e Commune, INFOR-
MATIONS MENSUELLEs, Numero special, decembre I957; Numero special, janvier I958; 
for ratification legislation see Chapter I, note I, supra. 
118 E.g., art. I8 in which Member States "declare their willingness" to contribute to 
the development of international commerce. Similarly: arts. so, I 17 and I20. 
114 Cf. arts. 5, 220. 
1
:u; Art. I4. 
116 Arts. 14 and II. 
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also from the entire scheme which was designed to establish the 
Common Market by progressive steps to be taken by the Members 
and from the flexibility of action left to Members. Consequently 
if a French exporter to Germany is forced to pay higher customs 
duties because the German government failed to reduce its tariff in 
accordance with its Treaty obligation, the French exporter would 
have no legal remedy in Germany against the German government. 
A similar conclusion would apply to other Treaty obligations im-
posed on Members with a view to the progressive abolition of re-
strictions within the Community.117 
Some Treaty provisions may be construed as becoming directly 
applicable at the end of the transitional period. Thus, to change the 
above example, if the German Government continues to collect 
customs upon imports from France after the expiration of the tran-
sitional period without an authorization from the Community in-
stitutions, the French exporter may be in a position to appeal 
through German administrative procedure for annulment of the 
national administrative act imposing the customs charges on the 
theory that the Treaty prohibition of internal tariffs became abso-
lute and directly applicable at the end of the transitional period.118 
Again, certain Treaty articles prohibiting the imposition by a 
Member State of new restrictions which did not exist when the 
Treaty came into force, may be interpreted as directly applicable 
from the effective date of the Treaty. Thus it might be argued that 
a French exporter to Germany has a right of appeal before German 
authorities if the German government, contrary to the prohibition 
of Article I 2, has introduced and sought to collect from him "new 
customs duties" which did not exist at the time the Treaty came into 
effect.119 In this case the result would be different (and a national 
remedy would not lie) in those Member States where any treaty 
(including the E.E.C. Treaty) is considered of no more effect than 
an ordinary statute so that a subsequent national law contrary to 
the Treaty would supersede the Treaty provision as domestic law.120 
117 E.g., arts. 33, 48, 49, 5Z, 54, 59, 63, etc. 
118 Arts. 8(7), 13(1). Perhaps a clearer example of a "self-executing" provision at 
the end of the transitional period is the provision relating to quotas. Art. 30: "Quanti-
tative restrictions on importation and all measures with equivalent effect shall, without 
prejudice to the following provisions, hereby be prohibited between Member States." 
Cf. also arts. 48 and 49· 
119 Article xz provides that "Member States, shall refrain from introducing, as be-
tween themselves, any new customs duties .... " For other "prohibitions" see e.g., 
arts. 31, 53, 6z, 76, ro6(3). On the German constitutional law question see v. MAN-
GOLDT-KLEIN, DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ, 1, 676 (znd ed., 1957) and references therein. 
1.00 In this case, the Member State would have violated its international obligation, 
but the enterprise would have no remedy under national law. 
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Whether or not there may be a remedy in national law, in practice 
a violation of a Treaty prohibition against new restrictions may be 
taken up by the Commission with the delinquent Member State 
and, if necessary, brought before the Community Court by the Com-
mission or any other Member. 
One provision-Article 22 1-seems designed to become directly 
applicable three years after the effective date of the Treaty unless 
the Member States issue implementing measures earlier. The Arti-
cle provides for national treatment of nationals of Member States 
as regards financial participation in the capital of companies. Again, 
where the Treaty contains new conflict of laws rules, such rules 
appear directly and immediately applicable.120a 
Certain other provisions impose obligations upon Member States 
which not only are fairly clearly defined and capable of direct ap-
plication, but appear designed to benefit a class or group of individ-
uals.121 Thus, under Article 119 "[e]ach Member State shall in the 
course of the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the ap-
plication of the principle" of equal pay for women workers with 
men. Where a Member State fails to enact the necessary legislation, 
could a woman worker, who as a result suffers discrimination, claim 
a remedy, after the expiration of the first stage, which would bring 
about the application of the Treaty provision with respect to her? 
In order to establish such right she would have to show that the 
obligation involved was imposed upon the Member State for the 
benefit of persons or a class of persons to which she belongs and 
with a view to conferring rights directly on them. A rule of inter-
national law recognized by German 122 and French courts 123 holds 
that the conferral of rights on individuals must be clearly expressed 
in international agreements to overcome a presumption to the con-
trary. Unless the intention to benefit individuals is clear from the 
Treaty, the obligation of a Member State runs only to other Mem-
ber States but does not give individuals an enforceable right. The 
language of Article 119 and the fact that it appears ancillary to the 
general provisions dealing with social matters would indicate that 
the woman would not be entitled to a remedy against her govern-
ment.124 
'"'• E.g., art. 21 5· 
=Arts. 76, 106 (I), 119. 
122 117 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 280; 143 id. 57· 
123 Dame Kirkwood, Conseil d'Etat, May 30, 1952 [1952] Recueil des Arrets du 
Conseil 291. 
124 By like token, it may be said that art. 76 is ancillary to art. 75 and art. 106 to 
arts. 63-65. Cf. Katzenstein, Der Arbeitnehmer in der europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemcin-
schaft, 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1081 (No. 21, Nov, 10, 1951). 
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Article 7 of the Treaty deserves particular attention in this con-
text. It provides that " [ w] ithin the field of application of this 
Treaty and without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned 
therein, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is pro-
hibited.125 The Council may ... lay down rules in regard to the 
prohibition of any such discrimination." It could be argued that this 
provision was intended by the parties to the Treaty to modify na-
tional laws directly and bind individuals and enterprises in the Com-
munity as well as the Member States with an immediate effect in 
those fields where the Treaty does not contain special provisions 
for a gradual removal of discrimination based on nationality; the 
fact that the Council may (but is not required) to issue imple-
menting rules does not impair this conclusion.126 On the other hand, 
others contend that this Article included in the part on "Principles" 
contains only a policy declaration or at most an obligation imposed 
exclusively upon Member States, to be implemented by subsequent 
measures. Those supporting this position point to the limiting lan-
guage in Article 7 quoted above and to the Council's authority to 
issue implementing rules.127 It would seem that at least some im-
mediate and direct effect of this Article was intended by the Mem-
ber States in those areas within the scope of the Treaty where 
neither the Treaty itself nor Council rules provide otherwise.128 
The extent to which the antitrust provisions ("Rules applying 
to enterprises" in the Chapter on "Rules governing competition") 
may be considered as affording a national remedy is explored else-
where in this book.129 
12
' The English translation reads: " ... shall hereby be prohibited." The German 
and French originals read: " ... ist ... verboten"; " ... est interdite .•. " If read 
literally, Article 7 would prohibit discrimination against nationals of third states as 
well as of Member States. (Text published in Brussels; see note 199 infra.) 
'""Everling, Die Regelung der selbstiindigen beruf/ichen Tiitigkeit im Gemeinsamen 
ivfarkt, 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 817 (No. 23, Aug. 20, 1958); von Boeckh in HANDBUCH 
DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFT, KOMMENTAR, Art. 7 Anm. 5, 1A41, 21 (1958). Note 
also art. 90 ( r) of the Treaty prohibiting certain measures which are "contrary to 
the ... rules provided for in article 7· ... " 
127 SPENGLER, DIE WETTBEWERBSREGELN DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 
33; SteindorfF, Das 17 erbot von Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen in der Anfangszeit der 
Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 89, at 92 (No. 3, Jan. 30, 
'958). 
128 But see Kahn-Freund, "Labor Law and Social Security," Chapter VI supra. 
129 Riesenfeld, "Protection of Competition," Chapter X, infra. The provisions in ques-
tion are arts. 85-90. See also the decision of the Court of Dusseldorf, supra, note 94; 
the decision of the Court of Zutphen {Netherlands) reported and commented on (by 
SteindorfF) in 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 931-933 (No. 26, Sept. 20, 1958); Koch, Das l"er-
ltiiltnis der Kartellvorschriften des EWG-l"ertrages zum Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
besclzriinkungen, 14( I) BETRIEBS-BERATER 241-248 (No. 7, March ro, 1959), particu-
larly n. 3· 
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Thus one may conclude that only the few Treaty provisions, some 
of which were mentioned above, which are capable of direct applica-
tion and confer rights upon individuals, enable an enterprise to con-
test through national remedies a national administrative act based 
on a previous-and probably, as in France,130 on a subsequent-
national law contrary to these provisions. Such an appeal can prob-
ably also be brought if national authorities issue administrative acts 
which are at variance not with the Treaty itself but with adminis-
trative acts of the Community institutions provided that the Com-
munity acts are directly applicable in the Member States (as in the 
case of regulations) and are intended to benefit the appellant en-
terprise. 
Professor Reuter suggests another national remedy which may 
be open to an enterprise if, for instance, the government of Belgium, 
in violation of the Treaty, enacts a measure favoring Belgian enter-
prises and discriminating against French enterprises on the ground 
of nationality. In this situation a French enterprise might be able 
to institute an action for unfair competition against a Belgian enter-
prise before a French court with a view to obtaining compensation 
for the damages caused by the defendant's activity based on the il-
legal Belgian measure. The plaintiff could obtain execution of the 
judgment on defendant's property in France. 
It should be observed that where the remedies considered here 
involve an interpretation of the Treaty or a Community adminis-
trative act, the national court of last resort will have to refer this 
issue to the Community Court. 
B. REDRESS FOR VIOLATION BY AN 
INDIVIDUAL OR ENTERPRISE 
If an enterprise acts in violation of the Treaty or of a Community 
act to the prejudice of another, does the injured party have a na-
tional remedy? 131 Obviously, the question would arise only under 
those provisions of the Treaty or under those Community acts which 
are held to be capable of direct application and to confer rights and 
impose obligations directly upon individuals and enterprises. The 
first phase of this inquiry would thus parallel that pursued in the 
preceding section. The second phase would require an analysis of 
national laws of the Member States with a view to determining 
whether a remedy would be available to the injured party in a na-
13° CoNSTITUTION OF 1958, art. 55· 
=The possibility of a remedy before the Community Court was explored above in 
connection with a suit for inaction. (Part II, Section A Subsection 5 above). 
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tional court or administrative agency. Such remedy could, for in-
stance, take the form of an action for restitution where a contract 
contrary to a Treaty provision is held void or of an action in dam-
ages caused by a Treaty violation. Actions of this type based on the 
Coal-Steel Treaty and German law have already lead to decisions 
in German courts. Because the cases concern rules of competition 
they are more appropriately discussed in the chapter on Protection 
of Competition in the European Economic Community.132 The con-
clusion reached there is that a violation of at least one Coal-Steel 
Treaty provision-the prohibition of restrictive agreements-may 
constitute tortious conduct involving liability for damages under 
German law. A similar conclusion with respect to the correspond-
ing provision of the E.E.C. Treaty is suggested in a very tentative 
manner only. 
IV. LEGAL REMEDIES IN CONTRACT AND TORT CASES 
TO WHICH THE COMMUNITY IS A PARTY 
A. SuiTs IN THE CoMMUNITY CouRT 
In addition to its exclusive jurisdiction to annul administrative 
acts, the Community Court also has exclusive jurisdiction in tort 
actions (actions for "non-contractual liability") brought against 
the Community.133 The rules for these actions are much less detailed 
than diose governing the complaints for annulment. Thus an enter-
prise may sue the Community in the Community Court if it suffers 
damages from an act of a Community employee in the performance 
of his duty (negligent driving of a Community truck, disclosure of a 
trade secret by an official, etc.) as well as from an act of a Commu-
nity institution. The latter category includes damages arising from 
administrative acts which are annulled by the Community Court and 
damages arising from the Community's unlawful inaction. The 
Treaty specifically provides that a judgment of annulment or a judg-
ment finding that the Community failed to act in violation of the 
Treaty shall not prejudice any claims for damages.134 A suit for 
132 Riesenfeld, Chapter X infra. 
133 Arts. 178 and 183. Daig, ARCH. o. o. R. supra note 19, at 159. 
, .. E.E.C. Treaty art. 176 para. 2, art. 215 para. 2; Protocol on the Statute of the 
Court of Justice of the E.E.C. art. 43· The Treaty, in its broad statement of the Com-
munity's tort liability in art. 215 differs from th.e provisions of arts. 34 and 40 of the 
E.C.S.C. Treaty. For the E.C.S.C. tort liability see Kautzor-Schroeder, Public Tort 
Liability under the Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community Com-
pared with the Federal Tort Claims Act, 4 VILLANOVA L. REV. 198, at 235, (1958/59). 
See also MUCH, DIE AMTSHAFTUNG IM RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT FUR 
KOHLE UNO STAHL (Frankfurt/Main, 1952). 
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annulment is not a prerequisite to a suit for damages. Whether or 
not the Community is liable will be determined on the basis of "the 
general principles common to the laws of Member States." 135 
Similarly, the Community Court has jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing contracts concluded under public or private law by the Commu-
nity or on its behalf, but only if that Court's jurisdiction is stipulated 
by the parties in an "arbitration clause" 136 contained in the con-
tract. The Community institution entering into a contract with an 
enterprise has the opportunity to insist on a stipulation of Commu-
nity Court jurisdiction if the institution believes that the national 
court which would otherwise be competent might favor its own 
nationals.137 Other motivations might be considerations of conven-
ience and the desire to develop uniform jurisprudence in the field 
of contracts involving the Community. One author, subject to dark 
forebodings, foresees that the Community might insist on such a 
stipulation in order to complete its control over all transactions in 
which its institutions are involved, with the consequent overcrowd-
'ing of the Community Court's docket.138 The identical provision in 
the Euratom Treaty may have a greater impact because of the more 
extensive operational responsibilities of Euratom, envisaging the 
conclusion of contracts of purchase and sale particularly by its Sup-
ply Agency. 
The Coal-Steel Treaty contains a similar provision allowing stipu-
lation of the Community Court jurisdiction, and the Court adjudi-
cated several cases arising from employment contracts between the 
Community institutions and their employees on the basis of such 
stipulation.139 It is interesting to note that the bonds and notes issued 
by the High Authority in the United States are governed by a stipu-
lation extending the jurisdiction of the Community Court to disputes 
between the holders of these obligations and the High Authority; 
the High Authority, however, has also waived any claim of immu-
135 Art, 215. 
,.. "Schiedsklausel," "clause compromissoire," "clausola compromissoria," "arbitrage-
beding." Art. 18I. 
187 LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, PAR UN GROUPE D'ETUDE 
DE L'!NSTITUT DES RELATIONS lNTERNATIONALES, 223 (Bruxelles, I953). 
188 Croquez, Aspects Juridiques du Marchi Commun, I LE DROIT EUROPEEN 65, at 7I 
(No.2, I958). 
139 Case I-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 9; case I0-55, id. 379; case I-56, id. +4I. The stipu-
lation was contained in the employment contract or in the Reglement du personnel to 
which the contract referred. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 42. DELVAUX, LA CouR DE JusTICE 
DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L' ACIER 36 ( I956) j Antoine, 
La Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A. et la Cour Jnternationale de Justice, 57 REVUE GEN-
f.RALE DE DROIT lNTERNATIONAT. PUBLIC 2IO, at 25I ( I953). Cf. E.E.C. Treaty art. I79· 
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nity to suit in a state or federal court.l4° The practice of the High 
Authority, in this respect, has varied in its various financial opera-
tions. 
As confirmed by the cases under the Coal-Steel Treaty the pro-
ceeding before the Community Court arising under a contractual 
stipulation of jurisdiction does not differ from that instituted under 
the jurisdictional provisions of the Treaty. In this respect the Treaty 
terminology describing the stipulation as an ((arbitration clause" 
is misleading. 
B. Suns IN CouRTS oF MEMBER STATES 
From the foregoing it is clear that the Treaty limits the juris-
diction of national courts in the Member States in cases to which the 
Community is a party. National courts have no jurisdiction over the 
Community in tort; they do, however, have jurisdiction in contract 
unless the contract stipulates the jurisdiction of the Community 
Court. Even where the national courts have jurisdiction over the 
Community for purposes of the suit,141 they have no jurisdiction 
over Community assets for purposes of execution. In this respect 
the Community enjoys immunity.142 A judgment of a national court 
must be submitted to the Community Court which has exclusive au-
thority to allow execution against the Community. 
In the obvious interest of enhancing its credit standing, the Euro-
pean Investment Bank of the Community has been made subject 
to action in national courts as any legal person, and its assets have 
been made liable to execution by order of such courts.l43 As a gen-
eral practice, when a Bank extends a loan for the financing of a proj-
ect within the European territory of a Member State, the loan con-
tract stipulates that the courts of that Member State shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over suits arising out of the contract and that 
the contract shall be governed by the law of that Member State. 
This practice is not necessarily followed in the guarantee or security 
agreements supporting the loan contract. The Bank has not, as yet, 
140 Art. 3 sec. 3 and 5, High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community 
and the Bank for International Settlements, Tenth Supplemental Indenture to the 
Act of Pledge dated November z8, 1954, 5% Secured Bonds (Eleventh Series), Due 
July I, 1978. SALMON, LE ROLE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES EN MATIERE DE 
Pd:Ts ET D'EMPRUNTS-PROBLEMES }URIDIQUES 303 (1958). Cf. Delaume, Jurisdiction of 
Courts and International Loans, 6 AM.]. CaMP. L. 189, at zo8-zo9 (1957). Blondeel 
and Van der Eycken, Les Emprunls de Ia C.E.C.A., 1955 LA REVUE DE LA BANQUE 
(Belgium) z5o-287. 
141 Cf. art. 183. 
142 Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Economic Community 
art. 1. 
143 Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank art. 29. 
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developed a practice with respect to loan contracts concerning proj-
ects located outside the European territory of Member States. 
C. SuiTs IN CouRTs oF NoN-MEMBER STATEs 
I. SUITS AGAINST THE COMMUNITY IN 
AMERICAN COURTS 
An American enterprise which suffered damages at the hand of 
the Community might prefer to sue the Community in tort in an 
American court since courts of Member States have no jurisdiction 
and an action before the Community Court may be inconvenient. It 
would be necessary, of course, for the American court to acquire 
jurisdiction by attachment of Community assets or otherwise. Again, 
an enterprise may wish to bring a contract claim before an American 
court in the hope that a judgment could perhaps be satisfied out of 
the Community's American assets. Obviously the jurisdictional pro-
visions of the Treaty by themselves would not be a bar to such suits 
because the United States is not bound by the E.E.C. Treaty.144 
A number of questions would arise in connection with a suit in an 
American court. The limited scope of this survey allows mere list-
ing of some of these questions without any attempt at an examina-
tion: 
I) Will the plaintiff enterprise be able to sue the Community in 
a state court only or will the federal courts be also available? While 
federal jurisdiction may be desirable as a matter of policy it is 
questionable whether it could be sustained under the Federal Con-
stitution or present law.l45 
2) If the contract between the enterprise and the Community 
stipulates jurisdiction of the Community Court, will an American 
court nevertheless accept jurisdiction? If the court should consider 
the stipulation as an arbitration agreement within the scope of an 
arbitration statute applicable in the jurisdiction it might grant a 
stay of the proceeding if such remedy is available under that stat-
ute.146 However, because of the nature of the Community Court as 
a judicial body, because of the direct enforceability of its judgments 
144 See generally Wengler, Die volkerrechtliche Stellung der M ontanunion gegen-
iiber dritten Staaten und Staatenverbiinden, 3 AcTES 0FFICIELS DU CONGRES INTER-
NATIONAL n'ETUDES SUR LA C.E.C.A. 9 (1957). 
145 For a discussion see Note, The Status of International Organizations under the 
Law of the United States, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1300, at 1301-I306 ( 1957-1958). Cf. Inti. 
Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F. zd 858 (4th Cir. 1951). 
146 Domke lists fifteen State Arbitration Statutes in addition to the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act. UNION INTERNATIONALE DES AVOCATS, ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
197 (Dalloz, Sirey 1956). KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION, Annexes 1-Il, at 217-358 
( 1941). 
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within the Community, and despite the misleading Treaty termi-
nology, the American court is more likely to view the stipulation not 
as an "arbitration clause" but as an agreement specifying jurisdic-
tion of a "foreign court." In that event a modern American court 
might decide whether or not to take jurisdiction not on the basis of 
the so-called rule against "ouster" of jurisdiction but rather in the 
exercise of its discretion under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, perhaps taking also into account the equality of the bargain-
ing positions of the parties.147 
3) Will the Community be able to maintain successfully a claim 
of immunity against suit in an American court? It is possible, if not 
likely, that the legal status of the Community in the United States 
will be determined by special Congressional legislation which would 
simultaneously authorize accreditation of a Community diplomatic 
mission in Washington. In the absence of such legislation the follow-
ing observations may be pertinent. 
Traditionally, American courts grant immunity from suit to states 
under a rule of international law originally founded on the concept 
of the equality and sovereignty of states.148 The courts have been 
liberal in according this immunity, responding to and at times going 
beyond the wishes of the executive branch.l49 
On the other hand, surveying the practice of the United States in 
1946, a distinguished American commentator concluded that the 
United States has denied the existence of any obligation under cus-
tomary international law to extend to public international organiza-
tions or their officials any immunities; a demand for a special status 
has been "uniformly resisted" on the ground that such status "is 
147 Application of Hamburg-American Line, 135 Misc. 715, 238 N.Y. Sup. 331, affirmed 
without opinion, 228 App. Div. 802, 239 N.Y. Sup. 914 (1930) holding that a clause 
stipulating exclusive jurisdiction of "Hamburg Courts" and German law as the appli-
cable law is not an agreement to arbitrate within the meaning of the Arbitration Law. 
The Court observed that "[I]n any event, the clause cited in the contract herein is not 
sufficiently broad to be construed as an agreement to arbitrate." Contra an earlier opin-
ion of a lower court in Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 125 Misc. 728, 210 N.Y. 
Sup. 10 ( 1925). On agreements attempting to give exclusive jurisdiction to foreign 
courts see I EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 145-150 (1959); Case-Notes, 23 So. CAL. 
L. REV. 595 (1950); Sudburg v. Ambi Verwaltung K.A.A., 213 App. Div. 98, 210 N.Y. 
Sup. 164 (1925) and other cases in 56 A.L.R. 2d 300 (1957). But see Wm. H. Muller 
and Co. v. Swedish American Line, 224 F. zd 8o6 (2d Cir. 1955) cert. den. 350 U.S. 
903, 76 Sup. Ct. 182 (1955) and Learned Hand in Kreuger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 
F. 2d 556, at 561 (2d Cir. 1949). 
148 Harvard Research in International Law, Competence of Courts in Regard t.o 
Foreign States, P. C. Jessup, Reporter, 26 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPPL. 451-738 (1932). 
For a recent expression of this thought see Loomis v. Rogers, 254 F. 2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 
1958). 
u.• Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 ( 1926) ; Republic of Mexico v. Hoff-
man, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Peru: The Ucayali, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
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as yet dependent upon treaty or upon the municipal law and prac-
tice of the state concerned, and ... there is, therefore, no justifi-
cation under the law of the United States for conceding any privi-
leged position to international organizations ... in this coun-
try." 150 Since 1946 the United States has become a party to anum-
ber of treaties creating international organizations which grant to 
these organizations in the territories of the member states privi-
leges and immunities necessary for the fulfillment of their pur-
poses.151 Such grant is based not on the extension of the concept of 
sovereign immunity but rather on the recognition that independence 
from local authority is necessary for the organizations to fulfill 
their international functions. 152 The International Organizations 
Immunities Act enacted in 1945 accords immunity in American 
courts to public international organizations in which the United 
States participates pursuant to a treaty or under authority of an act 
of Congress and which have been designated by the President 
through an executive order. The immunity includes "the same im-
munity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by 
foreign governments" except insofar as immunity may be waived. 1" 3 
It has been vigorously argued that whatever the state of inter-
national law may have been in the past a new rule of customary in-
ternational law has been established by consistent national practice 
in recent years which requires non-member states to grant immu-
nity to any international organization which they have "recog-
nized." 154 
1
"" Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 332, 
at 333 (1946); 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 419-423 (1942). Cf. Note, 
The Status of International Organizations under the Law of the United States, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 1300, at 1309-1312 (1958). In one case before a lower court arising 
prior to the Immunities Act judicial immunity was granted to an international organi-
zation of which the United States was a member without a treaty provision requiring 
immunity. In that ca~e a writ of attachment, directed to the Pan American Union as 
garnishee and based on judgment against an employee of the Union, was struck down 
in the attachment proceeding before the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia, 
the Court having sustained the plea to the court's jurisdiction. Penfield, The Legal Status 
of the Pan American Union, 20 AM.]. INT'L. L. 257 (1926). 
151 E.g., Charter of the U.N. art. 105. 
152 Kunz, Pri'Vileges and Immunities of International Organizations, 41 AM. ]. 
INT'L. L. 828, at 847 ( 1947) · 
153 International Organizations Immunities Act Sec. 2(b), 59(1) Stat. 669 (1945), 22 
U.S.C. Sec. 288a(b) (1958). 
1M La live, L'Immunite de juridiction des hats et des organisations internationales, 
84 RECUEIL DES CouRs 293, 304, (1953, Vol. III); on U.S. practice id. 319-324; on 
Coal-Steel Community id. 376-383; for a more recent survey of American and foreign 
practice see Dinh, Les pri'Vileges et immunitis des organismes internationaux d'apres 
les jurisprudences nationa/es depuis I945, 1957 ANNUAIRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL 262. 
496 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
The Community could not assert immunity from judicial process 
in American courts on the basis of any treaty or under the Immu-
nities Act.154a Whether or not it could prevail on the basis of cus-
tomary international law is a question.155 However, it is likely that 
the courts would follow a request for immunity from the Depart-
ment of State. Whether or not the Department would make such 
a request is another question. The United States has "recognized" 
the Communities in the sense that it has had considerable dealings 
with them as entities endowed with international legal personality. 
The United States has concluded agreements with the Coal-Steel 
Community 156 and Euratom 157 and maintains official relations with 
all three Communities through a special diplomatic mission in Brus-
sels. 158 The United States is expected to negotiate agreements on 
tariff concessions with the Community rather than with the individ-
ual Member States within the framework of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) 159 It could also be argued that 
immunity ought to be granted because the Community may be more 
nearly likened to a "state" than any other international organiza-
tion. In the absence of new legislation the Department may never-
theless be reluctant to do more than to point generally to the United 
States relations with the Communities but refrain from a specific 
'"'• It could hardly be argued that the U.S. "participates" in the Community within 
the meaning of the Immunities Act. 
155 In one case where immunity was claimed by the International Refugee Organiza-
tion before an American court in the U.S. Zone of Occupied Germany, the Court 
denied the existence of any obligation to accord on German territory immunity on 
the basis of a treaty or the Immunities Act but nevertheless granted immunity on the 
basis of a policy statement by the United States High Commissioner, "the highest 
executive authority" in the U.S. Zone, which the Court held it could not question. 
Apparently as a make-weight argument the Court added: " ... because of the fact 
that I.R.O. is an agency of many foreign governments, it would seem all the more 
reasonable that the High Commissioner should not permit an action in our courts that 
would directly affect other sovereign powers." The opinion certainly does not indicate 
that the Court recognized any obligation to grant immunity under customary interna-
tional law. Anton Schaffner v. International Refugee Organization, Civil Case No. 11, 
Opinion 665, U.S. Ct. App., Allied High Commission for Germany, Aug. 3, 1951, in 46 
AM. J. lNT'L. 575 (1952). Had the case arisen in the United States I.R.O. could have 
claimed immunity under the Immunities Act and Executive Order 9887, 3 C.F.R., 
1943-1948 Compilation. 
156 Loan Agreement signed at Washington April 23, 1954, entered into force April 
23, 1954, T.I.A.S. 2945; Agreement Supplementing and Amending the Loan Agree-
ment of April 23, 1954, signed at Luxembourg Dec. 8 and at Washington Dec. 16, 
1954, entered into force Dec. 16, 1954, T.I.A.S. 3126. 
w7 Agreement Relating to Cooperation for Peaceful Application of Atomic Energy 
signed at Brussels May 29 and at Washington June 18, 1958, entered into force Aug. 
27, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 4091 [1959]; [1959] Journal Officiel 312. 
:u;s EURATOM CoMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT 78-81 ( 1958), E. E. C. COMMISSION, 
FIRST GENERAL REPORT 126 (1958), E.C.S.C., SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT 38 (1959). 
"'°Cf. E.E.C. art. 111(2), 113(3). 
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request for immunity, leaving it to the courts to decide the immunity 
issue on the basis of common law. One factor which may be con-
sidered relevant is the provision in the E.E.C. Treaty to the effect 
that subject to the powers conferred upon the Community Court by 
the Treaty "cases to which the Community is a party shall not for 
that reason alone be excluded from the competence of domestic 
courts or tribunals." 160 One could argue that since the Community 
in principle is subject to suit in contract before domestic courts, it 
should not enjoy immunity in American courts.161 On the other hand, 
the availability of a remedy against the Community either in the 
Community Court or in a national court within the Community 
would reduce the importance of the American forum for the plain-
tiff suing the Community and thus the need for denying immunity. 
It has been suggested that the uncertainty as to the immunity of the 
Coal-Steel Community in American courts was one of the reasons 
for stipulating the jurisdiction of the Community Court in disputes 
arising from obligations issued by the High Authority in the United 
States.162 
Even if immunity is granted in principle to the Community, the 
question arises whether it may nevertheless be disallowed in a given 
case-and the suit permitted-on the ground that in the matter 
before the Court the Community has acted in a "proprietary" func-
tion (for instance, when it entered into a contract to buy securities 
for purposes of investing funds for which it is responsible) rather 
than in a "governmental" function. This distinction, which applies 
to activities of states under the more recent commercial treaties con-
cluded by the United States and which is advocated by the United 
States Department of State, regrettably has not been established 
by judicial decision as a rule of American law as yet.163 
The Community has been endowed with sufficient "domestic" 
legal personality in the Member States and we may assume that the 
court would recognize the Community's capacity to sue. 164 
160 E.E.C. Treaty art. 183. 
161 Judge Mack in the Pesaro case, 277 Fed. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); National City 
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, at 363 (1955). 
162 Delaume, 6 AM. J. COMP. L., supra note 140, at 208-209. 
163 Treaty of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation between the United States and 
Japan of Oct. 30, 1953, art. XVIII (z). T.l.A.S. No. 2863. The distinction between 
governmental and proprietary functions was adopted in a 1952 Department of State 
policy declaration, the "Tate Letter," 26 DEP'T. STATE BuLL. 984 (1952). See Berizzi 
Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Ex parte Peru, The Ucayali, 318 U.S. 
578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, The Baja California, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
1 
.. Art 2II. Jenks, The Legal Personality of International Organizations, 22 BRIT. 
Ys. lNT'L. L. 267, 273-'79 (1945); Preuss, supra note 150, at 333. 
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2. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST 
THE COMMUNITY 
If an American enterprise obtains a judgment against the Com-
munity, how can it be enforced? As pointed out above, under the 
Treaty the courts of the Member States may not levy execution 
against the Community assets without an authorization from the 
Community Court regardless of whether the judgment was rendered 
by a domestic or foreign court or by the Community Court itself. 
Thus if enforcement of the judgment is sought within the Commu-
nity an application for authorization will have to be made to the 
Community Court. 
In considering the application the Court will have to decide 
whether the foreign judgment should be given effect (i.e., whether it 
should be accorded exequatur) .165 Since the law governing the recog-
nition of foreign judgments varies in the Member States, the Court 
may seek to develop its own rules based on principles common to 
the national laws. Unless the Court adopts the French rule authoriz-
ing in fact a complete review of the foreign judgment, it may limit 
itself to considering whether the recognition of the foreign judg-
ment would be contrary to public policy of the Community, whether 
the foreign court had jurisdiction, and possibly whether reciprocity 
exists in the recognition of foreign judgments.166 It could, however, 
be argued that the exequatur proceeding must take place in the com-
petent national court which ultimately will direct the execution upon 
the Community assets and that the Community Court has no other 
function than to decide whether immunity against execution will be 
waived. Under the first of the two possible interpretations suggested 
above an "authorization" by the Community Court would have the 
force of its judgment. The competent national court in the Com-
munity would be required to perform the execution against Com-
munity assets on a showing of nothing more than the authenticity 
of the "authorization" paper. 
If enforcement of a judgment against the Community is sought 
in a non-Member State such as the United States with respect to the 
Community's assets located there, the outcome will depend in the 
first place upon the question, discussed above, whether the Commu-
nity is given immunity from judicial process. It may be of interest to 
note, however, that American courts deny execution against assets 
belonging to a foreign state even where they disallow the immunity 
""'REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 80 (1953). 
160 NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE lNTERNAT!ON AL LAW 236-238 ( 1943). 
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of such state from suit.167 International organizations to which the 
Immunities Act is applied would presumably enjoy similar immu-
nity. 
3· ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OBTAINED 
BY THE COMMUNITY 
If the Community obtains a judgment against an enterprise either 
in a national court of a Member State or in the Community Court, 
will such judgment be enforceable outside the Community and speci-
fically in the United States? If the judgment was rendered by a court 
in a Member State, the American court would apply its rules con-
cerning suits on foreign judgments.168 If the judgment was rendered 
by the Community Court, the American court will consider it more 
likely a "foreign judgment" than an arbitral award. If the Com-
munity Court's judgment was rendered in a suit on a contract in 
which that Court's jurisdiction was stipulated; it is difficult to con-
ceive of reasons based on lack of jurisdiction or public policy justi-
fying an American court's denying enforcement.169 
It is most improbable that an American court would allow en-
forcement of a Community Court judgment imposing, for instance, 
a penalty against an American enterprise for violation of an anti-
trust provision of the Treaty. Such judgment would very likely be 
refused enforcement on the general principle refusing enforcement 
of foreign penalties.170 
V. THE COMMUNITY COURT: PROCEDURE AND 
SOURCES OF LAW 
An enterprise seeking relief in the Community Court will be 
directly concerned with the procedures applicable in cases before the 
Court and the sources of law upon which it will draw. 
A. PROCEDURE AND FINALITY 
I. TIME LIMITATIONS 
An enterprise must bring its appeal for annulment within two 
months from the time it was notified or had knowledge of the act 
167 Dexter & Carpenter Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. 2d 705, at 708 (2d 
Cir. 1930), cert. den. 282 U.S. 896 (1931). 
168 STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 13o-133 (zd. ed., 1951). 
160 1£ the Court follows the doctrine of reciprocity under Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 
113 (1895), lack of reciprocity would be difficult to establish before the Community 
Court has had occasion to pass upon the conclusiveness of an American judgment. 
170 STUMBERG, supra note 168, at 118-119, 130. 
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it seeks to contest. 171 Suits for inaction of an institution may be 
brought only after the institution has failed to act during a period 
of two months following a request for action; the suit must be 
brought within two months after the lapse of that period.172 A 
party with residence habituelle outside of Europe is given an ad-
ditional month. Actions in tort must be brought within five years 
from the "occurrence of the circumstance giving rise thereto," 173 
while the limitation on contract claims, where jurisdiction of the 
Court has been stipulated, presumably will be determined by the 
"law applying to the contract." 174 The bar resulting from the lapse 
of the time limitations may be overcome by proof of an "Act of 
God or force majeure." 175 
2. PROCEDURE 
The proceeding before the Court is divided into a written and an 
oral stage.176 Like the French Conseil d'Etat, the Court is grouped 
into chambers to which the President of the Court assigns cases and 
which prepare the cases for public hearing and final disposition. 
This procedure differs from that of the International Court of Jus-
tice where chambers may be utilized with the consent of the parties 
only.177 The Court may appoint a rapporteur from among the judges 
to guide the case through the preliminary investigation ( "instruc-
tion") after the basic documents, such as the complaint, the answer, 
and replies, have been filed. 178 As is true in cases before the French 
Conseil d'Etat, 179 but not in those before the International Court of 
Justice/80 the written proceeding and the preliminary investigation 
171 Art. 173 para. 3· 
172 Art. 175 paras. 2-3. These time limitations are increased by specified periods of 
time to allow for the distance of the parties from the Court. Reglement de procedure 
art. 81 § 2 (hereinafter cited as Rules of Procedure), [1959] Journal Officiel 350, at 
368. (For certain modifications of the texts of the Rules in the four languages see 
[r96o] Journal Officiel 13-16.) A decision of the Court provides for an additional two 
days if the parties reside in Belgium, six days for Germany, Metropolitan France and 
the Netherlands, ten days for Italy, fifteen days for other European countries, and one 
month for all other countries. [1959] Journal Officiel 378. 
173 Protocol on the Statute of the Court art. 43 (hereinafter cited as Protocol). 
17
• Art. 2 r 5· 
175 Protocol art. 42. 
176 Protocol art. 18. 
177 Rules of Procedure arts. 24 and 46; for the French Conseil d'Etat see SCHWARTZ, 
FRENCH ADM!N!STRAT!VE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WoRLD 131-149 ( 1954). Statute 
of the I.C.J. arts. 26(3) and 29. The United States Supreme Court does not utilize 
chambers. 
178 Rules of Procedure arts. 45-54. 
1
7ll ScHWARTZ, op. cit., supra note 177, at qr-r4r. 
180 Statute of the I.C.J. art. 43 ( 5) which shows the large scope of the oral proceding 
before that Court. 
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of the case by the chamber are more important than the oral hearing. 
During this preliminary investigation witnesses are called either by 
the parties, or-in keeping with the inquisitional nature of the 
Court's procedure-by the Court; expert testimony may be taken 
upon a Court order calling for expertise.181 Oral hearings are 
scheduled only after all relevant information has been collected, 
testimony heard, and expert reports received in the preliminary in-
vestigation.182 During the oral hearing the parties have a final chance 
to argue their views and the Court Advocate General presents his 
conclusions and observations to the Court, 183 but evidence may be 
submitted only by order of the Court.184 Both the preliminary in-
vestigation and the oral hearing are public unless otherwise ordered 
by the Court.185 
In all proceedings an enterprise, whether a natural or legal per-
son, must be represented by counsel who is a member of the bar of 
one of the Member States or who is a professor of law whose na-
tional law allows him to practice before national courts.186 There 
is no separate bar of the Community Court.187 Thus, the conditions 
for admission to practice before the Community Court are midway 
between the strict requirements of the United States Supreme Court, 
which has a special bar of its own, and the much looser provisions of 
the International Court of Justice which require that parties be 
represented by "agents" without specifying their qualifications.188 
The legal department of the High Authority has defended the 
Authority before the Court and has acquired an outstanding repu-
tation in presenting the Community view in the face of what at times 
appeared to be cryptic complaints by some plaintiffs. The legal de-
partments of the Authority and of the E.E.C. and Euratom Com-
missions have now been consolidated into a "common service" com-
posed of some forty-nine lawyers. Since so much of the formal power 
181 Rules of Procedure arts. 47 and 49; SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 177, at 127-138, 
explains that in the Conseil d'Etat an "order for expertise" means the calling of expert 
witnesses, by the Court, from a permanently established list of experts in particular 
professional fields. These experts have the power to conduct their own investigation 
and to submit a report on their findings. The latter is also true of the Community Court 
procedure. Rules of Procedure art. 49· 
182 Rules of Procedure arts. 54-55· 
183 Rules of Procedure arts. 56-59. 
104 Rules of Procedure art. 6o. 
180 Rules of Procedure arts. 46 § 2 and 56. 
186 Protocol art. 17 pars. 2 and 5; Rules of Procedure art. 36. 
187 Riese, Die Verfahrensordnung des Gerichtshofes der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft 
fiir Koh/e und Stahl, 6 NEUE }URISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 521 1 at 524 (1953). 
188 Rules 5-6 of the United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. Appendix 1958; Statute 
of the I.C.J. art. 42. 
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of decision has been shifted in the new treaties from the "executive" 
to the Councils of Ministers, some appeals may now have to be 
directed against acts of the Councils. The question will therefore 
arise as to who will conduct the defense of the Councils against such 
appeals: will it be the "common service" which has the legal talent 
with accumulated valuable experience or will the Councils be de-
fended by the small legal section in the Secretariat of the Councils? 
For purposes of service all parties must elect domicile at the seat 
of the Court and specify persons who are authorized to accept serv-
ice of all communications and documents.189 The proceeding is con-
ducted in one of the four official languages of the Community-
Dutch, French, German, Italian. If the defendant is a Member 
State, or a person, natural or legal, of the nationality of a Member 
State, the language of that state will be used; if the defendant is an 
institution of the Community, or a person, natural or legal, of the 
nationality of a third country, the language of the plaintiff will be 
used. In all cases, the Court may, however, make special arrange-
ments.190 
3· THE JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT 
The judgments of the Court are final. They are not subject to 
review except in three specified cases. (I) A judgment may be re-
viewed by the Court upon the application of a third party which is 
affected by the judgment but was not represented in the case.191 
( 2) The Court may be asked by an interested party or institution 
to interpret its judgment if difficulties arise as to its meaning and 
scope.192 Strictly speaking, this is not a case of review of the judg-
ment, since the request for an interpretation may not be used as a 
means for obtaining another determination of the case on the mer-
its.193 ( 3) Finally, a case may be re-opened and judgment reviewed 
in the sense of a proceeding de novo-if, within a ten year period, 
a new fact is discovered which would have "decisive influence," but 
the appeal must be instituted within three months after the appellant 
learned the new fact.194 
189 Rules of Procedure arts. 38 § 2 and 40 § 1 last par. 
100 Rules of Procedure art. 29 § 2. 
'"'Protocol art. 39; Rules of Procedure art. 97· 
102 Protocol art. 40; Rules of Procedure art. 102. 
'""See E.C.S.C. case 5-55, Sammlung, Vol. I, 275, at 292-293. A similar provision is 
included in the Statute of the I.C.J. art. 6o. 
"''Protocol art. 41 ; Rules of Procedure arts. 98-roo. Art. 61 of the Statute of the 
I.C.J. provides for a review in identical terms. Both provisions envision a procedure 
in two stages: (a) a judgment finding the existence of a previously unknown fact, and 
(b) the proceeding reviewing the original judgment. Curiously enough, the Treaty 
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Judgments vary in form. Some follow the syllogistic pattern of 
French courts while others are in the narrative form of German 
(and American) courts as well as of the International Court of 
Justice. 
In striking contrast to the rights of litigants in an American court, 
parties before the Community Court have a right to a decision by 
the Court which takes account of their main lines of argument. If 
a judgment fails to consider one of the party's principal arguments, 
the party concerned may request the Court for a ruling.195 
The Court has the power to render judgments by default. Like 
the International Court of Justice, the Court in such cases is re-
quired to examine not only whether it has jurisdiction but also 
whether the claim "seems to be well founded." 196 As pointed out 
previously, the judgments of the Court are enforceable in Member 
States on the same conditions as administrative acts of the Com-
munity institutions. 
B. THE CouRT's SouRcEs OF LAw 197 
The Treaty contains no general and comprehensive statement of 
the sources of law analogous to Article 3 8 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.198 The Community Court draws 
upon the Treaty and extrinsic aids to its interpretation, upon in-
ternational law, national laws of the Member States, and general 
principles common to these national laws, and upon acts and prac-
tices of the Community institutions. 
I. THE TREATY 
The most important source of Community law is, of course, the 
Treaty, to which several lists, protocols, and supplementary conven-
tions are annexed.199 It is the standard by which all activities of the 
omits the limitation contained in the Statute of the I.C.J. whereby a review is ex-
cluded if the party failed to discover the fact through its own negligence. 
1915 Rules of Procedure art. 67. 
106 Rules of Procedure art. 94 §§ 1-2; Statute of the I.C.J. art. 53· 
107 Steindorff, ARCH!V DES VoLKERRECHTS supra note 67, at 52-55. 
109 Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38: "x. The Court .... shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, . . . ; 
(b) international custom, .•. ; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) ••. , judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified pub-
licists .... " 
199 The Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and 
Euratom lists the relevant texts. See Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community as published by the Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common 
Market and Euratom 365-368 (Publication 1931 bis/s/57/4, Brussels). 
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institutions are tested. Its provisions are to be interpreted in the 
light of the provisions laying down the general principles and ob-
jectives of the Community.200 The practice in the United Nations 
where Charter provisions are consistently interpreted in the light 
of the "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations offers an 
analogy. In the Geitling case, for example, the Court utilized the 
general principles stated in Article 4 of the Coal-Steel Community 
Treaty to interpret the concept of "discrimination" of the anti-car-
tel article. 201 
Some clarification may be also gained by comparing the text of a 
provision in the French, German, Italian, and Dutch versions of 
the Treaty, all of which are equally authentic. The purpose of such 
a comparison {which at times may compound the confusion rather 
than clarify) is not to arrive at a majority vote but to seek clarifi-
cation of the true scope of the provision, to find that version which 
serves the ends of the Treaty best.202 
Of the preparatory materials commonly used as extrinsic aid for 
the interpretation of a treaty relatively few documents are avail-
able reflecting the opinions of the negotiators of the E.E.C. Treaty 
and the positions of the governments during the negotiations. Fore-
most among them is the "Spaak Report." 203 On the other hand, a 
number of reports of Member Governments to their parliaments, 
their statements at the time of the ratification debates, and records 
of these debates are available. They have, however, a limited value 
for purposes of establishing the intent of the Treaty framers, and 
most of these materials are in any case not very enlightening. 
The four volumes of judgments of the Court rendered under the 
Coal-Steel Community Treaty offer an important "extrinsic aid" 
since many of its provisions were included verbatim in the E.E.C. 
Treaty. This use of precedent would be justified on the presumption 
that the continued use of a term indicates the intent to accept its 
established interpretation. Caution is in order, however, when the 
200 E.q., Part One of the Treaty is entitled "Principles." See Lagrange, L'Ordre 
juridique de Ia C.E.C.A. vu a traevrs Ia jurisprudence de sa Cour de Justice, 74 
REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SciENCE POLITIQUE 841, at 844-847 (1958). 
201 Case 2-56, Sammlung, Vol. III, 9· Cf. Bebr, The Development of a Community 
Law by the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN. L. REV. 845 
( 1958}. 
202 Daig, ARCH. D.o. R. supra note 19, at 157. See art. 248. Polach, On the Margin of 
the Rome Treaties, 7 AM. J. CoMP. L. 593 ( 1958). 
2
"
3 Rapport des Chefs de Delegation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres ( Spaak 
Report}, published by the Comite Intergouvernemental cree par Ia Conference de 
Messine (1956); see also the Messina Declaration and other documents collected in X 
CHRONIQUE DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, Nos. 4-6 (Brussels 1957), 
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connotation of an identical term is varied in the new Treaty, how-
ever slight the variation may be. Thus, as shown above, detourne-
ment de pouvoir (misapplication of power) is a ground for appeal 
against administrative acts in both Treaties. To the extent that a 
definition of its meaning is needed under the new Treaty, the Coal-
Steel jurisprudence will serve as a valuable precedent although it 
must be used with circumspection.204 
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
It has been suggested that to the extent that the Court applies 
international law it should look to Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice as the best general statement of 
sources of internationallaw.205 
Several types of international agreements may provide a source 
of Community law: those concluded by the Community as a person 
under international law with third states (for example, trade agree-
ments), those concluded among Member States,206 and finally those 
to which the Treaty makes explicit reference. Such reference is con-
tained, for example, in Article 131, paragraph 3 of the Treaty which 
provides for the association of the overseas territories with the 
Community "in conformity with the principles stated in the Pre-
amble" to the Treaty; the Preamble, in its eighth paragraph, refers 
to the Charter of the United Nations. The result of this reference 
is that the association of the overseas territories under the Treaty 
must not only conform to the particular provisions of the Treaty 
but also take into consideration the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, such as the principle of self-determination,207 however 
limited the legal content of this principle may be at this time. 
The Court will resort to customary rules of international law and 
general principles when interpreting the above international agree-
ments, when defining the relations of the Community with third 
countries (such as the right of active and passive legation), and 
perhaps as a subsidiary source when enunciating a rule applicable to 
= Pinay, La Cour de Justice des Communautes Europeennes, 1959 REVUE nu 
MARCHE CoMMUN 138, at 144 (No. 12). 
200 MATHIJSEN, op. cit. supra note so, at 90 and 157-158. Fitzmaurice, Some Problems 
regarding the Formal Sources of International Law, SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 161-168, 173-
176 ( 1958) includes natural law as one of the sources of international law. 
206 Cf. art. 220. 
207 Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, 2 Wahlperiode, Schriftlicher Bericht des J. 
Sonderausschusses Gemeinsamer Markt/Euratom iiber den Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
zu den Jlertriigen vom 25 Miirz I957 zur Griindung der Europiiischen Wirtschafts-
gemeinschaft ... (1957), Drucksache 366o, at 56.-U.N. Charter art. 73· 
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the relations between Member States in matters not arising directly 
under the Treaty-not unlike the United States Supreme Court 
when it resorts to rules of international law in adjudicating contro-
versies among the States of the Union.208 In one instance, without 
drawing a sharp distinction between sources, the Court applied a 
rule of interpretation which it held was "generally recognized both in 
international law and national law." 209 
3· NATIONAL LAWS OF MEMBER STATES AND GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES COMMON TO THEM 
The Treaty refers explicitly to national law, for instance when it 
provides that forced execution of a pecuniary obligation imposed 
upon an enterprise by an institution shall be governed by the rules of 
civil procedure in force in the Member State where it takes place.210 
The Treaty refers explicitly to the "general principles common 
to the laws of the Member States" as the source of law to govern 
Community tort cases. The Court is required to scrutinize the six 
national legal systems for common principles, a task of some magni-
tude considering the differences among these systems.211 This source 
is reminiscent of the general principles of law of civilized nations 
included in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. 
In cases of contracts to which the Community is a party the Treaty 
requires reference to "the law applying to the contract concerned." 
How will the Community Court determine the choice-of-law rule 
pointing to the applicable law? One possibility would be for the 
Court to refer to the choice-of-law rule of some other forum-as 
American federal courts since Erie v. Tompkins 212 have done in 
diversity-of-citizenship cases, applying the choice-of-law rule of the 
State in which they are sitting. The Community Court could, for 
instance, refer to the choice-of-law rule of the national court which 
would have had jurisdiction if the contract had not stipulated the 
jurisdiction of the Community Court.213 Another possibility would 
008 Cf. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 ( 1893) ; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 
158 (1917); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934). 
"""Case 8-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 297, at 312. 
210 Art. 192. 
211 Art. 215 par. 2. Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 183-184. Braband, Liability 
in Tort of the Government and its Employees: a Comparative Analysis, 33 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 18 (1958). 
212 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 ( 1938) ; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487 ( 1941). 
213 Daig, ARCH. D. 0. R. supra note 19, at 203 j cf. RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 
527 (4th ed. 1955). 
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be for the Court to apply the substantive law of the court of the 
jurisdiction in which, in the absence of the Community Court, the 
plaintiff would presumably have sought relief-an approach fol-
lowed at times by special international tribunals.214 Since courts in 
more than one state may well have jurisdiction with respect to the 
contract case in question, as well as for other reasons, the better rule 
might be for the Community Court to develop its own choice-of-law 
rules from the general principles common to the laws of the six 
Member States.215 Since the jurisdiction of the Community Court 
in contract cases must in any event be stipulated by the parties, the 
contract may stipulate also the law which the parties wish to govern 
the contract. New York law, for example, was stipulated as govern-
ing High Authority obligations issued in the United States.216 The 
Coal-Steel Community Treaty contains no provision concerning the 
applicable law in tort or contract cases involving the Community 
comparable to the provision in the E.E.C. Treaty discussed above. 
Where will the Community Court seek a rule of law in those in-
stances in which the Treaty is silent and contains no specific refer-
ence to national law or to the common general principles? The 
answer to this question will have a profound effect on the growth of 
Community "common law." When the Treaty provides that "any 
... legal person" has the right of appeal to the Community 
Court,217 the Court most likely will look to the national law of the 
appellant to determine whether or not it is a "legal person." In 
most instances, however, the Court may be well advised to look 
to the common general principles rather than to an individual na-
214 NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1943), referring to de-
cisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal instituted by the Treaty of Versailles. WoLFF, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-94 (1945). 
21
" The Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Serbian and Brazilian 
Loan Cases: 
"The Court, which has before it a dispute involving the question as to the law which 
governs the contractual obligations at issue, can determine what this law is only by 
reference to the actual nature of these obligations and to the circumstances attendant 
upon their creation, though it may also take into account the expressed or presumed 
intention of the Parties. Moreover, this would seem to be in accord with the practice 
of municipal courts in the absence of rules of municipal law concerning the settlement 
of conflicts of law." 
Serbian Bonds Issued in France, P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 14 at 41 (1929). 
216 High Authority and Bank for International Settlements, Tenth supplemental In-
denture to the Act of Pledge dated November 28, 1954, s% Secured Bonds (Eleventh 
Series), June 1958, Art. III, sec. 10. However, questions with respect to the interpre-
tation or application of the Act of Pledge are to be determined "in accordance with 
the law which would otherwise be appropriate for such determination." See Salmon, 
note 140 supra, at 278. 
!11
7 Art. 173 para. 2. 
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tionallaw in order to develop Community definitions of such con-
cepts as "worker," "non-wage-earning activities," "current pay-
ments," and the like.218 In one case the Coal-Steel Community Court 
applied a principle common to the laws of the Member States, that 
is that a party is deemed to have notice of a letter when it has come 
in regular course "within the internal sphere of the addressee." 219 
In another case the Court, faced with an administrative law question 
for which it could not find a rule in the Treaty itself felt compelled 
to make the decision "taking into account the rules recognized in 
the legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence of the Member 
States." 220 
Even where the Treaty concept may have been adopted from a 
particular national system, such as the French notion of detourne-
ment de pouvoir} the Coal-Steel Community Court has sought to 
devise a Community definition rather than looking to French law 
only.221 
4· ACTS AND PRACTICES OF THE INSTITUTIONS 
The acts of the Council and the Commission adopted in the exer-
cise of their power are a vital source of Community law. The regu-
lations and other acts of the institutions will eventually have to 
fill important gaps in the Community legal framework. The "law-
making" process is dependent upon more or less specific authoriza-
tion in the Treaty. It may extend somewhat beyond these con-
fines, however, under the "general clause" of Article 235 which 
authorizes the Council to take measures, which while not expressly 
sanctioned in the Treaty, are necessary for the achievement of its 
objectives. The same clause in the Coal-Steel Treaty has already 
been invoked by the High Authority.222 Finally, the practices of the 
institutions may lay a basis for customary rules. 
To what extent does the Court itself "make law" drawing upon 
218 Arts. 48(2), 52 para. 2, 67(2). See Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Econo-
mique Europtfenne, 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 161, at 168 (No. 3). 
219 E.C.S.C. case 8-56, Sammlung, Vol. III, 189, at 200. 
""'Joint E.C.S.C. cases 7-56 and 3-57 to 7-57, id. 83, at 118-119. 
221 Lagrange, supra note zoo, at 857 and n. 14. Perhaps the same approach could 
apply to the Coal-Steel provisions concerning the tort liability of the Community which 
employ the French distinction between faute de service and faute personnel/e. See 
generally, Kautzor-Schroeder, supra note 134, at 201. MucH, op. cit., supra note 134, 
particularly at 3 r, 67-77. 
222 The provision is art. 95 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty. In its decision 27-58, [1958] 
Journal Officiel 486, the High Authority, with the unanimous consent of the Council 
utilized art. 9 5 to institute a subsidy to the coal industry in order to prevent unem-
ployment resulting from the extraordinarily high stock piling of coal. In decision 22-
591 [1959] Journal Officiel 418, art. 95 was used to grant temporary unemployment 
compensation to Belgian coal workers. 
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the sources indicated above? The jurisprudence of the Court itself 
is unquestionably an important source of law particularly where the 
Court interprets incomplete and ambiguous provisions of the 
Treaty. "Wherever there are courts, the law grows in the hands of 
the judges." 223 Some view the Court's power to "make law" with 
misgivings. Since the Court is not subject to any control, these 
critics are not prepared to concede that it can "make law" in the 
sense that the other institutions make law.224 Continental legal 
theory is more strongly opposed to judge-made law 225 than is the 
common law tradition. Yet it seems likely that the Community 
Court, in due course, will play a significant role in the development 
of Community law. The need for the Court to assist in adapting the 
broad Treaty provisions to concrete situations is accentuated by the 
fact that there is no Community legislature endowed with general 
legislative power and that the Treaty may be formally revised only 
through a cumbersome amendment process requiring the ratifica-
tion by all Member States. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Enterprises-whether natural or legal persons, whether nationals 
of a Member State or of a third State such as the United States-
are accorded the right to appeal to the Community Court against 
administrative acts of the Commission and of the Council which 
directly and specifically affect them on the grounds defined in the 
Treaty. Similarly, under specific circumstances enterprises may con-
test the failure of the institutions to issue an administrative act. The 
adequacy of these legal remedies will depend to an important degree 
on the jurisprudence of the Court, whether it will, for instance, con-
tinue the practice of the Coal-Steel Community Court and interpret 
broadly the right of appeal. The Coal-Steel Community Court 
utilized the concept of detournement de pouvoir to give private 
parties standing to contest general decisions. In view of the limiting 
language of the E.E.C. Treaty, the question may arise whether the 
Court will be able or willing to grant appeals under that Treaty in 
all situations where "direct and specific concern" of the enterprise 
affected would warrant it. 
Under an arrangement resembling somewhat a federal system 
228 Mathijsen, op. cit. supra note 50, quoting Schwarzenberger at 105-106; Ophiils, 
Gerichtsbarkeit und Rechtsprechung im Schumanplan, 4 NEUE ]URISTISCHE WocHEN-
SCHRIFT 693-694 (1951). 
224 STEINDORFF, op. cit. supra note 29, at 16-17. 
220 For two classic statements, see LAUN, DAS FRE!E ERMESSEN UNO SEINE GRE!'ZEN 
105 (1910), and HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DE DROIT PUBLIC 33-40 (1916). 
5 I 0 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
national courts of last resort must refer to the Community Court for 
binding determination questions concerning the Treaty or acts of 
the Community institutions which arise in proceedings before these 
courts. Where the right of a party depends on the proper applica-
tion of the Community law, the adequacy of its legal remedy may 
depend on the compliance by the national courts with the Treaty 
mandate. In at least one case a national court gave less than the in-
tended effect to this Treaty mandate and refused to submit certain 
questions to the Community Court. A possible solution would be 
the development by the Community Court of a procedure similar to 
the writ of certiorari in American law whereby the Community 
Court on request of a party could direct the national court of last 
resort to submit to it the record. Such procedure would deepen the 
"breach" in the "integrity of national systems." 
Where the Community becomes liable to an enterprise for dam-
ages on account of an act of a Community employee or of a Com-
munity institution, the enterprise may seek recovery in the Commu-
nity Court only. This Court will decide the case in accordance with 
the general principles common to the laws of the Member States. 
Where, on the other hand, an enterprise has entered into a contract 
with the Community, it may sue on such contract in the competent 
national court only, unless the jurisdiction of the Community Court 
is stipulated in the contract. In case of such stipulation, the Com-
munity Court will decide the question of contractual liability in 
accordance with "the law applying to the contract concerned." 
Thus from the viewpoint of the development of a "quasi-federal 
legal system," the Court has the potential to develop a "Com-
munity law" not only in the sphere of the administrative and con-
stitutional law of the Community, but also in the private law 
sphere by drawing upon general principles common to the laws of 
the Member States. 
The armory of legal remedies will, of course, not depend only on 
the attitude of the Court. The regulations and other administrative 
acts which the institutions are required to issue for the implementa-
tion of the Treaty will have an important impact on the remedies of 
the enterprises in the Community. 
